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ABSTRACT 
  
 The aim of this dissertation is to reflect on technologies of the self, a term 
coined by Michel Foucault to study western practices of self-formation. 
Influenced by his work on subjectivity and by Science and Technology Studies 
(STS), I explore two forms of meditation – Vipassana meditation in the tradition 
of S. N. Goenka and Thich Nhat Hanh’s practices of mindfulness – in order to 
analyze the entanglements between technologies, associations and subjectivity. 
 Two research questions guided this study. First, how do Vipassana and 
Zen assemblages bring forth subjective transformations? Second, what are the 
politics of meditation practice, considering that Vipassana and Zen perform 
particular paradigms of subjectivity and aim at transforming the “social”?  
 In order to address these questions, I relied on qualitative research 
methods, developing a multifaceted methodology that included participant 
observation at four meditation retreats, semi-structured interviews with 
meditators, the analysis of relevant literature and my own personal experiences 
as a beginner. 
 I argue that the mechanisms of subjectification employed by meditation 
rely on two main devices: the transformation of habitual webs of associations, 
including couplings between selves, other humans, nonhumans and spaces and 
the installation of new automatisms. Vipassana and Zen technologies invite 
subjects to become aware of particular automatisms – regular ways of eating, 
sitting, walking and breathing - and to direct their attention towards them in 
novel ways, installing specific ways of managing their selves (stopping and 
breathing whenever they hear the sounds of bells; developing an attitude of 
equanimity when they are looking for sensations in their bodies). 
 Vipassana and Zen are mediators that generate new experiences and 
ways of being informed by meditation, as well as a number of social 
applications that rely on the paradigmatic changes enacted by these practices. 
Informed by the dualism between modern and nonmodern, I argue that Zen and 
Vipassana can be understood as technologies of the nonmodern self (Pickering, 
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2010), suspending the dualism between body and mind, self and others, 
humans and nonhumans, contributing towards the establishment of nondual 
paradigms of selfhood and innovative forms of social organization that include 
new ways of performing human reformation, social action and human-
environment couplings.  
 The theoretical contributions of this dissertation are threefold. First, I 
want to extend current STS scholarly work on the self. Second, I want to 
contribute towards a post-humanist understanding of meditation assemblages. 
Finally, I am informed by Michel Foucault’s insights on technologies of the self 
to study meditation, but instead of focusing on the history or genealogy of the 
western self, I analyze a number of devices of subjectification mobilized to 
operate subjective changes and to transform the social. 
 
Keywords: Technologies of the Self; Meditation; Zen; Vipassana; 
Subjectification 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
“In the beginner’s mind there are many possibilities; in the expert’s mind there 
are few.” (Suzuki, 1970: 21) 
 
“Give me a dozen healthy infants, well-formed, and my own specified world to 
bring them up and I’ll guarantee to take any one at random and train him to 
become any type of specialist I might select.” (Watson, 1930: 82) 
 
I.I FOUCAULT GOES TO JAPAN 
 
 In 1978, while working on the history of Christian discipline, Michel 
Foucault went to the Zen temple of Seinonji at Uenohara, Japan. He discussed 
with the priests and monks the current state of western philosophy and 
practiced meditation. He summarized his experiences in the following way: 
 “If I have been able to feel something through the body’s posture in Zen 
 meditation, namely the correct position of the body, then that something 
 has been new relationships which can exist between the mind and the 
 body and, moreover, new relationships between the body and the 
 external world.” (Foucault, 1999a: 112-3) 
 
 Foucault’s words highlight the importance of relationality, of new 
associations between mind, body and the external world. As in traditional 
Japanese Zen practice, he must have sat in silence, focusing his attention on 
the breath (probably counting it, since he was a “beginner”), with his legs 
crossed and the spine straight. Most likely, an elder monk corrected his posture 
to allow him to have a glimpse of the Zen experience.1 
                                                             
1
 Some years earlier Foucault had tried LSD at Zabriskie Point, so he was not 
necessarily inexperienced in consciousness exploration (Miller, 1993). 
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 Some years after this experience, Foucault dedicated his yearly course 
at the Collège de France (between 1981 and 1982) to the study of the 
hermeneutics of the subject (Foucault, 2006). Drawing upon early Greek and 
Christian philosophy, he analyzed the transformation of discourses and 
practices of the self, illustrating the interconnection between exercises (spiritual 
exercises, as put by Hadot, 1995) and different understandings of subjectivity. 
In the fall of 1982, he went to the University of Vermont and gave a highly 
popular seminar on “Technologies of the Self” (Foucault, 1988), presenting his 
research on practices of self-formation in ancient culture. 
 Foucault had acquired notoriety by unveiling the logics of power 
permeating a variety of mechanisms, including prisons, schools, medical and 
psychiatric institutions. His “micro-physics of power” (Foucault, 1987) had the 
merit of revealing how power, as a strategy, is enacted in micro, molecular 
spheres, apparently contrasting with macro apparatuses such as the State. 
Could we interpret this new interest in technologies of the self as an attempt to 
illustrate how practices of self-formation were, once again, forms of 
power/knowledge (Foucault, 1980)? 
 Although these practices also illustrate the relational and strategic 
dimension of power (Foucault, 1987b), they clarify the practical nature of 
ancient philosophy as a mode of being (Foucault, 1987b) or way of life (Hadot, 
1995). Philosophy was a practice of freedom, a form of spirituality - a term that, 
according to Foucault, “refers to a subject acceding to a certain mode of being 
and to the transformations to which the subject must make of himself in order to 
accede to this mode of being.” (Foucault, 1987b:125). 
 Following Foucault’s insights, this dissertation explores two modes of 
being (Vipassana and Zen) supported by a practice called meditation. 
Meditation is a difficult concept to define (Naranjo and Ornstein, 1971), but it 
can be understood as referring to “a family of techniques which have in 
common a conscious attempt to focus attention in a nonanalytical way and an 
attempt not to dwell on discursive, ruminating thought” (Shapiro, 1984:6). 
 There are forms of meditation in practically all spiritual traditions, 
including Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Judaism and Buddhism (Goleman, 
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1996). What is common to all these practices is the attempt to transform one’s 
habitual reactions and to radically alter the sense of selfhood and the 
experience of the world; therefore, meditation is “a persistent effort to detect 
and become free from all conditioning, compulsive functioning of mind and 
body, habitual emotional responses that may contaminate the utterly simple 
situation required by the participant” (Naranjo and Ornstein, 1971: 9). 
 Meditation, as a mode of being, requires subjects to engage in a variety 
of activities to change themselves, transforming their habitual automatisms2 and 
allowing the emergence of new ways of being, reminding us of Foucault’s trip to 
the Zen monastery: one has to go to a particular place, turning the attention to 
the breath (or to particular parts of the body), maintaining silence, keeping a 
particular body posture and following a set of rules – hopefully, these alterations 
unveil new realms of experience and of being in everyday life. 
 
I.II MEDITATION AND THE SELF 
  
 Meditation, as a form of self-shaping, allows us to engage in a discussion 
on the self. The self, and its relation to social worlds, is a long standing topic of 
sociological discussion (see Callero, 2003; Stets and Burke, 2003; Burkitt, 
2008), including the entanglements between mind, self and society (Mead, 
1934), the role of the self in repeating and maintaining certain dispositions in 
everyday life (Bourdieu, 1977) or in performing social roles (Goffman, 1969). 
Meditation, according to Foucault, is a technology of the self (Foucault, 1988). 
This “technological understanding” allows me to tackle meditation as a form of 
self-shaping that requires particular body postures, gazes, modes of awareness 
and particular associations with materials and spaces to perform subjectivities. 
Instead of framing meditation within the so-called New Religious Movements 
(Dawson, 2003) or New Age (Heelas, 1996) practices, linked to particular 
historical processes, I am interested in understanding how bodies and minds 
are transformed to mobilize new forms of experiencing the self and the world 
                                                             
2
 See chapter II for a comprehensive exploration of this concept. 
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and how these new configurations unveil a variety of new possibilities 
understood as emergent phenomena (Pickering, 1993), linked to technologies 
of meditation. 
 This focus on technology, inspired by authors such as Foucault and 
Sloterdijk (2013)3, is strengthened by scholarly work in Science and Technology 
Studies (STS). STS have focused on the role played by nonhumans, 
performances and associations concerning scientific practice (Latour and 
Woolgar, 1979; Callon, 1986; Pickering, 1995; Verbeek, 2005). Regarding 
subjectivity, STS has also highlighted how new devices, substances and spaces 
contribute to the formation of new kinds of selves (Haraway, 1991; Schull, 2005; 
Hennion and Goumart, 1999; Rose, 1998; Suchman, 2007; Brenninkmeijer, 
2010; Verbeek, 2011). Humans, therefore, become entangled with materials 
and new associations, and Haraway’s Cyborg (Haraway, 1991) illustrates 
contemporary couplings between humans and nonhumans, nature and culture. 
 Foucault’s work on the self included the genealogy of forms of western 
subjectivity (although his Zen-becoming suggests that he could turn his 
attention to other practices if he hadn’t died at such a young age); the 
previously mentioned sociological reflections on the self mostly focus on how 
“societies” shape humans and how these perpetuate themselves through 
performances and habits, while STS remarks on the self deal mostly with 
associations between humans and “western” technologies, including 
neurofeedback devices (Brenninkmeijer, 2010), pharmaceutical drugs (Rose, 
2007) or gambling machines (Schull, 2005). An exception is Gomart and 
Hennion’s article (1999) on devices of attachment that brilliantly expands STS 
reflections to the study of the self in relation to drug use and music4. 
 Although STS is mostly concerned with contemporary applications of 
technoscience, it provides a strong alternative to humanist approaches towards 
practice and technology by focusing on the role played by materials, spaces, 
performances and associations. According to Pickering, the humanist 
understanding of reality, including traditional sociology (such as sociology of 
                                                             
3
 See chapter II. 
4
 The insights of Gomart and Henion are highly relevant to my research and will 
be explored in detail in chapter II. 
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science) “identifies human scientists as the central seat of agency” (Pickering, 
1993: 562). A post-humanist understanding of (scientific) practice, as in Actor 
Network Theory (ANT), (Latour, 2005) or the Mangle of Practice (Pickering, 
1995), acknowledges the “role for nonhuman- or material, as I will say- agency 
in science. Science and technology are contexts in which human agents 
conspicuously do not call all the shots” (Pickering, 1993: 562). 
 As stated by Pickering, “we need a posthumanist social theory, one that 
recognizes from the start that the contours of material and human agency 
reciprocally constitute one another” (Pickering, 2001: 173). Pickering’s insight is 
linked to new, post-humanist ways of conceiving the “social” that should take 
into account the role of materiality and nonhumans (Latour, 2005). These 
insights, emerging from STS, allow me to understand technologies of the self 
such as meditation not only as performances that alter subjects and their 
connections to the world but also as assemblages5 requiring new associations 
with nonhuman agents. This includes different settings, techniques, materials 
and the transformation of human automatisms, habitual workings of the human 
body/mind (not linearly “controlled” by human practitioners). 
 This means that, instead of framing practices of meditation within broader 
historical or sociological aspects, such as forms of detraditonalization (Heelas, 
1996b) (including the previously mentioned “new age” or “new religious 
movements”), I am particularly interested in the material, performative, spatial 
and regulatory aspects of technologies of the self. Humanist approaches to 
meditation turn it into a mere reflection of contemporary expressivism, 
authenticity, neo-romanticism or New Age (York, 1995; Heelas, 1996;  
Hanegraaf, 1996) – these reduce meditation to a mere consequence of 
                                                             
5
 The notion of assemblage will be widely used in this dissertation. In order to 
explain it, Deleuze and Guattari use the example of books: “A book has neither 
object nor subject; it is made of variously formed matters, and very different 
dates and speeds. To attribute the book to a subject is to overlook this working 
of matters, and the exteriority of their relations. In a book, as in all things, there 
are lines of articulation or segmentarity, strata and territories; but also lines of 
flight, movements of deterritorialization and destratification. Comparative rates 
of flow on these lines produce phenomena of relative slowness and viscosity, 
or, on the contrary, of acceleration and rupture. All this, lines and measurable 
speeds, constitutes an assemblage.” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 3-4) 
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historical and sociological trends that in turn “change” human identity as well as 
the social meaning of meditation. A paradigmatic example is McMahan’s book 
“The Making of Modern Buddhism”. He argues that modern forms of meditation 
have lost their traditional meaning and have been appropriated by 
contemporary regimes of subjectivity: 
  “Rather than exclusively a means of achieving awakening in a traditional 
 sense, it [meditation] has in some cases been reconfigured as a 
 technique for self-discovery, self-discipline, self-transformation, and 
 physical and mental health outside of doctrinal and sectarian 
 formulations.” (McMahan, 2008: 184) 
 
 According to McMahan, this modern appropriation of meditation is linked 
to the “Subjective Turn”, beginning in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
creating a new type of selfhood linked to increased self-reflexivity, “making 
one’s experience an explicit object of reflection and becoming aware of self-
awareness itself” (McMahan, 2008: 188). Instead of analyzing what happens 
when meditation is performed, these studies frame this technology of the self 
within broader social and historical structures, usually ignoring new 
associations, performances, experiences, and innovative social applications. 
  Following Latour, one could argue that these approaches reflect 
traditional modes of reasoning of social scientists, displaying a tendency to 
translate empirical material into broader, general frameworks reflecting 
particular historical forces/structures that participants (interviewees, informants, 
etc.) are usually unaware of: 
 “Too often, social scientists – and especially critical sociologists – behave 
 as if they were ‘critical’, ‘reflexive’, and ‘distanced’ enquirers meeting a 
 ‘naive’, ‘uncritical’, and ‘un-reflexive’ actor. But what they too often mean 
 is that they translate the many expressions of their informants into their 
 own vocabulary of social forces. The analyst simply repeats what the 
 social world is already made of.” (Latour, 2005: 57) 
 
  Instead of analyzing meditation from the point of view of broader 
historical or social forces, reducing it to an expression of some general trend or 
idea – such as romanticism or reflexivity - , I will develop a post-humanist 
analysis of Vipassana and Zen practices, understood as technologies that 
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require new associations between humans, nonhumans, environments and 
performances, allowing different forms of experiencing and of being in the world 
to emerge. This means that, instead of framing meditation within the broad 
category of “religion” (including contemporary variants of Buddhism), this 
dissertation will explore transformations of selfhood linked to new associations 
that transform realms such as human experience, everyday life or the 
management of social “issues”, analyzing the multiple enactments of 
meditation. 
 Technologies and aspects of morality, ethics, risks and politics are 
closely connected (see, for instance, Beck, 1992: Feenberg and Hannay, 1995; 
Callon et al., 2001; Verbeek, 2011). Regarding technologies of subjectivity, 
these assume many forms - education, media, the configuration of the 
workplace or of the domestic space, the design of cities and medicine. 
Technologies are everywhere, which means that, following a post-humanist 
understanding of the social, we are constantly being “fabricated” and performed 
through associations with materials, performances and spaces. Our “modes of 
being”, as put by Foucault, are entangled with these heterogeneous formations. 
 Much has been written on “modern selves” from anthropological, 
historical, philosophical, and sociological perspectives. Notions such as 
discipline (Foucault, 1995), narcissism (Lasch, 1979), liquidity (Bauman, 2000), 
entrepreneurialism (Foucault, 1991; Burchell, 1996); individualism (Dumont, 
1986); reflexivity (Beck, Giddens and Lash, 1994) and dualism (Pickering, 2010) 
are salient 6 . Technologies of the self such as meditation have political 
consequences, enacting particular paradigms of subjectivity, modes of being in 
the world.  As Kuhn wrote: 
 “The term “paradigm” is used in two different senses. On the one hand, it 
 stands for the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so  
 on shared by the members of a given community. On the other, it 
 denotes one sort of element in that constellation, the concrete puzzle-
 solutions which, employed as models or examples, can replace explicit 
 rules as a basis for the solution of the remaining puzzles of normal 
 science.” (Kuhn, 1962: 175) 
 
 
                                                             
6
 A more comprehensive discussion will be provided in chapter II. 
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 Initially, one could interpret Kuhn’s words as humanist, the paradigm as a 
set of beliefs shared by a “community”, with the second formulation of the word 
referring to a shared mode of scientific practice. However, Kuhn’s notion of 
paradigm suggests that practices and forms of reasoning are interwoven, and 
that ultimately the set of performances deployed by scientists (but also by “lay 
people” in general) produce certain versions of the world. 
 STS have provided a number of interesting notions that condense the 
interplay between practices and the enactment of versions of the world, 
including ontological politics (Mol, 1999; Law, 2004), politics of ontology 
(Pickering, 2010), performativity (Callon, 2006), ecology of practices (Stengers, 
2005) and cosmopolitics (Stengers, 2010). Consequently, when we are writing 
about practices of self-formation, we are exploring forms of enacting particular 
versions of subjectivity and of the world, raising the issue of politics – if 
technologies enact versions of worlds and selves, which versions are being 
performed through these practices?   
 Following Foucauldian analyses of the self and STS concerns with 
ontology and practice, this dissertation explores Vipassana and Zen 
technologies, analysing how paradigm shifts in subjectivity are enacted, 
reflecting on the politics of these technologies and expanding STS scholarly 
work on the self.  
 
I.III THE CASE STUDIES 
 
 Although I previously stated I wanted to demarcate myself from those 
approaches that seem to focus on generalizations to study technologies of the 
self such as meditation, these practices have histories and contexts, and they 
do not emerge out of nowhere. The practices studied by Foucault (2006) were 
linked to a variety of different philosophical schools in the West, such as 
Stoicism, Epicureanism or Platonism.  
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  While there are some interesting attempts to readapt these practices to 
contemporary times7, the practices of meditation I will analyze are linked to 
what is commonly called “Buddhism”, dealing with the teachings of Siddhartha 
Gautama, who lived in North India in the 6th Century BC. In a nutshell, the 
practices of meditation developed by Siddhartha aimed at the cessation of 
human suffering. There are four noble truths or principles that are usually 
elicited to summarize Buddhism. The First Noble Truth deals with suffering 
(dukkha) – life is suffering and pain. The second noble truth states that dukkha 
arises due to craving and desire (tanha). The third noble truth affirms that it is 
possible to overcome suffering through the extinction of craving. The fourth 
noble truth consists of the path leading to the cessation of suffering, the Noble 
Eightfold Path – Right Understanding; Right Thought; Right Speech; Right 
Action; Right Livelihood; Right Effort; Right Mindfulness; Right Concentration 
(Rahula, 1959: 16-45). 
 Another important issue concerning the teachings of Siddhartha 
Gautama is the fact that he suggested that there is no such thing as an 
independent self, no “permanent, everlasting and absolute entity, which is the 
unchanging substance behind the changing phenomenal world” (Rahula, 1959: 
51). This obviously raises some concerns – how can we understand forms of 
meditations as “technologies of the self” if there is no such thing as the self8? 
The insight of no-self (anatta) is not given a priori, rather depends on the 
development and continuation of these practices that eventually suspend 
habitual ways of experiencing the self – as suggested in chapter VI, these 
realizations should be understood as performative.  
 A fundamental tenet of Buddhism is Nirvana, the ultimate truth, bringing 
forth a radically new version of reality; it is “the realization that the substratum of 
existence is a Voidness out of which all things ceaselessly arise and into which 
they endlessly return, that this Emptiness is positive and alive and in fact not 
                                                             
7
 There was an interesting initiative that took place at the University of Exeter 
called “Be stoic for a week”, co-organized by Patrick Ussher, a PhD student in 
Classics http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/nov/28/stoic-week-stiff-
upper-lip (Retrieved: 12/04/2013) 
8
 Interestingly, when I was explaining my work to a Buddhist monk, he 
immediately told me – “But there is no self!” We both laughed afterwards. 
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other than the vividness of a sunset or the harmonies of a great symphony.” 
(Kapleau, 1989: 16) 
 In order to study meditation as a technology of the self, I identified two 
case studies, two “schools” of meditation that are widely disseminated in the 
West. These schools promote the practice of meditation (in both cases, linked 
to what is usually called “Buddhism”, although regarding one of the case studies 
– Vipassana -  these links are questioned9), offering to those who attend their 
retreats or practice centres the possibility of attaining different modes of being 
and of experiencing themselves. These new modes of being are attained 
through the transformation of habitual associations with spaces, materials, 
performances and regulations. 
 The first case study is Vipassana, a form of Insight meditation, taught by 
S. N. Goenka. This tradition is linked to Theravada Buddhism 10  (the only 
surviving school of a group of schools which was called Hinayana), belonging to 
the orthodox forms of Buddhism followed in Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia 
or East Pakistan (Rahula, 1959: viii). 
 Vipassana is characterized as a “practical way to examine the reality of 
one’s own body and mind, to uncover and solve whatever problems lie hidden 
there, to develop unused potential, and to channel it for one’s own good and the 
good of others” (Hart, 1987: 6). Vipassana is a term that is usually used to 
classify the set of practices of meditation that do not only focus exclusively on 
mental concentration (samatha), but actually generate “Insight into the nature of 
things, leading to the complete liberation of mind, to the realization of the 
Ultimate Truth, Nirvana.” (Rahula, 1959: 68) 
 The type of Vipassana prescribed by Goenka aims to transform selves 
through the observation of sensations. Goenka started practicing Vipassana 
during the 1950’s with U Ba Khin of Burma and in 1969 he led his first 10-day 
course in India. Afterwards, many people became interested in Vipassana, and 
in 1979 Goenka started teaching in different locations around the globe 
                                                             
9
 The Vipassana organization doesn’t assume itself as “Buddhist”, since 
Vipassana is not considered a religion but a technique – see chapter V. 
10
 Theravada can be translated as “Path of the Elders” (Ellwood and McGraw, 
1999: 135). 
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(Goenka, 1998: vii-viii). Nowadays, there are approximately 120 Vipassana 
centres worldwide and it is estimated that more than 100,000 people attend 
these courses every year. 
 Vipassana is taught in a controlled setting, the meditation retreat, 
requiring subjects to abandon their habitual associations, submitting themselves 
to new spatial, performative and material configurations. The homogeneity of 
these retreats, ideally enacted in the same way all over the world, will allow me 
to look at the 10-day courses as mechanisms deployed to create new 
paradigms of selves. These mechanisms also have social/political ramifications, 
being mobilized to “reform” prisoners across the world (see chapter VIII). 
 The second case study comprises the set of practices promoted by the 
Order of Interbeing11, formed in Vietnam in 1960 by the Zen Master Thich Nhat 
Hanh. Born in central Vietnam in 1926, he was ordained as a Buddhist monk at 
the age of sixteen. His teacher was the Zen master Thich Chan That, belonging 
to the Lam Te Zen school, including both Theravada and Mahayana traditions12 
(Chapman, 2007: 299). In 1961, he went to the United States to study and 
teach comparative religion at Columbia and Princeton. In 1963, he returned to 
Vietnam to help his monk-colleagues in stopping the civil war after the fall of the 
Diem regime by applying principles of nonviolence (Hanh, 1995: X). Due to his 
political involvement, he was later refused permission to return to Vietnam 
(Hanh, 1995: xii). His current residence, the Plum Village Monastery, is located 
near Bordeaux, France and was founded in 1982. For the past 30 years it has 
attracted thousands of visitors.13 
                                                             
11
 See chapter V for a comprehensive explanation of what Interbeing means. 
12
 According to Rahula, Mahayana is a later development of Buddhism, and it is 
followed in countries such as China, Japan, Tibet and Mongolia (Rahula, 1959: 
viii). It contrasts with Theravada in the sense that is postulates that 
“enlightenment is na achievable goal for all humans, in this lifetime, here and 
now” (Gregory and Sabra, 2008).  Zen is a form of Mahayana Buddhism, and its 
origins go back to the first patriarch, Bodhidharma, a 6th century Indian. (Reps, 
2000: 15). The first Vietnamese school of Zen was founded by Vinitaruci in 580 
CE (Kit, 2002: 148). 
13
 Plum Village is comprised of four main Hamlets: Upper Hamlet (for male 
monastics, male visitors and couples), Lower and New Hamlet (for female 
visitors and monastics) and Son Ha (for male monks and visitors). 
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 Thich Nhat Hanh is widely known for promoting “engaged Buddhism”, 
defined by King as “a contemporary form of Buddhism that engages actively yet 
nonviolently with the social, economic, political, social and ecological problems 
of society” (King,  2009: 1). Thich Nhat Hanh’s proposal is not only engaged 
because he was particularly active and influential during the Vietnam War (see 
chapter VIII) but also because his approach to Buddhist practice advocates the 
application of mindfulness – moment to moment awareness - to everyday life 
activities. In 1954, Thich Nhat Hanh wrote a series of articles called “A Fresh 
Look at Buddhism”, where he developed the idea of engaged Buddhism (Hanh, 
2008d: 30), “Buddhism that is present in every moment of our daily life (Hanh, 
2008d:31) and “that responds to anything that happens in the here and the now” 
(Hanh, 2008d: 31), including social, political, psychological and environmental 
issues causing suffering to humans and nonhumans. 
 This case study will be particularly useful to understand how everyday life 
activities are transformed in order to support a mode of being (mindfulness) and 
how technologies of meditation are mobilized to achieve particular social 
outcomes, including “peace” and supposedly less destructive and hegemonic 
relationships between humans and the environment. 
 These two case studies are relatively popular and well known forms of 
meditation in the West. If you live in Europe, the US, Canada, Australia or New 
Zealand, there is probably a Vipassana practice centre relatively close to you, 
as well as a sangha – a community – of those practicing meditation according to 
the instructions of Thich Nhat Hanh. My fieldwork was, therefore, conducted in 
Europe – England, France and Portugal – and the vast majority of participants 
(those I interviewed) were westerners – Portuguese, American, Irish, Dutch and 
British - and lay “followers”, not monks or nuns. In some cases, these 
participants were even beginners. 
 The inclusion of westerners and beginners in this study supports my 
general concern with modes of being, allowing me to reflect on how 
subjectivities are transformed along with new practices, spaces and material 
associations. The struggles of some of these participants with the practice can, 
following Kuhn, be understood as illustrations of a “paradigm shift” (Kuhn, 1962) 
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or struggles of agency between two modes of existence, the nonmeditative one 
and the “cultivated”, meditative mode of being, whether it’s Thich Nhat Hanh’s 
Zen or Goenka’s Vipassana.  
 The differences between meditative and nonmeditative modes of being 
allow me to contrast the ontological politics of Zen and Vipassana with the 
regular, nonmeditative world. This process of “triangulation” can, obviously, fail 
for being too abstract or generic; however, it will serve to illustrate how these 
practices contrast between themselves and conventional forms of performing 
the self, with ramifications on experience, everyday life and social phenomena. 
 
I.IV RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES  
  
 There are two questions guiding my research. First, how do these 
traditions (Vipassana and Zen) bring forth new paradigms of selfhood? Second, 
what are the ontological politics (Mol, 1999) of these new versions of selves? 
Following post-humanist STS, I suggest that these practices of meditation rely 
on a variety of heterogeneous devices to reconfigure subjectivities, involving 
new webs of associations and performances. These new associations are met 
with various resistances, obliging practitioners to struggle with their habitual 
automatisms to train themselves in meditation. If these struggles are dealt with 
(including pain, boredom, sleepiness or restlessness), new realms of human 
experience can be unveiled, transforming everyday life conduct, expanding the 
human potential and inspiring alternative ways of dealing with issues such as 
human reformation, the ecological crisis or social activism. 
 This means two things. Firstly, these practices have to be studied from a 
post-humanist perspective – it is not enough to look at human motives 
(including the reasons leading people to meditate), interactions (between 
practitioners or between students and teachers) or broader historical/social 
trends to understand meditation. In order to study these practices we have to 
analyze how spaces are reconfigured, objects are used, performances are 
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altered and struggles take place – in sum, how new connections between 
humans, nonhumans, spaces, regulations and practices are enacted, replacing 
former couplings. Secondly, I suggest these practices of Zen and Vipassana are 
alternatives to dominant, dualist ways of conceiving associations between body 
and mind or self and environment, and through these performances new realms 
of reality can be unveiled, perhaps offering us more imaginative and enriching 
ways of being in the world. If, according to Pickering, the ontology of 
cybernetics is nonmodern, since it “goes with a performative understanding of 
the brain, mind and self... which undoes the familiar Western dualism of mind 
and matter” (Pickering, 2010: 13), meditation can be understood as a 
technology of the nonmodern self (Pickering, 2010), reinventing what people 
can experience and re-imagining forms of intervention in the world, constituting 
an alternative to modern and dualist forms of selfhood. Human modes of being 
are transformed by meditation, allowing the emergence of nonmodern 
archipelagos, with ramifications on experience, everyday life and social action. 
These ontologies will be contrasted with modern ways of being in the world, that 
in STS are usually considered dualist and dichotomous (Latour, 1991a; 
Haraway, 1991; Stengers, 2008; Pickering, 2010), reinforcing the divide 
between body and mind, self and others, nature and culture, people and things. 
Following this dualist ontology, influenced by Cartesian dualism, modern 
subjectivity corresponds to the “self-contained individual, dualistically opposed 
to other selves and the material world, a center of reason, calculation, planning, 
and agency; and measured against such a yardstick dreamers and madmen are 
defective selves” (Pickering, 2010: 74). 
 I argue that the practices of Zen and Vipassana meditation, through the 
establishment of new sets of associations and performances, suspend this 
dualist paradigm of the self, belonging to the set of “techniques that do enable 
us to make the Jamesian jump towards forces we were separated from” 
(Stengers, 2008: 58). Meditation will, therefore, be understood as an alternative 
to modern ways of being in the world, and I argue, following post-humanist STS, 
that it is through new webs of associations (with materials, techniques, spaces 
and regulations) that these new modes of being are performed. 
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I.V WHY MEDITATION? 
 Finally, and as it will become clear in chapter III, my interest in meditation 
is not merely academic. Although Foucault’s work on technologies of the self 
and STS literature on ontology and performativity made me realize it would be 
interesting to study transformative technologies, coupling personal and social 
transformation with new practices and performances, I was also curious about 
new ways of experiencing my “own” subjectivity. My existential curiosity as a 
teenager led me to enrol in Philosophy at the University of Coimbra, Portugal, 
abandoning my initial plans to study Economics. After years of studying the 
history of western philosophy, I became progressively frustrated with the 
abstract nature of the discipline, and realized that in order to “change myself” I 
would have to turn my attention to other practices that go beyond the discursive 
realm. After I started practicing Yoga to deal with back pain, aggravated by the 
perils of sedentary life, I discovered how the breath, attention and particular 
postures can unveil new experiences and realities. As I was researching the 
public perception of nanotechnologies for my MA, I realized that perhaps a PhD 
dissertation on meditation would allow me to, at least, become acquainted with 
new practices of the self. This dissertation emerges as the result of that 
innocent decision. 
 
I.VI DISSERTATION OUTLINE 
  
 This dissertation is organized in the following fashion: 
 Chapter II (Meditation, Technologies of the Self and STS) is the literature 
review. It elaborates on three different branches of scholarly work directly 
relevant to this dissertation: meditation research; Foucauldian reflections on the 
self and STS literature on relationality, performativity and ontological politics. 
Concerning meditation research, I provide a historical background of some of 
the most relevant topics that arose during the last 40 years and I focus on 
sociological and anthropological analyses of meditation. Regarding the section 
on Foucault and the self, I initially explore his notion of “technologies of the self” 
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and its ramifications on forms of “creating” versions of people, such as 
performances, materials, spaces and power. Finally, the section on STS 
explores the entanglements between practices and ontology, highlighting the 
importance of relationality, with relevant consequences on how the self is 
understood. The section called “Interpretation” clarifies how these three 
branches of scholarly work are articulated to support my argumentative thread. 
 Chapter III (Methodology) explores the various methods I mobilized to 
address the aforementioned research questions. I explain how I used semi-
structured interviews, participant observation at retreats, autoethnography, the 
analysis of relevant literature and other sources. I reflect on the importance of 
having first-hand experience with meditation and elicit the difficulties I 
encountered, namely with finding interviewees that practice Vipassana 
meditation and having access to that organization. 
 Chapter IV (Setting) analyzes meditation retreats as devices for the 
fabrication of subjectivities, drawing upon new material, legislative and spatial 
devices. Following my observations at Vipassana and Zen retreats, and 
influenced by Foucauldian and STS literature, I elaborate on the role of a variety 
of devices to bring forth new modes of being. These include rules, inscriptions, 
nonhumans and forms of spatial partitioning. Supported by the situationist 
notion of psychogeography, I argue that Zen and Vipassana assemblages 
reconfigure space to perform meditative kinds of people, contrasting meditation 
retreats with the outside world. 
 Chapter V (Performances) elaborates on Zen and Vipassana techniques 
of meditation. Supported by notions such as habits and automatisms (that will 
be explored in detail in chapter II), I suggest that the mobilization of these 
technologies of the self aims at breaking usual workings of the mind and body. 
This justifies the importance of sitting in certain ways and following particular 
programs that alter one’s awareness towards body parts, automatic workings 
(such as the breath), movements or nonhumans. In this chapter, the contrasts 
between Goenka’s Vipassana and Thich Nhat Hanh’s Zen will be clear – 
Vipassana’s mode of being is supported by three technologies of the self, and 
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one should be sitting while practicing them, while Thich Nhat Hanh’s version of 
engaged Buddhism applies meditation to a variety of everyday life activities. 
 Chapter VI (Experiences) draws upon the wide range of experiences 
linked to Zen and Vipassana practice, following semi-structured interviews with 
participants, my own experiences and relevant literature on the topic. This 
chapter is organized according to three major sections. The first section deals 
with what I call struggles of agency (inspired by Pickering’s dances of agency 
and the dialectic of resistance and accommodation, see Pickering, 1995), and 
explores the difficulties faced by meditators in adapting to new paradigms of 
selfhood. The second section elaborates on the feeling of meditation – what 
happens when one supposedly overcomes the initial struggles and is able to 
practice mindfulness and Vipassana? Finally, the section on “mystical 
experiences” reflects on some transformative episodes shared by interviewees 
and advanced practitioners, exploring their politics and contrasting them with 
modern, dualist ways of being in the world. 
 Chapter VII (Meditation in everyday life) has two major sections. In the 
first section, I analyze how practitioners, after retreats are over, apply 
meditation in order to deal with a variety of situations, turning meditation into an 
equipment 14  for everyday life. The second section explores some relevant 
transformations operated by meditation, contrasted with modern ways of being 
in the world. In order to support the hypothesis that meditation leads to a 
nonmodern version of selfhood, I explore three important aspects: the 
development of new forms of awareness; the enactment of an extended version 
of selfhood and the experience of nonstandard phenomena. 
 Finally, chapter VIII (Meditation and social change) explores social 
aspects of meditation. I focus on three examples that illustrate how meditation, 
as a technology of the self, is used to tackle “social issues” - the introduction of 
Vipassana courses in prisons; the role of technologies of mindfulness during 
Thich Nhat Hanh’s lifetime struggle for peace; the links between meditation and 
ecology, including a reflection on Zen practices as forms of “mental ecology” 
                                                             
14
 My understanding of equipment is influenced by Foucault’s remarks on 
paraskeue (Foucault, 2006), see chapters II and VII. 
27 
 
(Guattari, 2000). This will be followed by the analysis of a procedure supported 
by meditation, called The Council of all Beings, that aims at overcoming 
anthropocentric and dualist modes of being; afterwards, I will explore the 
creation of an environmentalist political party in Portugal, partly influenced by 
the meditative insights of its leader. 
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II. MEDITATION, TECHNOLOGIES OF THE SELF AND 
STS  
 
II.I INTRODUCTION 
  
 Meditation has already permeated mainstream popular culture. 
Meditation books can be easily found on the bookshelves of western libraries, 
usually in the spirituality, esotericism, Buddhism or Hinduism sections. Authors 
such as Alan Watts, D. T. Suzuki or Philip Kapleau popularized this practice, 
and Thich Nhat Hanh’s or the Dalai Lama’s latest books are easily found in an 
airport bookstore. 
 Similarly, meditation research is a growing academic field. We have all 
heard of Mattieu Riccard, the happiest person on the planet, a monk whose 
brain and mood was studied and validated through technological devices (Lutz 
et al., 2004). This contrasts with early literature on the subject, which compared 
experiences with meditation to neurological pathologies such as catatonia 
(Alexander, 1931). Nowadays, meditation is not only studied by neuroscientists, 
neurophenomenologists, psychologists and contemplatives in general – it is 
even promoted and widely used by National Health Systems in the Western 
world, including Britain, following a secular adaptation of the practice called 
mindfulness. 
 Meditation is no longer a strange, off-the-wall technique that can only be 
explored by going to the Himalayas, India or Southeast Asia. It is already here, 
it has penetrated our universities, it allows family members to leave their homes 
and to attend retreats once or twice a year, it sparks in children’s minds a 
natural curiosity to learn about themselves, it invites us to write about it.  
 The apparent popularity of meditation does not mean that it is 
“normalized”. Joining a retreat implies a radical transformation of one’s workings 
and habit patterns, clashing with regular, outside world devices to maintain and 
make up selves. Meditation, through the lenses of a sociological enquiry, helps 
us reflect on two relevant issues: firstly, the set of mechanisms that are 
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deployed to operate individual transformations – different spatial, material and 
performative arrangements are entangled to bring forth new ways of 
experiencing the self and the world; secondly, these forms of fabricating new 
versions of people are political – not only do they clash with dominant versions 
of subjectivity but they also sustain new ways of being in the world, including 
the transformation of interpersonal relationships, human/nonhuman couplings 
and supporting particular social/political projects. 
 My take on meditation is influenced by three different branches of 
scholarly work: firstly, meditation research – psychological research has 
focused on the phenomenological and emotional effects of meditation, revealing 
the wide range of states of consciousness that meditators go through, unveiling 
experiences and realities that seem awkward to the untrained, nonmeditative 
mind; sociological and anthropological approaches to meditation have focused 
on a variety of issues such as the role of training or real-world and political 
dimensions of meditation. 
 Secondly, my approach is highly influenced by Foucauldian reflections on 
selfhood. The notion of technologies of the self, his remarks on discipline and 
the fabrication of subjects allowed me to reflect on the highly productive nature 
of meditative practices, how spatial, material and performative arrangements 
enact particular versions of people. Meditation can only exist as an organized 
practice and way of life if it is supported by these networks – spaces carefully 
arranged, ways of managing the body and the mind, forms of actualizing 
meditation in daily life, etc.  Foucault’s remarks support the assumption that the 
creation of selfhood is eminently technological – practices of discipline and of 
self-care enact different types of people, meaning that subjectivity, 
environments, performances and knowledge (such as the disciplinary branch 
nowadays called the “human sciences”) are entangled to enact particular 
versions of selfhood. 
 This leads us to the third branch of scholarly work, STS, in particular 
literature dealing with relationality, performativity and ontological politics. I 
suggest that meditation not only draws upon new performances and webs of 
associations to enact paradigms of subjectivity but also that these versions of 
30 
 
people contrast with what in post-humanist STS is called the modern. 
Supported by Latour’s and Pickering’s notion of nonmodern, I suggest that 
meditation is a technology of the nonmodern self (Pickering, 2010), which 
allows me to analyze retreats not as off-the-wall and weird forms of social 
organization but as assemblages that require a suspension of normal, 
mainstream, dualist modern associations to bring forth a different self. In sum, 
Vipassana and Zen are instances of ontological politics – by recognizing the 
performativity of the world and subjects, they entangle performances, spaces, 
constraints and a set of devices to deploy meditative versions of selves and 
reality. 
 Therefore, this chapter situates this dissertation within these three major 
fields of scholarly work: meditation research; Foucauldian remarks on 
technologies of the self; STS discussions on relationality, performativity and 
ontological politics. A fourth section, entitled “Interpretation”, clarifies the 
argumentative thread of this dissertation. 
 
II.II.I MEDITATION RESEARCH 
  
 In the last forty years, meditation has become an important field of 
academic research. Early attempts to study meditation involved heroic efforts, 
illustrated by Richard Alpert’s trip to India, in 1967, to find mental maps that 
would enable him (a researcher in psychology at Harvard) to label altered states 
of consciousness, prompted by psychedelics such as LSD and psilocybin. He 
eventually met his teacher, Neemkaroli Baba, changed his name to Ram Dass 
and stopped being an academic, becoming a figure of popular culture like his 
former colleague, Timothy Leary (Dass, 1996). 
 Other academics have developed meditation research, mostly 
contributing towards the phenomenological exploration of nonordinary states of 
consciousness – basically all those states that are not restricted by the 
disciplined, organized and supposedly efficient mode of existence that 
characterizes modern life. Classic psychological research on meditation 
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included the analysis of the phenomenological differences between various 
meditative paths (Goleman, 1996; Brown, 1986), the “effects” of meditation 
according to different stages of practice (Walsh, 1977 and 1978; Brown and 
Engler, 1986), therapeutic applications of meditation (Smith, 1976; Shapiro and 
Giber, 1978; Kwee, 1990; Kabat-Zinn, 1991) or even complications associated 
with meditative practice (Walsh and Roche, 1979; Epstein and Lieff, 1981; 
Wilber, 1986; Kuijpers et al., 2007). Early studies on meditation, psychedelics 
and other contemplative practices led to the formation of transpersonal 
psychology, dedicated to the study of those realms of consciousness “far 
beyond the usual boundaries of both our bodies and our egos, as well as 
beyond the physical limits of our everyday lives.” (Grof and Bennet, 1993: 84)15 
 Meditation research is now part of mainstream academic culture – those 
who study consciousness, human emotions and the brain take this practice 
seriously. The formation of the Mind and Life Institute (MLI)16  has fostered 
dialogues between the Dalai Lama and researchers from all walks of academia. 
Psychologists, philosophers of mind, neuroscientists, cognitive scientists and 
phenomenologists no longer ignore meditation. Nowadays there are two 
popular branches of research: studies on “mindfulness” and on the couplings 
between meditation and the brain. 
 Academic research on mindfulness was highly influenced by the efforts 
of Jon Kabat-Zinn, who defines this practice as consisting of “moment-to 
moment awareness. It is cultivated by purposefully paying attention to things we 
ordinarily never give a moment's thought to.” (Kabat-Zinn, 1991: 2). Mindfulness 
Based Stress Reduction Therapy was initially developed at the University of 
Massachusetts Medical Center as an attempt to provide increased health and 
well-being to people who suffered from a variety of conditions such as 
headaches, high blood pressure, back pain, heart disease, cancer and AIDS 
                                                             
15
 According to Walsh and Vaughan, “Transpersonal psychology is the 
psychological study of transpersonal experiences and their correlates. These 
correlates include the nature, varieties, causes, and effects of transpersonal 
experiences and development, as the psychologies, philosophies, disciplines, 
arts, cultures, lifestyles, reactions, and religions that are inspired by them, or 
that seek to induce, express, apply, or understand them.” (Walsh and Vaughan, 
1993: 3-4) 
16
 http://www.mindandlife.org/ 
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(Kabat-Zinn, 1991: 1). There is a growing body of academic literature on 
mindfulness, evidencing a range of “positive” effects. Davis and Hayes, after a 
careful literature review on the topic, suggest a series of “positivities” such as 
self-control, objectivity, affect tolerance, enhanced flexibility, equanimity, 
improved concentration and mental clarity, emotional intelligence or the ability 
to relate to other’s and to one’s self with kindness, acceptance and compassion 
(Davis and Hayes, 2011: 198). 
 Most neuroscientific studies on meditation have suggested that 
meditation has real and measurable impacts on the human brain and its 
functions, including significant emotional changes that are measured through 
devices such as fMRI’s or electroencephalograms (Davidson et al., 2003; Lazar 
et al., 2000; Lutz et al., 2004 and 2008). Overall, meditation is no longer an 
obscure topic, and its effects are widely known and published in peer-reviewed 
academic journals. Shapiro, Walsh and Britton, in an overview of recent 
meditation research, suggested that “meditation appears to have the potential to 
enhance physiological, psychological and transpersonal well being on a wide 
variety of measures.” (Shapiro et al., 2003:82). They argue, however, that there 
are methodological problems with meditation studies that should be addressed, 
suggesting a set of recommendations, such as the differentiation between types 
of meditation, the assessment of temporal effects, the conduction of follow-up 
processes, the need to include experienced meditators in these studies and a 
stronger interplay between quantitative and qualitative data (Shapiro et al., 
2003: 84-85)17. 
 Most of these studies focus on phenomenological aspects, neural 
correlates of meditative practice and the psychological effects of meditation, 
with strong links to chapters V and VI. However, they do not explain how new 
subjects and experiences emerge through different webs of associations 
(including training and spatial, performative and material reconfigurations) and 
usually these studies do not elaborate on the correlations between meditation 
practice and the wider social world. Some of these issues have been tackled by 
sociological and anthropological research on meditation. 
                                                             
17
 For an earlier, although thorough assessment of meditation research, see 
Walsh (1979). 
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II.II.II SOCIOLOGICAL AND ANTHROPOLOGICAL RESEARCH ON 
MEDITATION 
 
 Sociological and anthropological literature on meditation is highly 
relevant for this dissertation, since there are commonalities regarding 
methodologies and theoretical concerns. My study explores the mobilization of 
devices to re-invent selfhood, as well as the politics of Zen and Vipassana 
versions of subjectivity. Meditation research in social sciences has focused on 
the importance of training, the interplay between practice, states of 
consciousness, emotions and daily life and on the relationship between 
meditation and social movements. On the following pages I will go through 
some of the most relevant studies in detail, justifying their importance to my 
research. 
 David Preston (1988), a sociologist, conducted a study on two Zen 
communities in Southern California. Informed by ethnography, interviews with 
practitioners, his own experience following years of Zen practice and a vast 
literature review (including transpersonal psychology), Preston argues that the 
experiences allowed by meditation shouldn’t be reduced to mere situated or 
“local knowledge”. They constitute a form of phenomenological reduction that 
transcends normal reality construction (Preston, 1988: 10). In fact, Preston 
argues that meditation involves “deconditioning of both personal and socially 
shared habits and processes of reality construction” (Preston, 1988: 73) – the 
“aim” is not the embodiment of a new symbolic universe and role but the 
transformation of the self through the examination of body and mind (Preston, 
1988: 73). This transformation of the self is linked to the Buddhist concept of 
true self (Preston, 1988: 135), and Preston rejects social theory’s rationalist 
view of humans, advocating a transpersonal model  that “suggests possibilities 
for developing and understanding our lives together that go well beyond the 
assumptions and perspectives presently dominating social theory” (Preston, 
1988: 146). Preston’s contribution aims to overcome the common theoretical 
framework of those who study new religious movements, usually relying on the 
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notion of “conversion”, implying a transformation (or re-conversion) of the 
symbolic order of the self. According to the author, one should not understand 
the phenomenon of becoming a Zen meditator as a form of conversion but 
rather as a form of experiential learning, involving individual variation and effort. 
In chapter VII, I examine the role of meditation in daily life and also reject the 
conversion paradigm to analyze the embodiment of meditation practices, 
favouring a technological understanding of such phenomenon. 
 Preston follows Becker’s remarks on becoming a Marijuana smoker 
(Becker, 1953, see chapter VI), considering that both processes are identical 
(Preston, 1981:48). He argues that Zen practitioners go through important 
stages in order to “become” meditators: they have to sit properly to produce the 
symptoms of meditation; they have to recognize the symptoms as a product of 
sitting and they have to attribute them a certain meaning, in order to take 
encouragement from them (Preston, 1981: 50). In chapter VI I analyze some of 
the experiences Zen and Vipassana meditators go through, and I suggest that, 
although training is essential, we should be careful about translating Becker’s 
remarks on marijuana to meditation, in the sense that one should be able to 
learn skilful ways to detach oneself from whatever happens – including 
thoughts, emotions, events and sensations – to maintain the meditative way of 
being, and this is particularly clear with Vipassana, since one should be 
detached from sensuous experience18. 
 Michal Pagis, a sociologist, conducted an extensive ethnography in the 
US and Israel, interviewing numerous subjects who practice Vipassana 
meditation in the tradition of S. N. Goenka’s. She benefited from good access to 
this organization (even being allowed to record student-teacher interactions) 
that, as we will see in chapter III, can be quite secretive. She wrote a rich and 
comprehensive ethnography that revolves around three main arguments: the 
first one is that practices of self-cultivation can “produce” a self-dependent self, 
in the sense that “one's own inner sphere is less dependent on external anchors 
in terms of self-knowledge, reflexivity or happiness”  (Pagis, 2008: 3); secondly, 
self-cultivation requires a comprehensive process of training, maintenance and 
                                                             
18
 My informants also told me that smoking Marijuana harmed their meditation 
practice, see chapter VII. 
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habituation, confirming Preston’s findings; finally, Pagis argues that this mode of 
cultivation transforms meaning at the level of embodied semiotic processes, not 
only at the level of abstract and symbolic cognition (Pagis, 2008:3-4). An 
important point made by Pagis, linked to her third argument, is that Vipassana 
enacts a process of embodied self-reflexivity, supported by the augmentation of 
body awareness:  
          “The framework of embodied self-reflexivity balances the common view 
 that  gives language the main role in inner self-relations. Such a 
 framework  suggests that we can use the body consciously and 
 reflexively just as we can use communication and language.” 
 (Pagis, 2009: 281).  
 
 Pagis’ study is, so far, the most comprehensive ethnography available on 
Goenka’s Vipassana, showing that the continuous practice of meditation can 
lead to a new kind of embodied self that is able to attain reflexivity beyond 
language and the internal dialogue19. Her research also shows how selves are 
transformed through the continuous practice of meditation and how Vipassana 
is applied in daily life, and she suggests that retreats suspend habitual 
mechanisms of self-stabilization, such as the usual social environment, 
discursive self-narration, bodily images and affect (Pagis, 2008: 250-251), 
highlighting the role of relationality in producing new selves. Building on her 
valuable insights, I will focus my attention not exclusively on human actors (the 
meditators) but also on techniques, spaces, performances and materials, also 
dialoguing with meditation research (something she has not done 
comprehensively) and exploring wider ramifications of meditation, including its 
mobilization to tackle “social issues”. I also disagree with Pagis when she states 
that Foucault was cynical regarding the freedoms arising along with 
technologies of the self (Pagis, 2008: 262)20; not only Foucault can help us 
                                                             
19
 According to Mead, the “essence” of the self is cognitive, and “it lies in the 
internalized conversation of gestures which constitutes thinking, or in terms of 
which thought and reflection proceeds” (Mead, 1934: 173). Pagis, through her 
study on Vipassana, showed us that selves do not have to be defined by 
cognition or the internal dialogue, meditation can help them become embodied. 
20
 Pagis comments on the cynicism of Michel Foucault are perhaps linked to 
what Latour calls the “transatlantic destiny of Michel Foucault” (Latour, 2005: 
86). According to Latour, “No one was more precise in his analytical 
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understand these emerging subjectivities as linked to new strategic 
reconfigurations, but we should also reflect on the types of “freedoms”, 
affordances (Akrich and Latour, 1992) that meditation can trigger, beyond 
embodiment or self-mastery in everyday life (Pagis’ focus), as it will be clear in 
chapters VI and VII.    
 A more recent study on Vipassana was conducted by Nasima Selim 
(2011), an anthropologist. It is an ethnographic research of the Vipassana 
community in Amsterdam, affiliated to the organization of S. N. Goenka. Selim 
undertook a six-week period of fieldwork, including observation during weekly 
Vipassana group sittings, semi-structured interviews with meditators, the 
analysis of some Vipassana-related material and a brief reflection on her 
personal experience. Her academic framework is the anthropology of the body 
and of body practices, and she explores everyday practices, lived experiences 
and how the effects of Vipassana are felt (Selim, 2011: 26). She follows a 
constructivist approach, recruiting participants’ narratives to justify the claim that 
Vipassana reconstructs the body and the mind, a general and relatively abstract 
way of saying that meditation has real effects on those who practice it. 
According to Selim – meditation “is mobilized to deconstruct the notion of a 
former ‘self’ into the reconfiguration of personhood, a ‘new’ self” (Selim, 2011: 
83). Although some of the work of Ian Hacking and Annemarie Mol on 
ontologies is used, her approach is mostly constructivist and humanist, and the 
normative claims of Mol on ontological politics are not explored. Although she 
examines the effects of Vipassana practice, how Vipassana becomes part of 
the lives of the meditators, the [ontological] political dimensions of this practice 
of meditation are left unexplored. 
 Aspasia Leledaki, on the other hand, has elaborated on the normative 
dimensions of long-term meditation practice following her qualitative study of 
yoga and meditation. In her PhD dissertation, “Inner and Outer Journeys: A 
Qualitative Life History of Modern Yoga and Meditation as Body-Self-
                                                                                                                                                                                  
decomposition of the tiny ingredients from which power is made and no one 
was more critical of social explanations. And yet, as soon as Foucault was 
translated, he was immediately turned into the one who had ‘revealed’ power 
relations behind every innocuous activity: madness, natural history, sex, 
administration, etc.” (Latour, 2005: 86) 
37 
 
Transforming Pedagogies” (Leledaki, 2007), she examines 10 life-stories of 
subjects who have engaged with different forms of Yoga and Meditation, 
drawing upon semi-structured interviews. She focuses on narratives of self-
transformation, identifying fourteen key metaphors emerging from her 
informants’ accounts 21 . In chapter VII, I elaborate on three aspects that 
challenge dualist understandings of selfhood. 
 According to Leledaki, the 10 life-stories she studied suggest that the 
meditators’ habitus (Bourdieu, 1977) is transformed, and “through these 
pedagogies, the informants’ existential feelings might be gradually transformed 
and thus their body-selves potentially moving from a restrictive emotional 
habitus towards a more productive one.” (Leledaki, 2007: 355). Subjects move 
towards a kinaesthetic sense of their body-self, understood as impermanent 
natural elements, as a microcosm or even part of something bigger (Leledaki, 
2007:355), which is ultimately a reflection of Hinduism and Buddhism. The 
major problem with Leledaki’s research is the fact that she focuses on life-
stories of subjects who engage in different “eastern” technologies of the self, 
including many different types of meditation and Yoga. This neglects relevant 
theoretical and phenomenological differences between those practices, 
eventually reproducing the same Orientalism22 that she and Brown criticize: 
“Orientalism remains an important backdrop to the collective social meaning of 
Eastern movement forms in the West today” (Brown and Leledaki, 2010: 128). I 
suggest that, in fact, there are relevant differences between Vipassana and Zen 
formations – meditation is not a homogeneous practice, and this dissertation will 
elaborate on distinct forms of creating meditators (Chapters IV and V), of 
experiencing and deploying meditation in daily life (Chapters VI and VII) and of 
re-inventing the social (VIII).  
                                                             
21
 The metaphors identified by Leledaki are the following:  life as a journey and 
transformation as a journey within the journey of life; coming back home as the 
core; moving forward and moving on; awakening from the dream of everyday 
reality to the underlying reality; uncovering the underlying reality; seeing clearly 
and looking inside; recognizing the Self; Transformation of the body; From (the 
embodied prison of) attachment to liberation; Freedom from samsara and 
karma; The body is a container of Karma. (Leledaki, 2007: 194) 
22
 According to Said, “Orientalism is a style of thought based upon an 
ontological and epistemological distinction made between "the Orient" and 
(most of the time) "the Occident”” (Said, 1978: 2). 
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 Preston, Pagis, Selim and Leledaki have conducted qualitative studies on 
meditation with different degrees of sophistication, research questions and 
theoretical backgrounds. Albeit their differences, they have one thing in 
common – the fact that they have ignored the broader social impacts of 
meditation, limiting the outcomes of these practices to daily life interactions. On 
the other hand, the two studies I will shortly introduce focused on the social and 
political dimensions of meditation in Thailand and Burma. 
 Joanna Cook (2010), an anthropologist, conducted an ethnographic 
study in a Vipassana (Non-Goenka) meditation monastery in Thailand, focusing 
on the process of renunciation. Her methodology relied on socialization 
(including becoming a nun, or mae chee, for a good period of time) and various 
interviews. By “going native”, she was able to have access to interesting data, 
gaining the trust of other nuns. Her findings run across various aspects, such as 
the experiences of monastics; the particularities of ascetic discipline; the 
community-monastery interactions (including a detailed analysis of the role of 
dana, or gifts) and the historical development of Buddhist monasticism in 
Thailand (Cook, 2010:1). Since these mae chee are lay women, they have an 
unclear role in the religious hierarchy of Thailand, leading Cook to argue that 
“not only asceticism [is] a vibrant and relevant practice in modernity but also 
that ascetic practice may be adopted by those outside the religious order 
valorised in textual Buddhism.” (Cook, 2010:194). Her study combines a variety 
of data, including interesting institutional, phenomenological and experiential 
aspects. However, no strong reflection is provided on the role of meditation as a 
technology to reorganize social relations. 
 Ingrid Jordt, also an anthropologist, managed to couple 
phenomenological and ontological aspects with social change. Her study 
consists of an ethnography of more than ten years in Burma (now Myanmar). 
Jordt studied the lay meditation movement of Mahasi Sayadaw, the most 
influential disseminator of Vipassana in that country – she does not focus 
exclusively on meditation practice, offering highly relevant insights to 
understand political and social aspects of meditation, with strong links to 
chapter VIII, where I partially draw upon her findings to analyze the 
entanglements between Vipassana, Zen and social change. 
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 Her ethnography explores five different aspects: the shaping of social 
and political realities through meditative practices; the characteristics of the 
mass lay meditation movement; the codification of individual experiences 
operated by such movement; the sustenance of social, political and 
soteriological aspects through meditation; the scope and influence of political 
legitimacy by Buddhist laity and lay institutions through moral appeals (Jordt, 
2007: 3). Jordt’s study highlights the connections between meditative practice, 
phenomenology and social change, suggesting that “the meditation movement 
has promoted a Burmese Buddhist theory for the social contract between state 
and society” (Jordt, 2007: 92). According to Jordt, those who practice meditation 
are not only working towards their “salvation” but also “enacting broader social 
ideas about the arrangement of the state, the structure of cosmic time, and their 
participation in a metahistorical project of sasana perpetuation” (Jordt, 2007: 
92). 
 How will my approach differ regarding the previously mentioned studies? 
Firstly, influenced by Foucault and STS, I will conduct a post-humanist research 
of meditation, focusing on performances, materialities and spaces. Secondly, I 
will explore meditation as a form of ontological politics – I will tackle meditative 
practices and forms of subject-formation not merely as processes of training (as 
in the cases of Preston and Pagis) but as forms of unveiling experiential and 
phenomenal realms that are blocked by modern, dominant forms of enacting 
selves. Thirdly, I will not consider social applications of meditation as just 
another dimension of technologies of the self – their inclusion is justified as 
exemplifying the interplay between subjective and social apparatuses, 
understood from a post-humanist perspective (as it will become clear in chapter 
VIII). 
 In order to sustain this approach, the following sections will draw upon 
two dimensions of scholarly work: Foucauldian remarks on technologies of the 
self and subject formation (intertwined with a number of other approaches 
directly or indirectly linked to his analyses) and STS literature on relationality, 
performativity and ontological politics, justifying my interest in the politics of 
meditation. 
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II. III TECHNOLOGIES OF THE SELF 
  
II.III.I INTRODUCTION 
 
 The second major branch of scholarly work influencing this dissertation 
concerns Michel Foucault’s remarks on technologies of the self, allowing me to 
study meditation as a technology, thus justifying the deployment of STS 
literature to analyze the complexities of such practice. 
 The notion of technologies of the self was developed by Foucault (1988) 
in order to analyze Greek and Christian practices dealing with the care of the 
self, including some forms of meditation. These are part of a set of 
hermeneutical technologies, mechanisms used by humans to understand 
themselves, linked to different forms of developing knowledge. He lists four 
types of these technologies: 
 “(1) technologies of production, which permit us to produce, transform, or 
 manipulate things; (2) technologies of sign systems, which permit us to 
 use signs, meaning, symbols, or signification; (3) technologies of power, 
 which determine the conduct of individuals and submit them to certain 
 ends or domination, an objectivizing of the subject; (4) technologies of 
 the self, which permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the 
 help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and 
 souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform 
 themselves in order to  attain a certain state of happiness, purity, 
 wisdom, perfection, or immortality.” (Foucault, 1988: 18) 
 
 Foucault’s formulation allows me to tackle meditation as a technology of 
the self, not from the point of view of religion but of practice itself. A similar 
formulation arose in Hadot’s work on “spiritual exercises”, those  “voluntary, 
personal practices intended to bring about a transformation of the individual, a 
transformation of the self” (Hadot, 2011: 87)23. 
                                                             
23
 I consider that the notion of “voluntary” is problematic (in the sense that it 
implies the existence of human beings with “agency” and “free will”), since some 
technologes of power (such as governmentality, a political technology) include 
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 Sloterdijk, through his analysis of practices of self-shaping (including 
western and eastern techniques), goes even further, exploring the notion of 
anthropotechnics: 
 “The methods of mental and physical practicing by which humans from 
 the most diverse cultures have attempted to optimize their cosmic and 
 immunological status in the face of vague risks of living and acute 
 certainties of death.” (Sloterdijk, 2013: 10) 
 
 Foucault’s and Sloterdijk’s formulations are highly relevant to this 
dissertation in the sense that they will allow me to study meditation not as a 
form of religiosity but as a practice of self-reshaping. Foucault, in his analysis of 
the Greek notion of epimeleia heautou, the principle of “take care of yourself” 
(Foucault, 2006:4), suggests that technologies of the self are practical – one 
has the responsibility to undertake a series of exercises to change, purify, 
transform oneself, such as “techniques of meditation, of memorization of the 
past, of examination of conscience, of checking representations which appear in 
the mind” (Foucault, 2006: 11). 
 Sloterdijk argues that, in order to analyze  practices of the self, we should 
reject terms such as “religion”, “religious”, “morality”, “ethics” or “spirituality”: 
“What we are actually dealing with ... are variously misinterpreted 
anthropotechnic practice systems and sets of rules for moulding one’s inward 
and outward behaviour.” (Sloterdijk, 2013: 84) 
 So much for sociology of religion. Instead of framing meditation within the 
field of religion24, I deploy post-humanist STS literature to explore meditation as 
a technology of the self. Considering that the notion of “religion” is a 
misunderstanding, practices of meditation (such as Zen and Vipassana) can be 
compared and contrasted to other regimes of self-production. These can 
include virtually everything – the school, mass media, mainstream ways of 
managing bodies and mind, conventional ways of doing politics or even western 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
the voluntary deployment of practices and exercises (requiring the 
“internalization” of power) as part of their mechanisms of population control. 
 
24
 Linking it to “Buddhism”, as in Jordt (2007), McMahan (2008) or Cook (2010). 
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psychiatry. These contrasts will be salient throughout all the chapters of this 
dissertation, illustrating the alternative ontologies of meditation. 
  Understanding practices of meditation as anthropotechnics or 
technologies of the self means that these are forms of “subjectification”, 
“heterogeneous processes and practices by means of which human beings 
come to relate to themselves and others as subjects of a certain type” (Rose, 
1998, 25)25. As put by Butler, “Subjection26 is, literally, the making of a subject, 
the principle of regulation according to which a subject is formulated or 
produced” (Butler, 1997b:84). We can understand subjectification as a form of 
what Hacking calls “making up people” (Hacking, 2002)27. 
 The separation of technologies of the self from the notion of “religion” 
allows us to de-naturalize mainstream instances of subject formation. 
Meditation assemblages, instead of being devices of self-transformation that 
contrast with a sort of societal zero-level of subjectification, rather present 
alternative ways of being in the world. Much could be written on dominant forms 
of constituting and fabricating subjects. We all have been educated, we are 
surrounded by technological devices such as televisions, laptops or cell phones, 
some of us have jobs that focus on efficiency and productivity, we share 
languages, physical and mental dispositions that were here, in this world, much 
before our existence as human beings. The powers of subjectification are 
everywhere, and a post-humanist account of such process would have to 
include virtually every science and discipline to tackle all the mechanisms of 
power/knowledge that make us into what we are. To say that these 
                                                             
25
 Rose’s definition of subjectification is an adaptation of Foucault’s remarks on 
subjection – “the way a human being turns himself into a subject” (Foucault, 
1982: 778). See Foucault (1990: 26-28) for an exploration of the various 
mechanisms of formation of the moral subject – the ethical substance, types of 
subjection, forms  of elaboration of the self, and moral teleology. See Verbeek 
(2011) for an insightful analysis of the importance of Foucault’s remarks 
regarding human-technology associations. 
26
 There are various ways of formulating subjectification: sometimes we also 
find “subjection” or “subjectivation”. 
27
 My use of this expression is slightly different from Hacking’s – I do not 
understand the “making up” of people as the creation of new human categories 
(the deviant, the suicidal, the ethnographer/scholar) but as a dimension of 
subjectification, as an effect of certain technologies that postulate what people 
should be, feel or experience (including technologies of the self). 
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mechanisms are historical, cultural, psychological, biological, physical, 
cosmological, sociological and linguistic falls short of illustrating the complexity 
of the networks that make us into what we are. 
 The pervasiveness of anthropotechnics is not new. According to 
Foucault, back in the 17th century a new type of power, as part of a 
governmental project of docility, emerged. He called it discipline: “it is a type of 
power, a modality for its exercise, comprising a whole set of instruments, 
techniques, procedures, levels of application, targets; it is a ‘physics’ or an 
‘anatomy’ of power, a technology.” (Foucault, 1995: 215) 
 Disciplines aimed to create docile, useful, operable bodies and selves, 
constituting “a certain mode of political investment of the body, a new ‘micro-
physics’ of power” (Foucault, 1995: 215). They aimed at the training, 
reformation, normalization and reshaping of individuals in different spaces such 
as schools, prisons, workshops or the army. This led Foucault to question 
mainstream narratives of Enlightenment and Reformation as creating a new 
political subject – autonomous, rational, free to choose. At the practical level, 
these new constitutions promoting equality and freedom were, according to 
Foucault, supported by the disciplinary powers, ensuring the subjectification, 
homogeneity and normalization of individuals. 
 The emergence of discipline as a device of subjectification is directly 
linked to the dissemination of a new technology of power that Foucault calls 
governmentality 28 . According to Miller (1987:13), governmentality is 
                                                             
28
 Foucault provides a comprehensive definition of governmentality, 
considered “the ensemble constituted by the institutions, the procedures, 
analyses and reflections, the calculations and the tactics that permit the 
exercise that well specific form, though complex, of power, that has as the main 
goal the population, as the major form of knowledge, the political economy, as 
the essential technical instrument the devices of security … by government, I 
understand the tendency … that, in all the West, hasn’t stop to conduct … 
towards the prominence of this type of power that we could call the government 
over all the others: sovereignty, discipline; that has brought, on the one hand, 
the development of a whole series of specific apparatuses of government and, 
on the other hand, the development of a whole series of knowledge. Finally, by 
government, I believe that we should understand the processes or … the result 
of the processes through which the State of justice of the Middle Ages, that 
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characterized by two important aspects: the first one concerns the management 
of individuals, including their conduct and aspirations (discipline) – power 
penetrates the life of individuals; the second vector comprises the management 
of the population, the flock as a whole, through the “calculated management of 
life” (Miller: 1987:13). Through the use of statistics, the population becomes 
marked by a set of regularities that can be controlled and worked upon, such as 
the number of deaths, diseases or accidents. 
 One could argue that Foucault’s focus on institutional discipline fails to 
recognize that, in the contemporary neo-liberal age, power is actively 
internalized by subjects (Rose, 2007), who are expected to actively engage in a 
variety of actions to normalize and enhance themselves. In contemporary 
societies of control, power is no longer enacted through various disciplinary 
instances of enclosure but through ubiquitous metastases of the same system - 
“In societies of control one is never finished with anything – the corporation, the 
educational system, the armed services being metastable states coexisting in 
one and the same modulation, like a universal system of deformation.” 
(Deleuze, 1992: 5) 
  The practices of meditation that I will analyze are also attempts to create 
different kinds of humans, but it would not be correct to reduce them to forms of 
discipline or governmentality. As technologies of the self, they allow selves to 
enter new realms of experience, to alter habitual ways of being and to 
eventually suspend dualist paradigms of selfhood. These incursions into 
governmentality served to illustrate how discipline relies on forms of 
subjectification; however, these technologies, such as discipline, were mobilized 
to hold societies together, categorizing and normalizing selves, while the 
practice of meditation is a “voluntary” attempt to transform oneself. These 
differences are linked to the distinction between technologies of power and of 
the self (Foucault, 1988); despite these contrasts, Foucault’s reflections on 
selves allow us to analyze assemblages of subjectification such as meditation 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
became an Administrative state at the XV and XVI centuries, has become little 
by little «governmentalized».” (Foucault, 1978:655) 
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and to explore a number of relevant issues, including performances, materiality, 
spaces and power. 
 
 
II.III.II PERFORMANCES 
  
 Practices of meditation require individuals to engage in particular ways of 
managing and dealing with their bodies and minds, comprising a set of 
techniques that will be presented in chapter V. The exercises analyzed by 
Foucault included meditation, ablutions, the preparation of diaries, diets, etc.. In 
order to be modified, humans have to embody new sets of performances. As a 
technology of power, discipline is supported by a new political anatomy of the 
body, managed by temporally controlling its activity (what Foucault calls 
anatomo-chronological schemes of behaviour), including movements, gestures, 
and instrumentally coding the body (Foucault, 1995: 157).   
 More importantly, the meditative transformation of performance clashes 
with regular, mainstream techniques of the body (Mauss, 1973). Mauss 
suggested that cultural and social collectives have different ways of performing 
the body, drawing on a variety of performances such as sleeping, waking, 
walking, running, dancing, jumping, climbing, pushing, pulling, lifting, taking care 
of the body, consumption and reproduction (Mauss, 1973: 80-84). Zen and 
Vipassana anthropotechnics display some differences: in the case of 
Vipassana, self-transformation is operated through the performance of the 
immobile sitting body, whereas with Thich Nhat Hanh’s Zen virtually all the 
techniques of the body that Mauss wrote about are mobilized to strengthen the 
desired mode of existence.  
 We can also think about this performative transformation as a shift in 
terms of habitus. This notion was popularized by Bourdieu, who suggested that 
habitus functions as a set of disposition that support human existence, granting 
consensus to the practices, harmonizing the experience of reality and regulating 
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inter-subjectivity (Bourdieu, 1977: 72). Habitus reproduces human 
characteristics and is internalized by imitating actions and postures of others, 
reproducing subjective experience. Performances, in that sense, are linked to 
mechanisms of “reproduction”, since children imitate gestures and postures of 
adults, including “a way of walking, a tilt of the head, facial expressions, ways of 
sitting and of using implements, always associated with a tone of voice, a style 
of speech, and ... a certain subjective experience” (Bourdieu, 1977: 87). In this 
sense, the formation of bodies is deeply interwoven with the set of practices that 
constitute them, which means that performances are performative. According to 
Butler: 
 “Such acts, gestures, enactments, generally construed, are performative 
 in the sense that the essence or the identity that they otherwise purport 
 to express are fabrications manufactured and sustained through 
 corporeal signs and other discursive means. That the gendered body is 
 performative suggests that it has no ontological status apart from the 
 various acts which constitute its reality”. (Butler, 1990: 185) 
 
 Butler suggests that gendered selves are performatively constituted 
through performances, repetitions and rituals. However, she draws upon the 
Althusseriam (Althusser, 2008) notion of interpellation to suggest that the 
process of subjectification is initiated by the doctor’s verbal announcement of 
gender at birth: “The doctor who receives the child and pronounces: “It’s a girl” 
begins that long string of interpellations by which the girl is transitively girled: 
gender is ritualistically repeated” (Butler, 1997a: 49). 
 Following a post-humanist STS approach that draws upon the 
performative idiom (Pickering, 1995), my analysis will not be limited to these 
forms of discursive subjectification, but will explore  material, performative and 
spatial ones29  - following Pagis (2008), we could say that meditation is an 
embodied practice, instead of reducing selves to cognition, language or the 
internal dialogue. Moreover, some of the retreats I will analyze take place in 
silence, which reduces the role of verbal interpellations, in some cases leading 
                                                             
29
 However, meditation does not totally reject language - as we will see in 
chapter V, performances can be accompanied by small poems, or gathas, that 
support meditative ways of being. 
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to instances of “inner silence” where the wandering mind (constantly creating 
new thoughts and ideas) stops (see chapter VI)30. However, this does not mean 
that performances are merely material; they are indeed entangled with 
particular ways of moving one’s attention towards body parts and of 
understanding oneself, revealing particular gazes (see chapter V).  
 Performances ultimately reflect technologies of power that attempt to 
bring forth new versions of people. In order to do so, the performative order of 
the individual needs to be transformed, inviting her to adopt a new set of 
anthropotechnics linked to different versions of subjectivity. These performative 
transformations are supported by material and spatial changes, carefully 
managed in retreat spaces, highlighting the role of material and spatial 
dimensions as subjectification devices. 
II.III.III MATERIALS AND SPACES 
  
 Foucault’s reflections on technologies of power, such as discipline, 
analyzed the role of materials and spaces in the constitution of new versions of 
people. A good example is the Panopticon (Foucault, 1995). This architectural 
apparatus allows the supervisor to constantly observe prison inmates without 
being seen; the individuals are confined, meaning that they cannot contact with 
their companions, avoiding plots, violence, noise, etc.. Surveillance takes place 
permanently, and it does not matter who is exercising this type of power – 
power relations are ensured by material and architectural devices and not 
exclusively by experts. As Foucault suggests: “Any individual, taken almost at 
random, can operate the machine: in the absence of the director, his family, his 
friends, his visitors, even his servants.” (Foucault, 1995: 202). Latour, in his 
famous essay “The Berlin Key”, argues that “The very notion of discipline is 
impracticable without steel, without the wood of the door, without the bolt of the 
locks” (Latour, 1991b: 19). This means that we cannot understand instances of 
meditative subjectification without paying attention to couplings between 
                                                             
30
 See Cook (2010) for an interesting reflection on how advanced meditators no 
longer identify with a particular gender. 
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humans and nonhumans, and in chapter IV these entanglements will be 
explored. 
 The classic trope that illustrates the role played by nonhumans in 
shaping selves is Haraways’ cyborg: “we are all chimeras, theorized and 
fabricated hybrids of machine and organism; in short, we are cyborgs. The 
cyborg is our ontology; it gives us our politics” (Haraway, 1991: 150). The role of 
materials and places in shaping subjectivity is illustrated by the consumption of 
drugs, leading to altered states of consciousness (Huxley, 1963; Harner, 1980), 
interactions between humans and machines (Schull, 2005; Brenninkmeijer, 
2010) or the exposure to particular environments (Lilly, 1977; Salter, 2010). 
Rose (2007), in his analysis of contemporary biopolitics, suggests that this 
technology of power relies on entanglements between humans and 
nonhumans: humans are shaped by different forms of expertise (biological, 
psychological, psychiatric and neurological) and selves are worked upon at the 
biological, molecular and neurological levels.  
 Apart from Foucault’s Panopticon, widely used in disciplinary settings 
(such as prisons), there are two interesting historical illustrations of how new 
material and spatial devices reshape subjectivities. The first example concerns 
Schivelbusch’s reflections on the railway journey (Schivelbusch, 1977). 
According to him, the proliferation of railways allowed new forms of 
experiencing the landscape to emerge, generating the “panoramic view”. 
Travelling by train disrupted traditional ways of experiencing journeys, initially 
generating criticism and resistance. The train was compared to a projectile, and 
its speed wouldn’t allow subjects to be visually aware of the outside world, 
compromising perception and causing a mechanization of experience 
(Schivelbusch, 1977: 55). 
 However, the train also allowed new and enriching possibilities of dealing 
with the landscape, enacting the previously mentioned panoramic view: 
 “While the consciousness moulded by traditional travel found itself in a 
 mounting crisis, another kind of perception started to develop, one which 
 did not try to fight the effects of new technology of travel but, on the 
 contrary, assimilated them entirely. For such a pair of eyes staring out of 
 the compartment window, all the things that the old consciousness 
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 experienced as losses became sources of enrichment. The velocity and 
 linearity with which the train traversed the landscape did not destroy it – 
 not at all; only under such conditions was it possible to fully appreciate 
 the landscape.” (Schivelbusch, 1977: 59) 
 
 The second example concerns the gradual introduction of the fork in 
Norbert Elias’ outstanding “The Civilizing Process”. Elias analyzed the 
progressive change of human habits, the manners, mediated by human-
material associations. The fork replaces the old habit of eating with one’s 
fingers, and the progressive transformation of manners generated a new “self”, 
marked by feelings of repulsion and shame. Modern man, according to Elias, 
has to be delicate, his drives and emotions have to be controlled and new 
instruments support this process – these nonhumans embody particular cultural 
and subjective meanings and modes of action. As Elias suggests: 
 “The suppression of eating by hand from one’s own plate has very little to 
 do with the danger of illness ... the first authority in our decision between 
 “civilized” and “uncivilized” behaviour at table is our feeling of distaste. 
 The fork is nothing other than the embodiment of a specific standard of 
 emotions and a specific level of revulsion. Behind the change in eating 
 techniques between the Middle Age and modern times appears the same 
 process that emerged in the analysis of other incarnations of this kind: a 
 change in the structure of drives and emotions... The standard of 
 delicacy finds expression in corresponding social prohibitions.” (Elias, 
 1982: 126-127). 
 
 Elias and Schivelbusch’s reflections exemplify how new versions of 
subjectivity emerge along with new material and spatial apparatuses. Coupled 
with post-humanist STS approaches to tackle socio-technical networks (Callon, 
1986; Latour, 2005; Pickering, 1995), I will suggest, in chapter IV, that retreat 
assemblages draw upon material and spatial reconfigurations to bring forth 
meditative versions of people. In that sense, particular materials (such as bells 
and cushions), architectural devices and regulations support the practice of 
meditation. The enactment of a new assemblage (the meditation “retreat”) that 
reconfigures regular associations is, therefore, the breeding ground for a new 
type of human. 
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II.III.IV POWER 
 Foucault’s reflections on power are also highly relevant to this 
dissertation. Firstly, the technologies of power identified by Foucault (such as 
Biopolitics or Discipline) carry certain “scripts”31 of subjectification, these are 
mechanisms to ensure that the individual becomes normalized, according to a 
certain version of what humans should be – productive, efficient, disciplined, 
etc. (Foucault, 1995). Secondly, power is always linked to knowledge and 
expertise – there are the pastoral authorities legislating on sexuality (Foucault, 
1987); the medical profession that is able to enact the clinical gaze, illuminating 
the truth of the sick subject (Foucault, 2003); the human sciences (such as 
psychology or criminology) that are an outcome of disciplinary devices, relying 
on knowledge and expertise and operating as laboratories of the soul (Foucault, 
1995). Thirdly, power is not merely an effect of hierarchies – it is a decentred, 
post-humanist “force” – it relies on architectural devices such as the Panopticon 
(Foucault, 1995); biopolitical mechanisms such as statistics (Foucault, 1987); 
epistemological and praxiological apparatuses such as technologies of the self 
(Foucault, 1998 and 2006); somatic regularities according to the performative 
models of discipline, etc.. Fourthly, power is not about restricting, castrating or 
limiting – it is power that generates subjectivity, it is positive (Foucault, 1995), it 
multiplies and is always accompanied by resistance within the political 
frameworks subjectifying the individual (Foucault, 1987). This means that power 
is everywhere, it is decentred, emerging from every connection between 
entities32. 
                                                             
31
 According to Akrich, “A large part of the work of innovators is that of 
"inscribing" this vision of (or prediction about) the world in the technical content 
of the new object. I will call the end product of this work a "script" or a 
"scenario.” (Akrich, 1992: 208) 
32
 The following quotation is particularly illustrative: “The omnipresence of 
power: ... because it is produced from one moment to the next, at every point, 
or rather in every relation from one point to another. Power is everywhere; not 
because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere.  And 
"Power,"  insofar as it  is permanent,  repetitious,  inert, and  self-reproducing,  
is  simply  the  over-all  effect  that emerges  from  all  these  mobilities,  the  
concatenation  that rests on each of them and seeks  in turn to arrest their 
movement … power is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical 
situation in a particular society.” (Foucault, 1987: 93). This decentred 
understanding of power has some connections with Deleuze and Guattari’s 
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 This post-humanist conception of power allows me to analyze practices 
of meditation as relying on a set of devices (performances, spatialities, 
materials, regulations and even discourses) to enact particular versions or 
projects of the self33.  Instead of understanding Zen and Vipassana formations 
as a form of “cult”, as in humanist literature (see Marty and Appleby, 1991; 
Dawson, 2003), focusing on humans and their institutions, I will analyze what 
takes place during retreats, how experiences are transformed and how 
technologies of meditation are used in daily life, exploring couplings between 
humans, technologies, nonhumans, constraints and spaces. The relationality 
implicit in this way of understanding power extends to the self, since these 
connections are considered the surface of emergence of what we understand 
as subjectivity, and the transformation of selfhood takes place through the 
reconfiguration of these habitual associations and technologies: 
 “Maybe the problem of the self is not to discover what it is in its positivity, 
 maybe the problem is not to discover a positive self or the positive 
 foundation of the self. Maybe our problem is now to discover that the self 
 is nothing else than the historical correlation of the technology built in our 
 history. Maybe the problem is to change those technologies.” (Foucault, 
 1999b: 181) 
 
 Drawing upon what Elias called the malleability of man 34 , Zen and 
Vipassana require humans to submit themselves to heterogeneous apparatuses 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
rizhome, “an acentered, nonhierarchical, nonsignifying system” (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1987: 21).  
33
 My use of the term “projects of the self” is distinct from Giddens’ “reflexive 
projects of the self”. By project of the self, I understand the telos of certain 
technologies of power (such as those deployed by the Zen and Vipassana), in 
the sense that they aim at making up certain versions of people and the world. 
Giddens, on the other hand, has an historicist  perspective of the self, arguing 
that, in post-traditional modernity, self-identity is reflexively organized. As he 
states, “The reflexive project of the self, which consists in the sustaining of 
coherent, yet continuously revised, biographical narratives, takes place in the 
context of multiple choice as filtered through abstract systems. In modern social 
life, the notion of lifestyle takes on a particular significance.” (Giddens, 1991: 5)  
34
 As Elias stated, “Man is an extraordinary malleable and variable being. The 
changes of human attitude discussed here are examples of this malleability. It is 
by no means confined to what we generally distinguish as the “psychological” 
from the “physiological”. The “physis”, too, indissolubly linked to what we call 
the “psyche”, is variously molded in the course of history in accordance with the 
network of dependencies that extend throughout a human life. One might think, 
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in order to foster alternative ways of being in the world, allowing selves to 
experience new realms and transforming dominant understandings of 
human/environmental couplings, reconfiguring their selves. Zen and Vipassana 
draw on relationality, on the reconfiguring of associations between selves, 
nonhumans, performances and environments to enact novel experiential and 
social paradigms. This leads us to the following section, where I will discuss 
issues of relationality, performativity and ontological politics, supported by STS 
scholarly work. 
 
II.IV STS 
  
II.IV.I RELATIONALITY 
 
 An important aspect of Science and Technology Studies concerns the 
importance of relationality and associations, challenging dualist and humanist 
accounts that separate people and things. For instance, Callon (1986) suggests 
that, in order to study power, we should abandon all a priori distinctions 
between natural and social and we should also be impartial regarding all the 
actors involved in controversies (Callon, 1986: 196). Actor-Network-Theory 
(ANT) suggests that we should suspend all a priori asymmetries between 
people and things, recognizing that the “social” (the collective) consists of 
relationships and associations between heterogeneous entities: 
  “[social] is the name of a movement, a displacement, a transformation, a 
 translation, an enrolment. It is an association between entities which are 
 in no way recognizable as being social in the ordinary manner, except 
 during the brief moment when they are reshuffled together.” (Latour, 
 2005: 64)  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
for example, of the molding of the facial muscles and thus of facial expression 
during a person’s lifetime, or of the formation of reading or writing centers in the 
brain.” (Elias, 1982: 277)   
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 Those entities, the nonhumans that are part of webs of associations, are 
usually called mediators; instead of being passive entities that function as 
intermediaries serving human intentions and actions, a mediator “is an original 
event and creates what it translates as well as the entities between which it 
plays the mediating role” (Latour, 1991a: 78). In sum, things have agency, and 
in ANT “Human and nonhuman actors are ... treated as being somehow on a 
par with one another.” (Pickering, 1992: 20) 
 In terms of scientific practice, this means that the work of scientists 
should be understood from a performative perspective, in the sense that 
scientists have to struggle with nonhumans (material agency) that they attempt 
to capture in machines – “Scientists are human agents in a field of material 
agency which they struggle to capture in machines. Further, human and 
material agency are reciprocally and emergently intertwined in this struggle.” 
(Pickering, 1995: 21) 
 Taking into consideration Pickering’s and ANT’s insights, one can 
understand meditation as involving displacements and reconfigurations, new 
webs of associations with new agents. These new agents can be physical 
spaces, timetables or materials. In order to capture “material agency” (which 
here we can understand as particular states of consciousness or ways of being, 
linked to Vipassana or Mindfulness), meditators have to struggle with their habit 
patterns (boredom, sleepiness, pain after sitting for a long time). Practices of 
Meditation can be understood as mediators that unveil new ways of 
experiencing oneself and support new ways of acting in daily life, as well as 
mediating a variety of “social” applications.  
 A relevant dimension of relationality is that entities emerge through these 
couplings, they are not pre-existing beings, as suggested by Barad’s notion of 
intra-actions (Barad, 2007), reinforcing the volatile ontology of matter and 
bodies (Mol, 1999; Clough, 2007; Blackman, 2010). Donna Haraway’s 
remarkable exploration of companion species highlights the importance of 
relationality, reinforcing the role of couplings in fabricating entities that do not 
exist prior to these associations: 
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 “Through their reaching into each other, through their ‘prehensions’ or 
 graspings, beings constitute each other and themselves. Beings do not 
 preexist their relatings. ‘Prehensions’ have consequences. The world is a 
 knot in motion. . . . There are no pre-constituted subjects and objects, 
 and no single sources, unitary actors, or final ends.” (Haraway, 2003: 6) 
 
 Influenced by these STS remarks on relationality, how should we think 
about subjectivities? Gomart and Hennion (1999) wrote an interesting paper 
that translates these post-humanist insights into the study of the self, reflecting 
on passionate subjects who consume drugs or are music amateurs. According 
to the authors:  
 “Human activity is ‘made possible’, ‘potentialized’, ‘conditioned’ by the 
 activity of drugs or the pull of music. The conditioning of the amateur by 
 cocaine or Bach’s partitas requires that she meticulously establish 
 conditions: active work must be done in order to be moved.” (Gomart and 
 Hennion, 1999: 227) 
 
 These conditions or new associations that the authors mention can also 
be applied to meditation. Subjects have to leave their homes, sit in particular 
ways and follow some rules (conditions) to be moved by meditation. 
Relationality, linked to the reconfiguration of heterogenenous networks, is a 
fundamental device for the transformation of selves that, as Hennion and 
Gomart suggest, emerge through entanglements with dispositifs 35 . These 
dispositifs affect selves and, influenced by Latour’s insights on the human body, 
                                                             
35
 According to Gomart and Hennion, a dispositif “focuses on objects, conditions 
and means through which entities in networks emerge” (Gomart and Hennion, 
1999: 244). The notion of dispositif plays a fundamental role in Foucault’s 
thinking. According to Agamben, it can be translated as “apparatus” (Agamben, 
2009), but sometimes it is translated as device (that is the formulation I will use 
throughout this dissertation). The Foucauldian notion of dispositif reinforces his 
post-humanist understanding of power: “What I'm trying to single out with this 
term is, first and foremost, a thoroughly heterogeneous set consisting of 
discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, 
administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral, and 
philanthropic propositions-in short, the said as much as the unsaid. Such are 
the elements of the apparatus. The apparatus [dispositif/device] itself is the 
network that can be established between these elements. (Foucault, Dits et 
écrits, vol. 3: 299, cited in Agamben, 2009: 2) 
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one could say that a relevant dimension of subjectivity is the development of the 
capacity to be affected: 
 “[the body is] an interface that becomes more and more describable as it 
 learns to be affected by more and more elements. The body is thus not a 
 provisional residence of something superior – an immortal soul, the 
 universal or thought – but what leaves a dynamic trajectory by which we 
 learn to register and become sensitive to what the world is made of.” 
 (Latour, 2004: 206) 
 
 
 Much of this dissertation is an attempt to describe the couplings that 
generate new ways for selves to be affected. In chapter IV (Setting), I argue that 
Zen and Vipassana paradigms of selfhood break habitual connections with 
nonhumans, spaces, regulations, establishing new ones and introducing a 
number of techniques that alter regular nonmeditative performances (chapter 
V). These new relations initially generate resistance, but can eventually bring 
forth experiences that are made possible (as put by Gomart and Hennion) by 
new mediations. These entanglements are linked to another concern that runs 
through this dissertation, a concern with the politics of ontology. If these modes 
of subjectivity emerge along with new associations, relationships and couplings, 
what are the politics of these versions of people, and how do these 
reconfigurations contribute to enact particular paradigms of selfhood? 
II.IV.II ONTOLOGICAL POLITICS AND PERFORMATIVITY 
 
 As we have seen in the Introduction, a number of concepts have 
emerged in STS that condense the interplay between practices and 
ontology, and a special issue of “Social Studies of Science”, in June 2013, 
was called “A Turn to Ontology in Science and Technology Studies?”, with 
a number of articles authored by academics including Steve Woolgar, 
John Law, Annemarie Mol and Michael Lynch (Woolgar and Lezaun, 
2013; Law and Lien, 2013; Mol, 2013; Lynch, 2013). 
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 Ontology addresses the problems of “how things are, what is a person, 
and what sort of a world this is” (Bateson, 1972: 313)36. Since meditation is a 
form of intervention, enacting particular paradigms of subjectivity, it raises a set 
of issues dealing with the articulations between performances and ontology and 
the kinds of selves and worlds it makes possible. The term “ontological politics” 
was coined by Annemarie Mol to exemplify how different medical practices 
perform distinct versions of bodies:  
 “Ontological politics is a composite term. It talks of ontology – which in 
 standard philosophical parlance defines what belongs to the real, the 
 conditions of possibility we live with. If the term ‘ontology’ is combined 
 with that of ‘politics’ then this suggests that the conditions of possibility 
 are not given. That reality does not precede the mundane practices in 
 which we interact with it, but is rather shaped within these practices. So 
 the term politics works to underline this active mode, this process of 
 shaping, and the fact that its character is both open and contested.” (Mol, 
 1999: 74-5) 
 
Mol (2002) explores this notion in regards to two medical conditions, 
anaemia and atherosclerosis, suggesting that “reality is manipulated by means 
of various tools in the course of a diversity of practices” (Mol, 1999: 77). 
Different medical practices (clinical practice; statistics or pathophysiology), 
though, are not closed upon themselves. They coexist and are put in sequence, 
reinforcing the idea of multiplicity between alternative realities that do not only 
coexist but “are also found inside one another” (Mol, 1999: 85). Mol’s remarks 
highlight the political dimension of relationality - what kind of devices should be 
used and who should have the legitimacy to select them? 
Along similar lines, John Law reflects on the implications for the social 
sciences of a new vision of method. The productive function of method 
attributes to social sciences a political dimension, associated with the 
impossibility of neutrality:  
                                                             
36
 According to Bateson, the traditional distinction between ontology (what 
things are) and epistemology (how we know things) is artificial, in the sense that 
“beliefs about what sort of world it is will determine how he sees it and acts 
within it, and his ways of perceiving and acting will determine his beliefs about 
its nature” (Bateson, 1972:  313). 
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“Method assemblage and its products can also be judged politically. It 
 does politics, and it is not innocent. In its different versions it operates to 
 make certain (political) arrangements more probable, stronger, more real, 
 whilst eroding others and making them less real.” (Law, 2004: 149) 
 
In the ontology of multiplicity, method becomes performative, helping to 
produce certain realities and “The issue becomes how to make things different, 
and what to make.” (Law, 2004: 143)37 
Michel Callon explored the notion of performativity linked to the creation 
of economic markets. A simple way to define performativity would be to say that 
it is related to the joint process commanded by specialists and the materiality of 
the field that they “describe”. Laws, regularities and trends emerge as a result of 
performances by different actors38, in line with the post-humanist critique of 
representation (see, for instance, Pickering, 1995). Callon’s claim is that “both 
the natural and life sciences, along with the social sciences, contribute towards 
enacting the realities that they describe” (Callon, 2006: 7). Economics and the 
economy co-constitute themselves, since the discipline contributes to the 
framing of economic institutions, such as markets: the laws of the markets are 
not in the nature of society or humans, nor are they constructed to simplify a 
complex reality. Those laws are linked to regularities established through 
actions, including those of economists (Callon, 1998: 46-47).   
                                                             
37
 These reflections on method, from the perspective of ontological politics, are 
particularly interesting because this dissertation deals with meditative exercises, 
procedures for self-transformation, methods of the self. Although Thich Nhat 
Hanh prescribes a set of practices of mindfulness, in Vipassana meditation 
there is a constant focus on the “purity of the technique”, the fact that the 
technology of Vipassana, as it is taught by S. N. Goenka, is something that has 
been transmitted, in its pristine form, since the time of the Buddha. In that 
sense, the “method” of Vipassana links the technical with the spiritual – in order 
to achieve certain results, one has to follow the right method of meditation, 
avoiding other techniques, as we will see in chapters III and V. 
 
38
 Callon’s research has strong implications for social scientists. These are no 
longer limited to the formulation of general rules or providing accounts on the 
functioning of “societies”. Their job should be the multiplication of possible 
realities – “We no longer have to choose between interpreting the world and 
transforming it. Our work, together with the actors, is to multiply possible worlds 
through collective experimentations and performations.” (Callon, 2006: 53) 
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Similar concerns with practice and ontology have emerged much earlier, 
including Fleck’s remarks on the Wasserman reaction (Fleck, 1979) or Marx’s 
aphorism stating that “production not only creates an object for the subject but 
also a subject for the object” (cited in Pickering, 2005: 31). These various 
examples reinforce the political dimension of scientific and technological 
practice, being translated into various recommendations or programs - Mol 
advocates a more active engagement of patients in the selection of the 
treatments they are submitted to; Callon argues for the deployment of hybrid 
forums of public participation (aiming to overcome the so-called “double 
delegation” of contemporary technical democracies, see Callon et al., 2001) and 
Pickering, through the notion of performative incommensurability, questions 
conventional, modern forms of human agency, supported by what he calls 
nonstandard human performances (Pickering, 1995). 
As stated in the Introduction, one of my hypotheses is that Zen and 
Vipassana practices constitute politics of ontology, enacting nonmodern kinds of 
selfhood, a notion that is inspired by Pickering’s reflections on cybernetics and 
is linked to Latour’s exploration of modernity. According to Latour, modern and 
nonmodern are terms that illustrate different understandings of the couplings 
between humans and nonhumans, nature and culture. Moderns tend to be 
dualists, separating these two dimensions, while “a nonmodern is anyone who 
takes simultaneously into account the moderns' Constitution and the 
populations of hybrids that that Constitution rejects and allows to proliferate.” 
(Latour, 1991a:47). Latour’s use of the notion is mostly political, and he wishes 
to overcome the modern dualism between nature and culture by developing a 
new kind of parliament – the parliament of things (see chapter VIII). Pickering’s 
use of the term is slightly different - it is linked to the ontological politics of 
cybernetics, and the notion of nonmodern is used to distinguish cybernetic 
applications from mainstream, modern ones, such as conventional psychiatry: 
“Conventional psychiatry, one could say, already knows what people 
 should be like, and it is the telos of this sort of psychiatry to reengineer—
 to enframe—mental patients back into that image. That is why a 
 hierarchical  system of social relations is appropriate. Power relations 
 and understandings of the self go together. The Bateson-Laing line, of 
 course, was that selves are endlessly complex and endlessly explorable, 
 and the antihierarchical approach of Kingsley Hall was deliberately 
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 intended to facilitate such exploration in both the mad and the sane. This 
 is the mode of revealing, of finding out what the world has to offer us. We 
 can, then, name this contrast in social relations in terms of power and 
 hierarchy, but that is not enough. The sociological contrast echoed and 
 elaborated a contrast in ontological stances—enframing versus 
 revealing— which is, I think, very hard to grasp from the standpoint of 
 modernity.” (Pickering, 2010: 211) 
 
 Meditation can suspend the modern self, characterized in the introduction 
as a dual centre of reason and control. The set of experiences and possibilities 
generated by meditation can be understood as an alternative to modern 
understandings of subjectivity, such as the skin-encapsulated ego (Watts, 1966) 
or Elias’ homo clausus (1978)39. The exploration of the politics of meditation will 
be clearer in chapters VI, VII and VIII, where I will analyze the range of 
experiences allowed by meditation, the transformation of subjectivity in 
everyday life and the couplings between technologies of meditation and the 
“social”, encompassing different understandings of human reformation, social 
activism or environmentalism. 
 These remarks on relationality, performativity and ontological politics 
contribute to strengthen the interpretative thread of this dissertation that I will 
clarify in the following section. 
II.V INTERPRETATION 
 
  This section lays out the interpretative thread of the dissertation and 
clarifies a number of relevant concepts to my analysis. I will explore a variety of 
issues, including how we should think about selves; how to interpret the forms 
of subjectification operated by meditation; how to tackle the new experiences 
and ways of being that meditation supports as well as the politics of meditation. 
                                                             
39
 Elias’ characterization of the homo clausus is particularly insightful in order to 
describe the modern self: “The conception of the individual as homo clausus, a 
little world in himself who ultimately exists quite independently of the great world 
outside, determines the image of man in general. Every other human being is 
likewise seen as homo clausus; his core, his being, his true self appears 
likewise as something divided within him by an invisible wall from everything 
outside, including every other human being. (Elias, 1978: 249) 
 
60 
 
I suggest that selves should be understood as comprising a set of automatisms; 
that meditation assemblages transform these automatisms through the 
establishment of new webs of associations and technologies of the self; that 
meditation fosters the installation of new automatisms and leads to the 
development of novel experiences; finally, I argue that the automatisms, 
experiences and social applications supported by meditation practice are 
nonmodern, contrasting with their modern, dual counterparts. 
 A key feature of meditation as a technology of the self is to challenge 
existing automatisms, installing new ones. The notion of automatism was 
characterized by Hartmann in the following way: 
 “In well-established achievements they [preconscious ego processes] 
 function automatically: the integration of the somatic systems involved in 
 the action is automatized, and so is the integration of the individual 
 mental acts involved in it. With increasing exercise of the action its 
 intermediate steps disappear from consciousness. ... Not only motor 
 behaviour, but perception and thinking, too, show automatization. 
 Exercise automatizes methods of problem-solving just as much as it 
 does walking, speaking or writing. ... In using automatisms we apply 
 means which already exist, which we need not create anew at every 
 occasion, and consequently the means-end relations in some areas are, 
 so to speak, “not subject to argument”. (Hartmann, 1958:88-91)40 
 
 To get on with our daily lives, we resort to a series of automatisms that 
we have learned - walking, eating, seeing, breathing. As we have seen 
previously, Bourdieu and Mauss use notions such as habitus (Bourdieu, 1977) 
or techniques of the body (Mauss, 1973) to talk about these things. When a new 
baby is born, he is expected to start breathing automatically – in fact, crying out 
loud means that the infant is fully able to use his or her lungs and to breathe 
regularly, meaning that the automatism is put in place and the child is healthy. 
Breathing usually takes place without our conscious control - when our bodies 
lose the ability to breathe automatically we need the help of devices such as 
iron lungs or ventilators. Being able to eat, walk and breathe without thinking too 
much about it is a relevant dimension of being human, and these automatisms 
                                                             
40
 According to Mead, automatisms are “certain inevitable reactions to certain 
specific stimuli, such as taking our hand away from a radiator that is touched, or 
jumping when a loud sound occurs behind us.” (Mead, 1934: 83). Mead’s 
definition focuses exclusively on the aspect of reaction; in this dissertation, not 
only reactions but also thoughts, perception and movements are considered 
automatisms that meditation, as an art of living, deals with. 
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are deep rooted habits that have been repeated numerous times, and most of 
the time we are not aware of them. 
 In order to operate subjective changes, meditation practices require 
individuals to direct their attention toward automatisms41. In Vipassana, one has 
to turn the attention to the breath coming in and going out; after some days of 
retreat, one pays attention to sensations throughout the body. Similarly, the Zen 
practices promoted by Thich Nhat Hanh require subjects to become aware of 
what they are doing and to transform their automatisms. They have to train 
themselves to stop and breathe for three times when they hear the sound of the 
bell; they have to walk slowly and to coordinate breath with movement; they 
have to eat in different ways, etc.. In sum, the forms of subjectification operated 
by meditation require participants to embrace a set of practices that deal with 
regular automatisms, installing new ones - scanning the body from head to toe, 
observing sensations or stopping and breathing every time one hears the sound 
of the bell. These technologies will be explored in detail in chapter V. 
 These devices of subjectification do not rely exclusively on technologies 
of the self. Supported by STS literature on relationality, I suggest that a relevant 
dimension of meditation assemblages is the transformation of habitual 
environments. In everyday life, much of what we do is supported by nonhumans 
(cars, tables, computers, chairs), spaces (living rooms, offices, highways) and a 
number of entities including norms, expectations and personal dispositions. 
These devices constitute webs of associations that are entangled with selves - 
subjectivities are always coupled with particular heterogeneous configurations42. 
                                                             
41
 Meditation, according to Deikman (1966), is a form of de-automatization (Gill 
and Brenman, 1959) – the self becomes aware of automatic processes and 
does not identify with or reacts to them, which permits new experiences and 
understandings of reality to emerge, including mystical experiences. However, I 
suggest that what is at stake is the installation of new automatisms. 
42
 My use of the term “webs of associations” is influenced by STS scholarly 
work, in particular by ANT (see previous section), recognizing the role played by 
nonhumans in socio-technical systems. Similar approaches have been 
developed in psychology, such as the theory of distributed cognition. According 
to Hutchins, memory is distributed throughout human and nonhuman devices. 
He studied airplanes’ cockpits and suggested that memory is supported by 
nonhumans such as the “speed bugs”, transcending the boundaries of 
individual actors – “Memory is normally thought of as a psychological function 
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Foucault used the term discourses to characterize these surfaces of emergence 
of subjectivity 43 . Following a post-humanist interpretation, my analysis will 
address material and performative aspects of subjectification - in chapter IV I 
develop a post-humanist analysis of retreats as settings (comprising a number 
of subjectification devices) that break habitual webs of associations (such as 
those we encounter in our daily lives), establishing new relations – with bells, 
cushions, timetables and a variety of constraints, including silence. 
 Mobilizing particular forms of awareness towards regular automatisms, 
installing new ones and submitting participants to different environments are the 
two major instances of subjectification I analyze in this dissertation (see 
chapters IV and V). The transformation of habitual performances and settings 
allows practitioners to go through experiences that contrast with dominant 
states of consciousness. The attempt to transform automatisms and to submit 
humans to new settings is met with resistance, generating struggles of agency. 
If selves persist and deal with these resistances they can eventually install new 
automatisms and tune in to different realms of experience, including feeling 
subtle vibrations throughout their body, experiencing dissolution or oneness 
with the present moment, suspending the flow of thoughts. Michael Harner used 
the term Ordinary States of Consciousness (OSC) to contrast everyday life, 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
internal to the individual. However, memory tasks in the cockpit may be 
accomplished by functional systems which transcend the boundaries of the 
individual actor. Memory processes may be distributed among human agents, 
or between human agents and external representational devices.” (Hutchins, 
1995: 284) 
43
 According to Foucault, discourses denote “a group of verbal performances; 
and by discourse, then, I meant that which was produced (perhaps all that was 
produced) by the groups of signs. But I also meant a group of acts of 
formulation, a series of sentences or propositions. Lastly — and it is this 
meaning that was finally used (together with the first, which served in a 
provisional capacity) — discourse is constituted by a group of sequences of 
signs, in so far as they are statements, that is, insofar as they can be assigned 
particular modalities of existence.” (Foucault, 2002: 120-121). Foucault 
suggested that “discourse is not the majestically unfolding manifestation of a 
thinking, knowing, speaking subject, but, on the contrary, a totality, in which the 
dispersion of the subject and his discontinuity with himself may be determined” 
(Foucault, 2002: 60), meaning that discourse is not something individuals can 
deploy but rather devices that create subject-positions; a subject, therefore, is a 
“vacant place that may in fact be filled by different individuals” (Foucault, 2002: 
107). 
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mundane experience, with Shamanic States of Consciousness (SSC)44. The 
emergence of distinct states of consciousness along with meditation practice 
follows the radical reconfiguration of settings and of how people deal with their 
automatisms. This generates new ways of experiencing selves and the world, 
and the role of chapter VI is to explore some of the experiences shared by my 
interviewees. 
 In order to tune in on meditative states of consciousness, participants 
have to replace habitual automatisms. They have to submit themselves to new 
webs of associations and technologies of the self. New states and ways of 
being are not enacted as a direct result of their will and intentions - they actually 
require meditators to be passive in order to emerge, taking them by surprise, as 
I suggest in chapter VI. As Pickering states:  
 “As active, intentional beings, scientists tentatively construct some new 
 machine. They then adopt a passive role, monitoring the performance of 
 the machine to see whatever capture of material agency it might effect. 
 Symmetrically, this period of human passivity is the period in which 
 material agency actively manifests itself.” (Pickering, 1995: 21-22) 
 
 The participants surrender themselves to new webs of associations and 
technologies of the self, becoming passive in face of new networks of power, 
suspending their will. When these new assemblages become installed, 
meditative agency can eventually emerge, and nonmodern experiences take 
place without individual control: “Captures and their properties in this sense just 
happen. This is my basic sense of emergence, a sense of brute chance, 
happening in time.” (Pickering, 1995: 24) 
 Practices of meditation allow meditators to capture different agencies, 
including mystical experiences (chapter VI), nonstandard phenomena that 
                                                             
44
 According to Harner, “Dragons, griffins, and other animals that would be 
considered "mythical" by us in the OSC are "real" in the SSC. The idea that 
there are "mythical" animals is a useful and valid construct in OSC life, but 
superfluous and irrelevant in SSC experiences. "Fantasy" can be said to be a 
term applied by a person in the OSC to what is experienced in the SSC. 
Conversely, a person in the SSC may perceive the experiences of the OSC to 
be illusory in SSC terms. Both are right-, as viewed from their own particular 
states of consciousness.” (Harner, 1980: xvi) 
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question mechanistic understandings of time and space or the ability to 
abandon their skin-encapsulated selves (chapter VII) – these are temporally 
emergent phenomena (Pickering, 1995) that can be eventually perceived if 
practitioners implement technologies of meditation. 
 In order to get on in the world in meditative ways, these technologies 
have to keep running, altering habitual ways of reacting to events and allowing 
the emergence of a wide range of phenomena that can include a heightened 
awareness towards others and even telepathy and synchronicity (chapter VII). 
 There are many notions that can be used to classify the fruits or effects 
of meditation. Foucault suggested that power is always positive – in the case of 
meditation, new settings and technologies of the self conjure up new ways of 
being in the world, and these can be understood as positivities. Akrich and 
Latour use the Gibsonian notion of affordances to characterize “what a device 
allows or forbids from the actors” (Akrich and Latour, 1992: 261)45 – the device 
of meditation allows actors to experience a wide range of phenomena that 
regular, modern configurations prevent, experiences that people in OSC, as put 
by Harner, usually do not go through and do not understand - they are in a 
different frequency and paradigm of subjectivity. In order to capture these 
affordances of meditative agency, participants have to suspend their will, 
embracing new regulations, moving and sitting in particular ways, staying in 
particular places for certain periods of time – by doing so, they have a chance to 
witness the emergence of new ontologies that are blocked by modern 
configurations of selfhood. 
                                                             
45
 Gomart and Hennion also resort to the notion of affordances to highlight the 
fact that “the propensity of music refers to and unfolds with the habits and 
embodiment of the creature listening.” (Gomart and Hennion, 1999: 239). The 
notion of “affordances” was created by James Gibson, and it refers to the 
possibilities offered by the environment – “The affordances of the environment 
are what it offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes, either for good or ill. 
The verb to afford is found in the dictionary, but the noun affordance is not. I 
have made it up. I mean by it something that refers to both the environment and 
the animal in a way that no existing term does. It implies the complementarity of 
the animal and the environment.” (Gibson, 1986: 127). In this dissertation, 
“affordances” will not refer exclusively to the new possibilities offered by the 
retreat environment but also to the phenomena that emerge along with 
meditation practices, understood as mediators. 
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 Meditation practices are nonmodern, contrasting with modern, dual ways 
of being in the world. Eating meditation involves thinking about food chains and 
nonhumans; the technique of Vipassana involves looking for sensations in the 
body, increasing one’s awareness. Modern automatisms produce a dualism 
between mind and body, self and others, humans and nonhumans. The 
automatisms and experiences prompted by meditation contrast with dualist 
versions of selfhood and anthropocentric human/nonhuman couplings, 
constituting alternatives to modern forms of subjectivity. Experiencing 
dissolution and eating as a deeply collective endeavour are positivities allowed 
by the assemblages of meditation, webs of associations and automatisms that 
are surfaces of emergence of meditative agencies. I argue that the ontologies of 
meditation are nonmodern, expanding the range of human experience beyond 
dualism, representation and control, revealing symmetrical and performative 
ways of being in the world. 
 The experiences generated by meditation practice suggest that the way 
one inhabits the world is not linear but rather filtered by automatisms. Jakob von 
Uexkull used the notion of Umwelt, usually translated as environment, to argue 
that different species have different ways of experiencing the world. We pick up 
certain elements from the environment according to our organisms and sense 
organs, selecting a small amount of what is available - “Every subject spins out, 
like the spider's threads, its relations to certain qualities of things and weaves 
them into a solid web, which carries its existence” (Uexkull, 2010: 53). Different 
ways of perceiving the environment are linked to different physical constitutions 
– an example used by von Uexkull is the tick, that has a very limited and 
reductive experience of the world 46 . One could argue that an important 
dimension of meditation training is to transform one’s perception of the 
environment, including bodily dimensions and how one deals with external 
objects. Through the installation of new automatisms and associations, the 
human machine is altered, allowing the emergence of new agencies, increasing 
one’s sensitivity to perceive them. This includes a variety of nonordinary states 
                                                             
46
 According to Uexkull, “The whole rich world surrounding the tick is constricted 
and transformed into an impoverished structure that, most importantly of all, 
consists only of three features and three effect marks—the tick's environment.” 
(Uexkull, 2010: 51) 
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(chapter VI) different ways of perceiving the self in relation to its environment 
(chapter VII), leading to the enactment of an extended version of subjectivity 
that does not filter those nonstandard phenomena usually unavailable to 
nonmeditators.  
 The installation of new automatisms fosters the emergence of a different 
Umwelt, allowing meditators to undergo novel experiences and to develop 
sensitivity towards phenomena they would otherwise ignore. In chapter VII I use 
the notion of “equipment” (influenced by Foucault’s and Rabinow’s remarks on 
the Greek notion of paraskeue) to suggest that the application of technologies 
of the self in daily life leads to a wide range of consequences, including new 
ways of reacting to difficult situations and the development of a set of positivities 
that can be understood as nonmodern, transforming regular experience. 
 The nonmodern character of meditation extends to its social applications. 
In chapter VIII I analyze how meditation is used to tackle human reformation 
and the environmental crisis and to support forms of social action. One could 
argue that the “social” dimension is not necessarily linked to technologies of the 
self. However, in order to operate subjective changes, Vipassana and Zen 
assemblages reconfigure habitual webs of associations with nonhumans, 
spaces and regulations (see chapter IV) that constitute the social. The 
subjectifying power of new heterogeneous assemblages and the wide range of 
new ways of experiencing reality that they enact support new ways of imagining 
and performing the world, constituting mediators that affect and reconfigure the 
social sphere. Vipassana’s approach towards human reformation in prisons is 
influenced by the performativity of the self that allows individuals to transform 
their selfhood due to new practices and associations; meditation-based 
approaches to tackle the environmental crisis are supported by a symmetrical 
conception of human and nonhuman couplings, rejecting the modern and 
dualist anthropocentric bias. 
 Influenced by Foucauldian and STS literature, I suggest that meditation 
fosters subjective changes through the reconfiguration of habitual environments 
(the retreat) and the installation of new automatisms (stopping and breathing 
whenever one hears the sound of the bell; accepting whatever sensation occurs 
at the bodily level, without craving or aversion), allowing selves to tune in to 
realms of experience that are “blocked” by ordinary states of consciousness. 
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These new realms of experience are eminently nonmodern, prompting nondual 
experiences of the environment, feeling the body as dissolved or experiencing a 
total absorption in the present moment. These transformations are not limited to 
mystical experiences (chapter VI) but involve novel ways of being in the world. 
Progressively, practitioners are able to develop new forms of awareness, 
abandoning dual, skin-encapsulated ways of being, transforming habitual ways 
of experiencing the environment – their Umwelt is transformed. 
 The performativity of selves extends to the plasticity of the world we live 
in. Zen and Vipassana practices act as mediators, influencing and reconfiguring 
broader social formations, informed by meditative insights such as 
impermanence or Interbeing (see chapter V) and by different paradigms of 
subjectivity. The applications that they bring forth suspend habitual distinctions 
between friend and foe, human and nonhuman, normal and deviant. By 
coupling Foucauldian reflections on subjectivity with STS insights on politics 
and technology, this dissertation will explore the politics of meditation, 
examining how human subjects undergo a number of subjective changes 
through the development of technologies of the self and how these technologies 
inform alternative ways of performing social worlds, presenting meditation as 
the breeding ground for nonmodern paradigms of the self and the world. 
  
II.VI CONCLUSION  
  
 This chapter outlined three branches of scholarly work highly relevant to 
this dissertation: meditation research; Foucauldian reflections on subjectivity 
and post-humanist STS concerns with relationality, performativity and 
ontological politics. Meditation is not understood as a religious practice but as a 
technology of the self that mobilizes spatial, legislative, material and 
performative devices to create different versions of people. These instances of 
subjectification, aiming at the transformation of regular automatisms, clash with 
the habitual networks that support the modern self – new connections have to 
be established to allow different experiences, different ways of acting in 
everyday life and of tackling social problems – affordances of meditation.   
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 Considering these three branches of academic literature, the contribution 
of this dissertation is threefold. Regarding meditation research, I will develop a 
post-humanist analysis of meditation, focusing on how self and social 
transformations are fostered by different associations between meditators and 
new webs of associations that include new environments, nonhumans and 
techniques. Concerning Foucauldian reflections on subjectivity, I will move 
beyond Foucault’s focus on the genealogy of western subjectivity. Instead of 
focusing on the history of subject formations, I will analyze Zen and Vipassana 
practices as constituting alternative paradigms to dominant social/self 
formations, linked to different networks of subjectivity, exploring the experiences 
of meditators. Finally, I will contribute towards expanding STS scholarly work on 
the self, analyzing meditation as a technology of the self that performs 
nonmodern versions of subjectivity and of the world. 
 The role of the following chapter is to explain how I developed my 
research, presenting the wide range of methods I used to study meditation and 
the difficulties I came across.  
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III. METHODOLOGY 
 
III.I  INTRODUCTION 
 
 Historically, meditation studies have drawn upon a series of methods to 
address a multiplicity of research questions. In psychology, different 
methodologies were used, including tests (such as the Rorschach test, see 
Brown and Engler, 1986), the personal experience of the author (Walsh, 1977 
and 1978), the analysis of central texts of Buddhist meditation, such as the 
Visuddhimagga, providing “maps” for inner spaces (Goleman, 1996) or even 
quantitative methods. Sociological and anthropological studies have resorted to 
comprehensive ethnographies (Cook, 2010; Jordt, 2007; Pagis, 2008; Preston, 
1988), semi-structured interviews with meditators (Pagis, 2008; Selim, 2011), 
life-stories of practitioners (Leledaki, 2007) and the personal experience of the 
researcher (Selim, 2011; Preston, 1988). More recently, neuroscientific and 
neurophenomenological studies have measured the brainwaves of experienced 
meditators through fMRI’s and other technological instruments, justifying the 
assumption that meditation has real, measurable effects on the brains (and 
minds) of practitioners (see, for instance, Lutz et al., 2004). 
  These different approaches are ways of tackling phenomena taking 
place at the realm of “inner experience”, which can raise a set of methodological 
issues: how to translate the inner world? Can we use words to talk about those 
experiences that belong to the realm of the ineffable? Can we trust the accounts 
of those who go through these states? Are academic approaches to meditation 
based on personal experiences “objective”?47 As Wittgenstein states, “What we 
cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.” (Wittgenstein, 1961: 89); if 
we assume that meditation is about the ineffable, the unreachable and 
untranslatable, then meditation research would become an impossible 
endeavour. However, instead of becoming a verboten field of study, it requires 
                                                             
47
 For a comprehensive discussion of some of the issues raised by first-person 
approaches to the study of consciousness, see Varela and Shear (1999). 
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the deployment of innovative methodologies that recognize the particularities of 
the topic. Varela and Shear (1999) argue that links have to be created between 
first and third person approaches to the study of consciousness. This involves 
the deployment of a set of methodologies in order to “move towards an 
integrated or global perspective on mind where neither experience nor external 
mechanisms have the final word. The global perspective requires the explicit 
establishment of mutual constraints, a reciprocal influence and determination” 
(Varela and Shear, 1999:2).  A good example of intertwining first and third 
person approaches is, for instance,  crossing verbal reports of meditative 
experiences with their physiological correlates, measured in laboratories (Shear 
and Jevning, 1999). 
 Another important issue concerning meditation research is that those 
who undertake it become actively involved in this practice, which means that 
sometimes they have to “go native” in order to study ritual our religious 
experience (Knibbe et al., 2001). This is justified by various reasons: in order to 
have access to those places where meditation is taught (monasteries, practice 
centres, etc.), one has to practice; to understand the particularities of this 
technology of the self, one is required to have experiential knowledge, in order 
to know what meditation is all about; finally, meditation is a deeply existential 
and spiritual quest - it is about personal transformation, dealing with fears, 
expectations, sensations, memories and, of course, the possibility of 
transcendence – it mobilizes the totality of the individual, and requires a strong 
engagement to attain long lasting results. As Bache suggests, “The 
philosophical discussion of nonordinary states cannot be done well from a 
distance but requires the commitment of personal experience” (Bache, 2000: 6). 
 My interest in meditation is not purely academic: as a curious human 
being, I also want to explore the possibilities of experience beyond the shackles 
of modern selfhood and academia. Meditation can easily become a passion for 
the academic and, in this field, it is not uncommon to “go native”, becoming an 
avid practitioner. In fact, mind-altering practices and substances have this 
particularity – the stories of Timothy Leary and Richard Alpert (now Ram Dass) 
are well know – through their contact with psychedelics (such as LSD) and 
spiritual practices (such as meditation), they “went native”, abandoning the 
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establishment (namely academia, the University of Harvard) and embodying 
new sets of beliefs and technologies; Michael Harner, after experiencing 
ayahuasca, decided to dedicate his career to the promotion of shamanism, 
even developing new techniques for the emergence of altered states of 
consciousness (Harner, 1980); Stanislav Grof, after taking LSD for the first time, 
realized that his career as a psychiatrist was forever transformed (Grof and 
Bennet, 1993). 
 Meditation is also prone to these phenomena – Cook (2010) became a 
nun to conduct her study and Preston (1988) became deeply involved with the 
Los Angeles Zen Centre. In my case, I did not have any serious experience with 
meditation, although I practiced from time to time, and nowadays I try to 
maintain a regular meditative regime. However, I am still a beginner, therefore 
there are many meditative realms that I do not claim to understand, meaning 
that my reflections on meditation are limited by my experience. In that sense, 
we should probably reformulate Wittgenstein’s proposition, turning it into 
something like: “What we cannot experience we must pass over in silence.”  
 Finally, as stated in the literature review, methods are performative, they 
open up certain realities, as Law puts it (2004). This complicates my research 
even more: on the one hand, meditation is a difficult subject to tackle, since it 
apparently deals with inner experience; on the other hand, meditation research 
requires the deployment of certain methodologies that offer partial readings of 
the real – in the case of this dissertation, qualitative research methods. 
 In order to address these issues, I selected different methodologies to 
deal with specific research questions, bearing in mind the overall concerns of 
this dissertation – mechanisms of subjectification and the ontological politics of 
Vipassana and Zen. I am particularly concerned with how specific interventions 
and associations allow the emergence of different subjective dispositions. 
Therefore, I decided that this project should unfold in such a way that I would 
have different chapters on the articulations between subjectification and 
ontological transformations, drawing on aspects such as the setting, 
performances, experiences, meditation in everyday life and social applications 
of meditation. 
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 This means that I had to obtain data on those different aspects. 
Regarding the setting, I needed to understand how these retreats work. What 
kinds of mechanisms are used? What are the materials that are recruited to 
“shape” subjectivities in these spaces? What are the regulations that these 
movements draw upon in order to perform new subjectivities? Then, since we 
are dealing with technologies of the self, I needed to understand exactly what 
the performances, techniques, movements, forms of managing the mental and 
somatic order of the individual employed by meditation actually are. In sum, I 
had to obtain data on the performative reorganization of the meditative 
individual.  Since these movements also deploy specific politics of experience 
(Laing, 1967), particular ways of experiencing bodies, minds and the 
environment, I needed to have access to those realms of experience. According 
to Zahavi, “Phenomenology is concerned with attaining an understanding and 
proper description of the experiential structure of our mental/embodied life” 
(Galagher and Zahavi, 2008:9); regarding meditation, I was interested in 
understanding what happens when one meditates and how it differs from 
“normal” experience. Concerning meditation in daily life, we find in both 
traditions an attempt to disseminate meditative technologies (and dispositions) 
throughout everyday life. Therefore, this required data on how these practices 
are used in daily life and how they transform subjectivities. Finally, and 
concerning the chapter on meditation and social change, I had to understand 
exactly how these movements mobilize meditation to foster social 
transformations – what exactly are their projects? How have they historically 
promoted certain social arrangements and what is the role played by 
meditation? 
 These various concerns justified the use of a multifaceted methodology, 
including participant observation; semi-structured interviews; auto-ethnography; 
central literary sources concerning each movement; numerous personal 
accounts dealing with these practices, present in popular literature, online 
blogs, discussion forums or even journals (and newsletters) published by these 
traditions; movies and documentaries exploring social applications of 
meditation, particularly Vipassana. The role of the following sections is to 
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explain how these various resources were mobilized and to critically reflect on 
the methods used. 
 
III.II PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION 
 
 My fieldwork involved participation in four meditation retreats. In May 
2010 I went to my first 10-day Vipassana retreat, in Dhamma Dipa, 
Hereforshire, England. I attended the second 10-day retreat in November 2011, 
in the South of Portugal, this time at a non-permanent centre48. Regarding the 
case study on Zen, I attended a two-week retreat in March 2011, and I returned 
to Plum Village for a week of intensive practice in December 2011. In both 
cases, my stay coincided with the winter-retreat, a period of three months 
between early December and March when the whole monastic community 
(along with Thich Nhat Hanh) is present, since there are various monasteries 
worldwide where the community can travel to. The “central” monastery of this 
tradition, where Thich Nhat Hanh lives, is located in the South of France, one 
hour by train from Bordeaux, and it is called Plum Village. I also “followed” the 
local groups of Vipassana and Thich Nhat Han’s Zen meditation group in 
Exeter. In the case of Zen, I started following the group in October 2010, and 
until approximately June 2011 I maintained a regular contact with the Sangha, 
or community of practice. Between March-May 2012 I resumed attending the 
weekly meetings of the group. During these periods, I also managed to attend 3 
“mindfulness days”, basically a day (usually on Sundays) dedicated to intensive 
practice, including sitting, eating and walking meditation, dharma sharing, etc. 
(see chapter V). I participated in the weekly sittings of the Exeter Vipassana 
group from January to May 2012, including attending a one day course of sitting 
meditation. 
                                                             
48
 This means that the retreat takes place at a property that does not belong to 
the Vipassana Trust, requiring volunteers to adjust the space to make sure the 
retreat is organized according to the general model (see chapter IV). 
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 Conducting participant observation in the Vipassana retreats was 
particularly challenging because one is not suppose to read, write or take notes, 
and the 10 days are spent in silence. Since the practice consists of sitting 
meditation, with the eyes closed, limited observation can be undertaken while 
meditating at the same time, not to mention that meditation itself is a private 
practice generating a diversity of mental states, some of then challenging. The 
data I obtained consisted fundamentally of instructions on how to meditate; 
organizational aspects; some incidents that took place (one of my roommates in 
the second retreat became aggressive, and had to be expelled) and, of course, 
my personal experiences. As previously mentioned, writing was forbidden, and 
although the control over such activities seemed lax (since there was no one 
controlling what happened in the semi-privacy of the residential quarters), I was 
sharing my room with other people, and self-censorship prevented me from 
publicly engaging in “intellectual” behaviour such as taking notes. In fact, in the 
first retreat I shared a small room with two other people, and we benefited from 
comfortable beds and good heating. In the second retreat, I had to share a 
Tepee with three other people, and the conditions weren’t particularly pleasant 
– for instance, the mattress was really small and sometimes I would wake up in 
the middle of the night sleeping on the hard floor. Since I wasn’t by myself, I had 
to adopt “guerrilla tactics”, doing undercover research. I had a small hygiene 
bag that I carried with me every time I went to the bathroom, and there I had my 
small notebook where I wrote all the experiences, observations and other 
aspects that I found relevant. In the second Vipassana retreat this task proved 
quite difficult – although I was slightly more experienced in this “undercover 
writing”, the lighting wasn’t sufficient to see everything that I was doing, so I had 
to strategically place a flashlight during my bathroom visits to properly conduct 
the task at hand. Later on, after the retreats, I used those notes (as well as 
other materials provided during the 10-day course, such as the code of conduct) 
to prepare a summary of the whole “experience”.  
 Doing research at the Zen monastery proved to be much easier. In fact, 
minutes after arriving for the first time, I had contact with another social scientist 
who was also conducting research there, and I realized that this tradition had 
little or no reservations concerning qualitative research on meditation. Every 
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night, before falling asleep, I wrote extensive notes in my notebook, 
summarizing the experiences of the day, the practices undertaken and other 
aspects I considered relevant for the research. In fact, some of the other 
participants also had their own diaries, and the practice of writing was well-
accepted. I brought my recorder with me and I also managed not only to 
interview other retreatants but also to record an event where some old 
practitioners shared their experiences with the practice, as well as one occasion 
when the bells were being played for an ordination ceremony. 
 The local groups were also particularly helpful to provide an idea of how 
these practices are maintained “outside” the retreat environment, and how 
subjective dispositions are deployed throughout daily life, supported by the set 
of technologies promoted by these movements. The days dedicated to intensive 
practice were also important to understand how these micro versions of the 
retreat are put in place – what kinds of activities, performances, discursive 
instructions and materials are mobilized? 
 Participant observation was crucial to obtain data on various aspects: 
how these retreats are organized (including aspects of regulation, spatial 
partitioning, architectural devices and associations between humans and non-
humans), the performances that are enacted by these traditions (the various 
technologies of meditation) and also theoretical aspects promoting certain 
hermeneutics of experience (in Plum Village there are regular Dharma Talks 
during the winter retreat and in the Vipassana retreats there are the evening 
discourses of S. N. Goeka and also the interactions between assistant teachers 
and students).  
III.III THE SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS 
 
 Another “instrument” that I found highly useful were semi-structured 
interviews. Since there are two case studies, I managed to interview 12 
participants of each tradition, plus another participant who was relatively 
experienced in both, as well as an expert in meditation also familiarized with the 
tradition of Thich Nhat Hanh. I wanted to interview beginners (like myself) and 
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long term participants. Regarding the Zen tradition, this task wasn’t particularly 
difficult. I managed to convince most of the people I approached in Plum Village 
to be interviewed, and during my first retreat I conducted 6 interviews with both 
recent and “old” practitioners. I explained that I was conducting a PhD research 
and that I wanted to know about their experiences with meditation. Afterwards, 
and since I was part of the local meditation group linked to the tradition of Thich 
Nhat Hanh, I managed to interview other experienced participants, including a 
Dharma Teacher. My interview “script” underwent various changes throughout 
the years of research, but my questions were open ended, and they focused on 
the experiences with different practices of meditation; the various ethical, 
mental and somatic changes experienced by individuals; the effects of 
meditation in everyday life; the importance of the community of practice and of 
notions such as impermanence and Interbeing (see chapter V)49.  In the case of 
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 My Vipassana interview script included the following questions: “When was 
the first time you went to a Vipassana retreat? Motivations; reasons…;  When 
did you start practicing Vipassana regularly? (Sitting everyday, etc., making 
Vipassana part of your  life)…; What do you feel when you practice Vipassana?; 
What do you feel when you practice Metta?  and Apanana?; Have you been 
through any non ordinary experience(s) you would like to share? Are they 
important?; Is it common to experience dissolution/ feeling the inside of the 
body, organs, etc? ; What about gross sensations turning into subtle ones; 
according to your experience when/why does this happen?; Have you 
experienced Bangha? Was outside reality different after experiencing 
dissolution? (Were things vibrating, etc.); Could you please elaborate on the 
evolution of equanimity and awareness throughout the years of practice?; Do 
you agree that Vipassana is a path of purification? If so, and according to your 
experience, how do equanimity and awareness contribute, through practice, to 
the eradication of Sankharas?; Do you think it’s common to have old memories 
coming up during Vipassana? Are they linked to physical 
sensations/sankharas?; Regarding awareness, could you please elaborate on 
the importance of vibrations for this practice? How do they affect the retreats or 
daily practice, for instance? What about the vibrations of other people?; How do 
you apply Vipassana and awareness of sensations in daily life? Is there any 
situation when you resort to Metta or Anapana?; How do you use equanimity in 
daily life, for instance if a challenging situation arises (someone being rude, 
shouting at you, etc)?; Do you think Vipassana transformed your habit patterns? 
The types of thoughts you have, for instance (compassion, etc)?; Are you more 
aware of emotions? Is this generated by the awareness of sensations 
(correlations between mind/emotions/sensations)?; Could you please elaborate 
on the importance of Sila?; Some people, in the beginning of their meditative 
journey, struggle with physical pain, lack of concentration, etc. How have you 
learned to deal with these issues?; Could you please tell me about the 
importance of participating in a retreat? What about daily sittings?; Is it fair to 
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Zen practitioners, I also included some questions on the social and political 
aspects of this form of Engaged Buddhism50. These conversations, in some 
cases, didn’t follow the structure of a “script”, and I explored various different 
aspects according to the answers and willingness of the participants.  
 In the case of Vipassana, it was much more difficult to find interviewees. 
First of all, we are dealing with retreats conducted in silence, and talking to 
other retreatants is only allowed at the beginning (before the course starts) and 
from the 10th day onwards. Conducting interviews at these retreats was 
impossible. Initially, I attempted to interview assistant teachers. I sent an e-mail 
to two assistant teachers (a married couple) in Portugal, where I’m originally 
from, but they refused, stating that “We’re sorry that your research proposal was 
not accepted. However, we wish you plenty of success with your doctoral 
project.”51 After contacting a friend of mine who is linked to this organization, I 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
say that Vipassana transformed your life? If so, how?; According to your 
personal experience, what are the most important benefits of Vipassana?” 
50
 This is the script I used to interview Zen meditators in the tradition of Thich 
Nhat Hanh: “Do you remember the first time you went to Plum Village?;How 
many times have you been here?; Could you tell me about the most relevant 
experiences with: Sitting meditation / Walking meditation / Eating meditation 
/Working meditation and also with other practices you consider relevant 
(touching the earth, looking deeply, etc)?; Regarding these practices of 
mindfulness, how do they make you experience your body and mind? Could 
you give me some concrete examples?; What did you learn about yourself? ; 
Do you keep a regular practice of meditation? ; What are/were the main 
difficulties to practice mindfulness? How did you overcome these difficulties?; 
What is the importance of the teacher, Thay, his presence and teachings for the 
practice of mindfulness? Do you have any particular episode with Thay you 
recollect and want to share? ; How does mindfulness affect your experience of 
mind and body? Could you give me some examples? ; During the practice of 
mindfulness did you have any nonordinary experience? Could you please 
describe it? ; Do you use gathas to meditate? Do you have gathas in your 
house/bedroom? Are these gathas yours or written by Thay?; This practice talks 
a lot about watering good seeds, such as the seed of mindfulness. How do you 
water your positive seeds? Have you abandoned any habits?; How does 
mindfulness affect inter-personal relationships?; Do you think the practice 
affected how you deal with animals, plants and minerals?; What about in terms 
of politics? ; What is the importance of Interbeing for your meditation practice? 
How do you apply the five mindfulness trainings in your daily life?; Do you 
consider the Sangha important for the practice?; Do you consider that 
mindfulness transformed your life? Could you give me some examples?   
51
 In the email I sent them initially I didn’t mention the questions I was going to 
ask, but I presented my research project and stated that I was interested in 
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was told that it was unusual for the organization to support research projects or 
to have Assistant Teachers give interviews. At this point, I only had one case 
study, Vipassana meditation, and I started to realize that, since this organization 
was not going to help me and it would therefore be difficult to interview a good 
number of subjects, the ideal course of action would probably be to add other 
case studies: from that moment on (this was by the end of my first year) I 
decided to include the Zen tradition of Thich Nhat Hanh. After consulting more 
academic literature on the organization of S. N. Goenka, I realized that other 
researchers had come across similar problems. Aspasia Leledaki, who 
completed her PhD at the University of Exeter, reports in her doctoral 
dissertation the problems she encountered while studying this tradition of 
Vipassana: 
 “My initial meditation group turned out to be a ‘blind alley’ as I met a lot of 
 resistance from Goenka’s Vipassana meditation assistant teachers to 
 allow this research project any formal access either for interviewing 
 teachers or practitioners. With the benefit of hindsight, it is not surprising 
 considering the ‘conservative’ and ‘preservationist’ attitude his tradition 
 has. Indeed, these very cautious and closed attitudes make it a very 
 interesting group to study in the future should access be gained.” 
 (Leledaki, 2007: 106) 
 
 Paul Solomon, who wrote an interesting book on the phenomenological 
experiences of psychologists who meditate, also reports similar problems with 
this Vipassana organization. He attempted to recruit participants for his study, 
but the organization did not help him: 
 “I also e-mailed three Vipassana meditation centres in Australia and one 
 in the UK, attaching information sheets and consent forms describing the 
 study, but they were unable to put me in touch with any potential 
 participants. This was disappointing, especially since the manager of the 
 English centre submitted my information sheet and consent form to the 
 Vipassana Ethics committee in Switzerland, which approved my request 
 on the grounds that the study might encourage psychotherapists to 
 practice Vipassana.” (Solomon, 2008: 32) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
understanding how “certain practices alter how humans experience their bodies 
and minds, as well as their impacts on ethics”. 
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 After contacting an old student who is also a social researcher, I was told 
that this organization is not interested in independent research; usually, in order 
to be granted the possibility to conduct research with their support it is 
necessary to be a serious practitioner of Vipassana – this means meditating for 
varying lengths of regular extended practice, attending retreats, serving in 
courses and, of course, having privileged links with the national “Vipassana 
Trust”, the association, in each country, responsible for running these courses. 
In fact, this organization even has its own “Research Institute”, called the 
“Vipassana Research Institute”52, which produces different reports and “papers” 
on Vipassana meditation, although these do not go through the regular 
mechanisms of “scientific” assessment, such as double blind peer review.  
 Aware of the fact that I wouldn’t be helped by the organization, and after 
deciding that I would include another case study (whose “organization” didn’t 
oppose my study), I carefully identified some participants to be interviewed. 
Initially, I followed an opportunistic sampling, approaching those individuals with 
whom I had developed a connection: because they were sitting next to me, 
because they were also Portuguese or just because they were also interested in 
academic research. Most of these participants had attended between 2 and 5 
retreats. Then, after joining the local sitting group in Exeter, I attempted to 
interview older students, those who have been practicing for more than 10 or 20 
years. This task was particularly difficult, because I already knew that those who 
practice for a long time become affiliated to the organization, therefore there is a 
greater chance of “embodying” the official policy regarding research (namely its 
rejection). I approached those who were practicing for longer. In one case, one 
of them asked me to send him the questions beforehand. I did so (I sent him the 
interview script) but unfortunately my interview was rejected, with the potential 
interviewee stating that “These are not questions I would like to discuss. I hope 
you are able to find others to help you with this research project.” Another 
experienced meditator I approached also politely refused to be interviewed, 
suggesting me to interview other meditators in the area (one of them was the 
author of the email I quoted), although he provided me with some material on 
Vipassana, due to his privileged links to the organization (he was part of the 
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 http://www.vridhamma.org/ 
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Vipassana Trust). Through this local group, I managed to interview two “old 
students” who have been practicing for more than 20 years, which was 
extremely helpful. However, in one case I was asked to send an e-mail with the 
questions beforehand, and I had to insist to conduct the interview. In the other 
case, initially I was met with great enthusiasm, since my research was 
considered highly interesting, and after the interview this person told me I would 
be given more material on a specific social application of Vipassana. However, 
before I could be given such material, permission had to be granted by the main 
Vipassana centre in the UK, Dhamma Dipa. The assistant teachers in charge of 
the centre refused to grant me access to those materials, and this interviewee 
told me that “the centre teacher does not favour getting involved in research 
projects.” The rest of the email read like this: 
 “They gave me some detailed explanations of why The Vipassana Trust 
 are not involved in research projects, one reason being to respect the 
 privacy of the meditators, along with participant pre-selection bias, ( 
 all participants are already meditators),  and the possibility of negative 
 findings being published. The Vipassana Trust feel that they are already 
 well informed....” 
 
 In sum, one can induce, according to this information, that they are not 
particularly interested in academic research on their “practice” conducted by 
those who are not affiliated with the tradition for a long time, eventually to avoid 
criticism, according to an informant. Therefore, they try to produce their own 
“research” through the Vipassana Research Institute, or through the work of 
professionals affiliated to this tradition (such as Paul Fleischman, a psychiatrist). 
Another interesting aspect is that the discursive branch of Vipassana (meaning 
the discursive apparatus linked to this practice, namely the books written by 
Goenka and his daily discourses in the 10-day “course”) promotes the idea that 
this technology of the self is “scientific” (see chapter V) – one is experiencing 
reality as it is – the Buddha, who supposedly rediscovered this ancient practice, 
is considered a scientist of the mind and matter and various examples are given 
justifying the “scientificity” of this practice, in a modernist sense, since it is about 
“cause and effect” (the law of Karma) 53 . Consequently, Vipassana is the 
                                                             
53
 See chapter V for a reflection on Vipassana’s claims of “scientificity”. 
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privileged instrument to access “truth” (therefore its definition as “seeing things 
as they truly are”), requiring not only a deep epistemological operation of the 
individual to “embody” this truth through the transformation of regular 
automatisms, performances etc., but also turning the practice of meditation into 
the highest form of knowledge. Since meditation assumes this epistemological 
status, it is only through practice, through the experiential wisdom granted by 
meditation that one achieves “truth” – Goenka, during the discourses, gives 
plenty of examples confirming this assumption, and in some instances he even 
criticizes academic knowledge for being too abstract 54 . Consequently, the 
Vipassana organization, instead of relying on external and academic 
mechanisms to assess the “validity” of practice, promotes meditation as a 
technology of epistemological and scientific truth. As one of my informants, 
linked to the Vipassana Trust, told me, the assistant teachers refused to be 
interviewed because they would rather have people experiencing meditation for 
themselves, demanding their participation in the retreats along with the various 
instances of subjectification (including forms of institutional affiliation) that 
constitute them. 
 Although I encountered some difficulties to find research subjects, I 
managed to identify a reasonable number of practitioners that agreed to be 
interviewed. All the interviews were recorded, and most were transcribed 
(namely those conducted with long-term practitioners). In the other cases, I 
listened to the interviews and I took notes of the most important ideas and 
passages. Overall, the interviews lasted between 40 and 90 minutes. All the 
                                                             
54
 In one of the central books of this tradition, the “Art of Living”, Goenka tells 
the story of a young professor who, while travelling on a boat, was asking an old 
sailor if he knew anything about oceanography, geology or meteorology. Since 
this member of the crew was an illiterate, with no academic background, the 
young professor told him that he had wasted three quarters of his life (since he 
didn’t know anything about the three central branches of knowledge supposedly 
directly relevant to his work).The next day the sailor asked the academic if he 
knew anything about swimology, if he could swim. Since the professor didn’t 
have any practical knowledge (he couldn’t swim), the sailor told him he had 
wasted all his life, because the ship had struck on a rock and would sink, and 
those who couldn’t swim would die. The moral is that “You may study all the 
“ologies” of the world, but if you do not learn swimology, all your studies are 
useless. You may read and write books on swimming, you may debate on its 
subtle theoretical aspects, but how will that help you if you refuse to enter the 
water yourself? You must learn how to swim.” (Hart, 1987: 11) 
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interviews with Zen practitioners were conducted face-to-face; in the Vipassana 
case study, I conducted three interviews by telephone, since I found it was 
impossible to interview the subjects during the retreat and it was also quite 
expensive to travel long distances to their homes. All the names of the 
participants were changed to protect their identities. Since, in meditation 
retreats, participants were segregated by gender, the majority of interviewees 
were male (approximately 70%). As I stated in chapter I, the vast majority of 
participants in this study were westerners, and most of them were between 25 
and 45 years old. 
 These interviews were particularly relevant for the chapters on 
experiences and meditation in everyday life. They gave me an idea of what 
people experience when they practice meditation and helped me to understand 
how daily lives are informed by meditative practices, how these are used in non-
institutional settings and how the continuity of practice produces a certain 
number of effects on people. Moreover, the interviews with the Zen practitioners 
helped me, in some cases, to reflect on the connections between meditation 
and forms of social action (see chapter VIII). 
III.IV AUTOETHNOGRAPHY 
 
 According to Ellis et al. (2010), “Autoethnography is an approach to 
research and writing that seeks to describe and systematically analyze (graphy) 
personal experience (auto) in order to understand cultural experience (ethno)”. I 
chose to do a PhD on meditation partly because I was curious about new 
possibilities of experiencing myself through different practices, and I thought 
that meditation would be a fantastic learning opportunity. Therefore, this 
research is not merely academic, it is also part of a personal process of self 
discovery that can, obviously, be problematic, since, according to Gill, one of 
the tenets of neo-liberal subjectivity is the identification between pleasure and 
work - there is no differentiation between work and the self (Gill, 2009). 
However, one should also bear in mind that, in the ideal world, work should be 
meaningful, and although I might have been co-opted by neo-liberal logics, it 
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would have been difficult to study meditation without having a clue of what it is 
all about. 
 Moreover, the associations between self-experimentation and academic 
research are not novel or limited to the topic of meditation. The discovery of 
Helicobacter Pilori by Barry Marshall or the creation of maps of alternative 
dimensions of reality by John C. Lilly involved a total commitment with the 
project at hand, jeopardizing the safety of the researcher (see Lilly, 1972). 
According to Lilly, this corresponds to the application of the Bazett-Haldane 
principle: “Do on yourself what you would do on others before you do it on 
others” (Lilly, 1988: 125). In my case, embracing meditation research was a 
form of embodying what Huxley called the non-verbal humanities, “the arts of 
being directly aware of the given facts of our existence” (Huxley, 1963: 62). 
Embracing meditation as a technology of the self was not merely a by-product 
of “fieldwork”, such as the “obligation” of attending retreats to obtain relevant 
data - it assumed an existential dimension, in the sense that I tried to learn and 
to reshape myself through these arts of living. The fact that I had two case 
studies was complicated – Vipassana and Zen, as projects of the self, are 
constituted by different technologies that have to be embodied. They also have 
different “conceptions” of what constitutes a regime of the self. In Vipassana 
courses, participants are taught three distinct techniques: one focusing on the 
breath, another one on a proprioceptive gaze and finally a loving-kindness 
technology. In Thich Nhat Hanh’s Zen, we find a multiplicity of techniques that 
include meditation but also verbalization (in some cases accompanying 
meditative practices) and various forms of deploying mindfulness in daily life. In 
Vipassana, the art of living is the continuous practice of meditation (attending 
retreats, maintaining daily sittings, attending meditation groups affiliated to this 
tradition, etc.); in Zen, we can practice various techniques, not necessarily in a 
specific order, and it is also possible to use the technique of Vipassana as one 
of the various tools for self-cultivation. 
 Although the two Vipassana retreats proved to be highly interesting, 
generating various altered states, the emergence of some deep rooted 
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memories and even transpersonal episodes55, I felt a deeper connection with 
Thich Nhat Hanh’s teachings and practices; not only I found his proposal of 
engaged Buddhism particularly insightful and illustrative of a link between self-
cultivation and social activism but I also resonated with the various practices of 
mindfulness that he advocates. By the end of my first retreat, I had the chance 
to take the five mindful trainings, a formal ceremony where one commits to 
follow the ethical guidelines of this tradition, involving the attribution of a 
Dharma name, and since then (this was in March 2011) I have tried to maintain 
a regular practice of mindfulness. 
 Since I had no regular practice of meditation before starting the PhD, my 
insights and experiences are still limited but, at the same time, highly valuable 
to highlight the contrast between meditative and nonmeditative paradigms of the 
self, helping me understand the ontological politics of meditation. Meditative 
cultivation is a life-long project, and since I am still in the first stages of the 
practice, the perspective I will be able to offer is from the point of view of a 
beginner. However, the experiences I have been through opened up new ways 
of experiencing myself and the world, and although I am far from being an 
accomplished meditator, I feel that only by practicing one is able to write about 
these technologies of the self. This means that, in order to research meditation, 
one has necessarily to develop a certain understanding of this practice that 
contrasts with academic techniques and modes of reasoning. 
 In fact, Johnson (2002), an academic and also a promoter of somatic 
practices56, argues that academic selves are shaped by specific techniques 
(scholar-shaping techniques), such as sitting, writing or speaking. These 
techniques are recruited to fabricate what we could call the academic, critical or 
analytical mind, able to interpret the world according to certain theoretical 
lenses. In order to learn how to meditate, I had to resort to other techniques. I 
was “forced” to accept certain aspects, such as the teacher and the practices; I 
had to sing (in Plum Village it is common to gather before walking meditation 
and to sing two or three songs); I had to sit straight trying not to move for one 
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 I will elaborate on these in chapter VI. 
56
 These can include Yoga, the Alexander technique or Reich’s bioenergetics, 
see Johnson (1986). 
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hour (it was painful!); I had to share some of my personal experiences with 
other meditators, etc.. In sum, this meant that I had to actively participate and 
embrace a new set of practices in order to develop experiential understanding 
of these projects of the self. In some cases, this created a conflict with my 
critical mind (namely during the painful Vipassana retreats), but as the days 
passed and the practice became deeper, I was able to “suspend” some of my 
criticism in order to see what meditation was all about. Basically this meant that, 
in order to access certain realms of experience, I had to detach myself from 
some “resistances” (such as my “academic” or “critical” mind) that were 
preventing me from fully embracing these practices. This represented a struggle 
of agency between two different regimes; in order to attain some degree of 
understanding of Vipassana or Zen, I had to do certain things that clashed with 
my habitual ways of being, and I felt that, if I were to produce a relatively 
accurate account of what meditation does, I had to “suspend” my 
intellectualism.  
 I kept an account of the experiences I went through during the four 
retreats I attended. In Plum Village, it was relatively easy to write down these 
experiences; regarding Vipassana retreats, sometimes (namely during the first 
retreat) I didn’t have a chance to write every day, therefore I tried to remember 
what happened in the previous days. However, since some of the experiences 
are ineffable and hard to tackle through language, words are limited to describe 
what happens during meditation – there is no substitute for experience itself. 
After the retreats, I didn’t use a diary to register what was happening during 
daily practice; therefore, I rely on memory to provide examples of some events 
that took place in everyday life (see chapter VII). Some of my experiences with 
these technologies of the self can be found in chapters VI and VII, but I would 
say that, in general, they helped me understand what it is like to be submitted to 
retreat assemblages, providing also the opportunity to dialogue and to create a 
bond with the interviewees, through the elicitation of my own difficulties and 
“successes”. 
 Autoethnography was, therefore, a central dimension of this research; it 
challenged the usual conceptions of academic work, transforming the 
researcher’s self into the surface of emergence of practical understanding. It 
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also provided a strong ground to foster inter-subjectivity with meditators, helping 
me to make sense of their own experiences. Finally, I became more aware of 
how certain performances can also contribute to denaturalize other realms, 
such as the intellectual one, that usually sustains academic reflection. Through 
the observation of my own resistances, I realized that my critical self emerged 
as the result of a complex assemblage (involving the scholar-shaping 
techniques that Johnson wrote about but also specific institutional settings, 
internalized ambitions, etc.), and I learned that it could (and should) be 
suspended, allowing me to embrace other dispositions, namely meditative ones. 
The obvious limitations of this approach concern the fact that I might generalize 
the effects I experienced, therefore my take on meditation would be biased. 
However, since a number of interviews were conducted, the experience of other 
practitioners is also included. 
 
III.V LITERATURE 
 
 Foucauldian studies of the self relied on the comprehensive analysis of 
literary sources to identify the transformation of discourse formations, the rules 
governing those discourses, those who were authorized to mobilize them, etc.57. 
Subjectivities are considered a product of certain discursive regimes of truth 
and power, enacted through positive means. This means that discourses are 
embedded in a “general politics” of truth: 
   “Each society has its regime  of  truth,  its  'general  politics'  of  truth:  
 that  is,  the types  of discourse  which  it  accepts  and makes  function  
 as true;  the  mechanisms  and  instances  which  enable  one  to 
 distinguish  true  and  false  statements,  the  means  by which each  is 
 sanctioned;  the techniques and procedures accorded value  in  the 
 acquisition of truth;  the status of those who are charged with  saying 
 what counts as  true.” (Foucault, 1980: 131) 
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 For a comprehensive assessment of the Foucauldian methodology, see 
Foucault, 2002. 
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 Through the analysis of central literary sources for the constitution of 
forms of power/knowledge (Foucault, 1980), it is possible to understand the 
various epistemological axes responsible for the fabrication of subjectivities as 
“effects” of power. Since my research is informed by the Foucauldian notion of 
technologies of the self, I could not ignore his methodological strategy to study 
various instances of subjectification. Consequently, I had to compile and 
analyze the most relevant literary sources concerning the two traditions under 
scrutiny. Through the analysis of these sources, I was able to identify the most 
relevant concepts; comprehensive formulations of meditative instructions; the 
history of these movements; their ontological assumptions (such as detailed 
explanations of impermanence or Interbeing); social applications of these 
movements; how one should experience the mind, body and environment using 
these technologies as mediators, etc.  The literary “canon” of these movements 
is crucial to understand their projects of the self, how they constitute themselves 
as instances of subjectification and the teleological aspects of these meditative 
assemblages. 
 In order to identify the canonical literary sources informing these 
traditions, I followed different strategies. With Vipassana, these resources were 
relatively limited. Goenka is not a prolific writer, and some of the books 
available from this tradition are compilations of his discourses. On the website 
of Dhamma Dipa, the most important Vipassana centre in Europe, the various 
books “recommended” by this tradition are grouped according to different 
categories: readings for Vipassana meditators (with the books authored by S. N. 
Goenka and compilations of his discourses, etc.); Sayagyi U Ba Khin (a journal 
was compiled in English with the most important writings of Goenka’s teacher); 
Ven. Ledi Sayadaw and Ven. Webu Sayadaw (older Burmese teachers of 
Vipassana, supposedly maintaining the practice in its “pristine purity”) and Paul 
Fleischman (an American psychiatrist and academic who is an assistant 
teacher and a promoter of the practice), etc.. I focused on the writings of 
Goenka and U Ba Khin, understanding them as representing the discursive 
“regime of truth” of this tradition. 
 Regarding Thich Nhat Hanh’s case study, the task of identifying relevant 
literary sources is complicated, because we are dealing with the most prolific 
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writer of books on Zen in contemporary times. His books have different styles: 
in some cases, they can be read as self-help books; as manuals for serious 
meditators and/or monks; as historical accounts of political struggles; as 
dedicated to specific aspects of Buddhist practice or ontology and he also 
published poetry and children’s books. In order to identify the discursive “core” 
of the practice, I talked with a long term lay practitioner and with the Abbot of 
one of the hamlets in Plum Village. It is not uncommon to use his books as a 
foundation for the practice, even before being in contact with his organization or 
retreat centres. That is not discouraged, whereas with Goenka’s Vipassana one 
has to go through the 10-day system in order to actually learn the technique - 
one has to become an “old student”, someone who has already completed a 10-
day course, in order to attend the weekly sittings, or one-day retreats, while 
anyone can join the Sangha meetings of Hanh’s organization. 
 This literature allowed me to identify the normative claims of these 
traditions, how different performative, spatial, ethical and experiential 
arrangements of individuals are linked to ontological assumptions and to certain 
versions of what people should be. Moreover, Thich Nhat Hanh’s books also 
focus on social applications of meditation. 
 My methodology is not necessarily Foucauldian - I am not trying to 
constitute archaeologies or genealogies of meditative subjects through the 
analysis of the regimes of truth of Zen and Vipassana. What I am doing is 
providing a reflection on the enactment of certain ontologies of the self through 
the analysis of various axes of subjectification deployed by these movements.  
Although discourses may display certain powers, eliciting the aims of these 
various practices – equanimity or mindfulness, see chapter V - my approach is 
not merely discursive, in the sense that words are useless without the support 
of performances, spaces and nonhumans.  
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III.VI OTHER SOURCES 
 
 Since it was difficult to have access to Vipassana meditators who were 
willing to be interviewed (not to mention the problems with the main 
organization), I compiled dozens of reports of experiences with this practice that 
I found in blogs over the Internet. Since, nowadays, this is perhaps the most 
popular and disseminated Vipassana tradition worldwide, there are numerous 
blogs and websites providing first-person accounts of individuals attending 
these retreats. They are usually highly detailed and in some cases provide rich 
phenomenological accounts as well as eliciting the resistances of beginners to 
the practice, rules, hierarchies, etc.. These accounts are usually written by 
beginners, those who are attending their first retreat. I also found some online 
forums that helped me to understand more complex aspects of Vipassana. 
There, serious old students share their experiences and doubts with various 
aspects of the practice and its application in daily life. The Vipassana 
newsletters58 were also particularly useful. Not only did they contain some texts 
authored by Goenka, clarifying some conceptual and practical aspects, but also 
some accounts of experiences and “benefits” of the practice, provided by old 
students. Although the tone can be apologetic and propagandistic, they 
illustrate the rhetoric and particularities of this technology of the self. In most 
cases, I attempted to use the data I collected, but these resources were useful 
to understand the official “discourse” of these movements. 
 Regarding Zen, I initially tried to obtain access to the Mindfulness Bell, 
the official magazine of this tradition since 1990. Since some of the issues were 
online, I downloaded and read some of them. Afterwards, I contacted some 
members of the Exeter Sangha (The White Lotus Sangha) to see if I could 
obtain access to the printed versions, but I didn’t find it very practical to carry a 
large number of magazines with me from one place to another. I also contacted 
the editor of the journal in the US to see if it would be possible to buy a large 
number of editions, or if they could upload all the issues, from the very 
beginning of the magazine. They didn’t have all the issues available for sale, but 
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 www.news.dhamma.org 
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fortunately after some months the whole collection became available online, 
which was very helpful59. The Mindfulness Bell has hundreds of articles on 
Sangha building, social applications of mindfulness, ways of “embodying” the 
five mindfulness trainings, reflections on the practice, personal transformation 
through mindfulness, etc.. In sum, it is an extremely valuable source to 
understand this tradition, containing hundreds of articles written by Thich Nhat 
Hanh, monks, nuns and lay practitioners. 
 Popular books, written by long term Vipassana and Zen meditators, were 
also particularly useful. These books usually provide life histories of these 
individuals, describing their processes of self-transformation, the difficulties they 
encountered or the various phenomenological phenomena they went through. 
These helped me to understand how meditators write about their experiences, 
how they recruit conceptual apparatuses to interpret their practices and, in 
some cases, these publications also elaborate on the importance of teachers, 
such as Thich Nhat Hanh or S. N. Goenka, and can also include transpersonal 
episodes fostered by meditation.  
 Finally, I also relied on video resources to analyze social applications of 
Vipassana. There are three films about Vipassana in Prisons. The most famous 
one is called “Doing Time, Doing Vipassana” (1997), about Vipassana courses 
in the Tihar Central Prison in New Delhi and the Baroda Jail in Gujarat, India; 
there is also another film called “The Dhamma Brothers” (2008), about the 
introduction of these courses in the Donaldson Correction Facility in Alabama. 
Both of these movies were shot in facilities for males. There is also a 
documentary called “Changing from Inside” (1998), telling the story of 
Vipassana courses at the North Rehabilitation Facility (N.R.F.) of the King 
County jail in Seattle, Washington. These films draw on various aspects: the 
necessary material, spatial and institutional changes that have to be developed 
in order to organize prison courses; the “expectations” of directors, guards and 
prisoners; the experiences of inmates and their accounts of “self-
transformation”. I watched these films and took notes of the most relevant 
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 All the archived issues are available online 
http://www.mindfulnessbell.org/wp/ (Retrieved: 12/11/2012) 
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passages to understand how meditation was mobilized to enact institutional and 
personal transformation (see chapter VIII). 
 
III.VII CRITICAL REFLECTION ON THE SOURCES OF 
INFORMATION 
 
 One could argue that the movies on Vipassana in prisons are a form of 
propaganda – they were directed by Vipassana practitioners and can obviously 
transmit a biased picture of that particular application. Moreover, books written 
by Goenka or assistant teachers of Vipassana may tend to exaggerate the 
benefits of meditation and to ignore negative side effects (see chapter VII). In 
some cases, I relied on those sources (namely in chapter VIII) – including books 
written by Thich Nhat Hanh and his followers and videos produced by 
Vipassana followers.  
 These resources should not be dismissed as mere propaganda; they 
contain highly relevant information on the concepts and history of these 
traditions, how they understand selves and deal with social issues. Primary 
literature emerging from these traditions explains how relevant actors (such as 
Goenka, Thich Nhat Hanh and advanced practitioners) make sense of their 
experiences and why retreats are organized in particular ways; they describe in 
detail and contextualize the techniques of meditation and give very precise 
indications regarding self cultivation in everyday life.  
 One could also argue that there is an unbalance between the first four 
empirical chapters, where I relied on observations, interviews and my own 
experiences, and the chapter on social applications of meditation, mainly 
informed by movies and literature. Regarding the Vipassana case study, I 
actually conducted an interview to obtain data on a particular application60; 
however, since the UK Vipassana Trust did not allow that person to grant me 
access to some relevant documents, I had to drop that case study. Initially I 
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 I cannot disclose what particular application it was because I don’t want to 
compromise the source of information. 
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wanted to focus on two social applications of Vipassana, but since my plans 
were compromised by the secretive nature of the Vipassana Trust I had to focus 
on Vipassana in Prisons drawing upon films, personal accounts present in 
books and literature on the impacts of these courses61. Regarding Thich Nhat 
Hanh’s case study, I used a variety of sources, including literature on engaged 
Buddhism (Hanh’s model of social action has generated a considerable amount 
of scholarly literature), as well as interviews (I often asked interviewees if this 
tradition of engaged Buddhism had an impact on their social/political views). 
This chapter does not involve as much fieldwork as the other ones because its 
aim is to reflect on the connections between technologies of the self and models 
of social action and transformation – the movies on Vipassana in prison allow 
me to understand how the retreat apparatus is “mobilized”, and I couldn’t go 
back to the sixties to understand how Thich Nhat Hanh used meditation in the 
peace movement during the Vietnam war, therefore I relied on a variety of 
sources to reflect on his well documented efforts. In order to explore the links 
between meditation and ecology I used not only data from participant 
observation at retreats in Plum Village, but I extended my reflections through 
the analysis of a meditation-based exercise developed by Joanna Macy, John 
Seed and others (see chapter VIII). I also contacted (by e-mail) a lay 
practitioner in charge of the Happy Farm in Plum Village, and I was given 
detailed information about this interesting project. I also had the chance to 
interview the founder of an environmentalist political party in Portugal, who is 
also the leader of the national Buddhist Union, allowing me to understand the 
connections between meditation and ecology. 
III.VIII CONCLUSION 
 
 In order to provide an account of forms of meditative subjectification and 
their politics, I conducted semi-structured interviews; I participated in retreats, 
observing the multitude of apparatuses that emerge in order to allow meditative 
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 These articles, although published in peer reviewed journals, were, in some 
cases, written by Vipassana meditators, which can obviously lead us to 
question their “objectivity”, reminding us of previous research on TM meditation, 
see chapters V and VIII. 
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dispositions and reflected on my own experiences; I immersed myself in the 
central literature of these movements and I also relied on other sources 
(including blogs, videos, newsletters, etc) that I considered relevant.  
 My approach is influenced by post-humanist STS, as the literature review 
and introduction have suggested. These various methodologies are inspired by 
a performative concern. Meditation is entangled with specific struggles of 
agency, involving new associations with performances, nonhumans and 
spaces. My analysis is post-humanist because processes of meditative 
subjectification are not understood as the result of humans and their intentions, 
such as the leaders of these movements (as pastoral authorities), the assistant 
teachers (those who “ensure” that the leader is being represented) or human 
communities/groups (including monasteries or practice centres). In fact, my 
approach takes Callon’s (1986) claim of agnosticism (the impartiality between 
humans and nonhumans) seriously, recognizing that without these 
heterogeneous associations meditative selves cannot emerge. If Pickering 
argues that the performative idiom regards science as “a field of powers, 
capacities and performances, situated in machinic captures of material agency” 
(Pickering: 1995: 7), a post-humanist approach to meditation inevitably 
recognizes the power of nonhumans. Moreover, if we understand Vipassana 
and Zen projects of the self as forms of subjectification, they are not necessarily 
the result of a top down hierarchy, with their leaders at the top of the pyramid, 
giving specific orders and making sure that people are “subjected” according to 
their pastoral powers. In fact, these “projects of the self” emerge within 
heterogeneous assemblages composed of technologies, performances, 
discourses, verbalizations and a set of material powers. 
 The following chapter will reflect on the first vector of subjectification, the 
setting, comprising new associations with spaces, constraints and nonhumans 
that should ideally foster transformations of selfhood, bringing forth meditative 
dispositions. 
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IV. SETTING 
 
 “The nature of the experience depends almost entirely on set and setting. 
Set denotes the preparation of the individual, including his personality structure 
and his mood at the time. Setting is physical — the weather, the room’s 
atmosphere; social — feelings of persons present towards one another; and 
cultural — prevailing views as to what is real.”  (Leary, Metzner and Dass, 1976: 
11) 
 
 “Contrary to non-humans, humans have a great tendency, when faced 
with scientific authority, to abandon any recalcitrance and to behave like 
obedient objects... Human science laboratories rarely explode!” (Latour, 2004: 
217) 
 
IV.I INTRODUCTION 
  
 In order to transform automatisms and to unveil new ways of being in the 
world, human subjects have to be exposed to novel settings. Zen and 
Vipassana retreats function as instances of subjectification. They break regular 
connections and suspend the habitual environments that subjects are exposed 
to, submitting them to a series of productive constrains that destabilize them, 
inviting them to establish new associations and to engage in different, 
nonmodern types of subjectivity. 
 Zen and Vipassana retreats are supported by a number of devices that 
include forms of managing space (such as spatial partitioning, see Foucault, 
1995), nonhumans, regulations and instructions. These new associations 
transform Zen and Vipassana retreats into heterogeneous assemblages 
(Delanda, 2006) that suspend modern distinctions between nature and culture 
(Haraway, 1991; Latour, 1991a); both humans and nonhumans are essential 
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elements of the setting, a new psychospiritual (D’andrea, 2007) landscape that 
brings forth new ways of being. These assemblages are positive in the sense 
that, by altering habitual connections between humans, nonhumans, spaces 
and technologies, regular automatisms are progressively transformed, 
prompting new experiences. We can think of these retreats as ways of 
suspending the conventional networks of the outside world, entangling subjects 
with new webs of association that can trigger affordances unavailable to the 
dualist modern self. 
 Vipassana and Zen assemblages use different strategies and webs of 
associations to bring forth new realms of experience. The typical mechanism of 
initiation to Vipassana is the 10-day retreat. These retreats can be understood 
as “standard operating procedures”62, relatively homogeneous and transposable 
assemblages that can emerge anywhere in the world. The Vipassana retreats 
are formations that entangle a variety of  human and nonhuman devices: audio 
and video tapes with instructions; cushions that support the practice of sitting 
meditation; vegetarian food prepared according to a cookbook; timetables that 
have to be scrupulously followed; technologies of the self; regulations that 
manage individual existence; Assistant Teachers (ATs) who can travel long 
distances to represent the teacher (Goenka), ensuring the homogeneity of this 
assemblage; servers who volunteer to spread the Dhamma (the teachings of 
the Buddha, in Pali), through the reproduction of these retreats; beginners with 
no experience in meditation; old students who are submitting themselves to the 
assemblage once again, etc..63 
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 This term comes from scholarly work in International Relations. For a good 
discussion of the concept, including the negative impacts generated by such 
procedures, see Ramsbotham (2000). 
63
 Even if someone is well experienced in other types of meditation, if he or she 
hasn’t experienced the Vipassana retreat in the tradition of S. N. Goenka he is 
considered a new student, and after completing the 10 days he/she acquires a 
new status, that of an old student. Old students are given a username and 
password that they can use to access the websites of the Vipassana 
organization, download podcasts, papers of the Vipassana Research Institute, 
discovering local sitting groups, enrolling in courses as “students” or “servers”, 
and eventually attending other types of retreats (20-days and 30-days retreats 
and also thematic ones). In sum, the retreat grants spiritual and institutional 
existence to the subject – he becomes established in the “Dhamma.” In terms of 
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 Although Thich Nhat Hanh’s retreats do not follow any standard or pre-
defined “model”, their assemblages are populated by a diversity of humans and 
nonhumans, including Dharma Teachers (ordained by Thich Nhat Hanh), 
monks and lay members of this tradition (wearing their characteristic brown 
jackets); books of Thich Nhat Hanh; bells; pictures of ancestors that are 
carefully placed to form the “ancestors’ shrine”; small statues of the Buddha; 
cushions (or even stools or chairs); vegetarian food; relatively well regulated 
instances of dialogue and sharing between practitioners and the diversity of 
practices promoted by this tradition. However, although there are these 
common elements, as well as forms of institutional affiliation64 , it is possible, for 
instance, to attend the weekly meetings of the Sangha (community of practice) 
or a mindfulness day without having participated beforehand in a formal retreat 
in a monastic setting such as Plum Village. Thich Nhat Hanh is a widely 
published author and his books include comprehensive and detailed instructions 
on meditation, while Goenka explicitly recommends the participation in a 
course65.  
 Despite these differences, Zen and Vipassana retreats aim at 
transforming subjectivities, fostering a paradigm shift of the self. Foucault 
suggested the term “heterotopias” to characterize “other spaces” that invert, 
contest but also represent other cultural sites66. He gave various examples, 
such as boarding schools, brothels, colonies, cemeteries and museums. An 
interesting example is the mirror - it counteracts the position one occupies and, 
by doing so, reconstructs subjectivity through the gaze:  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
access, Vipassana contrasts with Hanh’s organization, which allows anyone to 
attend local meetings and days of mindfulness, as we have seen in the previous 
chapter. 
64
 Such as becoming a monk, taking the five mindfulness trainings or becoming 
a member of the Order of Interbeing. 
65
 “The first experience of Vipassana must be in an organized 10-day course, 
under the guidance of a qualified teacher.” (Hart, 1987; 138) 
66
 Foucault defined heterotopias as “real and effective spaces which are 
outlined in the very institution of society, but which constitute a sort of counter 
arrangement, of effectively realized utopia, in which all the real arrangements, 
all the other real arrangements that can be found within society, are at one and 
the same time represented, challenged, and overturned: a sort of place that lies 
outside all places and yet is actually localizable.” (Foucault, 1997: 332) 
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 “Starting from this gaze that is, as it were, directed toward me, from the 
 ground of this virtual space that is on the other side of the glass, I come 
 back toward myself; I begin again to direct my eyes toward myself and to 
 reconstitute myself there where I am.” (Foucault, 1997: 332) 
 
 Retreats function as spaces that counteract common worldly 
environments, inverting their logics, displacing subjectivities and multiplying new 
connections that alter one’s automatisms, supporting a transition towards a 
nonmodern paradigm. In order to do so, these Zen and Vipassana heterotopias 
rely on a diversity of generative dispositifs, reconfigurations of habitual 
associations that allow selves to attain novel dispositions in different 
environments. Zen and Vipassana retreats combine a series of dispositifs to 
transform habitual automatisms: these include forms of entering the retreat 
assemblage (registration devices); regulations (devices of positive constraint); 
the management of space (devices that reorganize and partition space, that 
manage environmental interactions and that inscribe space with particular 
signs) and materialities (nonhuman devices, solid entities that support Zen and 
Vipassana webs of associations). The aim of this chapter is to explore retreats 
as heterotopian networks, contrasting them with their modern counterparts and 
analyzing how these assemblages reconfigure selves. 
 
IV.II ENTERING THE RETREAT ASSEMBLAGE 
 
 As in every reconfiguration of subjective experience, selves have to go 
through a series of steps before they are able to enter Zen and Vipassana 
retreats. Actions such as buying tickets, going through x-ray machines and 
presenting a passport are usually conducted before entering the airplane. One 
usually spends some minutes in a room, waiting for the pre-boarding 
announcement, which is also accompanied by another series of rites, such as 
showing a boarding pass, etc.. Schivelbusch’s remarks on the waiting room, 
representing a transition from regular life to the train experience, are quite 
insightful concerning the phenomenon of entering a new assemblage: 
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 “The traveller’s sojourn in the waiting room, that hiatus in the passage of 
 traffic from city to railway was perhaps the clearest indication of the 
 station’s function as a gateway. One might say that the pause was 
 necessary to enable the traveller to cope with the change in the quality of 
 space.” (Schivelbusch, 1977: 177) 
 
 In order to participate in these retreats, subjects have to register in 
advance, they have to fill in a registration form67, sharing some information with 
the institution68. The Vipassana registration form contains some of the following 
questions: name, native language, other languages understood and nationality. 
Then, there are questions specifically dealing with one’s spiritual practice69.  
 The Vipassana application form is a comprehensive instrument to assess 
one’s experience with technologies of the self, mental and physical health and 
aspects such as age, contact details or nationality. The application form to 
                                                             
67
 The course application form is available here - 
http://www.dhamma.org/en/docs/forms/appform-en.pdf (Retrieved: 12/09/2013) 
68
 The transformation of subjectivity and the production of knowledge on 
humans are intertwined, as Foucault’s reflections on subjectification suggested 
(Foucault, 1987; 1995; 2007). In order to manage populations and to conduct 
changes at the individual level, registries, forms of inscribing the knowledge on 
individuals, their habits, the regularities of life and death are crucial. 
69
 “Have you had any previous experience with meditation techniques, therapies 
or healing practices? ... Do you teach or practice these techniques/therapies on 
others?”  If the answer is yes, one has to provide explanations. Then, and since 
we are dealing with mechanisms with the potential to radically reshape the self, 
some questions, on the general health of the participant, are included: 
 “Do you have any physical health problems, medical conditions or diseases? If 
yes, please give details (dates, symptoms, duration, treatment, and present 
condition); Do you have, or have you ever had, any mental health problems 
such as significant depression or anxiety, panic attacks, manic depression, 
schizophrenia, etc.? If yes, please give details (dates, symptoms, duration, 
hospitalization, treatment, and present condition); Are you now taking, or have 
you taken within the past two years, any alcohol or drugs (such as marijuana, 
amphetamines, barbiturates, cocaine, heroin, or other intoxicants)? If yes, 
please give details (dates, types, amounts, addictions, treatment, and present 
use).” According to online reports, some people have been prevented from 
attending these retreats because they were taking psychiatric drugs or were 
practicing alternative therapies such as Reiki, a form of energy manipulation 
that can clash with Vipassana (where energy is not manipulated but merely 
observed). According to the code of conduct, people with serious mental 
disorders should not practice Vipassana, therefore these questions are used to 
prevent those with psychiatric problems from attending retreats. 
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attend a retreat in Plum Village is less comprehensive70. It basically focuses on 
personal data, including aspects of institutional affiliation (have you taken the 
five mindfulness trainings or the 14 mindfulness trainings?). Then, there is a 
section on the arrival date, emergency contacts and the preferred 
accommodation (unlike Vipassana retreats, staying in Plum Village involves 
paying a fee). 
After filling in these forms and submitting them, one is able to enter the 
physical space dedicated to the practice. However, before the course (or the 
retreat) starts, it is necessary to go through another device. At the Vipassana 
retreats, one has, once again, to fill in a form that is similar to the first one. 
There is also a section where one should write a short biography and reaffirm 
the compliance with the rules of conduct. One is also asked to place electronic 
devices, notebooks and writing material in a locker (the participant keeps the 
key with him and by the 10th day he is allowed to collect everything), breaking 
all the connections with the outside world. Regarding Plum Village, after arriving 
one has to wait for a while before going to the registration room. On my first 
retreat there was a long period of waiting and I went for a walk with other 
participants before registering. New participants will be asked some few 
questions by a monk (do you have any experience with meditation, do you know 
what we do here?, etc.), usually involving some proximity with the subject71. 
Filling in forms, waiting rooms, travelling long distances to the retreat and 
saying goodbye to electronic gadgets mark the beginning of the retreat 
experience. An important dimension of these assemblages is the alteration of 
habitual automatisms, and the set of regulations that are implemented 
contribute to support the transition to new paradigms of selfhood. 
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 See, for instance, http://register.plumvillage.org/spring/nh (Retrieved: 
15/09/2013). 
71
 On my first retreat I was asked to sit close to the monk to answer these 
questions. 
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IV.III.I REGULATIONS 
 
Regulations are positive constraints that allow selves to engage in new 
webs of associations, transforming their habitual ways of being in the world. 
These retreats are supported by a set of regulations and can be understood as 
total institutions, “a place of residence and work where a large number of like-
situated individuals, cut off from the wider society for an appreciable period of 
time, together lead an enclosed, formally administrated round of life” (Goffman, 
1968: 11). In order to administer meditators’ existence, these are submitted to a 
variety of constraints. These are interpreted in a positive sense, following 
Foucault’s understanding of power as productive, relying on a variety of devices 
(such as rules and architectural settings) to enact forms of subjectification: 
“Power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals 
of truth.” (Foucault, 1995: 194) 
Regulations suspend habitual connections and create new habits, 
entangling the transformation of selves with a variety of constraints such as 
timetables. These are central devices of power in disciplinary institutions, 
controlling activity. Recognizing that timetables were developed by monastic 
communities, Foucault suggests that they produce three major effects: 
“establish rhythms, impose particular occupations, regulate the cycles of 
repetition” (Foucault, 1995:149). In both traditions we find these devices. Below 
is an adapted timetable of a Vipassana retreat72: 
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 http://www.dhamma.org/en/code.shtml 
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TABLE 1 - VIPASSANA COURSE TIMETABLE 
04:00 Wake-up bell  
04:30 - 6:30 Meditate in the hall or room 
06:30 - 8:00 Breakfast  
08:00 - 9:00 Group meditation in the hall  
09:00 -11:00 Meditate in the hall or room according to instructions  
11:00 -12:00 Lunch  
12:00 -13:00 Rest and interviews with the teacher  
13:00 -14:30 Meditate in the hall or room  
14:30 - 15:30 Group meditation in the hall  
15:30 - 17:00 Meditate in the hall or own room according to instructions  
17:00 - 18:00 Tea break  
18:00 - 19:00 Group meditation in the hall  
19:00 - 20:15 Teacher's Discourse  
21:15 - 21:00 Group meditation in the hall  
21:00 - 21:30 Question time  
21:30 Retire to your room  
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In Zen retreats, we find a similar timetable73: 
 
TABLE 2 - PLUM VILLAGE DAILY TIMETABLE 
5:00 Wake-up bell 
5:45 Sitting meditation 
7:30 Breakfast 
9:00 Dharma talk, Class, or Sharing 
11:00 Walking meditation 
12:00 Lunch 
13:00 Personal time 
14:45 Working meditation 
17:00 Sitting meditation & Chanting or other activities 
18:30 Dinner 
20:00 Personal Practice or other activities 
21:30 Noble Silence 
22:00 Lights Out 
 
In Vipassana retreats, the schedule is scrupulously observed. If someone 
is missing in the Meditation Hall, one of the servers will call this person, 
ensuring that discipline is respected. One is also discouraged from leaving the 
hall during meditation – if that happens, one of the volunteers will immediately 
reach this person, telling him or her to return to meditation. In a couple of 
occasions me and my roommates didn’t manage to wake up on time, and one 
of the servers came to our room telling us that it was “time to meditate”. He was 
referring to the period between 4:30 - 6:30, when one is supposed to meditate 
in the room or in the meditation hall. There are also occasions when, due to the 
fatigue imposed by strict schedule, one falls asleep. I remember one situation 
when someone started snoring and a server immediately reached him, telling 
the participant to “be aware”. These servers act to help meditators break their 
habitual automatisms: if they fall asleep, they will wake them up; if they are not 
in the meditation hall, they will be called; the servers ensure that regulations are 
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 http://www.plumvillage.org/visiting-us/general-retreat-information.html 
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followed, therefore contributing towards the transformation of automatisms, 
allowing participants to break habitual habits and to embrace Vipassana ones. 
Regarding Plum Village retreats, the schedule can be changed or even 
ignored. There are also the “Lazy Days” - in order to create a contrast with 
outside life and its focus on work, one abstains from working or following 
spatial-temporal discipline. If the 10-day Vipassana retreats are carefully 
designed to introduce subjects to different techniques and experiences, Thich 
Nhat Hanh’s retreats are engaged approaches to meditative practice, 
speculums of daily life infused with meditative innovations. Therefore, the 
“recruitment” of the timetable is distinct: if, in Vipassana, it is aimed at 
establishing regularities, maximizing the times for meditation, regularizing the 
periods for sleeping, eating, etc, regarding Plum Village it is more of an 
invitation to practice collectively. If one is supposed to benefit from the presence 
of the community, the timetable indicates how one should do so, by joining a 
certain activity – meditation, exercise, walking together, etc.. In both cases, the 
timetable can be understood as a technology that delegates decision making to 
the community, allowing subjects to flow from one space/activity to another 
without having to think about it, suspending their will. 
If the timetable manages temporalities, in Vipassana retreats we find a 
set of regulations aimed at creating meditative positivities. First, the typical 
Buddhist precepts have to be followed: to abstain from killing any being; to 
abstain from stealing; to abstain from all sexual activity; to abstain from telling 
lies; to abstain from all intoxicants. Then, there are other regulations: 
acceptance of the teacher and the technique; the prohibition of undertaking 
other techniques, rites, and forms of worship; noble silence (it is lifted on the 
10th day); separation of Men and Women; no physical contact between 
participants; no yoga or physical exercise; religious objects cannot be used; no 
outside contacts; music, reading and writing are forbidden74. For ten days, the 
totality of the individual, her physical and mental functioning, spatial and 
temporal possibilities are under control. These constraints resemble rites of 
passage, where subjects have to be detached from a stable set of cultural 
                                                             
74
 The full code of discipline is available here 
http://www.dhamma.org/en/code.shtml (Retrieved: 1/09/2013) 
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conditions and go through a new cultural realm that is “liminal” (Turner, 1969: 
94). What is at stake here is not merely to impose a new set of “customary 
norms and ethical standards” (Turner, 1969: 94) but to foster new associations, 
ideally transforming human automatisms through a variety of constraints that 
should allow the emergence of new ways of experiencing the world. 
With such a radical transformation of one’s regular habits, the imposition 
of a strict schedule and the teaching of new and challenging techniques of 
meditation (that can be practiced for more than 10 hours a day), one could 
argue that we are facing logics of shock. In fact, in order to have access to 
techniques supposedly containing the potential for self-transformation, subjects 
have to suspend their regular habits and associations. Therefore, we can draw 
some comparisons between this school of Vipassana and Ewen Cameron’s 
approach to psychiatric treatment, involving a radical depatterning (through 
shock) to rewrite and domesticate the soul: “With patients shocked and drugged 
into an almost vegetative state, they could do nothing but listen to the 
messages – for sixteen to twenty hours a day for weeks; in one case, Cameron 
played a message continuously for 101 days.” (Klein, 2007: 32). The notion of 
shock was actually used by one of my interviewees, Tim, to describe his first 
retreat experience: 
“The first time I didn’t feel I was supported, I felt I was thrown in and left 
 to drown. Which was probably an interesting experience for me at the 
 time ... I was young, I probably needed a shock!” (Interview, Tim, April 
 2011) 
 
In these retreats, one has to rely on a new performative, spatial and 
hierarchical regime that transforms the interaction order (one is prevented from 
interacting with others, unless one has some practical questions); dictates how 
and when one takes care of the body; manages the inputs the self receives 
(with no reading, no talking and no outside contacts, the subject is totally 
“exposed” to the technologies of the self and the daily discourses of S. N. 
Goenka, and the suspension of external inputs through sensory deprivation 
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enacts altered states of consciousness (see Lilly, 1977; Salter, 2010)) and 
governs how he or she can make sense of the experience75. 
These are strategies to bring forth a new version of selfhood, depending 
on the suspension of habitual webs of associations; selves have to be 
entangled with new networks – they have to maintain silence, following 
instructions given by the teacher, moving from one place to another according 
to a timetable; they have to submit their agency to the Vipassana assemblage, 
leaving their familiar environments in order to transform their automatisms. 
In sum, we witness a radical process of changing one’s habits, 
contrasting with the outside world, accompanied by the introduction of 
technologies of the self. However, the goal is not to produce more obedient and 
“normal” subjects (as in Klein’s example) but to bring forth affordances (as we 
will see in chapters VI and VII) that emerge when associations are transformed. 
These devices (that resemble what, in total institutions, Goffman (1968) 
designated as instances of mortification), invite subjects to suspend their 
regular associations (performative, material, mental, regulatory) for a certain 
period of time and to engage in new couplings (with technologies of the self, 
timetables, regulations, architectural apparatuses) that should ideally foster a 
transformation of the self. 
In Plum Village one also encounters a number of regulations: at lunch, 
one shouldn’t start eating before a formal announcement is made, and one is 
supposed to undertake the five contemplations76. These are meant to alter the 
                                                             
75
 Dialogue is limited to the brief interactions between student and assistant 
teacher, and every night there are discourses containing a variety of 
information, namely hermeneutical one, on Vipassana; moreover, the 
prohibition of writing is an attempt to slow down the internal dialogue, supported 
by verbalization, therefore somatising the retreat experience, since Vipassana is 
about observing sensations, not thinking, as it will become clear in chapter V. 
76
 “THE FIRST CONTEMPLATION This food is a gift of the whole universe: the 
earth, the sky, numerous living beings, and much hard, loving work. THE 
SECOND CONTEMPLATION May we eat with mindfulness and gratitude so as 
to be worthy to receive this food. THE THIRD CONTEMPLATION May we 
recognize and transform our unwholesome mental formations, especially our 
greed, and learn to eat in moderation. THE FOURTH CONTEMPLATION May 
we keep our compassion alive by eating in such a way that we reduce the 
suffering of living beings; preserve our planet; and reverse the process of global 
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habitual performance of eating, establishing new connections with other beings 
and transforming eating into a form of meditation, as we will see in chapter V77. 
This aspect complicates the distinction between rules and practices of 
meditation, suggesting that in Plum Village the “constraints” become a form of 
mindfulness. In one occasion, and due to distraction, I started eating before this 
formal announcement was made – instead of being explicitly reprimanded, a 
monk just looked at me and I realized that I should wait a bit longer, unlike the 
Vipassana retreats, where the servers are meant to take immediate action when 
regulations are broken. 
 In Plum Village there are no televisions and internet access is limited, 
although there is a phone booth that can be used and people can bring their 
own laptops; noble silence is observed from 21:30 until breakfast. Meditation, 
instead of being imposed externally and in a top down fashion, rather depends 
on the willingness of participants to be enacted. We could argue that Zen 
retreats are a form of commodified spirituality (Carrette and King, 2005), in the 
sense that one pays a determined sum of money to stay in Plum Village for a 
certain period of time. The amount varies, and it is usually something between 
280 to 500 Euros a week - this sum can be reduced if one is a student 
(benefiting from a discount of 50%) or if he or she commits to work more often 
when needed.  
However, and beyond the interpretation of these retreats as forms of 
commodified spirituality (some of my informants even compared Plum Village to 
a summer camp, stating that it wasn’t “serious”), we shouldn’t be naive about 
this apparent spiritual “liberalism”. The practices promoted by Thich Nhat Hanh 
are not so much forms of inducing altered states of consciousness through 
sitting and sensory deprivation (although these eventually happen, as we will 
see in chapter VI), but mechanisms to transform regular automatisms in daily 
life situations, including sitting, walking, talking and working. Meditation, in that 
sense, is not necessarily a specific practice or “technique” (such as Vipassana 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
warming. THE FIFTH CONTEMPLATION We accept this food in order to 
nurture our brotherhood and sisterhood, build our community; and nourish our 
ideal of serving all living beings." (Hanh, 2009: 46) 
77
 In that chapter, I will also explore some of the difficulties with eating 
meditation. 
107 
 
or the other technologies of the self promoted by S. N. Goenka) but a way of life 
that relies on different performances to maintain the same attitude of 
mindfulness. The retreat setting maintains elements and characteristics of daily 
life: one interacts with others, works, reads and even keeps contact with the 
outside world - in that sense, the Plum Village apparatus prepares individuals 
for the real world, not involving a total detachment but the penetration of 
“normal” practices by the spirit of mindfulness78.  
Consequently, we can argue that Vipassana and Zen retreats have 
different styles of recruiting legislative orders to enact positivities: on the one 
hand, Vipassana retreats explicitly suspend regular daily life connections, 
centralizing the performative and hermeneutical powers through a set of 
regulations that support the mastery of meditative techniques; on the other 
hand, Zen also deploys different practices and some regulations, but these are 
not necessarily mobilized to create isolations and separations (between the self 
and “non-meditative” sensorial inputs, regular habits or even other people) – 
their aim is the engagement with daily life, intentionally developed through 
regular activities in community. In that sense, the absence of a radical shift of 
one’s actions during these retreats of Plum Village is meant to train the self for 
all life situations, without a sole focus on typical forms of meditation (such as 
sitting meditation). This illustrates a contrast between a disciplinary model (in 
the case of Vipassana) and the neo-liberal conception of the entrepreneurial 
self (Foucault, 2008) (in the case of Zen), where self-management replaces 
conventional institutionalized mechanisms of power. This difference is 
reinforced by the different use of silence as a technology of the self. The 
permanent silence enacted at Vipassana retreats is colonized by instructions 
and brings selves back to the inner world, releasing memories and strong 
emotions; the quasi-maintenance of more conventional interaction orders found 
at Plum Village transforms silence into an option, a resource that can be 
                                                             
78
 The “engaged” nature of this tradition will become clear in chapters V and 
VIII. 
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mobilized by subjects if they intend to79, avoiding a violent rupture with non-
meditative/metropolitan/conventional uses of spatial forms of power/knowledge. 
This means that, if Vipassana depends on mechanisms of destabilization 
that can be compared to forms of “shock”, depatterning and mortification, linked 
to “rites of passage”, forms of discipline enacted in controlled settings, the Zen 
assemblage has fluid boundaries and rules, and does not aim at radically 
inverting the habitual modern environment. As a form of engaged Buddhism, 
this Zen tradition is a preparation for everyday life, and the challenge is how to 
maintain mindfulness without the forms of isolation present in other formats, 
such as Vipassana retreats (see chapter VII). 
 
IV.III. II REGULATIONS AND THE BATTLE OF AUTOMATISMS 
 
The introduction of new regulations, whether by disciplinary (Vipassana) 
or liberal (Zen) mechanisms create forms of resistance – these new constraints, 
aiming at the transformation of automatisms, are not accepted without a fight. 
Foucault suggested that power always creates resistance (Foucault, 1987)80, 
and the Vipassana assemblage, consisting of a radical transformation of human 
automatisms through new webs of associations, is particularly helpful to 
understand this aspect. 
Although the timetable indicates when one should meditate in the room 
or in the meditation hall, it is not uncommon to sleep during these periods, in 
particular because most of the participants (this was my case) are not used to 
waking up at 4 PM. A significant number of participants are actually asleep, and 
during my first retreat practically all of my roommates didn’t meditate during this 
period. Oversleeping, or falling asleep during early morning meditation, 
                                                             
79
 When someone decides to maintain silence during a particular period of time, 
he or she wears a sign saying “noble silence” to let others know of his/her 
choice. 
80
 Regarding the enactment of power through spatial organisation, the work of 
Rofel (1992) explores some of the strategies developed by Chinese workers to 
“subvert” the scientific organization of labour brought by modernization.  
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represents a clash between automatisms – old automatisms, such as the habit 
of sleeping 7 or 8 hours per night, prevent participants from making the best use 
of the conditions and to fully respect the timetable. 
Another form of subversion concerns transgressing spatial boundaries. 
One is not supposed to abandon the “total institution” during the 10-day period, 
and the boundaries are clearly marked; however, in various instances I saw 
people sneaking outside – both retreats were in rural areas, and it was possible 
to escape without being seen, and the barriers (a small wall or just some 
bushes) were easily overcome. 81  Other forms of resistance involve talking 
(some students deliberately sought the course manager to complain about 
some problems, and although their problems could be real, this can also be 
understood as a strategy to cope with the suspension of verbalization) 82 ; 
deliberately making noise during the periods for meditation in the Hall83; eating 
when it is not scheduled to do so84; or even practicing forms of exercise85. 
                                                             
81
 On my second Vipassana retreat, at a non-permanent centre, the boundaries 
weren’t particularly well-defined, and in one occasion I wandered for half an 
hour through the woods – since I was in a particularly sensitive state due to the 
intensive practice of Vipassana, this sort of “escape” was an interesting way to 
assess how the practice of meditation transformed my perception of nature. 
During these walks, I also observed other participants smoking, a practice that 
is deliberately forbidden (since tobacco is considered an intoxicant). 
82
 Another strategy of “resistance” deals with the process of accepting the 
teacher. After each meditation session there are chantings in Pali by Goenka, 
and students are supposed to repeat sadhu three times, an expression that 
shows appreciation or agreement 
(http://www.accesstoinsight.org/glossary.html#s (Retrieved: 17/09/2013)): 
during my first retreat, instead of repeating sadhu I used the Portuguese word 
sapo, meaning frog, as a reference to the fact that Goenka is overweight, which 
initially made me doubt his spiritual “authority.” Another  Portuguese speaking 
participant did the same thing (his personal experience is available here 
http://www.livredesi.com/curso-de-vipassana-dia-01/ (Retrieved: 15/08/2012) 
83
 Although it is common to cough, sneeze or to change posture when the pain 
becomes unbearable, there was one occasion, during my first retreat, when one 
of the youngest participants decided to fart out loud in such a way that it 
couldn’t be accidental; after he did so, everyone started giggling, and eventually 
some of us laughed – one of the participants couldn’t stop laughing and had to 
leave the Hall to calm down. 
84
 One interviewee told me that he brought some bananas to the retreat and he 
would eat them at night while taking a shower. 
85
 During the breaks between sittings it is common to stretch, but some people 
engage in more complex exercises, and in one occasion one participant started 
practicing advanced Yogic asanas, getting the attention of other retreatants. 
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However, the most radical form of subversion, considering that these retreats 
are basically “courses” for the establishment on specific technologies of the self, 
deals with the resistance towards the performative order imposed by this 
assemblage. In fact, since meditation is practiced in silence, it is possible to 
engage in other techniques, not necessarily advocated by the movement, taking 
advantage of the setting.86 
According to Foucault and Butler (Foucault, 1987; Butler, 1990), these 
episodes of subversion emerge within discourses87, sites of resistance and 
power. Performative, legislative, material and discursive devices, enacting 
meditation assemblages, are not accepted without resistance. Episodes of 
subversion elicit a battle of automatisms with the constraints imposed by the 
Vipassana assemblage – instead of accepting new webs of association, 
becoming passive regarding meditative assemblages and abandoning 
themselves, participants develop strategies to keep their selves in control. 
Regulations, the control of activity, the spatial partitioning of bodies, practices 
and pastoral authorities (such  as Goenka) are contested devices, creating 
struggles with the habitual automatisms of participants that in turn resist them, 
suspending the optimal application of the subjectification devices of the retreat. 
This does not mean that all participants resist disciplinary devices. Rob, 
who is in his mid seventies, spent his childhood in Africa. He told me that the 
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 On my second retreat, I realized that this practice, solely focusing on sitting, 
was not for me, and I decided to practice walking meditation whenever I could 
to ease the transition between sitting, eating and other scheduled activities. In 
another occasion, I rebelled against the obligation of sitting for one hour and 
decided not to meditate as I was being told – I just started counting the breath 
until the end of the session. An old student, who practiced for 10 years but was 
eventually forbidden by the organization from attending more courses, wrote a 
testimonial, available online, where he states that: “in the long courses, I have 
met about 10 practitioners who secretly mixed their long courses with Zen, 
Advaita Vedanta, Tibetan visualizations, Hare Krishna Mantras, Energy-healing 
techniques or Bhang (cannabis).” - 
http://vipassana.awardspace.info/forum/index.php?topic=9.0 (Retrieved: 
15/08/2012) 
87
 Here I’m explicitly referring to Foucault’s assumption that “discourse can be 
both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling-
block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy” 
(Foucault, 1987: 101) and to Butler’s subversive bodily acts (Butler, 1990). 
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retrat triggered some positive memories in him, and he confessed that he 
actually enjoyed the discipline: 
“It was a wonderful experience. You’re in a sort of monastery, which is 
 very pure, compared with today’s materialistic world. It brought me back 
 to the days of being a student in Africa ... Waking up early in the morning, 
 I felt so fresh. I never felt tired like I do on a normal day. Discipline is the 
 main thing I liked about it, and noble silence was another thing that I 
 liked. If we don’t talk for 10 minutes [in the outside world] everybody 
 asks...what’s wrong?” (Interview, Rob, October 2011) 
 
Rob mentioned that, discipline, including noble silence, contrasts with the 
outside, modern world, giving him a new kind of freedom (not having to talk) 
and also more energy. According to Maxwell, the regulations were actually 
helpful, and his words reinforce the positive dimension of constraints and 
regulations: 
 “I enjoy the schedule once I get used to it.  I don’t see these precepts as 
 mutually exclusive of Nietzschean ideas of defining your own system of 
 ethics or morality…actually they’re just helpful, kind of guides, you can 
 actually think of them as ideas that eventually you could probably have 
 yourself, although ….as far as I’m concerned I think they probably do 
 help me personally.” (Interview, Maxwell, February 2011) 
 
 Regulations are meant to inculcate new automatisms, and the 
resistances they generate indicate a battle between meditative and 
nonmeditative habit patterns. In Zen retreats, episodes of resistance are harder 
to detect, since we are dealing with subtler mechanisms of subjectification, not 
necessarily relying on discipline (in the classical sense), but rather resembling 
neo-liberal forms of subject maintenance and formation. During my two stays at 
Plum Village, I witnessed some episodes that represented a defiance or 
challenge towards regulations. First, when one sits to eat, it is normal to join the 
palms and bow, recognizing the presence of other participants at the table, and 
some people refused to undertake this ritual, ignoring the fact that they were in 
a community of practice. Second, some people talked while practicing walking 
meditation, which should be conducted in silence. Third, since the use of 
electronic gadgets and mobile phones is allowed, there were some participants 
who were constantly posting on their Facebook pages and playing games (one 
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could argue that this is not consistent with the focus on the “here and now”).  
Finally, some of the ethical guidelines promoted by this practice (see chapter 
VIII) suggest that one should avoid consumerism; however, in each hamlet of 
Plum Village there is a  shop selling books (mostly by Thich Nhat Hanh), 
chocolate and other candies, calligraphies (handwritten by Thich Nhat Hanh) 
and various meditative paraphernalia (such as bells). These shops open in 
certain occasions, and they offer the possibility to acquire all these different 
commodities, reinforcing the picture of commodified spirituality as previously 
mentioned. 
 These various examples suggest that regulations, understood as devices 
that break usual connections to suspend regular automatisms, can trigger many 
forms of resistance, which in turn reflect old, pre-meditative automatisms that 
the retreat assemblage aims at destabilizing – the modern self. The following 
section will analyze how retreat assemblages manage spaces to encourage 
meditative dispositions, thus reinforcing their role as mechanisms of 
transformation through the reconfiguration of habitual couplings between selves 
and the world. 
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IV. IV MEDITATIVE SPACES 
 
ILLUSTRATION 1 - MAIN MEDITATION HALL, DHAMMA DIPA, HEREFORDSHIRE, 
ENGLAND88 
 
 
 
ILLUSTRATION 2 - PLUM VILLAGE, DORDOGNE, FRANCE 
 
 
                                                             
88
 All rights belong to the Vipassana Trust, see 
http://www.dipa.dhamma.org/views.html for more images of Dhamma Dipa. 
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If regulations are understood as constraints that should foster new 
automatisms, devices such as spatial reconfiguration, the management of 
human and nonhuman interactions and inscriptions are also central 
mechanisms of subjectification in retreat spaces. 
The retreat is a suspension of regular, modern life, and of its networks of 
subjectification. Simmel argued that the modern city has certain subjective 
effects, leading to the constitution of a new kind of man, the metropolitan one. 
This type of subject “reacts with his head instead of his heart” (Simmel, 
1950:410) due to the calculative logics exerted by the “overwhelming power of 
the metropolitan life” (Simmel, 1950: 411), illustrating the power of cities to 
enact particular kinds of people (Certeau, 1984). The role of materiality in 
shaping subjects is highlighted by post-humanist STS (see Schull, 2005; 
Haraway, 1991; Rose, 1998; Pickering, 1995; Suchman, 2007; Brenninkmeijer, 
2010; Verbeek, 2011), and retreats recruit spatial and institutional devices to 
foster the emergence of selves that are opposed to modern, nonmeditative and 
dual ones. Retreat assemblages rely on psychogeographical reconfigurations 
as a vector of subjectification. The term psychogeography was coined by Guy 
Debord to illustrate the subjectifying power of cities, landscapes and spatial 
organization in general: 
“Psychogeography sets for itself the study of the precise laws and 
 specific effects of the geographical environment, whether consciously 
 organized or not, on the emotions and behavior of individuals. The 
 charmingly vague adjective psychogeographical can be applied to the 
 findings arrived at by this type of investigation, to their influence on 
 human feelings, and more generally to any situation or conduct that 
 seems to reflect the same spirit of discovery.” (Debord, 2006: 8) 
 
Meditative psychogeographies rely on a diversity of devices to alter 
modern associations, including spatial reconfiguration, the management of 
interactions, inscriptions and are supported by particular understandings of 
space – situated spatial ontologies. 
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IV.IV.I SPATIAL RECONFIGURATION 
 
If, according to Foucault (1995), the Panopticon is a laboratory of power 
for the fabrication of disciplined selves, Zen and Vipassana also rely on forms of 
spatial and architectural reconfiguration to help subjects become meditators. 
Meditation halls are paradigmatic spatial assemblages - lighting is scarce; 
decoration is kept to a minimum to avoid distractions and the habitual sounds of 
the city are suspended (in both cases, retreats take place in rural locations). 
In Vipassana retreats, old students sit at the front, and the two ATs, male 
and female, are elevated (sitting on a platform), overseeing the practitioners, 
while male and female course managers are close to the ATs. The male AT sits 
on the left and the female on the right; male course managers and male servers 
sit on the left of the male AT, and female staff on the right of the female AT89. If 
something disruptive happens, the AT, who has a wide view over the hall, will 
ask the course manager to take action. The way the hall is organized often 
means that at the back, where new students sit, it is much noisier than at the 
front - by the end of the retreat these differences become less noticeable. 
In Plum Village, the main meditation hall of the Upper Hamlet (where my 
fieldwork was conducted) is called the Still Water Meditation Hall. There are two 
sides, right and left, and two lines of cushions. The exterior line is for visitors 
and lay practitioners, and the inner line is for monastics. Usually, the more 
senior a practitioner is the more distant he will be from the entrance of the Hall. 
When Thich Nhat Hanh comes to practice, he usually sits at the end of the inner 
line of cushions. 
The different buildings and architectural devices have relatively clear 
goals, linked to the spatial partitioning of individuals (Foucault, 1995). In 
Vipassana retreats, all these buildings have particular functions, allowing 
regular circulations between spaces that take place according to the timetable – 
from the residential quarters to the meditation hall, from the meditation hall to 
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 See Pagis (2008) and Selim (2011) for good visual depictions of how the 
Meditation Hall is organized. 
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the dining room, from the dining room to the toilets, etc.. In Dhamma Dipa, an 
established centre of practice whose property was purchased in 199190, each 
space has a specific function – “meditation hall” to meditate, attending the 
evening lectures and asking questions to the AT; dining hall to have breakfast, 
lunch and “dinner”91, to register at the beginning of the retreat and to give Dana 
(donation) when it is over; residential quarters to sleep, rest and meditate; 
walking areas outside to walk (these include some trees and gardens, since 
Dhamma Dipa is in a rural area). In sum, Vipassana remind us of Goffman’s 
depiction of total institutions, indicating a radical shift from regular “modern” 
societies92, transforming individualities into a sort of homogeneous flock that is 
mobilized from one space to another, according to different scheduled activities. 
This allows selves to become fully engaged in the practice of meditation, and 
they do not have to make choices – everything is chosen for them. This means 
that they can concentrate their efforts in meditation: they give away their spatial 
freedom, their ability to move from one place to the other at their will, in order to 
transform their selfhood. 
In Plum Village, although different buildings display different functions – 
sleeping, resting, eating, meditating, etc. – we don’t find the same 
homogeneous and relatively predictable flow of human bodies: the schedule 
can always be changed, there are periods for rest and self-practice and 
participants can stay in their rooms if they want to – meditation is not 
“compulsory”. This confirms the liberal or entrepreneurial approach to 
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 http://www.dipa.dhamma.org/about.html 
91
 At 5 o’clock, new students can have some tea with a piece of fruit; old 
students are allowed to drink lemon juice.  
92
 As put by Goffman, “a basic social arrangement in modern society is that the 
individual tends to sleep, play and work in different places with different co-
participants, under different authorities, and without an over-all rational plan… 
The central feature of total institutions can be described as a breakdown of the 
barriers ordinarily separating these three spheres of life.” (Goffman, 1968: 17). 
Goffman identifies four important mechanisms at stake here: the conduction of 
all aspects of life in the same place under a central authority; the fact that these 
activities are undertaken with a large number of others, treated as equals and 
required to do the same tasks; all the activities are tightly scheduled, and these 
are ordered by formal rulings; finally, all these activities are unified by a rational 
plan (Goffman, 1968:17). 
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meditation, where selves have to make a decision to actually practice. 
Moreover, and since no “shock” is involved, as in the case of Vipassana, there 
are various devices that display similarities with everyday life – a ping pong 
table is available outside to play with other retreatants and monks; a building, 
called the bamboo hall, has a small library with a wide range of literature (even 
non-religious one), there is a piano and participants can run their own 
workshops on yoga or tai chi if they wish to do so; in Lower Hamlet there is a 
swing set that is very popular, and even a basketball net. In sum, this means 
that different architectural devices and distinct ways of organizing space are 
used to support different paradigms of meditation. Vipassana isolations, regular 
tempos and compulsory practice contrast with Zen as an expression of the 
outside world. 
 
IV.IV.II MANAGING INTERACTIONS 
 
An important dimension of these retreats is the management of the 
interactions between self, environment and others. In the Vipassana retreats 
there is a focus on isolation, self-containment, on the individualisation of 
experience. First of all, numbers are attributed to participants - they are given a 
code that represents the place where they are sitting for the whole duration of 
the retreat, and this codification is linked to other information (name, room 
where this person is staying) that is mobilised if that individual is not present; 
secondly, interactions with others are forbidden – no talking, no physical 
contact, for 10 days the self is the only refuge; thirdly, this generalized isolation 
extends to sensory deprivation – meditative spaces, such as the Hall, have 
reduced lighting, minimal sounds and clothes should be as simple as possible 
to avoid distractions and there are cells (that augment sensory deprivation) that 
can be used by old students – basically a couple of cushions in a very small 
room without distractions to meditate; finally, the interaction with nonhuman 
living beings is reduced to a minimum – one should not meditate outside (sitting 
on a bench or under a tree), and there are explicit indications to avoid cuddling 
cats – in sum, one should reduce the interactions with human and nonhuman 
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entities, including the “natural world”. The politics of the Vipassana assemblage 
is to break all connections with the outside world, to suspend all habitual 
networks. Callon used the term enrolment to designate “the device by which a 
set of interrelated roles is defined and attributed to actors who accept them” 
(Callon, 1986: 204). Regarding the 10-day retreat, one could say that habitual 
networks are broken through a suspension of regular connections that 
afterwards enrols new architectural, regulatory, temporal and material devices 
to alter human automatisms. Vipassana reduces the habitual modern network 
and multiplies a new set of associations that should ideally foster a new way of 
being. 
On the other hand, in Plum Village there is a focus on community and 
interaction – it is common to gather with others and to sing before walking 
meditation; there are various other instances of sharing and talking, and there 
are many devices that can be used to reinforce this communitarian dimension, 
such as holding hands during walking meditation or practicing hugging 
meditation. This focus on inter-subjectivity is supported by the aesthetic 
experience of nature – the monastery is surrounded by vineyards and farms, it 
is a rural area with pine and oak trees, and fields that, during spring, are filled 
with thousands of beautiful daffodils – aesthetically, it is stunning. Plum Village 
has various hamlets, sometimes several miles apart, and one is encouraged to 
walk between them, becoming “exposed” to the environment, embracing 
“nature” while at the same time working on the self, slowing down and 
maximizing the experience of the present moment; these associatons with the 
environment are not merely aesthetical, as we will see in chapter VIII, and 
contribute to the transformation of the meditator’s Umwelt. 
We are facing two distinct logics of enrolment, of performing the network 
of meditation. Much has been written on modern Buddhism - according to 
McMahan (2008), it reflects modernity’s turn to the subject, reflexivity and 
aesthetics, mostly from Romanticism onwards (Taylor, 1989). One could argue 
that the Plum Village assemblage is a mere expression of contemporary ways 
of translating eastern practices, reducing them to a mere facet of modernity’s 
reaction to disenchantment. However, what is at stake here is the performance 
of a new paradigm of selfhood, involving a number of environmental and 
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experiential changes that should not be reduced to mere signs of modernity or 
disguised nostalgia. These devices actually foster new ways of experiencing the 
self through the alteration of habitual associations, transforming affect and 
reconfiguring automatisms. Selves are invited to hold each other’s hands, to 
look at the environment, to smell the fragrance of flowers – the reconfiguration 
of habitual interactions is an attempt to revitalize the role of the body in 
connection with other humans and nonhumans and to alter the perception of the 
environment, bringing forth a different Umwelt as well as a whole new set of 
experiences (see chapter VI). 
 
 
IV.IV.III INSCRIPTIONS 
 
Vipassana and Zen assemblages are filled with spatial inscriptions, 
mechanisms that populate the retreat space with signs, elements that should 
support the practice of meditation93 . In Vipassana retreats, there are signs 
reading “Male course boundary” or “Female course boundary”, indicating the 
frontiers of the space of confinement, reinforcing the prohibition of leaving the 
established boundaries; there are other signs such as “Don’t cuddle the cats” 
and there is a notice board, usually on the door leading to the dining room, or 
inside the dining room, with some of the rules, technical aspects of the practice, 
the indication of the current day (day two, day three, etc) or any change to the 
schedule or regulations (due, for instance, to the introduction of a new 
                                                             
93
 Latour and Woolgar, in their “Laboratory Life”, used the notion of 
inscription devices to illustrate the transformation of matter into written 
documents. According to them, “An inscription device is any item of apparatus 
or particular configuration of such items which can transform a material 
substance into a figure or diagram which is directly usable by one of the 
members of the office space.” (Latour and Woolgar, 1979: 51). In the case of 
retreats, these inscriptions do not aim at transcribing material agents into words 
through laboratory equipments but to reinforce the psychogeography of the 
retreat assemblage. 
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meditation technique). These inscriptions function in co-operation with the work 
of the servers, who enforce the regulations, and with nonhumans, such as duct-
tape, that signal the course boundaries when it is a non-permanent centre, 
requiring a set of spatial and material transformations to allow it to become a 
Vipassana retreat centre. 
In Zen retreats, there is a relatively ubiquitous mechanism that infuses 
the space with the spirit of mindfulness - the physical inscription of verses, or 
gathas, in various places. For instance, in the dining hall there is a gatha 
reading “This piece of bread is an ambassador from the entire cosmos” and in 
the toilets we can find a gatha saying “Water flows over these hands. May I use 
them skilfully// to preserve our precious planet” (Hanh, 1996: 20) – these gathas 
are virtually everywhere and their aim is to support the mode of being promoted 
by this tradition through the creation of new connections. These gathas function 
as legislative marks or codifications, illustrating a new ontology that selves 
should embrace through practice. In both cases, these inscriptions aim at 
creating a spatial reality that entangles the legislative with the performative and 
the ontological, working as lieutenants (following Latour, 198894) of meditation – 
they remind participants that they are in a retreat, inviting them to adjust to new 
spatial, institutional and performative requirements and reinforce the clash with 
the outside world by populating the space with meditative inscriptions. Here, we 
are dealing with devices of linguistic subjectification. Butler’s example of the 
doctor who pronounces the gender of the child at birth (Butler, 1997a) indicates 
how this first announcement triggers a lifelong chain of gendered 
subjectification; it also reminds us of Althusser’s interpellations. According to 
Althusser, ideology transforms individuals into subjects through interpellations 
                                                             
94
 We might think that reflecting on doors, doorknobs or door closers stands in 
the fringes of social theory and humanities. However, a door closer was the 
motto of a paper by Latour (under the pseudonym of Jim Johnson) where he 
identified the pervasiveness of what he called lieutenants in our societies, 
nonhumans to which certain competencies have been delegated. Door closers 
justify a shift in the object of sociology (reinforcing the importance of STS): “One 
of the tasks of sociology is to do for the masses of nonhumans that make up our 
modern societies what it did so well for the masses of ordinary and despised 
humans that make up our society” (Latour, 1988:310). 
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“which can be imagined along the lines of the most commonplace everyday 
police (or other) hailing: “Hey, you there!” (Althusser, 2008: 48). Inscriptions, 
instead of directly interpellating participants (as in Althusser’s policemen), are 
nonhumans that populate the retreat heterotopia and that can remind 
practitioners of the constraints or create new webs of associations, as in the 
case of Zen. In both cases these new associations are positive, in the sense 
that they should allow the emergence of new paradigms of selfhood. 
 
IV.IV.IV SITUATED SPATIAL ONTOLOGIES 
 
Finally, there are aspects linked to the ontological understandings of 
these traditions, including notions such as “vibrations” (Vipassana) and 
“energies” (Zen) that are relevant in order to understand retreats. Much has 
been written on local and situated knowledge (Haraway, 1988; Harding, 2004) 
and epistemological pluralism (Viveiros de Castro, 1998; Santos, 2006). There 
is also some literature on Transcendental Meditation (TM) advocating the 
existence of what is called the “maharishi effect” – if people practice meditation 
(TM, obviously), the rest of society will benefit from it (see Orme-Johnson et al., 
1990; Hatchard et al., 1996; Hagelin et al., 1998) involving the assumption that 
selves are interconnected by a common matrix that can be accessed and 
modified through meditation.  Notions such as “vibrations” and “energies” 
suspend usual dualisms between mind and matter, suggesting that not only 
consciousness but also space can be affected by the practice of meditation, 
requiring a different understanding of what the world is (see chapters V, VII and 
VIII). 
Concerning Vipassana, one of my informants told me that S. N. Goenka 
came to England shortly before Dhamma Dipa was inaugurated and spent 
some time meditating in a tent, in exactly the same spot where the ATs 
nowadays sit during the retreats – the point was to generate “good vibrations” to 
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support the practice of meditation95.   Regarding the movement of Thich Nhat 
Hanh, there is a focus on the energies generated by collective practice, the 
energy of the Sangha. In fact, the practitioners are asked to “stop struggling” 
and to accept the collective flow, letting their bodies and minds being infected 
by this energetic power: 
“Even if you don’t do anything, if you just stop thinking and allow yourself 
 to absorb the collective energy of the Sangha, it’s very healing. Don’t 
 struggle, don’t try to do anything, just allow yourself to be with the 
 Sangha. Allow yourself to rest, and the energy of the Sangha will help 
 you, will carry and support you.” (Hanh, 2002: 25) 
 
The retreat space is not understood in a positivist sense but regarded as 
potentially affected by vibrations and energies that can be transformed through 
the practice of meditation. This means that if meditation practice is linked to the 
repetition of a set of technologies of the self, these favourable repetitions 
(Sloterdijk, 2013) can affect the environment, generating more beneficial 
psychogeographies for meditation, suspending the dualism between self and 
environment. As I argue in chapter VII, an important dimension of meditation in 
everyday life is the transformation of the regular Umwelt, and the long term 
practice of meditation can allow selves to experience time and space in novel 
manners, generating nonstandard experiences, confirming that these 
nonmodern paradigms can actually be enacted.  
The role of the environment in the fabrication of meditative selves and 
the transformation of psychogeographies through technologies of the self 
suggest that there is a feedback loop between subjects and environments. 
According to Hayles,   
“The idea of the feedback loop implies that the boundaries of the 
 autonomous subject are up for grabs, since feedback loops can flow not 
 only within the subject but also between the subject and the environment. 
                                                             
95For a comprehensive assessment of the role of “vibrations” for this tradition 
(namely its rhetorical, practical and regulatory value) see Goenka, 2002b. The 
informant who shared this information also told me that the sort of negative 
energy one encounters at the bookies illustrates how repeated emotions and 
performances can penetrate the temporal texture of places. See also chapter V 
for an exploration of Vipassana’s standpoint psychology and the importance of 
vibrations. 
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 From Norbert Wiener on, the flow of information through feedback loops 
 has been associated with the deconstruction of the liberal humanist 
 subject.” (Hayles, 1999: 2) 
 
 These couplings between humans and the environment justify the 
relevance of the setting as a device of subjectification, submitting humans to 
new networks, constraints and couplings with nonhumans, suspending the 
habitual connections of the outside world. The setting is a post-humanist space 
(Pickering, 1995), relying on a diversity of devices that displace and reinvent 
subjectivities: 
  “a space in which the human actors are still there but now inextricably 
 entangled with the nonhuman, no longer at the center of the action and 
 calling the shots. The world makes us in one and the same process as 
 we make the world.” (Pickering, 1995: 26) 
 
Meditation teachers such as Goenka and Hanh recognize this 
phenomenon, which means that Vipassana and Zen retreats explicitly alter 
webs of associations to allow the emergence of nonmodern selves. A relevant 
dimension of these retreats concerns the introduction of new material agents, 
as I argue in the following section. 
 
 
IV.V MATERIALITIES 
 
An essential aspect of these retreats is the introduction of nonhuman 
devices that can transform and adapt human behaviour. These materials, 
following Latour and ANT, can be understood as actants, entities that modify 
“another entity in a trial; of actors it can only be said that they act; their 
competence is deducted from their performances” (Latour, 2004b: 237). 
Our lives are characterized by a proliferation of nonhuman devices such 
as TV’s, computers and mobile phones, constantly interacting with us and 
shaping our selves. How should we characterize the technological or material 
networks of meditation retreats, the set of nonhuman elements that should 
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ideally sustain, maximize and support meditation? First, if people are going to 
practice sitting meditation, they have to sit. In the Vipassana retreats, there is a 
“standard operating procedure” for those who sit for the first time. There is a 
large, thin quadrangular cushion that rests on the floor, and then there is a 
smaller, thicker cushion on top of that. It is possible to add another small 
cushion to the set, to elevate the body, easing the process of sitting cross 
legged or in the lotus or semi-lotus position. In Plum Village, each person can 
use one of various Zafu cushions available there; these also rest on top of a 
larger quadrangular cushion that protects the legs from the contact with the 
hard, wooden floor. 
The adaptation to a new material network generates resistances. Sitting 
for long periods of time is not easy for beginners, and in chapter VI I explore 
some of the most common difficulties (including pain) that take place, 
understood as struggles of agency. Robert Hover, who learned meditation with 
U Ba Khin in Burma (Goenka’s teacher) recalled his first experience with the 
cushions in the following way: 
“I was a five-pillow man”. Hover described. “One under my seat, one 
 under each knee, one behind my back against the wall, and one that I 
 brought along”, and he waved his hand in the air shaking an imaginary 
 pillow that you could practically see, “just in case.” He demonstrated his 
 initial sitting posture: slumped shoulders, knees jutting up in the air, and 
 an expression of naive bewilderment on his face.” (Lerner, 1977: 61) 
 
Judith Toy, a Zen practitioner, started using a bench, after many years of 
meditation, to be able to sit for long periods of time. She even sewed a thin 
cushion for the top of the bench, reinforcing the importance of nonhumans to 
the practice of meditation: “the bench became for me a happy middle way 
between cushion and chair, a benchmark. I sewed a cushion for the top of the 
bench, covering it in black cotton. I discovered I was able to sit relaxed.” (Toy, 
2011: 115-116) 
There are many other actants that are part of networks of meditation. In 
the Vipassana retreats, the course manager carries with him a document with 
the name of each student, the place where he sits and his room number, in 
order to trace him if he is not following the schedule; in Plum Village, and during 
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the mindfulness days, we can find ancestors’ shrines, containing pictures of 
(usually dead) relatives. Architectural devices, environments, spatial partitioning 
and nonhumans create new webs of associations that alter how people use 
their bodies and interact with others, contributing towards the transformation of 
automatisms. There are two relevant sets of nonhumans that reinforce the role 
of materiality in reconfiguring habitual associations: Audio and Video tapes (in 
Vipassana retreats) and bells (Zen). 
 
IV.V.I AUDIO AND VIDEO TAPES 
 
In Vipassana retreats, instructions are given through audio and video 
tapes. These nonhumans “suspend” sensory deprivation – it is through 
technology that one receives information on how to meditate and how to 
interpret one’s experiences. The same tapes are played everywhere in the 
Western world, supporting the quasi-universal character of this practice. These 
materials are standardized forms that can be understood as immutable 
mobiles96 (Latour, 1987), those actants that “remain stable enough to retain 
their shape or configuration as they circulate through and across networks.” 
(Gershon, 2010: 168). Instead of being texts, maps or diagrams, these actants 
are audio and video devices that resist spatial and temporal impermanence, 
assuring that in every retreat the same instructions and explanations are given. 
Few Vipassana meditators have met Goenka in person, but they all have seen 
his digital image and heard the low, guttural and slow paced voice that is 
constantly telling them what to do. Goenka may die, but these tapes will survive 
him for many years. Vipassana is a technology of the electronic era - the 
dissemination of these tapes is a form of governing at a distance (Foucault, 
2007) – the guru becomes virtual and anthropotecnics are globalized through 
the power of Ipods, CD players and TV sets. 
                                                             
96
 According to Latour, immutable and combined mobiles are “All these charts, 
tables and trajectories [that] are conveniently at hand and combinable at will, no 
matter whether they are twenty centuries old or a day old; each of them brings 
celestial bodies billions of tons heavy and hundreds of thousands of miles away 
to the size of a point on a piece of paper.”(Latour, 1987: 227) 
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These tapes are played every night between 7 and 8:15 PM, and they 
cover the following aspects: general difficulties and experiences in a specific 
stage of the retreat, according to the technique being “followed”; ontological 
aspects of matter and of the self, such as the nature of the mind and body; 
central aspects of Buddhist philosophy, such as the four noble truths or the law 
of kamma; narratives of the life of the Buddha and historical aspects of 
Vipassana, etc.. These discourses are adapted to each day, following a step-
by-step process. For instance, in day one the discourse covers topics such as 
the initial difficulties, the purpose of meditation, why respiration is chosen as the 
starting point, the nature of the mind, how to deal with difficulties and the 
dangers to be avoided (Goenka, 1987: 7). In day four, the discourse focuses on 
“Questions on how to practice Vipassana – the law of kamma – importance of 
mental action – four aggregates of the mind” (Goenka, 1987: 7)97. 
Bearing in mind Becker’s remarks on marijuana, we can understand 
these tapes as a form of “folklore,” allowing practitioners to justify their presence 
in the retreat – “In the course of further experience in drug-using groups, the 
novice acquires a series of rationalizations and justifications with which he may 
answer objections to occasional use if he decides to engage in it” (Becker, 
1963: 74). In sum, these tapes help participants make sense of their 
experiences. 
The role of ATs is to press play, allowing the tapes to display the image 
of S. N. Goenka, always accompanied by his wife. This confirms his status of a 
“householder” like those in attendance, suggesting that they don’t belong to 
different social strata. The videos are in English, and those who do not speak 
                                                             
97
 The role of these tapes is to reshape subjectivities, providing “responses” to 
existential conditions -  why we suffer, why our mind reacts in certain ways, why 
we are attached to sensations, etc. - participants are given detailed and 
comprehensive explanations concerning the methodology they are applying, 
and how such technique alters their physical and mental apparatus; they 
become part of a community of meditative experience, being presented with an 
array of experiences and difficulties that occur; they learn that there is a 
doctrine, a philosophical structure underlying the practice -  what they are 
practicing is Dhamma - they are given concepts, narratives, explanations and 
tools to interpret the experience of the self according to that background. In 
chapter V I will use the notion of “standpoint psychology” to characterize this 
hermeneutical assemblage, understood as essentially performative. 
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the language can use a headset with the discourses in another language98. 
These tapes are used to create the “retreat effect” in the absence of the 
teacher. All instructions are given by audio tapes, played at the beginning of 
each hour, involving Goenka chanting in Pali99, and without these tapes there 
could be no Vipassana retreats - they allow Goenka to fabricate brand new 
meditators at a distance. 
 
IV.V.II BELLS OF MINDFULNESS 
 
In Zen retreats, bells are actants with a quasi-ubiquitous status. They are 
constantly used to announce the beginning of an activity (eating, walking, sitting 
meditation) and practitioners are encouraged to stop whatever they are doing 
and to focus on their breathing. Ideally, this is done for three breaths. As Hanh 
states: “When we hear the sound of the bell, we stop talking and stop moving. 
We relax our body and become aware of our breathing. We do it naturally, with 
enjoyment, and without solemnity or stiffness.” (Hanh, 2009: 20). Bells, 
following ANT, are mediators, they translate a program of action (Akrich and 
Latour, 1992). As Verbeek explains,  
“When a technology mediates, it involves the “translation” of a “program 
 of action.” Say a person (actant 1) is angry and wants to take revenge on 
 someone, but is not strong enough to do that person physical harm. His 
 “program of action” - the “intention” to take revenge— is blocked. This 
 person, however, can take on a relation with a gun (actant 2). This gun 
 mediates the program of action of actant 1, on the basis of its own 
 program of action - the “function” of shooting. A new actant arises (actant 
 1 + actant 2), with a new, translated program: the killing of the person 
 against whom one wants to take revenge... The original program of 
 action is thus “translated” or “transformed” in the technical mediation into 
 a new one.” (Verbeek, 2005: 156) 
 
                                                             
98
 When I was attending the retreat in Portugal, they were playing a video 
dubbed in Portuguese in the meditation hall; in the dining room, they had the 
videos in English and I also heard a German translation when the discourse in 
English came to an end. 
99
 For a good reflection on the importance of chanting in Pali during meditation 
retreats, see Cook (2010). 
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The program of action of Zen retreat assemblages is to enact 
mindfulness, awareness of the present moment. However, participants are still 
dealing with their automatisms - they are distracted, they think about home, the 
past or the future, even when they are totally surrounded by a radically different 
environment. In order to materialize mindfulness, a new device, the bell, is used 
to help participants come back to the present moment. This nonhuman is not 
easily enrolled – human participants are struggling with the assemblage, and 
they find it hard to implement a new mode of existence. As Brad told me, the 
bell can actually have an unintended effect, linked to the expectation that a 
meditation session will end: 
“People can be bored, or impatient, and can just wait for the bell to ring, 
 and then…what happens when the bell rings? They certainly feel 
 relieved, or something, you know, I have that sometimes, I sit down 
 like…buhhhh…I’m waiting for this bell to ring!” (Interview, Brad, February 
 2011). 
 
The use of bells seems counterproductive; if meditation should allow the 
development of awareness trough the installation of new, meditative 
automatisms, the bell seems to lead to new conditionings (Pavlov, 1955; 
Watson and Rayner, 1920) that make the practice of meditation even harder. In 
order to be able to enjoy the bell, one has to practice: in sum, the bell can only 
serve the program of action of the retreat assemblage if those who hear it 
practice how to listen to the bell, transforming their automatisms and linking its 
sound to mindfulness, instead of projecting into the bell some particular 
expectation (dealing with food, rest, sleep, etc.). 
If, according to Latour, there is no discipline without steel (1991b), there 
can be no Zen retreats without bells. I remember that in one occasion, in the 
Spring of 2012, I was in charge of inviting the bell during a day of mindfulness in 
Devon, to remind people to return to the meditation hall after a period of self-
practice. It took me slightly longer than expected to call everyone (I had to invite 
the bell for several times, since people were all over the property) and when I 
returned to the meditation hall I realized that the retreat organizers were quite 
worried because they had no bell to announce the following activity.  
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There are various techniques and procedures to invite the bell, 
depending on the circumstances. It can be used during ordination ceremonies 
to produce entrancing melodies, to announce a new scheduled activity or just to 
make sure that everyone is practicing mindfulness100. Instead of striking, one 
invites the bell. Jane, a long-term practitioner who facilitates weekly meetings, 
told me that she needs a clear heart in order to invite its sound: 
“I send my heart with the sound of the bell... you know, there’s different 
 gathas about sending the…heart…well-being to the world, so that’s 
 great, actually it’s very good for heart connection, connecting my heart 
 and trying to have a clear space, and a clear heart. In order to invite the 
 bell, I need a clear heart ..., so you’re doing it with a clarity…and a 
 peaceful mind.” (Interview, Jane, April 2011) 
 
Inviting the bell requires the development of a particular state of mind. 
This means that in order to activate the bell, one should transform habitual 
automatisms. The bell and the practitioner are coupled to produce the sound 
that should ideally allow others to attain a different mindset: they should be able 
to listen, breathing for three times and staying in the present moment. 
Bells, video tapes and cushions can be understood as mediators (as put 
in chapter II), they support the practice of meditation, inviting human actors to 
alter their posture, affect and how they make sense of what is happening. 
These nonhumans are devices of material subjectification. Audio and Video 
tapes give instructions and provide hermeneutical explanations – Goenka 
becomes a digital guru; cushions are carefully used to permit the emergence of 
the sitting posture, clashing with the habitual automatisms of participants; bells 
are mediators of mindfulness – they allow the transition from one activity to 
another and require participants to engage in new performances.  
These different materials permit the emergence of the retreat 
assemblage. They alter and mediate human actions, requiring humans to adapt 
their automatisms and to rely on new material apparatuses to practice 
                                                             
100
 For an excellent introduction and explanation of the importance of the Bell, 
given by Sister Dang Nhiem, watch this great video 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E6aYE3irqFQ (Retrieved: 12/09/2013). The 
big bell in the Meditation Hall sits on a cushion, just like a human being. 
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meditation. Through these new couplings with materials, practitioners are able 
to attain different dispositions, including the range of affordances analyzed in 
chapters VI and VII. 
IV.VI CONCLUSION 
 
We can think of Vipassana and Zen retreats as heterogeneous 
assemblages composed of a variety of dispositifs: ways of entering the retreat 
space; constraints; spatial reconfiguration and nonhumans. The hybrid nature of 
spaces of meditation (comprising human and nonhuman agents) allows us to 
question humanist understandings of meditation (McMahan, 2008). In practice, 
meditation retreats are not the mere result of ideas, historical processes or 
social trends – they include the soft fabric of cushions, the cold metal of bells, 
the wooden floors of meditation halls, human bodies that move according to 
timetables and delicious vegetarian food.  
These new webs of association constitute new environments that 
contrast with the modern assemblages participants are used to. New meditators 
have a hard time adjusting to the new setting (see chapter VI) – they are not 
only learning new technologies of the self; they are also engaging in new 
networks, new couplings with material, architectural and regulatory devices that 
challenge their habitual ways of being in the world. 
Retreat assemblages emerge along with these heterogenenous devices. 
In order to reproduce these assemblages, the network of associations 
constituting the retreat has to be reproduced. For instance, the one-day 
Vipassana courses, available to old students, are spent in silence; there are 
special tapes with instructions; cushions are available and a timetable regulates 
the various activities undertaken101. The mindfulness days of the Zen tradition of 
Thich Nhat Hanh also attempt to reproduce the “retreat effect”. They are 
comprised of a set of actants such as pictures of relatives that constitute the 
                                                             
101
 08.50 - Arrive and settle in; 9.00 - 10.50 Anapana; 11.00 - 12.00 Vipassana; 
12.00 - 1.00 Lunch and rest; 1.00 - 1.50 Meditation; 2.00 - 3.00 Group Sitting; 
3.10 - 4.00 Meditation and Metta; 4.10 - 4.35 Discourse; 4.35 - Course ends 
and Tea. This is the timetable of a one-day course I attended in 2012. 
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ancestors’ shrine; chanting books (Hanh, 2007b) and the array of practices and 
performances linked to this tradition 102 . Likewise, social applications of 
meditation also rely on these nonmodern webs of associations, as we will see in 
chapter VIII. 
Retreat assemblages destabilize the modern self through the suspension 
of habitual associations (including those prompted by writing, speaking, or 
watching TV), relying on regulations, architectural agents and a variety of 
mediators. They set up new connections to allow selves to transform their 
automatisms, including their sleep, the way they eat or their habitual postures. 
Retreats, understood as “other places”, as heterotopias, invite participants to 
embrace a new environment, to be affected by new associations and to 
transform themselves.   
Another relevant element in the constitution of new paradigms of 
subjectivity is the transformation of human performances. The role of 
techniques of meditation is to foster new possibilities of existence by changing 
what people do with their selves, and the aim of the following chapter is to 
                                                             
102
 I attended three days of mindfulness in Devon; The timetable was never the 
same, and the focus was on practicing together – eating, walking, meditating 
and undertaking other central performances of this project of subjectivity. 
However, the timetable of a mindfulness day can be something like this: “9:45 to 
10:00 AM--Please Arrive and find a seat. Shoes may be left on the inside 
stairway as entering.  Bring slippers if you like, a cushion to sit on, a mat for 
warmth and a blanket for deep relaxation. A light vegetarian food item, to go 
with a homemade, organic, vegetarian soup, is optional.  Utensils, plates, cups, 
napkins, and tea are provided.; 10:00 AM—Welcome, Introductions, preview of 
morning schedule. Guided Meditation (10 Minutes)  Walking Meditation (20 
minutes) Sitting Meditation (30 minutes) 11:15 AM--10 Minute silent break for 
tea and bathroom. 11:25--DVD of one of Thay’s Dharma Talks as we co-
practice with Plum Village winter retreat. 11:45--Dharma Discussion: Your 
experience, especially as it relates to the Dharma  Presentation. 12:15—Lunch, 
a small bell will sound after a 5 minutes to enjoy quiet conversation.(20 minutes) 
12:35--Sitting Meditation (20 minutes) 12:55--Walking Meditation, or mindful 
movement stretching. (10 minutes) 1:05—Deep Relaxation—Bring a blanket 
please. (25 minutes) 1:30—Discourse on Love (Chanting from the Heart p. 351)  
Enjoy singing songs of practice.  1:50--- Sharing the Merit, Closure and Cleanup 
2:00—Enjoy the rest of your day.  Be kind.” This timetable was obtained from 
the website of the Five Stones Sangha in Oregon - 
https://sites.google.com/site/fivestonessanghacorvallis/Home/News/mindfulness
daythissaturdayjan11th (Retrieved: 15/06/2012) 
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explore the various technologies of the self taught in Vipassana and Zen 
retreats.  
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V. PERFORMANCES 
 
“When you will have made him a body without organs, 
then you will have delivered him from all his automatic reactions 
and restored him to his true freedom. 
Then you will teach him again to dance wrong side out 
as in the frenzy of dance halls 
and this wrong side out will be his real place." 
(Artaud, 1976: 572) 
 
 “Habit … concerns not only the sensory-motor habits that we have 
[psychologically], but also, before these, the primary habits that we are; the 
thousands of passive syntheses of which we are organically composed. It is 
simultaneously through contraction that we are habits, but through 
contemplation that we contract. We are contemplations, we are imaginations, 
we are generalities, claims and satisfactions.” 
(Deleuze, 1994: 74) 
 
V.I INTRODUCTION 
 
In the previous chapter I suggested that retreat settings reconfigure 
habitual webs of associations, allowing selves to enter new assemblages that 
foster nonmodern ways of being. The establishment of new settings, as devices 
of subjectification, is accompanied by the introduction of technologies of the self 
that clash with habitual ways of enacting subjectivity in everyday life, inviting 
practitioners to install new automatisms. 
One could argue that man is a creature of habit. We deploy a multiplicity 
of performances to get on with our daily lives, repeating automatisms that 
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illustrate patterns of reaction towards physical sensations and emotions (such 
as being disgusted by extreme pain or rejoicing with an orgasm). These are so 
deeply embodied in ourselves that we tend to naturalize them; moreover, in 
social theory, notions such as imitation, habitus or habits have been deployed to 
illustrate the couplings between self and social (Tarde, 1903; Mead, 1934; 
Bourdieu, 1977), suggesting that a relevant dimension of belonging to a 
particular social world is the ability to incorporate, repeat and maintain these 
regular automatisms. 
If the role of the retreat is to conjure up nonmodern settings, practices of 
meditation implement new automatisms that sustain nonmodern subjectivities.  
Sloterdijk provides a brilliant summary of how technologies of the self aim at 
transforming the totality of the individual through favourable repetitions (of 
technologies of the self or anthropotechnics): 
“No part of the human can stay as it was: the feelings are reformed, the 
 habitus remodelled, the world of thoughts restructured from the bottom 
 up, and the spoken word overhauled. The whole of life rises up as a new 
 construction on the foundation of favourable repetition.” (Sloterdijk, 2013: 
 405) 
 
We have seen, in the literature review (chapter II), that the management 
of human performance is an essential part of creating, sustaining and altering 
subjectivities. In the case of meditation, the reshaping of human performance is 
linked to the attempt to transform habitual automatisms, installing new ways of 
performing human existence, ideally enacting nonmodern forms of selfhood. 
Instead of developing a humanist approach to these practices 103 , I 
suggest that performances104 of meditation contrast with habitual, modern ways 
                                                             
103
 For instance, Durkheim developed a secular and social analysis of ritual life, 
suggesting that the sacred is a force generated by social assembling 
(Durkheim, 1995). The main problem of this humanist perspective is that it 
suggests that the “sacred” is just a projection of particular social configurations, 
the coming together of social actors. In order to generate new realms of 
experience and reality, these actors have, in fact, to associate themselves with 
nonhumans (as I suggested in the previous chapter), altering habitual webs of 
associations, and they have to engage in a series of technologies that reshape 
their habitual automatisms. 
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of being in the world, opening up new possibilities of agency and of 
experiencing the environment, transforming one’s Umwelt – through the 
alteration of couplings between humans and technologies of the self, they allow 
the emergence of new affordances. Unlike Durkheim, I do not understand these 
practices as “rituals”, but as technologies that permit the emergence of new 
realms of reality, involving entanglements between humans, nonhumans, 
technologies and a number of other devices. 
Technologies of meditation require practitioners to do different things 
with their bodies and minds, involving particular ways of eating, sitting, walking, 
paying attention to sensations throughout the body or becoming aware of their 
breath. Zen and Vipassana technologies invite practitioners to become aware of 
these deep rooted automatisms and to develop new ones.  
Zen and Vipassana resort to a variety of practices to alter human 
automatisms and to enact nonmodern paradigms of selfhood. Vipassana relies 
on the deployment of three technologies of the self - Anapanasati (awareness of 
the breath); Vipassana (insight [into the nature of reality] meditation, or “seeing 
things as they really are”105) and Metta (loving kindness meditation). These 
three different performances aim at transforming human automatisms, 
undertaking specific operations such as calming the mind, becoming aware of 
one’s body or radiating positive feelings. Regarding the set of practices 
promoted by Thich Nhat Hanh, we also find well-structured forms of 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
104
 Although Tambiah argued in favour of a performative approach to 
ritual, he still defines it as “a culturally constructed system of symbolic 
communication” (Tambiah, 1985: 128), and the performativity he advocates is 
Austinian (Austin, 1970) and merely linguistic, in the sense of perlocutionary 
acts (where saying something means doing something), with links to Butler’s 
performativity (influenced by Althusserian interpellations). Although language 
and words can be mobilized to achieve some effects, I will try to avoid these 
culturalist and humanist approaches to practice, illustrating the rule of the so-
called “linguistic turn” that, according to Verbeek: “turns things into little more 
than projection screens for our interpretations, reduces them to the words with 
which we describe them, and fails to give them their due, their proper weight.” 
(Verbeek, 2005: 1-2) 
 
105
 This definition is widely used by this movement. See  
http://www.dhamma.org/en/code.shtml (Retrieved: 13/09/2013). See also 
chapter I. 
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performative self-transformation: although these are also supported by 
particular techniques, the point is to maintain the same mental attitude 
(mindfulness) throughout everyday life activities. In both projects, humans have 
to develop new gestures, body postures, forms of dealing with their inner worlds 
and new associations to re-pattern selfhood, and these techniques are 
supported by particular understandings of what people are, what in this chapter 
I will call standpoint psychologies. 
This chapter is comprised of three main sections. In the first section, I will 
explore how Vipassana transforms human automatisms and how this process of 
transformation is coupled with particular ways of conceiving humans. I will also 
reflect on two important aspects to understand Vipassana assemblages: its 
claims of scientificity and the focus on purity. In the second section, I present 
the wide range of techniques promoted by Thich Nhat Hanh and I reflect on the 
performative continuity fostered by this tradition, as well as on the collective 
nature of these practices, coupled with nondual understandings of the self. In 
the third section, “The Performativity of Anthropotechnics”, and influenced by 
STS (see chapter II), I suggest that we should understand technologies of the 
self as performative, in the sense that they attempt to bring forth paradigms of 
selfhood and certain phenomena whose emergence is entangled with the 
activation of Zen and Vipassana assemblages. 
 
V.II VIPASSANA 
 
Vipassana retreats introduce participants to three technologies: 
Anapanasati, Vipassana and Metta. These comprise distinct performative 
transformations, embedded in disciplinary environments that also manage 
activities such as sleeping, eating, or speaking (see chapter IV). 
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V.II.I ANAPANASATI 
 
 The first meditative technique is called Anapanasati (sometimes referred 
to as Anapana), awareness of the breath, and it is practiced for three days.  
This new technology, as all the others in these retreats, requires participants to 
sit in a comfortable position, with a straight spine and closed eyes, in the lotus 
or half lotus position or the kneeling posture. Most of the meditators use the 
cross-legged position, and some of them (mostly older ones) may use a chair or 
even sit against the wall, although this requires permission by the AT. One has 
to find the most comfortable position by oneself, since there is no physical 
contact during the course, and there is no one in charge of correcting students’ 
postures. As we have seen in the previous chapter, one can go through many 
problems while adjusting to the cushion, and most participants experience pain 
(see chapter VI). 
 Initially, the meditator should feel the various sensations created by the 
touch of the breath inside, at the entrance or below the nostrils, inspiring and 
expiring. One should not control the breath or count it; however, if the mind is 
agitated, then a few deep breaths are advised to help fixing the attention (Hart, 
1987: 75). After those deep breaths, meditators should breathe normally, 
observing (feeling) the sensations caused by the stream of air touching the area 
of the nostrils, without controlling it. If the practitioner is not able to maintain the 
awareness of the breath continuously for approximately 5 minutes then he/she 
can try to breathe deeply for a while, to increase concentration. 
 This technique requires individuals to direct their attention towards the 
breath, an automatism they usually do not pay attention to, altering what 
Csordas calls somatic modes of attention, “culturally elaborated ways of 
attending to and with one’s body in surroundings that include the embodied 
presence of others’” (Csordas: 1999: 152), highlighting the impacts of pre-
reflective visceral feeling (Shaw, 2004 and 2010) on affect. The goal is the 
development of concentration by focusing on a single object, thus fighting the 
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“monkey mind” 106  that characterizes non-meditative selves, constantly 
wandering to the past and to the future, unable to be present107. Most of us 
frequently experience Task-Unrelated-Thoughts (TUT), “thought directed away 
from the current situation; for example, a day dream” (Smallwood et al., 2003: 
169).  TUT is a dominant characteristic of modern selves, meaning that while 
we are doing something (such as eating, walking or listening to someone 
speaking) we are often thinking of something else (sex, sleeping or some article 
we have to submit). According to Killingsworth and Gilbert (2010), 46.9 % of the 
5000 people of 83 countries they studied reported mind wandering, and it 
occurred in approximately 30% of the subjects during every activity except love 
making (Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010: 932). 
  The habit of the human mind is to escape from the present moment, and 
Ananapasati, as a practice of concentration, aims at transforming the regular 
automatism of not being aware of the here and now – by attempting to focus on 
the breath, this technology also prepares subjects to practice Vipassana. Since 
these retreats are organized in a progressive fashion, with the continuous 
introduction of new techniques and variations, Anapanasati is also constantly 
changing. 
 This first variation prepares the meditator to feel sensations in various 
parts of the body. One has to maintain the focus of concentration on the 
triangular area below the nostrils and above the upper lip108. Participants are 
told to observe different sensations, feeling (without noting109) whatever arises 
in that area. As Glickman puts it, reproducing Goenka’s instructions, “You may 
feel itchy, you may feel trembling, you may feel warmth, cold, perspiration, 
                                                             
106
 According to Goenka: “Like a monkey, this monkey-mind keeps jumping 
from one branch of a tree to another. As soon as it leaves one branch, it holds 
another. It is so agitated, so disturbed, so miserable.” (Goenka, 2002a:82) 
 
107
 See Hart (1987:75) for a comprehensive explanation of why it is important to 
develop awareness of respiration. 
108
 Old students are asked to start practicing like this from the very beginning of 
the retreat. 
109
 Other popular techniques of Vipassana, such as the one disseminated by 
Mahasi Sayadaw, focus on mental noting, permanently labelling 
phenomenological experience (Kornfield, 2010). 
139 
 
breeze, pain, palpitation, juggling, wiggling, pulsating or any combination of 
these” (Glickman, 2002: 89). If it is difficult to feel sensations this way, 
meditators can hold their breath for half a minute, noticing the emerging 
sensations.  
 To strengthen this process, there is another variation of the technique. 
One is asked to limit the attention to a spot the size of a fingertip, between the 
nostrils and the upper lip, with an attitude of non reactive observation towards 
sensations. The goal is to sharpen the mind to the point that it is able to feel 
sensations on a very limited area, increasing bodily awareness. 
V.II.II THE TECHNIQUE OF VIPASSANA 
 
On the fourth day, Vipassana is taught, and the technique consists of 
scanning the body from head to toes, feeling sensations. One has to start from 
the top of the head, feeling every part of the body - the scalp, the head, the 
neck, the throat, the arms, the chest and stomach, the back, the legs – it is 
important that every part of the body at the surface level is scanned. After some 
days, one scans the body not only from head to toes but from the tip of the toes 
to the top of the head. Ideally, and depending on the awareness (the ability to 
focus the mind on body parts), the area to be scanned should be a few inches 
wide, but bigger parts can be observed. When Vipassana is introduced, it marks 
the beginning of the Adhitanna sittings, or sittings of strong determination. One 
is not supposed to move for one hour, the length of each meditation session. 
Although small postural corrections (such as straightening the spine) are 
allowed, to maintain a correct posture, no scratching, opening the eyes or 
changing the hand position is permitted.  
A relevant dimension of our lives deals with the ability to react to 
whatever we are experiencing. If we feel itchy, we will scratch that part of the 
body; when we are working, if the back is sore after sitting for several hours we 
try to do some stretching, shift posture or get a new chair. We usually pay some 
attention to the body and react according to its signals – pain, cold, soreness, 
etc.. The aim of Vipassana is to alter this automatism of reaction, replacing 
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habitual somatic modes of attention, and the Adhitanna sittings reinforce this 
training in stillness, inviting practitioners to detach themselves from sensuous 
experience. 
Different sensations appear during this process, including gross ones 
(heat, cold, perspiration, itching, tingling, pain, aching, etc.) as well as those 
sensations usually called “subtle”. Goenka explicitly differentiates between 
these two types of sensations in order to allow participants to refine their 
awareness towards them and to ease the transition to a new anthropotechnical 
regime. 
According to my experience and the numerous accounts of meditators, 
these subtle sensations are felt as a kind of warm vibration – there is a strong 
awareness of the part being scanned, sensed as an intermittent dance of small 
particles, as if this specific part of the surface of the body was deprived from 
solidity, constantly radiating a vibrating warmth. While scanning, one is 
observing (or feeling) sensations – if participants are unable to feel something, 
they are instructed to pay attention to that part for approximately one minute. 
After feeling a sensation, the scanning can continue.  
The Vipassana technique installs new automatisms – selves become 
aware of their bodies ideally in a nonreactive way, and if they encounter subtle 
sensations, they can sweep their body from head to toes rapidly. They train 
themselves to become aware of a new type of body, a nonmodern body filled 
with subtle sensations that can be increasingly felt as the practice is refined – 
the subtle body of Vipassana meditation 110 , reinforcing its nonmodern 
character111. 
                                                             
110
 The notion of “subtle body” is also common in other traditions, including 
Yoga. According to Johnston and Barcan, “Subtle body is a term used to 
describe a model of embodied subjectivity in which matter and consciousness 
are not understood as ontologically distinct but as varieties of ‘energy’ 
resonating at different densities.” (Johnston and Barcan, 2006: 25).  
111
 The notion of “vibrations” is usually linked to a nonmodern ontology of the 
self. According to Henriques (2010: 58) “Modelling the transmission of affect on 
the propagation of vibrations is intended to aid and abet the radical potential of 
the concept of affect to literally shake up traditional psychology’s solid object of 
the ‘subject’. This individual has three key characteristics: selfconsistency, 
141 
 
The practice of Vipassana is linked to particular ways of understanding 
human beings. As the following section suggests, Vipassana portrays humans 
as essentially reactive, enslaved by their habitual automatisms, and the aim of 
the technology of the self is to allow practitioners to overcome this “condition”. 
 
V.II.III VIPASSANA’S THEORY OF THE SELF 
 
 In the previous chapter, the theory of the self supporting the practice of 
Vipassana was understood as belonging to the “folklore” (Becker, 1963) of this 
assemblage, a set of ideas and assumptions that help users justify their 
practice, constituting a standpoint psychology112 - a situated perspective on the 
nature of the human mind. There are many paradigms that aim at explaining the 
human condition, what people are – psychoanalysis, transpersonal psychology, 
existentialism, behaviourism, as well as a variety of non-western perspectives. 
Usually, these models of the self (especially in psychological, religious and 
contemplative contexts) prescribe particular ways of allowing humans to attain 
certain conditions, including dealing with their traumas, expanding the human 
potential, achieving self-realization or mystical union with God. 
   In the case of Vipassana, we are dealing with a simplification of Buddhist 
psychology (see Goleman, 1981; Kalupahana, 1987; Silva, 2000), highly 
influenced by the work of Ledi Sayadaw, who was responsible for reviving the 
tradition in Burma through the help of classic Buddhist texts (see Sayadaw, 
1999). The standpoint psychology deployed by Vipassana assemblages 
presents humans as highly reactive beings, trapped by their preconceptions 
about the nature of the world and the self.  
 According to this tradition, and following Buddhist psychology (and its 
scheme of the five aggregates), when the mind receives an input, a sensation 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
autonomy and rationality.” The journal “The Senses and Society” dedicated a 
special issue to Vibratory Movement (Volume 3, Number 2, July 2008). 
112
 Here, I am influenced by Sandra Harding’s notion of “standpoint 
epistemologies” (2004). 
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(or vedana) arises (Hart, 1987). If there is no evaluation of such input, the 
sensation is neutral, but if it is assessed it becomes pleasant or unpleasant. We 
now enter the realm of reaction, sankhara, highly important to Vipassana. 
According to Smart, we should understand sankharas as dispositions, “those 
short or long-term states of the individual disposing or inclining him to act in a 
certain way, and those karmic activities and dispositions which carry over from 
one life to another” (Smart, 1984: 373). These sankharas are automatisms, 
habitual ways of reacting towards phenomena. According to Goenka, there 
seems to be a general pattern characterizing human automatisms - when 
people feel a sensation they react with craving or aversion. If it is pleasant, 
humans desire the continuation of the experience – generating craving - , if it is 
painful or unwanted, aversion is developed: 
 “When the ear is functioning normally and one hears a sound, cognition 
 is at work. When the sound is recognized as words, with positive or 
 negative connotations, perception has started to function. Next sensation 
 comes into play. If the words are praise, a pleasant sensation arises. If 
 they are abuse, an unpleasant sensation arises. At once reaction takes 
 place. If the sensation is pleasant, one starts liking it, wanting more 
 words of praise. If the sensation is unpleasant, one starts disliking it, 
 wanting to stop the abuse.” (Hart, 1987:27)113 
 
 How should we understand this “map” of the mind, this explanation of 
consciousness and its functions? It is a mere construction, a “native” belief 
shared by Goenka and some of his followers? According to Latour (1999), there 
is a canonical dualism between fact and fetish, real and constructed. Goenka’s 
translation of Buddhist psychology (including the five aggregates) could initially 
lead us to suggest that there is a dualism between the experience of 
consciousness (fact) and the standpoint psychology of Vipassana and its 
mental map (a belief/ fetish). Latour suggests that construction and autonomous 
reality are, in fact, synonyms (Latour, 1999: 275), therefore the dualism 
between fact and fetish should be replaced by the term factish, dealing with 
those “types of action that do not fall into the comminatory choice between fact 
and belief” (Latour, 1999: 306). 
                                                             
113
 See Hart (1987: 91) for a thorough explanation of how Vipassana can 
counter this particular condition. 
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  The explanation of mental processes by Vipassana can be understood 
as a factish that is mobilized to justify a whole set of performances of meditation 
that aim at breaking a particular automatism that characterizes the human 
condition – reactivity. In fact, the automatism of craving for a pleasant sensation 
or avoiding unpleasant ones supposedly causes suffering, because reality does 
not correspond to human desire. Reactions occur because the mind is unable to 
deal with sensations in a detached manner.  Humans want to perpetuate a 
blissful experience or to avoid a negative one, and this phenomenon 
perpetuates the flow of consciousness due to the generation of new sankharas - 
they feed the mind (Goenka, 1987: 48). 
 The sankharas are considered the fuel of the mind - by reacting with 
craving or aversion, new sankharas are generated and accumulate – the 
multiplication of dispositions reinforce the continuous automatism of reacting 
towards positive/negative sensations. Vipassana is performed against this 
picture of reactivity, becoming a technique for the “purification” of the individual 
– through meditation, the generation of new sankharas should be stopped in 
order to “purify” the mind and the self; the installation of a new automatism 
should allow practitioners to suspend everyday ways of being, breaking the 
attachment to sensuous experience through a particular way of observing 
sensations. Meditation is mobilized to overcome a particular condition of the 
self, linked to automatisms, understood as subsidiaries of the craving/aversion 
dynamic and linked to a standpoint psychology. In order to overcome the 
reactive paradigm of the self, a particular gaze – using Csordas’ terms, a 
somatic mode of attention - called equanimity, needs to be developed. 
  
V.II. IV THE GAZE OF EQUANIMITY 
 
 The technique of Vipassana requires moving one’s attention throughout 
the body, part by part, piece by piece (as Goenka states during the retreats) 
with a specific gaze called equanimity, observing sensations without reacting to 
them – “One is aware of all that one experiences, of every sensation, but does 
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not react, does not tie new knots of craving or aversion, does not create misery 
for oneself.” (Goenka, 1987: 22) 
  Foucault suggested that the development of clinical medicine (and 
human sciences in general, particularly from the 19th century onwards) relied on 
the constitution of the clinical gaze that objectified humans: 
 “The great myth of the free gaze, which, in its fidelity to discovery 
 receives the virtue to destroy; a purified purifying gaze; which freed from 
 darkness, dissipates darkness. The cosmological values implicit in the 
 Aufklarung are still at work here. The medical gaze … was only one 
 segment of the dialectic of the Lumiéres transported into the doctor's 
 eye.” (Foucault, 2003: 62) 
 
 Vipassana, as a technology of subjective transformation, relies on the 
power of the equanimous gaze to install a new way of dealing with reality - while 
one is scanning the body one has to try not to crave for sensations, whether 
positive or negative. One has to remain alert, attentive to the present sensorial 
reality114. The focus on the present physical reality is meant to break the normal 
performative order of the individual, craving for pleasure and avoiding pain. By 
being equanimous towards experiences, meditation transforms habitual 
automatisms and becomes part of a broader project of subjectivity, allowing the 
unveiling of nonmodern experiences (Chapter VI), new ways of behaving in 
daily life (Chapter VII) and of reinventing social institutions (Chapter VIII). In 
sum, observing sensations without reacting, with the eyes closed and in silence 
is the touchstone of new, nonmodern ontologies. 
 But what exactly is the object of equanimity? One is being equanimous 
towards the plethora of physical sensations that emerge within the framework of 
the body, with the understanding of anicca or impermanence. A gross sensation 
is experienced, and one just feels. A pleasant sensation occurs, and one just 
feels. No reaction, no craving for good sensations or blissful experiences, no 
rejection of unpleasant ones. Whatever is happening will pass, because reality 
is impermanent - anicca. When one meditates, one strives to maintain the 
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 This is why there is no pranayama (Naranjo and Ornstein, 1971) involved, 
with Apanana it is the natural breath, no performative modulation of the breath 
is required. 
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awareness of anicca, not creating attachment to sensations (Goenka, 2002a: 
103). This resembles forms of suspended animation, such as those conferred 
by anaesthesia, a technique for “expanding one’s passivity competence” 
(Sloterdijk, 2013: 382). However, equanimity is not enacted by chemical 
substances but by rigorous spiritual performances that eventually break the 
attachment to whatever is happening, ideally erecting the figure of the inner 
statue (Sloterdijk, 2013), the subject unaffected by the theatre of consciousness 
and by bodily sensations, remaining stable in face of everything. Eventually, 
through this stillness, nonmodern experiences can take place, enacting body 
and mind in radically different ways. 
 According to U Ba Khin, Goenka’s teacher, equanimity with the correct 
understanding of impermanence permits the release of sankharas (Khin, 1991: 
31-32). The practice of Vipassana consists of observing physical sensations in 
a systematic fashion while maintaining the awareness of impermanence. 
Vipassana becomes a new operative system of the human computer, 
transforming the habitual automatism of reacting, and the user should ideally 
accept whatever arises, altering the habitual modern pattern of reacting and 
wandering in ordinary states of consciousness. 
 
V.II.V METTA 
 
  The aim of the third meditative performance promoted by this tradition, 
Metta, is to overcome the apparent neutrality of Vipassana, directing the merits, 
good feelings and other benefits emerging from meditative practice towards 
other beings. 
 Metta is taught on the 10th day of the retreat, when noble silence is lifted. 
It should be ideally practiced while experiencing subtle sensations, and one 
should expand this energy out into the world. If the general experience is not 
pleasant, one should abstain from practicing Metta based on sensations, just 
working at the intellectual level with a particular sentence. 
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 Metta, in contrast to Anapanasati and Vipassana, involves verbalization, 
not only by the practitioner but also by Goenka himself, and it is a guided 
meditation, with the teacher constantly giving instructions115. The inclusion of 
Metta at the end of a meditation session (both at the retreat, from the 10th day 
onwards and during daily sittings, when one listens to Goenka tapes 116 ) 
requires not only verbalization but also imagination, as the following words of 
Goenka exemplify: 
 “May I be free…free from all the anger…hatred…ill will…animosity…May 
 I generate Loooove and Good Will... Peaceeee and Harmony…Looooove 
 and Good will… Peace and Harmony…. May all beings share my 
 peace….Share my Harmony…. Share my Merits… Share my 
 Dhamma…Dhamma…Dhamma… May all beings be Happy… Be 
 Peaceful….Be Liberated…Liberated…Liberated... Be Happy….Be 
 Peaaaaaceful… Be Liberated…Liberated…Liberated”117. 
 
 Metta deals with inter-subjectivity, with the attempt to “spread” the 
Dhamma (the teaching of the Buddha, understood as the practice of Vipassana) 
to others, through what Pagis (2008) calls soft feelings (love, compassion, etc.). 
In retreats, Metta is explicitly recruited to manage the inter-subjective space. 
Assistant teachers generate Metta during the courses, while they are sitting with 
students. The servers also practice Metta every morning to help them deal with 
the retreatants (the “sitters”) in a compassionate way. Finally, Goenka, during 
the end of discourses, chants in Pali, generating Metta towards students. 
Goenka instructs old students to benefit from Metta by bowing their heads – 
according to Vipassana’s subtle anatomy, the top of the head is more prone to 
feel subtle sensations, therefore bowing helps practitioners to receive these 
sensations (see Goenka, 2002b: 76).  
 These three technologies are usually practiced in a sequence by 
meditators during daily sittings. In the beginning of a meditation session, one 
starts practicing Anapana to become aware of sensations on the area of the 
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 As opposed to Anapana and Vipassana, where instructions are only given at 
the beginning of the session. 
116
 Some old students use audio tapes with Goenka’s instructions in order to 
meditate. 
117
 Transcript of a tape of Metta Bhavana (instructions given by S. N. Goenka) 
available online http://diydharma.org/vipassana-meditation-track-1-sn-goenka 
(Retrieved: 12/04/2013) 
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nose; then, Vipassana is practiced, and in the end some minutes are dedicated 
to Metta. The aim is to initially develop concentration (Anapana) to be able to 
feel sensations throughout the body (Vipassana) and to spread the benefits of 
meditation (Metta). This indicates that we are not only dealing with the 
transformation of automatisms but also with the development of new feelings 
and experiences that support new ways of being in the world and that should 
inform inter-subjectivity. 
 After presenting these three practices, there are two relevant aspects 
that should be mentioned here: first, Vipassana’s claims of “scientificity”, 
comparing the meditator to a scientist; second, its focus on “purity”. These two 
aspects will help us understand the practice of Vipassana. 
 
V.II.VI SCIENTIFICITY 
  
 Entanglements between meditation and science are well known: not only 
meditation is assessed by various fields of science, including instruments such 
as fMRI’s, but there are also well-established dialogues between Buddhism, 
neurosciences (Austin, 1998), psychology (Wilber et al., 1986; Kabat-Zinn, 
1991) and even physics (Bitbol, 2006) (see chapter II). Vipassana is coupled 
with narratives and ideas of science, resembling other schools of meditation 
(Tambiah, 1985), including Transcendental Meditation, and according to Robert 
Sharf this results from the fact that some Burmese meditation teachers were 
exposed  to the Western, Christian critique of Buddhism (they were educated by 
Christian missionaries) and its esotericism (Sharf, 1995). 
  First, what is the epistemological status of the Vipassana meditator? 
According to Goenka, he should act like a scientist: “Examine the pain that you 
experience objectively, as if it is someone else’s pain. Inspect it like a scientist 
who observes an experiment in his laboratory. When you fail, try again.” 
(Goenka, 1987, 44). The equanimous gaze is “scientific”: one should be 
detached from sensations, maintaining the continuity of practice, repeating the 
performance – meditation becomes a technology, a type of anthropotechnics, 
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and no religion is involved, it is a scientific gaze towards oneself, a mere 
somatic mode of attention. As Joanna told me:  
 “As a meditator, I’m a scientist, we are scientists, I think we are 
 scientists, learning to observe our minds and our bodies. Because 
 consciousness is there, and interpretation of consciousness is there. And 
 then evaluating, that’s what we’re learning to change, our evaluation of 
 our experiences, to be less judgemental about them.” (Interview, Joanna, 
 April 2012) 
 
  To be a scientist is to be able to observe sensations throughout the body 
without evaluating them, with equanimity. In conventional accounts of 
objectivity, there was a separation between subjectivity and objectivity. 
Objectivity, as a quality of the equanimous gaze, transforms the mind into an 
objective machine that is able to tackle the depths of reality – the mind becomes 
a machine of epistemological truth. According to Daston and Galison: 
  “By mechanical objectivity we mean the insistent drive to repress the 
 wilful intervention of the artist-author, and to put in its stead a set of 
 procedures that would, as it were, move nature to the page through a 
 strict protocol, if not automatically. This sometimes meant using an actual 
 machine, sometimes a mechanized action such as tracing.”  (Daston and 
 Galison, 2007: 121) 
 
 In order to reach the status of a machine of truth, the human automatism 
of reacting towards sensations is transformed through a new automatism, 
Vipassana, that permits observation without reaction – the equanimous self 
becomes objective through the implementation of a new epistemological 
software that not only transforms the quality of observation but also allows new 
phenomena to be experienced.  
 If Vipassana is understood as a way of seeing things as they truly are, in 
a scientific and objective sense, meaning that the meditator will have access to 
the true nature of reality, experiences of meditation are considered the vehicle 
for the unveiling of “truth”. A good example concerns the set of experiences of 
bodily dissolution that will be explored in chapter VI; these reveal the “true 
nature” of human bodies, assemblages composed of tiny little kapalas, 
subatomic particles that create the illusion of solidity. The body is understood as 
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deprived from solidity, confirming the general ontology of anicca - “Particles 
[that] continuously arise and vanish, passing into and out of existence, like a 
flow of vibrations.” (Hart, 1987: 25- 26).  These kalapas are indivisible units that 
express the four aspects of matter - mass, coherence, temperature and 
movement (Hart, 1987). Body sensations are connected to the kalapas, masses 
formed out of the four constituents of matter (solid, liquid, calorific and 
oscillatory), the primary qualities, and subsidiary qualities - colour, smell, taste, 
and nutriment. 118  When these eight constituents unite, a kalapa is formed, 
lasting for a moment (a trillionth of a second) and, according to U Ba Khin, for 
someone experienced in Vipassana, they can be felt as a stream of energy 
(Khin, 1991: 32). 
 This new subtle anatomy of the body is not felt immediately after the 
introduction of Vipassana. One has to master the technique, repeat the 
performance endless times, becoming familiar with the conceptual apparatus 
supporting the tradition (its standpoint psychology). Advanced practitioners are 
able to translate their experiences into this new subtle anatomy (see chapter VI 
and Leledaki, 2007: 166-167).  
 Finally, although this practice suspends modern understandings of 
causality and of what humans can experience (see chapters VI and VII), 
Vipassana is considered a scientific technology of the self that should establish 
practitioners in the law of Kamma, cause and effect. If one does not remain 
equanimous towards sensations, a sankhara will be generated, and it will 
multiply suffering. This is considered the “law of nature”, to be known 
experientially through meditation (Goenka, 1987: 37). The practice of Vipassana 
thus follows supposedly universal laws of nature that also regulate the psychic 
life of the individual. Human life is bound to permanent, immutable universal 
laws, requiring a performative adaptation of the subject to become happy, 
nonreactive, equanimous. Another relevant aspect concerns the technology of 
Vipassana itself. For the sake of the reproducibility of the meditative 
performance, its adaptability to different phenomenological situations requires 
meditators to reduce whatever happens within the body/self to mere sensations. 
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 See Goenka, (1987:54) for a correlation between the different types of 
kalapas and the sensations they cause.   
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This involves a reduction of the classical four Buddhist objects of meditation 
(body, feelings, mind states and mental objects, see Hanh, 2006b), implying 
that meditative practice is focused only on the body and feelings119.  Moreover, 
it grants sensations the role of translating the totality of individual existence into 
an object of meditative practice, acquiring a special status over thoughts, vision, 
smell, understood as secondary or subsidiary qualities. Although it could be 
suggested that this technique is reductive, the aim is to transform habitual 
patterns of reaction through the focus on a particular element of experience – 
sensations. Focusing on sensations generates a wide range of transformations, 
allowing meditators to perform a different version of the body and new ways of 
being in everyday life, transforming their Umwelt.  
 
V.II.VII PURITY 
 
 The second aspect concerns performative purity. Vipassana is portrayed 
as the technique practiced by the Buddha, maintained in its pristine form for 
centuries in Burma. Goenka is considered the one who is giving this “pure 
technique of the Buddha” to the entire world. According to the Satipathana Sutta 
and to other texts, such as the Visudhimaggha, the Buddha used different types 
of meditation; however, according to this movement, this type of Vipassana has 
a superior status and should be practiced by all humans in the same way, 
becoming universal.  According to the Buddhist scholar Robert Sharf 120 , 
Vipassana as we know it (sweeping sensations throughout the body) was 
invented by Goenka. In fact, U Ba Khin, Goenka’s teacher, didn’t prescribe 
sweeping the body in the same way as Goenka does (producing the so called 
free flow that can happen when there are subtle sensations on the body), but 
told students to scan the body using areas the size of small Burmese coins. 
Moreover, Ledi Sayadaw, considered by Goenka as one of the teachers in the 
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 See Kornfield (2010) for an excellent characterization of other Vipassana 
techniques and their corresponding teachers. 
120
 I had the chance to ask some questions to Robert Sharf at the Mind and Life 
Summer Research Institute 2013. 
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long lineage of Vipassana (going back to the Buddha himself), actually invented 
the tradition in Burma, after reading ancient Buddhist texts (see Sharf, 1995, for 
some insightful remarks on the invented tradition of Vipassana in Burma). 
 Although we are probably dealing with an invented tradition, Goenka 
wants to make sure that this technique is maintained in its pristine form, and 
practitioners should undertake this performance exactly as prescribed by the 
teacher. We face what Leledaki (2007) characterizes as a form of spiritual 
eugenics: not only there is a cleansing of external elements, such as other 
techniques of meditation, but there is also the creation of a mythology 
supporting the superiority and potential of such practice for “liberation”. During 
the 10-day courses the participants are fed with some of these myths, namely 
the fact that the King Ashoka, one of the early disseminators of Buddhism, sent 
some monk emissaries to Burma with the technique of Vipassana, that was 
transmitted from generation to generation in its pristine form121; Goenka, in the 
evening discourses, even mentions a prophecy that says that, after 2500 years 
of the death of the Buddha, Vipassana would return to India, assuming himself 
(although indirectly) as the protagonist of such phenomenon, as the Maitreya, 
the Buddha of the future122.  
 Purity has a strong role in Vipassana.  The retreat space also has to be 
“pure”, cleansed from external elements, and no food from the outside can be 
brought on site. The Vipassana assemblage has to be filled with particular 
vibrations. As we have seen, the goal of Vipassana is to “break” the habit of 
reacting to sensations, generating sankharas that, according to U Ba Khin, 
become accumulated, creating a bank account of sankharas123. While one is 
equanimously dealing with whatever happens with sensations, maintaining the 
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 See Jordt (2007) on this aspect and its links to the Mahasi Sayadaw 
Vipassana movement in Burma; Various Authors (1991) and Khin (1999) for the 
appropriation of such myth by the Goenka movement. 
122
 Much could be written about the rhetorical use of this mythological 
paraphernalia and its linkages to historical, spiritual and performative “purity”. 
As Baudrillard states, “When the real is no longer what it used to be, nostalgia 
assumes its full meaning. There is a proliferation of myths of origin and signs of 
reality; of second-hand truth, objectivity and authenticity.” (Baudrillard, 2001: 
171) 
123
 U Ba Khin was an accountant, so the use of this kind of language is 
understandable. 
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precepts, the mind is supposedly being “purified”, releasing sankharas, 
cleansing the human assemblage from those defilements124. Retreats, as we 
have seen in the previous chapter, are organized in such a way that sensorial 
inputs are reduced to a minimum: not only to centralize mechanisms of re-
patterning through practices, materials, constraints and performances but also 
to suspend the regular aesthetic enjoyment of music, sex or spectacular 
images.  Therefore, purity is a device whose ramifications are mobilized to bring 
about a shift in paradigms of the self through the suspension of habitual 
associations and automatisms, justifying a cleansing of external elements and 
the focus on the installation of new automatisms that can lead to new ways of 
experiencing the self and the world.  
 
V.III THICH NHAT HANH’S ZEN PRACTICES 
V.III.I INTRODUCTION 
 
The practices promoted by Thich Nhat Hanh also aim at the 
transformation of habitual automatisms, leading to the installation of new habits 
and the alteration of regular experience; however, the approach is radically 
different from Goenka’s Vipassana. Instead of promoting sitting meditation in 
isolation, Hanh’s approach focuses on the development of various practices that 
cultivate mindfulness. The philological roots of mindfulness go back to the Pali 
word sati (smrti in Sanskrit). It means two things: “to stop” and “to maintain 
awareness of the object” (Hanh, 2006a: 10). The Chinese character for 
mindfulness, nian, has two components: heart (or mind), and present moment 
(Hanh, 1997a: 33). But what exactly is mindfulness? For Thay125, “Mindfulness 
                                                             
124
 According to Douglas (2006), dirt should be understood as “matter out of 
place”, implying the existence of an a priori ordered system where the presence 
of certain body or element is strange (such as shoes on the table), becoming 
“dirty”. Regarding Vipassana, dirt concerns all those elements that can 
jeopardize meditation: these could be the five hindrances - craving, aversion, 
mental and physical sluggishness, agitation and doubt (Hart, 1987:89); breaking 
sila or even the sensuous world.  
125
 Thich Nhat Hanh is called Thay (teacher) by his followers. 
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is the energy that sheds light on all things and all activities, producing the power 
of concentration, bringing forth deep insight and awakening” (Hanh, 1974: 26).  
This energy is directed towards the present moment – the present is the object 
of mindfulness - that is why, in the classical “The Miracle of Mindfulness”, Hanh 
states that “I’ll use the term mindfulness to refer to keeping one’s 
consciousness alive to the present reality” (Hanh, 2008a: 11). As its 
etymological roots indicate, there are two dimensions of mindfulness: stopping 
and looking deeply, exemplifying the connections between stopping, awareness 
and insight into the nature of the self and reality. Mindfulness, as a state of 
consciousness, contrasts with OSC (see chapter II), with modern, everyday 
consciousness, characterized by mind wandering and task-unrelated-thoughts. 
In order to suspend regular automatisms, subjects are invited to engage in 
different technologies that progressively allow them to experience the present 
moment and to become engaged with other humans and nonhumans. If, in 
Vipassana, practice is supported by particular ways of understanding the 
human condition, by a standpoint psychology, where humans are “condemned” 
to a state of eternal reactivity (unless they “purify” themselves through 
meditation), then in Thich Nhat Hanh’s Zen practices there is also a theory of 
mind supporting the wide range of mindfulness techniques.  
 
V.III.II THE MIND AS A GARDEN 
 
This psychology is divided in two parts: mind consciousness and store 
consciousness. Mind consciousness is our “active awareness” (Hanh, 2010: 9), 
and can be cultivated by being “truly present with whatever we are doing.” 
(Hanh, 2010: 9). Store consciousness, or root consciousness, is where all our 
past experiences are stored in the form of seeds (bija). Our mind is like a field, 
and “Every day our thoughts, words and deeds plant new seeds in the field of 
our consciousness, and what these seeds generate becomes the substance of 
our life.” (Hanh, 2006a: 25). These seeds (such as anger, despair, 
discrimination, fear, mindfulness, compassion or understanding) are located in 
store consciousness, that is constituted by the totality of the seeds, it is a kind of 
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soil preserving and maintaining them; when we hear, see, read or think about 
something, it “touches” a seed and provokes a certain reaction, such as anger, 
joy or sorrow, making the seed manifest at our mind consciousness, emerging 
as a mental formation (Hanh, 2010: 10)126. 
Human minds are understood as gardens, where certain seeds flourish 
and others can decay, due to our practice, our “gardening”. The aim of 
mindfulness is to take care of mental gardens, nourishing positive seeds, 
touching them as mental formations when they arise in our minds, leading Hanh 
to state that “mindfulness is like the sun” (Hanh, 2000: 80) and that “mental 
formations are photosensitive” (Hanh 2000: 80). 
 There are unwholesome and wholesome seeds in our minds, therefore 
the practice of mindfulness is that of selective watering, helping the subject to 
identify the seeds in his/her consciousness, choosing which ones are beneficial 
and should be watered (Hanh, 2006a: 25). This selective cultivation is meant to 
transform the self through the development of understanding, love and 
compassion, positive seeds that should lead to positive mental formations. This 
means that everyday life experience should be transformed, and practitioners 
are encouraged to take care of their mental gardens. Mindfulness allows them 
to alter modern ways of being in the world, promoting the cultivation of particular 
emotions and fostering nondual experiences and modes of being. 
 
V.III.III CULTIVATING MINDFULNESS 
 
 For Thich Nhat Hanh, meditation has to be engaged with life, and 
mindfulness is intentionally developed through a vast array of practices that 
contrast with modern automatisms, transforming regular actions and allowing 
new ways of experiencing the environment. I will focus on three categories: 
those that involve a specific time/period for individual practice, concerning 
different ways of changing the normal workings of the self – sitting meditation, 
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 See Hanh (2006a: 24) for an explanation of the threefold function of store 
consciousness. 
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walking meditation or deep relaxation. Then, practices relying on the adjustment 
of daily life situations to the performative requirements of mindfulness – eating 
meditation, driving meditation, brushing the teeth meditation, etc.. Finally, 
techniques concerning inter-subjectivity – dharma sharing, beginning anew, etc. 
- forms of incorporating mindfulness to manage interpersonal relations, solving 
conflicts or sharing insights emerging from the practice.  
 How are performances managed throughout these different devices? 
First of all, there is a general slowing down – movements become slow, 
attentive, to allow subjects to become aware of the activity127, reinforcing the 
role of movement to alter affect and experience (Massumi, 2002); secondly, 
while one is performing these various tasks, one has to be aware of the breath 
– this natural tool is used as an anchor or centring mechanism, allowing the 
meditator to come back to the present moment – the chaos of OSC is 
“suspended”; thirdly, there are various short poems, or gathas, that are mentally 
repeated in order to adjust one’s mindset to the optimal experience of 
mindfulness. These aim at establishing new mental connections, altering how 
one conceptualizes different existential dimensions, re-patterning one’s 
experience of the world through inner utterance. For instance, while one is 
brushing the teeth, the following gatha can be mentally repeated:  “Brushing my 
teeth and rinsing my mouth, // I vow to speak purely and lovingly. // When my 
mouth is fragrant with right speech, // A flower blooms in the garden of my 
heart” (Hanh, 1997b: 5); fourthly, there is an explicit association between the 
energy of mindfulness and the nondual awareness of Interbeing. If the previous 
devices contrast with modern ways of being in the world, Interbeing invites 
participants to abandon dual notions of subjectivity, opening themselves to 
couplings with other humans and nonhumans.  
 Interbeing is an ontological principle meaning that form is emptiness, that 
there are no closed entities, that there is no self without non-self elements. 
                                                             
127
 One of Latour’s hypothesis in “We have never been modern” is that, in order 
to deal with the imperial march of modernity, a general slowing down is 
necessary: “My hypothesis… is that we are going to have to slow down, reorient 
and regulate the proliferation of monsters by representing their existence 
officially.” (Latour, 1991a: 12). This is linked to the so-called “parliament of 
things”, partially discussed in chapter VIII. 
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Everything is connected and in constant interaction. Interbeing means that there 
is no stable, unified, closed self - everything is in touch and is impermanent, 
reminding us of post-humanist literature on entanglements, intra-actions, 
couplings and relationality (Pickering, 1995; Barad, 2003; Haraway, 2003; 
Latour, 2005).  There is no life or death, just a permanent dance of fluidity. 
Things are mere manifestations in a process of unending transition between 
forms – clouds, paper, rain, earth, and each one of these various forms contain 
each other. The following passage is quite illustrative: 
 “If you are a poet, you will see clearly that there is a cloud floating in this 
 sheet of paper. Without a cloud, there will be no rain; without rain, the 
 trees cannot grow; and without trees, we cannot make paper. The cloud 
 is essential for the paper to exist. If the cloud is not here, the sheet of 
 paper cannot be here either. So we can say that the cloud and the paper 
 inter-are. “Interbeing” is a word that is not in the dictionary yet, but if we 
 combine the prefix “inter” with the verb “to be”, we have a new verb, inter-
 be.… the word inter-be should be in the dictionary. “To be” is to inter-be. 
 We cannot just be by ourselves alone. We have to inter-be with every 
 other thing. This sheet of paper is, because everything else is.” (Hanh, 
 1995: 95-6).  
 
 Interbeing is Thich Nhat Hanh’s way of interpreting the Buddhist notion of 
paticca samuppada, dependent co-arising – “In this doctrine, reality appears as 
a dynamically interdependent process. All factors, mental and physical, subsist 
in a web of mutual causal interaction, with no element or essence held to be 
immutable or autonomous.” (Macy, 1991: 18) 
 The nonmodern notion of Interbeing has clear connections with post-
humanist STS and also with general systems theory, as suggested by Joanna 
Macy (1991). All entities are connected, there is no substantial separation 
between them - they emerge precisely because they are entangled and 
interconnected. The practices promoted by Thich Nhat Hanh should allow 
practitioners to become aware of these nondual entanglements between body, 
mind, environment, self and others, contrasting with dualist and modern 
understandings of reality. This permits the emergence of nonmodern versions of 
subjectivity supported by technologies of mindfulness that foster a whole new 
set of transformations of experience and affect, inspiring numerous social 
applications (see chapters VI, VII and VIII). 
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  The incorporation of Interbeing into practices of mindfulness is done 
through various ways, but the more explicit ones are during eating meditation 
(when there is an attempt to focus on the set of heterogeneous conditions 
leading to the generation of food, including human and biological processes) 
and walking meditation - when such activity is practiced outside, one is invited 
to engage with nature, contemplating the flow of a river, listening to the birds 
singing or hugging a tree, ideally altering the experience of the Umwelt through 
the transformation of somatic modes of attention. 
 After presenting some of the assumptions supporting practices of 
mindfulness, as well as identifying some of their common mechanisms, I will 
now focus on some of them. Due to the existence of a multiplicity of these 
techniques, the task of describing, explaining and exploring each one of them 
would require another PhD dissertation; therefore, I will limit my analysis to 
some of the most common technologies of the self deployed by this tradition.  
 
V.III.IV SITTING MEDITATION 
  
 In Plum Village, the Sangha sits to practice formal meditation twice a day 
– during the morning (at 5:45 am) and by the end of the afternoon (around 
17:00). During the Sangha weekly meetings, sitting meditation is also practiced. 
The amount of time dedicated to this activity varies, since the retreats in Plum 
Village are not designed in a regimented way. The average time dedicated to 
each session of sitting meditation is approximately 20 minutes, but in some 
occasions it can reach 45 minutes. 
 One should sit, if possible, in the lotus or half lotus position, using a 
cushion,  making sure that both knees touch the floor, since having three points 
in contact with the floor enhances stability (Hanh, 2008a: 34). If this is hard, the 
practitioner can use the cross legged position or another one that feels 
comfortable (Hanh, 2011: 17). Some of the more elderly meditators use a small 
stool to meditate, because they tend to develop knee pain. 
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 The back has to be straight, with the neck and head aligned with the 
spinal column, and the eyes can be closed or focused a yard or two in front of 
the practitioner, who should display a half smile128; different hand positions can 
be used, but the left hand can be placed on the right palm with the palm side 
up, for instance (Hanh, 2008a: 35). It is common, in Plum Village, to have one 
of the older monks correcting the posture of practitioners: usually the back is 
straightened and the neck and the hands are readjusted – this happened to me 
twice, and it was highly helpful to develop a stable posture129. 
  The practice of sitting meditation should bring joy and nourishment, 
therefore one is discouraged from holding on to a position for a long time if it is 
painful. In fact, Thay even criticizes some traditions for transforming meditation 
into discomfort (see Hanh, 1995: 17). This clashes with Vipassana’s approach, 
namely with the one hour sittings of strong determination, reinforcing the 
distinction between disciplinary and liberal approaches to meditation, as 
suggested in the previous chapter. 
  The Sutra on the Full Awareness of Breathing (Hanh, 1996a) and the 
Sutra on the Four Establishments of Mindfulness (Hanh, 2006b) list different 
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 The smile is one of the ubiquitous aspects that have to be observed 
throughout all different practices. 
 
129
 I had a very powerful experience the first time that my posture was adjusted. 
As I wrote in the field diary of my first trip to Plum Village: “At 5:30 it was time 
for meditation again. Plenty of bells and gongs and no instructions at all, just 
some entrancing words in French. Today my meditation wasn’t very relaxing. 
My tinnitus was kicking in really hard and I was struggling to find a posture that 
would minimize the pulsating sound, unsuccessfully. Then, something 
happened. Someone (at the beginning I thought it was Thay himself but then 
someone told me it should have been the Venerable) touched me to correct my 
posture. It was indescribable, since I’ve never felt such incredibly healing 
energy in all my life; first he changed the posture of my back, then my shoulders 
and finally my head; I immediately stopped feeling any back pain and felt 
involved by a warm bliss that penetrated my body from back to front. At first I 
hardly noticed I was being touched, as it seemed to be beyond the realm of the 
material; his touch was gentle, caring and wise and I opened my eyes for a 
couple of seconds to confirm that it was Thay, but I only saw a short figure 
surrounded by two monks leaving the meditation hall. It could have been him, 
but after a couple of days I was told it wasn’t usual for Thay to touch people, 
although it is common for the Venerable, the second oldest monk in the 
Monastery, to do so.” (Field Diary, February 2011). 
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exercises that should be followed during daily activities. In the Sutra on the Full 
Awareness of Breathing there are sixteen exercises with different objects of 
practice. These different exercises consist of specific gathas, verbal 
formulations that should be observed by the practitioner and harmonized with 
the breath. For instance, the first gatha of the Anapanasati Sutra is “Breathing 
in, I know I am breathing in. Breathing out, I know I am breathing out” (Hanh, 
1996a: 41). When someone is practicing, the breath is harmonized with the 
gatha, that is reduced – when one breathes in, one can repeat to oneself “In”, 
breathing out one says to oneself “Out”. The same goes with other exercises – 
“Breathing in, I am embracing my unpleasant feelings. Breathing out, I am 
calming my feelings” turns into “Embracing my feelings [breathing in], Calming 
my feelings [breathing out]” (Hanh 1996a: 80)130. 
  The aim of these exercises is the implementation of new ways of feeling 
the body, and the transformation of affect is done through the articulation 
between the breath and particular sentences, suggestions that reinforce the 
embracement of feelings or the awareness of the breath. In both cases, 
practitioners are asked to become aware of a natural, unreflective automatism 
(the breath) and to accompany this awareness with particular sentences that 
reinforce meditative ways of experiencing the body/self, establishing new 
mental associations. 
 How should these exercises be practiced? Is there a sequence one 
should follow? As in contemporary neo-liberal regimes, practitioners should be 
able to identify and assess their state of mind and choose the most adequate 
formulation. However, Thay also recognizes that the first exercises are for 
stopping and the last ones for “looking deeply”, although there is an interrelation 
between Samatha (concentration) and Vipassana (Hanh, 1996a: 40). Although 
sitting meditation may be “intended to provide an experience of calmness in a 
perfectly controlled environment” (as put by a monk during the induction 
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 These various exercises are not in some sort of hierarchy or a specific order 
leading to “enlightenment”. Thay suggests that practitioners should be able to 
know which ones to follow, although the first few exercises should be initially 
performed to bring about stability and well-being. (Hanh, 2000: 150) 
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session131), the aim of the practice is to go beyond sitting meditation. The 
various exercises that are prescribed in the two sutras should be practiced all 
day, not only during formal sittings132. In Plum Village, beyond these exercises, 
it is also common to have guided meditations led by Thich Nhat Hanh, drawing 
on different gathas and the sound of the bell, invited in regular intervals, and the 
same happens during the weekly meetings of the Sangha, when an 
experienced practitioner guides the meditation. 
 
V.III.V WALKING MEDITATION 
 
 Walking meditation is a central practice for this tradition. It can be 
practiced indoor or outdoor, and during the formal periods of sitting meditation 
in Plum Village it is usually practiced by the end of the meditation session. 
During the weekly meetings of the Sangha there is also a period dedicated to 
walking meditation, between the guided and silent meditations. A set of 
mechanisms are mobilized to transform the habitual automatism of walking. 
 First of all, walking should be emptied of any type of concern about the 
final destination – walking has to be done for the sake of walking, clashing with 
the deep rooted habit of using it as an instrument to travel a particular distance; 
one should just join the meditative choreography, without thinking about the 
destination: “Walking meditation is walking just to enjoy walking. Walking 
without arriving, that is the technique … The idea is that we do not put anything 
ahead of ourselves and run after it… We just enjoy the walking, with no 
particular aim or destination” (Hanh, 2009: 13).  
 The first aspect is that of aimlessness, one walks for the sake of walking, 
which implies a slowing down and a focus on the present moment.  
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 The induction session is when newcomers are introduced to the practices 
taking place in Plum Village. 
132
 As Thay states, “This practice [mindfulness] can be done not only in sitting 
meditation but also in every minute of our daily life.” (Hanh, 2006b: 121) 
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 The second aspect is a form of anatomo-politics (Foucault, 1995) of the 
moving body, involving the coordination between breath and steps, reinforcing 
the importance of movement for the transformation of selfhood (Massumi, 
2002). Indoors, the practitioner walks very slowly, and takes one step for each 
breath. Outside, the pace can be slightly faster, and it may be necessary to take 
two or four steps for each breath, saying “In” each time a step is taken with 
each in-breath and “Out” with the out breath. While walking, the attention should 
be focused on the feet touching the ground, and at the same time one should 
be aware of the breath. 
 The third aspect concerns inter-subjectivity – we have to be careful about 
the person in front of us, slowing down or walking faster according to him or her. 
It is not an individual but a collective practice, and an exercise in inter-
subjectivity. In walking meditation outside, it is also common to hold someone’s 
hand. It is an opportunity to explore the communitarian aspect of this practice 
and to benefit from the collective energy of the Sangha (see chapter IV), thus 
becoming a practical manifestation of Interbeing. 
 The fourth aspect concerns aesthetic fruition, enjoying nature. Outdoor 
meditation is particularly pleasant in Plum Village or in locations with natural 
surroundings, such as the days of mindfulness I attended in Devon. When one 
is practicing, one is not alone – ponds, trees, rocks, the sky, all these elements, 
constituting Interbeing, are present, and the practitioner is encouraged to stop 
at certain moments in order to look at them 
 In the previous chapter, I have suggested that Vipassana and Zen 
assemblages draw upon different devices of enrolment (Callon, 1986). There is 
a contrast between Vipassana’s focus on isolation and Zen’s approach, relying 
on the expansion of habitual networks of subjectivity. Walking meditation is an 
interesting example to explore the nonmodern paradigm of subjectivity enacted 
by mindfulness. The practitioner expands the object of contemplation from 
individual subjectivity to all other elements (including nonhumans) that belong to 
the relational, nonmodern ontology of Interbeing. The transformations operated 
by the implementation of a new automatism, walking meditation, are deeply 
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entangled with a new paradigm of subjectivity, and these nonmodern couplings 
between aesthetics and ontology are also clear regarding eating meditation.  
    
 
V.III.VI EATING MEDITATION 
 
 Mindful eating transforms the automatism of eating, coupling 
performative and aesthetic transformations with ontological changes. As we 
have seen in the previous chapter, in the dining hall of Plum Village there is a 
gatha saying “This piece of bread is an ambassador from the entire cosmos”. 
That sentence illustrates the ontology of Interbeing, permeating all the practices 
of this tradition, entangling the performance of eating with a nonmodern picture 
of the self and the world.  
 There are three aspects worth mentioning here. The first one concerns 
the performance of eating itself. It can be considered a somaesthetics 
(Shusterman, 1999)133 of nourishment: one has to slowly fill the spoon or pick 
the food with a fork, feeling the movements of the arm and the hand when the 
utensil reaches the mouth, and when the food enters the body one is invited to 
feel every movement of the tongue and jaws, chewing the food very slowly, until 
it is liquefied before reaching the stomach. There is a focus on slowness and 
the appreciation of every bite, leading to another relevant aspect - the 
awareness of Interbeing. 
 Secondly, when one eats one should be aware of non-self elements, 
embracing the interconnectedness between all existing entities. Food should be 
recognized not as an isolated substance but as a process resulting from human 
work (cooking, ploughing, driving, etc.), biology (necessary to allow the 
development of the “product”), meteorology and cosmology (including the action 
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 According to Shusterman, “Somaesthetics can be provisionally defined as 
the critical, meliorative study of the experience and use of one's body as a locus 
of sensoryaesthetic appreciation (aisthesis) and creative self-fashioning.” 
(Shusterman, 1999: 302) 
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of the rain and the sun). One should be aware of this heterogeneous inter-
dependence, while at the same time slowing down and applying mindfulness to 
the eating process, radically contrasting with disenchanted and detached 
approaches to nourishment, supported by industrial, massive and gruesome 
mechanisms of transforming animals into edible matter (Singer, 1975). Usually 
we do not pay much attention to these processes, and the aim of eating 
meditation is to allow practitioners to become aware of these associations, 
transforming eating into a nonmodern performance, extending the boundaries of 
the self.  
  One of the various exercises proposed by Thich Nhat Hanh, called 
“tangerine party”, illustrates this entanglement between mindfulness and 
Interbeing: 
 “We put the tangerine in the palm of our hand and look at it, breathing in 
 a way that the tangerine becomes real. … To look at the tangerine is to 
 see the blossom forming into the fruit, to see the sunshine and the rain. 
 The tangerine in our palm is the wonderful presence of life. … 
 Mindfully, we peel our tangerine and smell its fragrance. We carefully 
 take each section of the tangerine and put it on our tongue, and we can 
 feel that it is a real tangerine. We eat each section of the tangerine in 
 perfect mindfulness until we finish the entire fruit. …” (Hanh, 1988: 47-
 48). 
 
 It is worth mentioning that the language used by Thich Nhat Hanh can 
be, in some occasions, extremely kitsch. This is his strategy to permit a 
paradigm shift of subjectivity, developing a language that translates Buddhist 
practices into contemporary settings. This language, as well as the techniques 
developed by Thich Nhat Hanh, are skilful means that support the practice of 
meditation in contemporary, western contexts. 
  The third aspect concerns the recognition of other humans sitting at the 
table - when someone sits, he should bow, repeating the process while leaving 
the table, reinforcing the communitarian aspect of practice. 
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V.III.VII GOVERNING THE INTER-SUBJECTIVE REALM 
 
 A relevant dimension of these Zen practices it to alter inter-subjectivity. In 
this section, I will focus on Dharma Sharing and Beginning Anew, two practices 
that govern speech. Foucault, through his analysis of the Greek notion of 
parresia, translated as saying everything, free-spokenness or free speech 
(Foucault, 2010:43), suggested that technologies of the self require a relation to 
others. For Foucault,  
 “One cannot attend to oneself, take care of oneself, without a relationship 
 to another person. And the role of this other is precisely to tell the truth, 
 to tell the whole truth, or at any rate to tell all the truth that is necessary, 
 and to tell it in a certain form which is precisely parresia...” (Foucault, 
 2010: 43). 
 In Vipassana retreats, verbalization is practically eliminated; however, in 
the Zen tradition of Thich Nhat Hanh we find explicit procedures to make up 
people through the control of their speech – verbalization is thus part of a wider 
project of human engineering. This exemplifies a major difference between 
these two projects of the self: Vipassana aims at transforming individuals 
through a particular technique of inner gaze and its ramifications on human 
actions, whereas Zen mobilizes processes of training that focus on the totality of 
the individual, supported by a variety of techniques. 
 Dharma sharing is regularly practiced during the retreats and usually at 
the end of each Sangha meeting. People usually sit in a circle, and in some 
cases they present themselves before the beginning of the session. Whenever 
anyone wants to share something, he or she starts by saluting everyone, joining 
the palms and bowing. People draw on their life narrative, some particular 
episode that they believe should be presented to the community, and how the 
framework of mindfulness relates to that. In some cases, a monk/nun is present 
to guide the session, and he/she can suggest a particular theme. Thich Nhat 
Hanh explains this exercise in the following way:  
 “Base your sharing only on your own experience of the practice rather 
 than about abstract ideas and theoretical topics. Many of us share similar 
 difficulties and aspirations … One person shares at a time. While that 
 person is speaking, everyone follows their breathing and listens deeply 
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 without judging or reacting, and without making cross talk or offering 
 advice.” (Hanh, 2009: 106) 
 
 These events are not only about regulating what one should speak 
about, but also how one should listen. Deep listening is the mindful way of 
listening: one breathes, listens without giving advice or making any judgment, 
just with the aim of relieving the suffering of the other, with compassion (Hanh, 
2009: 85). Before speaking, the subject practices some form of mindfulness, 
such as breathing or walking meditation. 
 Another mindful practice explicitly dealing with verbalization is called 
beginning anew, and it is undertaken in order to solve conflicts134. There are a 
variety of applications of mindfulness that transform speaking, installing new 
ways of using words and of weighing its consequences on others. This 
“extension” of mindfulness practices to dimensions such as speech is part of a 
broader project of enacting a paradigm of meditative subjectivity. As I suggest in 
the following sections, this requires practitioners to use mindfulness techniques 
in a variety of situations.   
 
V.III. VIII PERFORMATIVE CONTINUITY 
 
 These technologies are not necessarily isolated practices but 
performative expressions of mindfulness. The exercises proposed by Thich 
Nhat Hanh support the continuity of mindfulness in every situation – 
mindfulness, therefore, becomes a sort of virtual or spiritual immutable mobile 
that is activated by particular techniques and gestures carrying forms of 
                                                             
134
 In Plum Village it is practiced every week. The first step concerns flower 
watering – the person who initiated the practice has to acknowledge the 
qualities and strong points of the subject he or she is having a problem with. In 
the second part, one should express regret for something done or said that may 
have hurt others. The third part concerns eliciting ways in which others have 
hurt us. Finally, “We listen to another’s hurts and difficulties with the willingness 
to relieve the suffering of the other person, not to judge or argue with her. We 
listen with all our attention” (Hanh, 2009: 74). The session is closed with a song 
or with mindful breathing. 
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performative subjectification. Mindfulness is understood as a way of life. This 
means that it is necessary to develop tools, exercises, performances that 
readjust human activity to the requirements of mindfulness and Interbeing. 
These adjustments rely on the pillars of this practice (the gathas, slowing down, 
the breath and the awareness of the activity), are supported by the actants that 
structure the spiritual-technical networks of mindful practice (such as the bells 
and their program of making people stop and breathe, as we have seen in the 
previous chapter) and affect performances as diverse as managing the moving 
body, looking at landscapes, relating to other bodies, governing inter-
subjectivity, or using bodily processes (such as the breath) to tune in to 
mindfulness. In that sense, the maintenance of the performative order does not 
rely on discontinuous, isolated spiritual exercises, as in Vipassana, but on the 
attempt to being present and alert while conducting a certain activity, whether 
walking, speaking, using the telephone, eating or sitting. In order to be mindful, 
there are permanent mechanisms that are used to come back to the present 
moment and that create new associations with the movements of the body, 
speech or imagination.  
   
V.III.XIX THE COLLECTIVE DIMENSION OF TECHNOLOGIES OF THE SELF 
 
          Zen performances in the tradition of Thich Nhat Hanh transcend the 
realm of individual practice. First, the standpoint psychology that sustains and 
justifies these technologies of mindfulness enacts a version of subjectivity that 
is highly de-centred and extended. Automatisms are not individual, they 
supposedly run through generations, and have to be dealt with in order to allow 
self-transformation, reminding us of Bourdieu’s remarks on the collective nature 
of habitus (Bourdieu, 1977) and post-humanist approaches to subjectivity, 
informed by relational ontologies that recognize the heterogeneous, 
intergenerational and entangled dimension of affect (Blackman, 2010;  Venn, 
2010; Manning, 2010). According to Thay and the relational ontology of 
Interbeing, the ancestors still live in us, and all generations, both past and 
future, practice with us, an assumption which clashes with dominant, modern 
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and dualistic versions of subjectivity - the homo clausus (Elias, 1978). This can 
be understood at an abstract level, exemplifying a special ontological or 
theoretical framework, but also literally. Some practitioners can have contact 
with deities (Devas) or even spiritual teachers from the past135. It is suggested 
that Dipa Ma, a very advanced meditator, can “appear” to some of his students 
while they are practicing (see Schmidt, 2005), and the range of experiences 
analyzed in chapters VI and VII confirm that these nondual ontologies can be 
actually enacted. 
        Some practitioners develop connections with their ancestors, and they 
feel they have to be in touch with them to progress in their practice. As Bob told 
me “I have felt that sometimes I can make my grandparents free in me, and I 
can change that cycle of suffering... If I smile, my grandfathers smile.” 
(Interview, Bob, February 2011). This nonmodern, more encompassing 
paradigm of subjectivity has strong links with deep ecology, leading to 
phenomena of identification with other humans and nonhumans and nonmodern 
ways of tackling social issues (see chapters VI, VII and VIII).  
         Secondly, and following the previous point, engaging with other 
practitioners is encouraged. Walking meditation outside can involve holding 
someone else’s hand, there are specific instances to promote this collective 
spirit (such as the practices of dharma sharing or beginning anew) and 
technologies of mindfulness are devices to transform human interactions136. 
This means that these practices translate programs of action that help subjects 
to transform their relationship with partners, family members, friends and 
strangers - they are devices that bring forth a paradigm shift of human 
existence. In sum, these practices are intentional in the sense that they should 
be included, developed and supported by interactions between selves and 
others and influence virtually all dimensions of human life. 
                                                             
135
 See Lerner (1977) for a first person account of such experience. 
136
 I don’t view human interactions and public behaviour in the sense of 
Goffman, repeating dual accounts of the subject (namely the distinction 
between actor and performer’s self, Goffman, 1969) characteristic of the homo 
laborans (Arendt, 1958), but as a crucial dimension of spiritual training, meaning 
that it also involves transforming relationships. 
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           Finally, these performances are supported by associations between 
humans and nonhumans, as we have seen in the previous chapter. This means 
that these performances, instead of relying on individualized isolations, depend 
on novel webs of associations, entanglements between selves, spaces and 
objects, reshaping one’s experience of the self and the world.  
 
V.IV THE PERFORMATIVITY OF ANTHROPOTECHNICS 
 
          Zen and Vipassana assemblages require a subject whose automatisms 
have to be transformed; as anthropotechnics, they radically alter the habitual 
performances of the human machine - the whole individual should ideally be 
altered through the installation of new automatisms. We encounter different 
strategies to allow these transformations to occur, different ways of operating 
performative subjectification: in Vipassana, one has to sit still, with the eyes 
closed, scanning the body while remaining aware of anicca. This requires a 
management of posture, a new somatic mode of attention and the maintenance 
of a certain understanding of the “nature” of reality. Practices of mindfulness 
privilege coming back to the present moment and to the self through the breath, 
the use of gathas (that also support certain ontological assumptions about the 
nature of reality and of daily activities), the management of bodily movements 
(with a focus on slowing down and eventually on graciousness) and even 
speaking and listening. Vipassana is a practice that is spatially confined to the 
meditation hall or the room and enacted through the sitting body and the 
equanimous mind. Mindfulness mobilizes the sitting, moving, working body in 
various spaces - the practitioner is invited to interact with others (both humans 
and nonhumans) and there are common meditative networks that can be 
recruited to support the practice. 
              This means that we find differences in terms of the scope of these 
performative regimes, involving the deployment and management of distinct 
devices to support them; in sum, these performative regimes govern aspects as 
distinct as bodily movements, regularities and postures; mental workings 
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(installing inner gazes and verbalizations) and ecologies (both human, with the 
government of inter-subjectivity between practitioners as well as interactions 
between human selves, environments and actants). These different ways of 
mobilizing the totality of the individual constitute distinct forms of dealing with 
bodies and minds. The sitting body of Vipassana, illustrated by the Adhitanna 
sittings, should be the body-statue, immobile, unaltered and unaffected by inner 
and outer inputs, a sort of self-induced and performative suspended animation: 
one should remain equanimous, and the physical assemblage becomes an 
instrument to release sankharas, purifying oneself. Likewise, the function of the 
mind is to support this inner gaze, scanning the body from head to feet and 
vice-versa – no images, hallucinations or any kind of other “distractions” should 
jeopardize this performative order. Concerning Zen, there is a focus on being 
gentle towards oneself: no painful sittings, and the body is constantly moving 
while maintaining mindfulness 137 ; the mindful mind should also be able to 
contemplate a vast array of phenomenal dimensions, not only sensations but 
also thoughts, emotions, etc.. 
               Secondly, these movements, while deploying a set of performative 
changes, also draw on explanations and mental maps to support them, 
standpoint psychologies. In Vipassana, we find the image of the monkey mind, 
constantly wandering, and the human condition of permanent reactivity towards 
the world, opposed to the picture of the pure, equanimous mind, of the self that 
no longer reacts to sensations. Mindfulness is opposed to mindlessness, 
contrasting with regular ways of being in the world, what Harner calls ordinary 
state of consciousness, characterized by task unrelated thoughts. These 
practices are coupled with particular understandings of what selves are, ways of 
summarizing the basics of nonmeditative experience and of characterizing its 
main points, contrasting them with alternative paradigms of experiencing mind, 
body and the world. 
                                                             
137
 The development of a set of practices of wellbeing, called the mindful 
movements (Hanh, 2008b), usually undertaken before a long sitting or during 
walking meditation, exemplifies the importance given by this tradition to the care 
of the body. 
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               These narratives and maps constitute the hermeneutics of meditation, 
relatively stable theoretical frameworks that offer a critique of ordinary states of 
mind and prescribe ways of attaining different paradigms of subjectivity. 
Following Pickering’s remarks on scientific practice (1995), we can understand 
these performances as forms of “tuning in” to particular forms of agency (in this 
case, particular realms of experience), and Zen and Vipassana assemblages 
tell us that paradigms of subjectivity involve the reconfiguration of automatisms, 
suspending the whole range of techniques that constitute the modern self (one 
can think of modern education for instance). Altering these habitual 
performances can lead to the emergence of new forms of experience (see 
chapter VI) and to the development of new hermeneutical frameworks, 
providing the contemplative seeker with forms of interpreting meditative and 
nonmeditative experience. 
               This has some links with Fleck’s reflections on the Wasserman 
reaction (Fleck, 1979), that was accompanied by the emergence of a 
community of practitioners who were able to undertake the procedure; similarly, 
Becker’s marijuana smokers (Becker, 1953) also had to develop a new kind of 
aesthetic expertise that would allow them to enjoy the effects of the drug. In the 
case of meditation, the proliferation of maps and hermeneutical frameworks, 
filled with terms and expressions such as anicca, sankharas, the monkey mind 
and tangerine party, are used to permit transitions between modern and 
nonmodern paradigms of the self. 
         These remarks reinforce the performativity of these meditative 
performances. Performativity applies to those phenomena that “have to be 
continuously performed to exist at all” (Callon, 2004 cited in Mackenzie, 2005: 
9), emerging through the action of heterogeneous assemblages. According to 
Guattari, psychological models are also performative:  
 “Freudian cartography is not only descriptive; it is inseparable from the 
 pragmatics of transference... I would argue that it should be disengaged 
 from a significational perspective and understood as a conversion of 
 expressive means and as a mutation of ontological textures releasing 
 new lines of the possible - and this from the simple fact of putting into 
 place new assemblages of listening and modelisation.” (Guattari, 1995: 
 62-63) 
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             My understanding of performativity is post-humanist (Barad, 2003), 
consisting not only of material-discursive (as put by Barad) associations but 
also environmental, energetic (see chapter IV) and performative couplings, thus 
rejecting merely discursive, Althusserian/Austinian accounts of performativity 
(see chapter IV and Tambiah, 1985; Butler, 1997a; Althusser, 2008; Austin, 
1970). Zen and Vipassana assemblages aim at revealing impermanence or 
Interbeing in order to undertake subjective changes (including dealing with 
suffering). In order to do so, they invite practitioners to operate a number of 
performative transformations. The ontologies of anicca and Interbeing, including 
new experiences, emerge alongside the repetition of a set of practices that 
conjure up new ways of experiencing the self and reality. These performances 
invite selves to suspend their habitual, modern automatisms, and to pay 
attention to their bodies and minds in different ways, installing new 
automatisms. The transformation of habitual webs of associations (chapter IV) 
and of regular automatisms lead to reconfigurations of the human assemblage, 
unveiling states that are not accessible through the habitual, nonmeditative use 
of bodies and minds. These reconfigurations are new assemblages that allow 
new ways of being in the world, they permit the emergence of a new Umwelt, in 
the same way that trains allowed the emergence of the panoramic view that 
Schivelbusch wrote about (see chapter II) and space exploration permitted 
astronauts to experience radically new ways of understanding the Earth and 
Cosmos, undergoing mystical episodes and seeing things in a larger context 
(Mitchell, 1996). 
          In order to analyze this interesting phenomenon – the transformation of 
human experience through couplings between humans, techniques, 
nonhumans and different settings - Timothy Leary used the example of the 
microscope: 
  “The techniques and methods of turning on and controlling the flow and      
energies of awareness and of mapping where you have gone and of 
helping others to make these explorations is very similar to the use of the 
microscope, because the microscope turns you on to levels of energy that 
are invisible to the naked eye. Turning on requires a change in the 
physiology of the human body.” (Leary, 1999: 38) 
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        New performative configurations are developed to permit nonmodern 
experiences that are blocked by modern automatisms and habitual ways of 
being in the world – the modern self. These performances are performative - 
without meditative technologies, ontologies such as Interbeing or anicca would 
not emerge: in order to actualize them, new automatisms have to be installed, 
suspending the technologies of the modern, dual self.   
 
V.V CONCLUSION 
 
        This chapter analyzed the set of Zen and Vipassana technologies of the 
self. These practices involve becoming aware of automatisms in particular 
ways, directing the attention towards the breath or body movements, installing 
new automatisms (looking for sensations in the body, walking in particular ways, 
coming back to the breath when one hears the bell) that are supported by 
standpoint psychologies, particular ways of understanding the human condition 
and of prescribing different methods to achieve some results, such as being 
equanimous or mindful. 
       The automatisms installed by Zen and Vipassana assemblages suspend 
modern ways of being in the world – the mind is stilled, one should become 
aware of the body and the dualist paradigm of the self should be progressively 
abandoned due to new associations with other humans and nonhumans. 
        The transformation of habitual performances is the second major device of 
subjectification developed by Zen and Vipassana. New practices are introduced 
along with the reconfiguration of habitual settings. These practices require 
participants to become aware of new ways of understandings selves and the 
world. They can develop sensitivity towards the impermanent, subtle body of 
Vipassana or the nondual interconnectedness between all entities – Interbeing.  
         I argued that we should understand these practices under the guise of 
post-humanist performativity. Zen and Vipassana performances enact 
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ontologies comprising particular forms of verbalization, performative changes 
and associations with nonhumans. Constraints, nonhumans, new performances 
and verbalizations alter the practitioner’s Umwelt, allowing him to experience 
himself and the world in nonmodern ways. The retreat, as a suspension of the 
modern, everyday life self, introduces new devices that bring forth nonmodern 
experiences, emergent phenomena that can “neither be predicted nor explained 
by examining component parts in isolation” (Macklem, 2008: 1844). 
Nonhumans, constraints, new gazes, ways of speaking, of walking, eating, 
sitting and breathing allow the emergence of new, nonmodern paradigms of the 
human assemblage. New webs of associations and the reconfiguration of 
automatisms perform a nonmodern paradigm of the self. The role of the 
following chapter is to explore the wide range of experiences that are enacted 
by Zen and Vipassana assemblages, contrasting them with modern, dualistic 
ways of being in the world. 
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VI. EXPERIENCES 
 
 “If the doors of perception were cleansed, everything would appear to 
man as it is, infinite.” (Blake, 2002: 170) 
 
 “In the province of the mind, what one believes to be true is true or 
becomes true – within certain limits – to be found experientially and 
experimentally. These limits are further beliefs to be transcended. In the mind, 
there are no limits.” (Lilly, 1967: 19) 
 
VI.I INTRODUCTION 
 
 In the previous chapters I have explored the devices of subjectification 
employed by Vipassana and Zen assemblages. In chapter IV I focused on the 
setting, comprising a set of devices that include constraints, the management of 
space and new connections with nonhumans, establishing new webs of 
associations. In chapter V, performances, I analyzed the set of new 
performances that practitioners should develop in order to suspend habitual 
automatisms – eating, breathing, walking – installing nonmodern ones. 
 The reconfiguration of habitual webs of associations and automatisms 
allows the development of nonmodern forms of experiencing the self and the 
world. These new experiences include feeling subtle sensations, experiencing 
the body as totally dissolved, becoming aware of the environment in new ways, 
feeling a strong sense of presence and even undergoing nondual experiences, 
constituting alternatives to the dual, modern self. 
 Initially, the transition from modern to nonmodern paradigms of selfhood 
is characterized by resistance. There is a struggle between meditative and 
nonmeditative ontologies that generates pain, boredom, suspicion. Effort is 
required in order to deal with these difficulties – to be able to tune in on different 
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ways of feeling the self and the world, participants undergo struggles of agency 
(an expression that I adapted from Pickering’s dances of agency, see Pickering, 
1995138 ). The continuation of practice helps meditators to cope with these 
difficulties and to implement new automatisms, allowing them to feel subtle 
sensations, to maintain equanimity towards the plethora of sensations and to 
adopt new ways of experiencing walking, breathing and a variety of other 
dimensions that include emotions and thoughts (in the case of Thich Nhat 
Hanh’s mindfulness). In some cases, mystical experiences (James, 2002) take 
place, signalling “the abandonment of forces to objects and the suspension of 
the self” (Gomart and Hennion, 1999). Instead of abandoning themselves to 
objects, practitioners enter realms of experience that they previously ignored 
and that suspend their habitual sense of selfhood. What these phenomena have 
in common is a strong sense of nonduality (between body, mind and the 
environment) that suspends the modern self, with the meditator becoming fully 
absorbed by an experience that he is unable to control – his will is suspended 
and he is overwhelmed by radically new ways of being in the world, forms of 
meditative agency that challenge the dual, autonomous and rational modern 
subject. 
 The structure of this chapter is as follows: in the first section, I will reflect 
on the struggles of agency generated by Vipassana and Zen practices, focusing 
on issues such as pain, the rebellious mind or difficulties adjusting to the 
setting; the second section presents an overview of what it means to practice 
mindfulness and Vipassana – what does one feel and experience while applying 
these gazes to objects such as the body, emotions and the mind? The final 
section explores mystical experiences with meditation. 
  
 
                                                             
138
 Pickering, in “The Mangle of Practice” (1995), uses two important notions – 
“dances of agency” and “dialectic of resistance and accommodation” – to 
analyze the performative dimension of scientific practice. The notion of 
“struggles of agency” that I’m using here exemplifies the conflict between 
modern and nonmodern ontologies of the self, generating a set of resistances 
such as pain, suspicion or lack of concentration.  
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VI.II STRUGGLES OF AGENCY 
 
 Going on retreat (especially for the first time) can be quite a challenging 
experience. Preston (1988), following Becker’s insights on becoming a 
marijuana smoker139, argued that a similar process is involved in order to fully 
experience the “effects” of meditation, as we have seen in chapter II. Meditation 
involves a vast array of practices (Preston was focusing on Japanese Zen in the 
US), but, regarding Vipassana and Zen, the task is not so much learning to 
enjoy meditation (although joy is an important part of Thich Nhat Hanh’s 
practices) but to re-order the self in such a way that meditative awareness 
becomes natural, installing new automatisms. The point is not to identify with a 
certain sensuous reality (such as the “effects” of meditation) but to implement 
new automatisms characterized by the gazes of equanimity and mindfulness. 
 These new automatisms create storms, struggles between programmes 
of equanimity/mindfulness and pre-meditative selves and their corresponding 
regimes of selfhood. These clashes are understood as struggles of agency 
between meditative and nonmeditative automatisms. In order to implement new 
ways of being, participants have to deal with many resistances, including pain, 
the difficult process of adaptation to the setting and the habitual configurations 
of their minds. 
  
V.II.I VIPASSANA PAIN 
 
 Vipassana retreats reorganize habitual webs of associations, becoming 
disciplinary or total institutions for a certain period of time (usually 10 days), as 
                                                             
139As Becker (1953: 235) suggested, the pleasant consumption of cannabis 
depends on three aspects: a) learning to smoke in a way that produces effects; 
b) recognizing the effects and linking them to the substance; c) enjoying the 
sensations that are perceived. 
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we have seen in chapter IV. In Vipassana retreats, one should be in a sort of 
artificial isolation – although there are dozens of others meditating at the same 
time, one should focus on oneself, ideally without reacting to whatever may 
happen. Subjects should endure pain without resorting to analgesics, changing 
posture or abandoning the practice – in order to develop equanimity, the 
habitual automatism of reacting to pain should be suspended. In the following 
passage, Philip recalls his first Vipassana retreat – he had the feeling that the 
Vipassana organization was particularly sadistic for deliberately putting people 
through such intense pain: 
 “The notion of pain, of pain being present and of you being invited to 
 accept it and living with it made me reach such a level of pain that I 
 engaged in a fight with my unconscious that was...I should leave ... 
 because this is a sadistic organization, and the teachers are part of this 
 organization and not even the students or the volunteers know that. They 
 are simply there, the teachers are in the room looking at everyone, 
 watching them suffer. This was a conclusion that my unconscious led me 
 to in order to convince me to get the hell out of there, to end something 
 I’d never thought of doing in my life, that is experiencing... accepting a 
 situation I’m not enjoying.”  (Interview, Philip, September 2010) 
 
 Philip also told me that since birth we seek sensations we enjoy and run 
away from unpleasant ones (the same narrative conveyed by Goenka, as we 
have seen in the previous chapter). Learning to cope with pain, due to long 
periods of sitting meditation, can even be complicated when the infamous 
adhitanna sittings are introduced, immediately after Vipassana is taught. I 
remember that during my second retreat I had the distinct feeling of someone 
stabbing me in the back due to the intense pain I was experiencing. These 
episodes are understood as tests to one’s equanimity, and extreme pain is, 
according to my informants, relatively frequent and part of the process of 
detaching oneself from whatever is going on at the physical level. As put by 
Rebecca: 
 “I’ve had pain so severe I thought I wouldn’t be able to walk, I am like 
 worried about it, and eventually I’m like...no, stop worrying, you’re just 
 worrying, and then...yeah...at the end of the hour the pain goes, and I get 
 up and walk out, and it’s like, well...yes, that wasn’t a normal pain, it’s like 
 a Vipassana pain.” (Interview, Rebecca, April 2012) 
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 Vipassana pain, instead of signalling that something is wrong with the 
body, is a manifestation of the mind to “test” the subject, making him or her stop 
the meditative performance by moving the legs, for instance140. The pain can be 
understood as a test to one’s equanimity, and the practitioner has to alter the 
habitual feeling of the body. In order to enact a nonmodern version of the body 
– the subtle body of vibrations – practitioners have to break the automatism of 
reacting to pain by changing posture, breaking a previously established 
connection. As suggested in the previous chapter, a relevant dimension of 
technologies of the self is the implementation of new “somatic modes of 
attention” (Csordas, 1999). As dualists Westerns, when we experience pain in 
the body we tend to believe that it is essentially physical (Jackson, 1994: 207). 
However, it has been argued that pain is not exclusively biological, being 
influenced by culture (Csordas, 1993; Bourdieu, 1977; Jackson, 1994). 
Moreover, intense episodes (such as sadomasochism and some forms of 
torture) tend to radically alter one’s perception of pain, challenging the 
boundaries between suffering and bliss, the intolerable and the ecstatic (Miller, 
1993; Bataille, 1989). Vipassana assemblages use strong emotions – including 
pain – as a test, training selves to experience a wide range of 
phenomenological phenomena with the same mental attitude - equanimity. As 
one of my informants told me, off the record, this Vipassana pain is actually a 
test, and the back pain he was experiencing was a sort of an illusion, because 
once the one hour session came to an end the feeling of the body would return 
to normal. The pain experienced at Vipassana retreats requires participants to 
reconfigure their inner gaze, interpreting their experiences in a different way. 
 
 
                                                             
140
 Since these retreats are collective, it is common to witness choreographies 
of people discontinuing the meditative performance, when individuals decide to 
move one after the other. As put by this informant: “One of them would shuffle 
and then the next one would shuffle and then the next one would shuffle...you’re 
fine for the three first shuffles, but it keeps going around and around and 
around...God save me! I killed people in my imagination… I imagined myself 
with baseball bats just going on people behind me, yeah, but I kept on sitting 
and I felt a lot better after that, bastards!” (Interview, Tim, April 2011) 
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 VI.II.II ADJUSTING TO THE COMMUNITY 
 
 Contrasting with Vipassana practices, the technologies of the self 
promoted by Thich Nhat Hanh are not meant to initially cause pain but joy141. An 
important aspect of these procedures is to invite retreatants to participate in 
communitarian life: instead of generating artificial isolations, as in Vipassana 
(see chapter IV), one should interact, engaging in activities such as singing, 
dharma sharing, walking or eating. The various practices developed by this 
tradition actualize Interbeing (see previous chapter) by reinforcing the 
communitarian dimension of meditation.  
 I remember that the first time I went to Plum Village it took me a while to 
be able to sing in a group, a regular activity that usually precedes walking 
meditation outdoors. In order to be able to sing in public142 I had to suspend my 
resistances towards the collective energy of the sangha, displaying my 
emotions in public. This is a common experience, as exemplified by the 
following passage: 
 “I remember [during my first retreat] I couldn’t breathe very well, I was 
 actually feeling quite anxious the first while. I remember going to 
 breakfast the first morning, someone comes over and sits down next to 
 me and I almost felt like snarling. How dare you be so happy?! Rubbish!” 
 (Interview, Paul, March 2011) 
 
 In this case, the clash is evident between the joyful environment of Plum 
Village and the outside world, emotionally embodied by Paul, who had just 
arrived at the monastery. This mental shut-down  (Lawton, 1998), reinforcing 
the status of the modern, dual self, the homo clausus, is clear in Claude Anshin 
Thomas’ case. He was a soldier who fought in Vietnam and, as many others 
who served there, went through highly traumatic experiences that profoundly 
shaped him. When he attended his first retreat in the tradition of Thich Nhat 
                                                             
141
 According to a monk I interviewed in the tradition of Plum Village, also 
experienced in Vipassana, Goenka starts off from the first noble truth, dukkha, 
or suffering, while Thich Nhat Hanh starts with the third noble truth, the 
cessation of suffering (see Goenka, 1987). 
142
 See Hanh (2001). 
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Hanh, he decided to protect himself from the surrounding environment in 
extreme ways, including checking the perimeter where he was supposed to 
camp: 
 “I drove to the retreat on my motorcycle. At that time I was riding a black 
 Harley Davidson. I was dressed in a typical fashion for me: black leather 
 jacket, black boots, black helmet, gold mirror glasses, and a red bandana 
 tied around my neck. My style of dress was not exactly warm and 
 welcoming. The way I presented myself was intended to keep people 
 away, because I was scared, really scared. 
 I arrived at the retreat early so I could check the place out. Before I could 
 think about anything, I walked the perimeter of the whole place: Where 
 are the boundaries? Where are the dangerous places where I’m 
 vulnerable to attack? Coming here thrust me into the unknown, and for 
 me the unknown meant war. And to be with so many people I didn’t know 
 was terrifying to me, and the feeling of terror also meant war.” (Thomas, 
 2004: 39) 
 
 After this retreat, Claude went to Plum Village to strengthen his practice 
of mindfulness, and he even set up booby traps around his camping site to 
“protect” himself. His experience of initial struggle with the communitarian 
dimension of practice is a great example of how one resists the retreat 
assemblage, attempting to maintain the nonmeditatve self in control. These 
resistances were characterized, in Claude’s case, by checking the perimeter, 
setting up booby traps and dressing in an unfriendly way.  This is obviously an 
extreme example – not all participants are Vietnam war veterans – but helps us 
understand how participants can resort to a diversity of devices that prevent 
them from letting go of their selves. In psychoanalytic theory, the notion of 
“defence mechanism” is used “to describe the ego’s struggle against painful or 
unendurable ideas or affects” (Freud, 1937: 42), including regression, 
projection, isolation, etc. (Freud, 1937). One could argue that the self and its 
automatisms are challenged by the retreat assemblage and its 
psychogeographical reconfigurations, and these episodes of resistance 
highlight the clash between meditative and nonmeditative paradigms of 
subjectivity. 
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VI.II.III THE REBELLIOUS MIND 
 
 The two previous examples, reaction to extreme pain and the difficulty in 
opening up to the community, suggest that the human mind generates a 
number of resistances towards practices of meditation. Since meditation 
involves the reconfiguration of human automatisms in radically different 
settings, characterized by silence and by the reduction of external stimuli, the 
meditators’ minds will produce a vast set of resistances.  
 In the previous chapter, ordinary states of consciousness were 
characterized by the pervasiveness of mind-wandering and task-unrelated-
thoughts. Nowadays, our minds are being constantly mobilized by technological 
devices such as televisions, computers, mp3 players and a variety of gadgets. 
The contemporary technological mind is constantly multitasking: while driving, 
one is listening to music and calling someone on the phone; while working on 
the computer, there are various windows opened at the same time, and one is 
constantly shifting the attention from one thing to another - we could say, 
inspired by Marcuse (1964), that the contemporary western mind is mobilized 
by a sort of technological rationality that dominates individuals by controlling 
their attention, bombarding them with the desire to buy useless commodities  
and to travel to exotic places143.   
 Instead of following these “negative” views on technology, I am interested 
in exploring the new realms of experiences opened up by new technological 
configurations, including meditation. Meditation and sensory deprivation 
suspend the plethora of environmental stimuli that characterizes western 
metropolitan life. When the mind is deprived of external objects, it rebels and 
creates a number of images, memories, desires, thoughts. As Joanna, a 
Vipassana meditator, puts it: 
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 Marcuse suggested that “Technological rationality reveals its political 
character as it becomes the great vehicle of better domination, creating a truly 
totalitarian universe in which society and nature, mind and body are kept in a 
state of permanent mobilization for the defense of this universe.” (Marcuse, 
1964: 20) 
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 “As soon as you sit cross legged, you take the precepts, and then you 
 start focusing the mind on the breath, the mind is in a state of turmoil, 
 and wants to push away, and fight ...” (Interview, Joanna, April 2012) 
 
 One of my informants remembers that during his first Vipassana retreat 
he felt like he was watching a movie, his mind was like a big screen preventing 
him from concentrating on the breath: 
 “For the first two days … my mind was like a screen, I was in this big 
 cinema, there were so many different views, like mountains, rocks, and 
 all those sorts of things, coming to sight, and I was wondering what it’s all 
 about … that was a difficult part, but then it cleared up by the third day.” 
 (Interview, Rob, October 2011) 
 
 The modern mind, whose ordinary states of consciousness are 
characterized by task-unrelated-thoughts, rebels against the practice of 
meditation, and selves have to struggle with these deep-rooted habits, coming 
back to the breath and not letting these distractions jeopardize the paradigm 
shift. Mental rebellion characterizes most of the initial experiences in Vipassana 
retreats, including hallucinations, which in Japanese Zen are called makyo 
(Kapleau, 1989). In my first Vipassana retreat I saw demonic faces during the 
evening discourses (probably due to my Catholic upbringing) 144  and in the 
second one, while I was taking a shower, I saw a human arm coming out of 
nowhere trying to grab me. Most of the interviewees mentioned that they had 
problems concentrating and experienced nightmares, visions 145  and old 
memories coming up. 
                                                             
144
 As I wrote in my field diary “I also suffered from mild hallucinations. During 
the first days, when they were playing the evening discourse, I would move my 
gaze from the TV to the assistant teacher’s face and I would see it morph into 
the face of Satan, with horns, etc.. The same thing happened when I looked at 
the face of the female assistant teacher (I would see it as somehow alien).” 
(Field diary, May 2010) 
145
 These seem to be fairly common. During my second retreat my mind was 
projecting a myriad of different faces and I was finding it hard to concentrate. I 
asked the assistant teachers what to do and they recommended that I open my 
eyes otherwise it would become impossible to meditate. An interviewee told me 
that “I started thinking absolutely crazy things, it happens to everyone…there 
was something that really scared me…I saw an image of my brother and father 
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 Goenka compares these retreats to brain surgery, and one could argue 
that they are in fact medical operations without general anaesthesia, to make 
sure that the patient is aware of each and every movement of the scalpel cutting 
through one’s self. Although organized in a radically different fashion, the set of 
practices promoted by Thich Nhat Hanh also generate a number of difficulties; 
however, we are facing a form of applied Buddhism, ideally engaged with 
everyday activities, without a focus on long periods of sitting meditation – it is a 
smoother transition. However, it doesn’t mean that it does not generate 
difficulties or struggle. We have seen that adapting to the setting can be 
problematic, but the interviewees also reported some difficulties with 
mindfulness itself. Lewis told me that he found impatience as the major 
resistance towards this technology of the self: 
 “There is a resistance that for me is fundamental in meditative practices 
 that is impatience, because meditation requires patience, and the first 
 natural resistance is impatience. Impatience towards what? The 
 impatience, at a given moment, to focus on a given object. The 
 impatience of being seated and wanting to walk. The impatience deriving 
 from the fact that the knee hurts and I want the pain to go away. ... I think 
 that the biggest problem is not even the fact that we feel anger or pain, it 
 is the fact that we do not have the patience to face it.”  (Interview, Lewis, 
 December 2011) 
 
 Impatience drives selves to interrupt mindfulness, preventing them from 
being in the present moment. When impatience emerges and the mind 
becomes agitated, the performative apparatus of mindfulness can be mobilized: 
a gatha is repeated, a bell is activated, one comes back to the breath and feels 
whatever one is doing (such as brushing the teeth or walking) – using 
Pickering’s performative idiom (Pickering, 1995), one develops a number of 
strategies of accommodation to progressively become able to practice 
meditation. As we have seen in chapter IV, this can include recruiting 
nonhuman allies – such as cushions and pillows – to support a new mode of 
somatic attention. In other cases, practitioners feel tempted to practice Yoga in 
order to endure long hours of sitting meditation (see chapter IV). Concerning 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
merged into one…it was just one person but with traits of my father and 
brother…I was meditating, in the meditation hall, and I got a little bit scared, I 
even jumped!” (Interview, Barbara, December 2011) 
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Thich Nhat Hanh’s tradition of mindfulness, the gathas are particularly helpful. 
As Sal told me: 
 “I use gathas when I don’t feel peace, when I really have to come back 
 to myself, then I use the gatha to help me come back, because 
 sometimes when I’m not at peace...sometimes when something 
 happens, I’m irritated with someone... and...sometimes my mind is 
 thinking about that problem all the time...even if he’s not there...in my 
 mind there’s a problem all the time, so this gatha helps me come 
 back...arriving...now...” (Interview, Sal, December 2011) 
 
 Participants, in initial phases, are constantly struggling with their habitual 
automatisms, and these strategies of accommodation can help them tune in to 
forms of meditative agency. These initial difficulties illustrate a clash between 
paradigms of subjectivity, signalling the enactment of new forms of being in the 
world.  Neil told me that he found working meditation particularly challenging 
because in the outside world, if he didn’t do his work, someone would yell at 
him: 
 “[It’s] way hard for me to stay mindful while I’m working… the first job I 
 had, the first thing they told me is if you stand and do nothing somebody 
 will come and yell at you…working meditation is very difficult, I always 
 lose my mindfulness…I work to get the job done…” (Interview, Neil, 
 February 2011) 
 
 This passage illustrates a clash between the paradigm of subjectivity 
enacted in Plum Village (where they even have the so-called lazy days) and the 
outside world, as well as the fact that one’s struggle with mindfulness is always 
conditioned by life circumstances, past experiences and the mental set. Some 
other practices, such as walking meditation outside, seem to do exactly the 
opposite of sitting meditation, “obliging” the subject to maintain mindfulness 
while he or she is being exposed to the environment, in order to transform the 
meditator’s Umwelt. According to Ethan: 
 “It’s very easy to get distracted because you’re walking outside, you can 
 walk around, look around, and… then your focus can easily…you can get 
 lost easily, you know.” (Interview, Ethan, February 2011) 
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 There are many other examples that could be provided to explore some 
of the initial difficulties with mindfulness. Since these practices of meditation are 
always applied to particular actions, the typical troubles arising during sitting 
meditation (commonly experienced with Vipassana) are extended to all the 
other practices. The challenge is to fully engage in the activity, not getting 
distracted by thoughts but accepting whatever is happening and using the 
breath and gathas as anchors to come back to the present moment. Since the 
mind is not trained to be still and present, the practitioner will struggle. 
Whenever mindlessness arises, one comes back to the breath – if the nature of 
the mind is to wander, the nature of the practitioner is to come back, over and 
over again. 
 The initial resistances to meditation highlight the clash between modern 
and nonmodern paradigms of the self. Meditation is supported by the breath, 
particular ways of reorganizing one’s posture and a variety of associations with 
nonhumans, inner gazes and settings. These assemblages enact a version of 
the human mind (present, not flooded by thoughts and aware of particular 
objects) that contrasts with ordinary states of consciousness, characterized by 
daydreaming, leaning towards the past and the future. The ordinary mind is in a 
permanent state of turmoil, eager for inputs from the five senses; instead of 
being present, it jumps from one thought to another, and this flow creates a 
constant background noise. William James, while reflecting on human 
consciousness, suggested that “A 'river' or a 'stream' are the metaphors by 
which it is most naturally described.” (James, 2007: 240). David Hume also 
recognized the dynamic and impermanent nature of the human mind, 
suggesting that it should be understood as a theatre: “The mind is a kind of 
theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, 
re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations.” 
(Hume, 1888: 253) 
  One could argue that the modern self is overpowered by this 
impermanence, preventing it from being in the present moment by constantly 
projecting new thoughts, memories and images. Instead of being fully present, 
one seems to regurgitate the same old endless river, identifying with it and 
blindly believing that the mind is the self. The modern self is overpowered by its 
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history, preventing it from experiencing the world as novelty. As Nietzsche 
suggested, “there is a degree of sleeplessness, of rumination, of the historical 
sense, which is harmful and ultimately fatal to the living thing, whether this living 
thing be a man or a people or a culture.” (Nietzsche, 1997: 62) 
 These struggles of agency, including pain, discomfort and unease, help 
the self to de-identify with the stream of thoughts, framing experience in new 
ways and allowing new ways of perceiving the self and the world to emerge, 
new programs of action (and of perception) enacted by the practice of 
meditation. 
VI.III THE FEELING OF MEDITATION 
  
Initial experiences with meditation can be challenging, signalling the shift 
between paradigms of the self, and Vipassana and Zen practices promote 
particular configurations of experience that are distinct from ordinary states of 
consciousness. As we have seen in the previous chapter, these technologies of 
the self differ in terms of scope. The “object” of Goenka’s Vipassana is the 
physical body and its sensations, while with Thich Nhat Hanh we find a plethora 
of objects of meditation. In both cases, the “aim” is the establishment of a new 
mode of existence that can be equanimity, in the case of Vipassana, or 
mindfulness, in the case of Zen. The repetition of meditative performances in 
relatively controlled environments leads to new ways of being and particular 
configurations of experience.  
Since Vipassana and Zen display different modes of experiential 
transformation, I will analyze these technologies separately. 
 
VI.III.I ANAPANA – APPROACHING MENTAL SILENCE 
 
What is it like to practice Vipassana? First, one does not start immediately 
with Vipassana but with Anapanasati, or awareness of the breath. Initially this 
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practice is met with an incredible resistance: the goal is to create a foundation 
for Vipassana, to still the mind, making it sharp, precise and concentrated. The 
type of Anapana practiced in these retreats involves focusing on the skin 
around the lip/nose areas (as we have seen in the previous chapter), and most 
of my interviewees report an increased awareness of these areas. As Tim told 
me: 
“I felt my moustache moving, then I felt just the skin itself, then I felt 
the breath on the skin and then just the skin. I was just  working with 
the size of a pea on the upper lip...”  (Interview, Tim, April 2011) 
Anapana increases the feeling of the object of concentration, and it also can 
still and calm the mind. Anapana is a propaedeutic tool for the practice of 
Vipassana, calming the mind. Rebecca recollects what she calls “mental 
silence” when she practices Anapana in longer Vipassana retreats: 
“I think it’s when my mind has been quietest, when I’ve been on 
courses. It’s like you’re in silence, but sometimes you start to approach 
mental silence, especially when you’re doing Anapana for ten days, on a 
thirty day course or a week of Anapana on a twenty day course...you 
approach mental silence and the thoughts come up every five or ten 
minutes or something and you’re like...oh, there’s a thought, and then it’s 
gone again, and then there’s a big gap of silence...and it’s like...then 
you’re able to observe more, just in a much quieter kind of...when you go 
from this Anapana into Vipassana. (Interview, Rebecca, April 2012) 
 
Anapana increases concentration, suspending the flow of thoughts that 
characterize ordinary states of consciousness. Practicing Anapana continuously 
in a particular setting elicits nonmodern experiences - the self is no longer 
overpowered by thoughts, and silence emerges.  
 
VI. III.II THE SUBTLE BODY OF VIPASSANA 
 
Anapana is not the final meditative performance, but rather a way of tuning 
the mind for Vipassana. While practicing Anapana, the sensations felt between 
the nostrils and the upper lip can progressively allow the emergence of the 
subtle feeling we introduced in the previous chapter. 
188 
 
The practitioners describe the subtle feeling by resorting to a variety of 
words and expressions, such as tingling, flowing water, pins and needles, static 
electricity, energy, vibrations, etc.. As we have seen in the previous chapter, 
Goenka tells practitioners that this subtle feeling is linked to the kalapas, the 
subatomic constituents of matter, according to the standpoint psychology of 
Vipassana. The continuity of practice may generate experiences of subtle 
energies, confirming the subtle anatomy of Vipassana. An interviewee told me 
that when he was practicing Vipassana a sort of a pattern was established, and 
these sensations would slowly progress to various body parts, “infecting” them 
with tingling vibrations. However, some parts of the body were blank, or 
deprived of subtle sensations: 
 “A pattern would be established...for instance,  a pattern in the face... that 
 would spread from the nose, the central part of the face, spreading in all 
 directions, radiating something from there in all directions and radiating 
 something like ... almost like if small drops of water were being spread out 
 by the wind in the air...So they would radiate... it was sort of a pulsation of 
 these sensations, like if there were hundreds of channels at the surface of 
 the skin that would originate in the centre of the face and then would 
 spread out through all my face, the neck, the cheeks, the chin, the 
 ears...so, that was what I felt in my face and that was constant... in my 
 arms there was a different pattern...in a more random fashion...but also of 
 subtle sensations that would appear and stay for a long time...in the rest of 
 my body there are plenty of blank zones, or solid sensations...or more 
 sporadic subtle sensations...” (Interview, Adam, December 2011) 
 
This passage is a good description of what happens when one is practicing 
Vipassana. One usually encounters subtle sensations in some parts of the body 
and gross sensations (such as pain) in other parts. Most of the practitioners 
report that it is easier to feel these subtle sensations in some parts of the body: 
“good” areas are the top of the head and the face, the palms of the hands, the 
soles of the feet. As the practice progresses, it may also happen that a subtle 
sensation develops above gross sensations - the mind becomes more finely 
tuned and is even able to “pick” these sensations in addition to the feeling of 
pain, for instance. The experience of Vipassana should be accompanied by the 
awareness of impermanence, anicca. As one is scanning the body, from feet to 
head and vice-versa, one encounters a diversity of sensations while ideally 
maintaining equanimity, detached observation. While dealing with physical 
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sensations (whether subtle or not) in a trained, equanimous way, one should be 
able to understand that reaction is produced conceptually, that the reactive 
state is a construction, and that with the practice of Vipassana it is possible to 
have a different experience of the self. As Maxwell puts it: 
 “You begin to examine your physical sensations and to realize that most of 
 your reactivity to pain happens on a conceptual level, and that actually 
 pain is conceptual … you begin to see really…pain is a certain intensity of 
 feeling, and if you drop the load of the conceptual level you can actually go 
 into the pain in your knee, and if you focus your attention on it you’ll feel a 
 higher or stronger frequency of vibrating in this kind of tingling, and realize 
 that what is actually manifesting on a gross level as pain is actually a 
 much more intense cluster of this kind of tingling energy, and by putting 
 your awareness, directly on the pain, it will disperse.” (Interview, Maxwell, 
 February 2011) 
 
By refining the mental ability to notice these subtle sensations, 
progressively developing a new somatic mode of attention, one enacts a 
different version of the body, opposed to the aesthetic experience characterized 
by the multitude of gross sensations such as pain, itching, cold, heat, 
perspiration, etc.. These may continue to be felt, but are progressively 
accompanied by subtle sensations, due to the refinement of the meditative 
mind. Advanced meditators can eventually discriminate these subtle sensations 
according to the five types of constituents of matter (see chapter V). While they 
practice, they can more easily “find” the subtle sensation accompanying a gross 
one, eventually identifying the type of constituent it represents: 
“Passing the awareness over a particular part with a particular sensation, it 
 doesn’t matter, but very often there will be a sensation, a flow above it, 
 because that sensation is always there, but the mind can’t feel it. So, by 
 passing over a gross sensation, there may or may not be tingling present 
 over the surface of that. And a visual image that I often will get when I’m 
 having these experiences is almost like a river, and what you might have is 
 maybe a bolder or...of a rock, and the water is just skimming over the top of 
 the rock, in this river, in this stream, and I feel that’s almost what I’m 
 experiencing in myself, is this strong earth element, which is the pain in the 
 knee, the strong painful element, and then as the river kind of...the path of 
 that river is just kind of undulating, washing over the top of this little rock.” 
 (Interview, Joanna, April 2012) 
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 Joanna’s words suggest that Vipassana, as a form of political anatomy 
(Foucault, 1995), enacts a nonmodern version of the body, filled with vibrations 
(see chapter V). A relevant dimension of Vipassana, therefore, is to transform 
one’s experience of the self and the world, as I suggested in chapter II. 
Influenced by the notion of Umwelt, I stated that meditation transforms the 
experience of the environment, fostering new associations (including the 
submission to a new psychogeography) that reconfigure subjectivity. In that 
sense, one could argue that meditation involves forms of attunement, a mode of 
engagement developed “between a personal body and his/her living ambience, 
both internal and external” (Nagatomo, 1992: xxv).  Meditation allows selves to 
tune in to forms of agency that reshape their bodily experience. This fosters the 
emergence of a new type of reality, and the pervasiveness of subtle sensations 
(accompanying painful areas) can also help the meditator to endure the sitting 
periods with an increased sense of equanimity, since subtle sensations are 
more pleasant than the habitual feeling of pain. 
  This different way of performing the body is allowed by continuous 
practice, fostering the emergence of a subtle anatomy that replaces the 
apparent solidity of the body. This is an affordance prompted by Vipassana and 
involves a new hermeneutics of the self, including the ability to associate 
sensations with specific constituents of matter. One becomes aware of this 
subtlety and establishes a new way of being – equanimity – based on the 
impermanence of sensations. As I suggest in the following section, this process 
is accompanied by the emergence of a variety of memories, sometimes 
associated with particular sensations.  
 
VI.III.III VIPASSANA AND MEMORIES 
 
 As one meditates, the mind brings up old, deep rooted memories, 
eventually disturbing one’s concentration. Goenka often argues that the body 
stores sankharas, reactions to life events. In the previous chapter we 
understood these sankharas as automatisms, habitual ways of reacting to life 
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events.  Although some of the advanced users I interviewed had a problem with 
the notion of sankharas as embodied memories of past reactions (they would 
rather associate sankharas with mental formations and dispositions, sometimes 
even refusing to use this concept or stating that it took them time to “believe” in 
such a thing)146, the practice of Vipassana triggers the emergence of memories 
that we had long forgotten147, often accompanied by strong sensations. In my 
second Vipassana retreat I had an experience that I managed to register in my 
field diary: 
  “Lying on my bed at night, observing sensations, I came across a knot in 
 my stomach accompanied by a memory of watching a rotting dog when I 
 was 7 – I remembered the stench of death and how it triggered an 
 unbearable fear of dogs and of dead animals, perhaps augmenting the 
 fear of death and decay. I remember that after we saw the dog (I was 
 with some friends, walking in the woods) we got lost and it took us over 
 an hour to find the track again. This was a very deep rooted memory that 
 hadn’t emerged for the past 15 years perhaps.” (Field Diary, November 
 2011) 
 
  After this experience I felt much lighter, and was able to sleep properly 
for the first time since the beginning of the retreat. This episode reminds us of 
the role of the body in maintaining and carrying our life history, the role of body 
memory: 
 “The underlying carrier of our life history, and eventually of our whole 
 being-in-the-world. It comprises not only the evolved dispositions of our 
 perceiving and behaving, but also the memory cores that connect us 
 most intimately with our biographical past.” (Fuchs, 2012: 20) 
 
 The experience I went through suggests that there are particular ways of 
allowing these memories to come to surface and to transform one’s 
dispositions. Different body memories emerge when regular automatisms are 
                                                             
146
 Goenka, in one of the evening discourses, actually mentions that Robert 
Hoover, a scientist who practiced meditation with U Ba Khin, found it quite hard 
to “believe” in the “bank account” model of the mind, as put by the Burmese 
meditation master (see chapter V); however, and according to Goenka, when 
he returned to the U.S. he felt incredibly lighter, like if a burden had been lifted.  
147
 See Pagis (2008: 132) for an interesting example of an advanced meditator 
associating a particular sensation with a memory, supposedly from a past life.  
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transformed.  Merleau-Ponty, in fact, suggested that habits, memory and the 
body are deeply entangled148, and what he called “knowledge in the hands” 
illustrates such process – someone who frequently uses a keyboard or a cell 
phone becomes familiarized with this process of bodily learning and memory at 
the digital level. Technologies of the self, as hermeneutics of the subject, imply 
new ways of interpreting and dealing with one’s past. In other formations, such 
as hypnosis, psychoanalysis or even holotropic breathwork (Grof and Grof, 
2010), memories are a common denominator concerning processes of 
transformation.  An interesting concept that allows us to explore the links 
between technologies of the self and the emergence of memories is the notion 
of “biogram” (Massumi, 2002). The biogram is linked to a bodily memory of 
movement that is kinaesthetic and aligned to proprioception (Blackman, 2010: 
177). Vipassana, as a somatic mode of attention, requires meditators to move 
their awareness throughout the body, and these memories emerge as the result 
of a different way of attending to one’s self, disrupting embodied dispositions 
that are crystallized by one’s life-history. 
 The following example, shared by Tim, exemplifies how the emergence 
of a particular memory was triggered by the practice of Vipassana, and how it 
was associated with a particular sensation - sickness: 
 “I sort of had the insight ... that memories, emotional memories are stored 
 in the body and while I was sitting there my legs were falling asleep and I 
 was trying to do the adhitanna, just trying to do that, it wasn’t working 
 terribly, but my legs fell asleep and I felt sick, I felt physically sick, I tried to 
 keep on going, and I had this strange notion crop up in my mind...I saw 
 myself sitting in the back of my parents car going on holiday on a hot 
 summers day and getting traveller sick...I said...ohhh...I feel sick because 
 the leg aches remind me of being in a car and as soon as a kind of...as  
 soon as I relieved it...the legs still fucking hurt, but I wasn’t sick anymore.” 
 (Interview, Tim, April 2011) 
 
                                                             
148
 According to Merleau-Ponty, “To know how to type is not … to know the 
place of each letter among the keys, nor even to have acquired a conditioned 
reflex for each one, which is set in motion by the letter as it comes before our 
eye. If habit is neither a form of knowledge nor an involuntary action, what then 
is it? It is knowledge in the hands, which is forthcoming only when bodily effort 
is made, and cannot be formulated in detachment from that effort.” (Merleau-
Ponty: 2000: 166) 
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This example reinforces the assumption that sensations (including pain) are 
not merely physical/biological, they are in fact coupled with particular modes of 
attention; the inner gaze of Vipassana, through the transformation of 
awareness, can alter embodied associations - in Tim’s case, the association 
between sitting and feeling sick was broken. 
Our automatisms are maintained without much effort because through 
repetition they become embodied. They are memorized, and without thinking 
too much about it our hands reach the keyboard and start typing or we close our 
eyes when a gruesome scene is being broadcasted on the TV. Memory plays a 
relevant role in the maintenance of automatisms, and Vipassana transforms 
these dispositions, implementing new ways of being. The installation of a new 
automatism – Vipassana – clashes with the modern paradigm of subjectivity 
that separates body and mind, and this transition to a new version of selfhood 
can trigger memories of episodes that were responsible for certain associations, 
such as feeling sick after sitting for too long. Vipassana alters these 
associations, reinforcing the role of the body in the development of new ways of 
being, suggesting that “it is the whole organism, not just the brain, that makes 
sense of the world.” (Colombetti, 2012: 8) 
 
VI.III.IV THE EXPERIENCE OF MINDFULNESS 
 
The set of practices promoted by Thich Nhat Hanh include a variety of 
technologies that aim at applying mindfulness in virtually all realms of existence,  
allowing selves to act mindfully in daily life – instead of enduring long hours of 
sitting meditation in isolation, one interacts, talks, eats and walks frequently. 
Initially, I believed that it would be possible to analyze the experience of 
mindfulness by fragmenting it into “blocks” - I thought that different practices 
(sitting, walking, eating, etc) would open up different experiential realms; 
however, after interviewing practitioners and deepening my own practice, I 
realized that it would be more useful to characterize the experience of 
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mindfulness in a holistic fashion, as a general art of living implying a set of 
common and ubiquitous experiential changes. 
 
VI.III.V AWARENESS OF ACTIVITY 
 
Meditators report a heightened sense of being aware of what they are 
doing, and they frequently contrast mindful performances with what they would 
do in the outside world, revealing a contrast between meditative and 
nonmeditative mindsets. For Ted, awareness is the common denominator in all 
practices of mindfulness: 
 “There’s no difference between sitting or not sitting. You can say that the 
 sitting that we just did, it ends when the bell goes, but in this practice, how 
 I understand it, it does not end when we stand up, we still have…it’s about 
 the awareness of what you are doing. We don’t walk differently, we don’t 
 work differently, we don’t eat differently, we don’t sit differently, what we 
 do is not different, how we do it is different. And how do we do that? To be 
 aware of what you are doing. I am sitting now with you and I know I’m 
 sitting here… most of the time we are distracted by our thinking. We are 
 thinking…oh yeah that girl is coming tonight and I’m going to say this to 
 her, yesterday that guy said this, what an asshole…I’m gonna…so we 
 are…our bodies are here…sitting, but our mind is in Paris, or in the future, 
 or the past. So all these practices that we have here, the basis is the 
 awareness of what we are doing, it doesn’t matter what it is that we are 
 doing, it’s just that we are aware…” (Interview, Ted, February 2011) 
 
For Ted, mindfulness is about being present, not being distracted by 
thinking, the future or the past, the characteristics of ordinary states of 
consciousness. Sal, in a similar tone, even resorts to the image of the zombie to 
characterize normal, nonmeditative states: 
 “Yeah, it’s like how you can be a pilot for yourself, you’re not a 
 zombie...how not to be a zombie... when you breathe you know that 
 you’re alive and your soul is automatically back.” (Interview, Sal, 
 December 2011) 
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This heightened awareness is linked to the performative modifications 
operated by mindfulness, and a good example of that is walking meditation. 
Brad’s reflections on walking meditation provide a good example of what can 
occur phenomenologically during the practice of meditation in movement: 
 “In the moment you start becoming aware of that…of what’s going on… 
 you make this deep imprint with your feet, every time you step you 
 become very aware of how….how your body is moving, how your body is 
 in harmony, how you feel comfort or discomfort, the way you walk 
 and…how it brings you a lot of joy” (Interview, Brad, February 2011) 
 
The experience described by Brad should be extended to all dimensions of 
life, allowing the subject to be aware of the present action and moment. This 
dynamic and continuous mobilization of mindfulness can be compared to the 
flow. According to Csikszentmihalyi, the flow “is the way people describe their 
state of mind when consciousness is harmoniously ordered, and they want to 
pursue whatever they are doing for its own sake” (Csikszentmihalyi, 2008: 6). 
However, with mindfulness there is no pursuit – the present moment is the only 
moment, and there is a phenomenological continuity throughout all activities. 
Moreover, some authors have criticized the notion of flow because it 
conceptualizes affect as bounded to individual subjects, whereas affect should 
be understood as a relational phenomenon (Blackman, 2010; Venn, 2010) that 
emerges within particular assemblages, including meditation retreats. 
By transforming the regular pace, the “self” becomes an object of 
mindfulness; by calming down, enjoying the present moment, relaxing and 
generally acting slowly, practitioners report instances of “opening up” 
emotionally. This is linked to the second major aspect of mindfulness. 
 
VI.III.VI AWARENESS OF EMOTIONS 
 
Most of the practitioners I interviewed mentioned the importance of 
emotions, of mindfulness allowing them to experience their self in different 
ways, of unfolding their selves (Metzner, 1986). If, in Vipassana, we face a sort 
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of meditative suspension where everything lies at the ground level of 
sensations, with mindfulness there are many expressions or doors that can be 
explored in order to cultivate meditation, and emotions seem to play an 
important role here. As Paul told me, recollecting his first retreat,  
 “I really noticed that mindfulness, because you just have to be with yourself, 
 and life, it just opened up things, and I found myself feeling a lot more than I 
 felt in a long time.  And usually quite positive, wholesome emotions. I felt 
 my heart was just opening up to people.  And that just came by naturally… 
 with spontaneity…” (Interview, Paul, March 2011) 
 
The opening up of things, as put by Paul, is connected with an increased 
sensitivity shared by most of the meditators. A dharma teacher I interviewed 
even reported that, in today’s world, this sensitivity can be quite challenging. 
One could argue that there are strong connections between this practice of 
mindfulness and new age models of subjectivity (Heelas, 1996) and their focus 
on expressivism, the so called subjective turn (we shouldn’t forget that singing 
and “enjoying” nature are part of Plum Village’s array of somehow “romantic” 
practices, see Taylor, 1989 ). However, what is at stake is not the celebration of 
the self but one of the very early processes of transformation deployed by this 
tradition. As put by Sean, 
 “My feeling is…the first stage of this practice is to take care of your…your 
 emotions…a lot of us…a lot of people…specially from the West, I think, 
 come to develop a lot of emotional disorders, often psychological 
 problems and not knowing how to take care of emotions… yeah, that’s 
 another thing, I think that skill.. in the West… no one ever teaches 
 you…nobody ever taught me how to … I feel that this practice gives you 
 these tools to, first to identify and name all the different emotions that 
 occur internally, in my internal world, and then a constructive way of 
 relating to them …” (Interview, Sean, February 2011) 
 
This process of becoming aware of emotions is not necessarily peaceful. It 
is common to cry and to experience a wide range of difficult emotions while 
attending retreats. As Jane told me,  
 “That tight shell breaks open and then you often go through tears and a 
 releasing of the heart…it’s often to do with kind of constrictions…sadness… 
 in some ways something that obstructed my being…and my spirit, way back 
 in the past.” (Interview, Jane, April 2011) 
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The notion of repression is of the utmost importance in psychoanalysis, 
referring to those ideas that have “been pushed aside, or driven from conscious 
awareness” (Billig, 1999: 15). One could suggest, in a rather simplistic way, that 
in the modern, outside world, emotions are “repressed” and, when people are 
able to join the retreat, these come to surface. This line of thought could be 
reinforced by resorting to Goffman’s (Goffman, 1969) performative selves, 
constantly hiding their “authenticity” from public scrutiny and playing certain 
social roles. However, contemporary societies do not suppress emotions, they 
actually play an important role in marketing and politics. The role of mindfulness 
is not to unveil these repressed emotions but to be able to become aware of 
them, developing relevant tools to take care of them, the non-verbal humanities 
that, as suggested by Huxley, address the aesthetic dimension of one’s 
existence (Huxley, 1963). 
 
VI.III.VII AWARENESS OF THOUGHTS 
 
A relevant feature of mindfulness practices is to become aware of thought 
patterns, including the possibility of turning them into more wholesome ones. 
Sean told me that he suffered from some psychological problems before coming 
to Plum Village, including depression and anxiety. According to him, meditation 
is highly beneficial because he can actually slow down the flow of thoughts, 
observing and then turning them into more positive, less destructive mental 
formations: 
 “Meditation … has the capacity to slow down the flow of thoughts … so I’m 
 able to see more clearly what…what is that I’m thinking… before I came 
 here I actually didn’t know what was going on in my mind. I knew I was 
 suffering but I wasn’t able to see clearly the content of my thoughts, on a 
 moment to moment basis, and meditation to me has given that clarity of 
 seeing more or less on a moment to moment basis what I’m actually 
 thinking and what the consequences of thinking like that are.  … it slows 
 down my thought patterns and … gives me an opportunity to change 
 them, so when I can see they’re negative and I see the negative thinking 
 leads to more suffering, and the negativity breeds more negativity, I can 
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 actually start doing something to bring more … more positive thoughts into 
 my mind … and nourish the positive mental states in me rather than just 
 exclusively the negative, which was what I was doing.” (Interview, Sean, 
 February 2011) 
 
We know from meditation research that mindfulness has a variety of 
psychological applications (see chapter II), including dealing with stress. By 
explaining how this technology of the self transforms his mental assemblage, 
Sean also highlights the connections between the therapeutic and the spiritual. 
The notion of healing is of the utmost importance to Thich Nhat Hanh, and it is 
not understood in a normalizing fashion (Foucault, 2003) but rather as a 
process of inner work to lessen human suffering. The humanist critique of 
contemporary meditation (McMahan, 2008) suggests that, nowadays, Buddhism 
has been co-opted by the subjective turn (Taylor, 1989). Lasch, in his critique of 
narcissism, even argues that:  
  “The contemporary climate is therapeutic, not religious. People today 
 hunger not for personal salvation, let alone for the restoration of an earlier 
 golden age, but for the feeling, the momentary illusion, of personal well-
 being, health, and psychic security.” (Lasch, 1979: 7) 
 
Lasch suggests that nowadays therapy and spirituality have merged149 . 
However, I cannot agree with him for the following reasons: first, he displays a 
humanist understanding of anthropotechnics, believing that technologies of the 
self can be explained by major social or cultural forces, ignoring the material 
and performative powers that enact novel experiences; second, he seems to 
ignore that meditation, informed by Buddhist philosophy, actually deals directly 
with the issue of human suffering, and it has done so for the past 2500 years, 
which means that personal and psychological transformations are not a mere 
symptom of contemporary capitalist and narcissist societies but part of 
legitimate and long-standing systems of practice; finally, Lasch’s criticism 
seems to prevent him from conceiving strong alternatives to contemporary 
                                                             
149
 In a similar tone, Jeremy Carrette argues that, in contemporary neoliberal 
societies, religion has been “psychologized”, and he elaborates on the important 
role played by humanistic psychology in transforming religion and spirituality 
into psychological techniques, focusing on the work of Abraham Maslow 
(Carrette, 2007). 
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subject-positions: instead of analyzing their potential, he rather classifies them 
according to a priori generalizations without actually studying, practicing or 
experiencing them150. 
 Thich Nhat Hanh has lived in the West for more than three decades, and 
he is skilled in translating Buddhist principles into contemporary contexts. In the 
previous chapter we have seen that the language he uses can be highly kitsch 
in order to allow westerners to engage in mindfulness. Some of the practices, 
such as what is commonly called “dharma sharing”, have some similarities with 
western psychology, including the encounter groups (Rogers, 1970). Hanh’s 
approach aims not at developing narcissism but to allow participants to apply 
mindfulness in everyday life situations, including emotions and thoughts. 
In Vipassana, reactions are transformed through the equanimous 
observation of sensations; regarding mindfulness, habit patterns can be 
transformed via a variety of gates, such as the observation of thoughts. The aim 
is to create a de-identification with the thought that arises; not by rejecting but 
by embracing it, treating “it” as an old friend. This process is eloquently put by 
Paul: 
 “Maybe some anxious thought comes up and I just smile to it and it’s no 
 problem, you know, I say “Hey, there’s an anxious thought, hello, how are 
 you today? Lovely to see you my old friend”. That sort of clarity,  that 
 strength of being able to do that, whereas before you would react to 
 everything in your head.” (Interview, Paul, March 2011) 
 
 This new ability to deal with arising thoughts creates an increasing sense of 
space. Space and spaciousness were recurrent themes during the interviews. 
Space was often understood as the ability to overcome habit patterns, avoiding 
normal reactions, or even part of a broader conceptualization of the self, 
entangled with other humans and nonhumans; in sum, space becomes deeply 
                                                             
150 Lasch’s cynicism goes even further when he “attacks” the New Age 
movement, stating that “New Age spirituality, no less than technological 
utopianism, is rooted in primary narcissism. If the technological fantasy seeks to 
restore the infantile illusion of self-sufficiency, the New Age movement seeks to 
restore the illusion of symbiosis, a feeling of absolute oneness with the world.” 
(Lasch, 1979: 245) 
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linked to Interbeing, suggesting that mindfulness reconfigures the connections 
between self and others.  
 
VI.III.VII INTERCONNECTION 
 
Some practitioners report feeling a deepened sense of connection with 
other humans and nonhumans, reinforcing the contrast with modern, dualist 
paradigms of subjectivity. Meditation fosters the development of feelings of 
empathy with other humans and nonhumans (see Sweet and Johnson, 1990; 
Kristeller and Johnson, 2005). I found it interesting how deeply and fast I 
developed emotional bonds with other retreatants, easing the process of 
recruiting interviewees. When the interviews took place, the practitioners often 
framed them as a form of “sharing”, similar to what happens during “dharma 
sharing” (see chapter V). 
Michael, a highly experienced dharma teacher in this tradition, mentions this 
sense of connection as one of the most relevant aspects of mindfulness 
practice: 
 “Very broadly speaking I think a sense of…a sense of space… things not 
 being cluttered…so…sort of clearing out the business of your life… that 
 we often experience in the modern world… a deepening level of insight 
 into how things inter-connect…and a sense of warmth and connectedness 
 with the other people on the retreat I think, is…the key elements of what I 
 experienced on the retreats.” (Interview, Michael, May 2011) 
 
This sense of inter-connection is expressed in a variety of ways: it can 
contribute to transform and heal difficult personal relationships through the 
development of empathy; it increases the appreciation of “nature”; it can support 
dietary choices, such as vegetarianism, by appreciating this interconnectedness 
between all beings and even permits the emergence of a decentred, 
nonmodern sense of the self, allowing subjects to connect with ancestors. One 
could argue that we are facing the development of what Romain Rolland 
described, in his letters to Sigmund Freud, as the oceanic feeling or the oceanic 
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sentiment. According to Freud, “it is a feeling of an indissoluble bond, of being 
one with the external world as a whole” (Freud, 1961: 12). Freud was quite 
cynical about such experiences, considering them regressive and narcissistic 
(Freud, 1961; Gleig, 2010); similarly, Lasch (1979) suggested that neo-
Gnosticism is a form of narcissism and Heelas considers environmentalism and 
deep ecology, linked to the New Age Movement151, as a by-product of de-
traditionalized and de-territorialized selves. However, I think that it is more 
interesting to analyze this phenomenon (this spaciousness and oceanic feeling) 
as the de-stabilization of the homo clausus, the skin-encapsulated ego, 
corresponding to the suspension of the modern self. We will see, in the 
following section, how mystical experiences illustrate a radically different, non-
modern paradigm of the self. By generating a feeling of spaciousness and 
involvement with one’s surroundings, mindfulness thus becomes a technology 
of interconnectedness, installing new automatisms that transform one’s Umwelt, 
eventually allowing practitioners to be in the environment in different, 
nonmodern ways. For instance, Bob told me that: 
 “I can arrive more quickly in nature, and feel at one in that home. I 
 remember sometimes in the past I went hiking a whole day in the 
 mountains and maybe…seven or eight hours, and the first six hours I 
 hiked, I’m in my mind… thinking about home, thinking about…wandering 
 around, and maybe by the end of the day there’s….half an hour where I 
 feel I have really arrived….open for the landscape, to perceive it, and with 
 mindfulness you can increase that.” (Interview, Bob, February 2011) 
 
According to Bob, mindfulness makes him more aware of nature, being able 
to enjoy the environment without the mind wandering that characterizes 
Ordinary States of Consciousness. In the long run, subjects can actually 
experience the total dissolution of the self and experience novelty, and the role 
of the following section is to analyze a number of experiences that challenge the 
modern self.  
                                                             
151
 Heelas, reflecting on Deep Ecology and ecological consciousness, stated 
that “The sense of connection which is then experienced with nature thus 
provides the basis – in ecological consciousness – for determining what counts 
as right action.” (Heelas, 1996: 85) We will provide a stronger account of the 
connections between Thich Nhat Hanh’s project of the self and deep ecology in 
chapter VIII. 
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VI.IV MYSTICAL EXPERIENCES 
 
 These various instances of experiential transformation elicit a paradigm 
shift from the dual, skin-encapsulated ego, constantly dominated by thoughts, 
towards nonmodern selfhood. A fundamental element of meditation is the 
emergence of experiences that we could coin as mystical, transpersonal, 
holotropic or even as peak experiences (Maslow, 1964). For the sake of clarity, 
I will use the term “mystical experiences”, following William James’ work on this 
topic. According to James, a fundamental aspect of these experiences concerns 
the suspension of the boundaries between self and other, the individual and the 
absolute. In sum, these experiences can suspend the dualistic split between 
individuals and the world:  
 “This overcoming of all the usual barriers between the individual and the 
 Absolute is the great mystic achievement. In mystic states we both 
 become one with the Absolute and we become aware of our oneness. 
 This is the everlasting and triumphant mystical tradition, hardly altered by 
 differences of clime or creed.” (James, 2002: 324) 
 
 According to James, these states display four relevant characteristics: 
Ineffability (they are hard or even impossible to describe with words, see 
Bataille (1988) for an interesting reflection on inner experience); Noetic quality 
(these states generate insights that are usually unreachable by the “normal 
mind”); Transiency (these states are not sustained for a long time) and Passivity 
(in these states, the subject feels as if his own will is “suspended”, and a higher 
power emerges) (James, 2002: 295). 
 These mystical states are transformations of consciousness, and they 
open up new paradigms for human existence beyond ordinary states, escaping 
even verbal attempts to conceptualize them. As Groff and Bennet suggest: 
 “Through our consciousnesses, we can transcend time and space, cross 
 boundaries separating us from various animal species, experience 
 processes in the botanical kingdom and in the inorganic world, and even 
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 explore mythological and other realities that we previously did not know 
 existed.” (Grof and Bennet, 1993: 18) 
 
 Transformations of consciousness are not limited to meditation: the 
consumption of psychedelics, bodywork, music in ritualized environments or 
even certain spaces (such as the isolation tank) can elicit radical changes in 
self-perception. These mystical states reflect particular conceptualizations of 
human existence, such as impermanence and Interbeing; they are noetic in the 
sense that, by going through them, realities that were unknown or only 
discursive become experiential and alive, signalling the passage from 
conceptual to embodied knowledge (Pagis, 2010). Following post-humanist 
STS, these experiences are affordances allowed by the devices of meditation, 
phenomena that constitute “a new way to perceive that just happened to 
manifest itself in a new material situation” (Pickering, 2001: 177). Considering 
that meditation practice requires new performative, spatial, regulatory and 
material arrangements (as chapters IV and V have shown), nonmodern 
experiences emerge through novel associations and bodily arrangements, 
contrasting with modern and dual ontologies. 
 An excellent example is the experience of dissolution. Eric Lerner, an 
American traveller who practiced Vipassana during the seventies, provides an 
interesting description of the state of Bangha, dissolution, in his book “Journey 
of Insight Meditation”: 
 “Very quickly I was aware of my entire body as a field of particles, tiny, 
 tiny particles, disappearing, disappearing before I could even say, here 
 they are. Then it seemed as if my mind was spread out through my entire 
 body. Anywhere I focused I felt this single mist like sensation, and my 
 mind felt as if it was being pulled into this fluid. Should I let go? My 
 attention seemed to gather just below my breastbone, where I often 
 experienced the most violent sensations of all. But that area was quiet 
 now, too. Everything was quiet. For a moment I was confused. It didn’t 
 feel like the tingling sensation of dissolution, anicca, impermanence. But 
 it grew stronger and I felt pulled toward it.  
 I was aware of the uniqueness of this sensation, and I wondered how I 
 could describe it. Then as my mind started to phrase the answer, the 
 conceptualizing stopped. The jaws of my chattering mind flapped open in 
 silence. The commentator disappeared.” (Lerner, 1977: 105) 
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 Eric’s experience was of the emergence of the body as a flow of 
vibrations, tiny little kalapas, as the subtle anatomy of Vipassana indeed 
indicates (see chapter V). Eric also reports being “pulled” into the fluid, 
indicating the passivity of the psychonaut, suggesting that he had to suspend 
his will in order to tune in to new realms of agency (Pickering, 1995); the novelty 
of such experience disrupts the habitual hermeneutical function of the mind: 
Eric is not sure if this is anicca, but the discriminative mind has vanished - there 
is no more conceptualization. At no point of this description Eric resorts to the 
term Bangha; however, the phenomenology he shared seems to indicate that it 
was the case, at least taking into account Goenka’s description of such a state 
(see Goenka, 1998).  
 Tim, more acquainted with Buddhist and Hindu philosophy, uses a more 
complex language to describe his experience. He told me that he experienced 
dissolution at least twice: 
 “On day ten of the first one [his first Vipassana retreat] I got a slight 
 sensation of Bangha, and it felt like...it was on day ten, we were talking, I 
 just had a really nice lunch, and I just felt very light and sattvic in yogic 
 terms, just pure being, and the sensation was like being in a jet when it 
 takes off, and then a vibration, that was very strong, permeated my whole 
 living world...it was fantastic... the second time...day five of the second 
 sitting, I got that again, in the evening, and I was so shocked that it had 
 come on, and I...it was about fifty five minutes in, I know this because I 
 looked at my watch just after it...I was completely racked in pain, it was 
 excruciating, but I felt like a slight sensation of being in a lift, I just felt the 
 ground pushing up beneath me and I was like...ok...remain equanimous, 
 remain with equanimity, stay with the breathing and the sensations on 
 the body, and then it was like the event horizon from 2001, everything in 
 my body felt like it was miles and miles wide, and it was just light, just 
 different colours of light, flashing up, everything was changing, and 
 above that was my consciousness, as if my consciousness was looking 
 down into my body, and I felt like I was having an out of body experience, 
 and I shat myself [Laughs] it was...oh...so I opened my eyes and that was 
 it, I couldn’t get that back.” (Interview, Tim, April 2011) 
 
 Tim’s description illustrates the deeply transient nature of bodily 
dissolution and also the fact that it seems to emerge out of nowhere, it is not 
controlled in a linear fashion by the practitioner, indicating his passivity. The 
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radically different nature of Bangha was particularly frightening, but it gave Tim 
a strong feeling of impermanence due to the feeling of vibrations and the 
apparent dissolution of the habitual experience of the body. According to 
Goenka (1998), Bangha is a test because equanimity can be compromised by 
these pleasant subtle sensations.  Although it can be dangerous, in the sense 
that it seems to multiply subtle sensations (that can generate attachment), it 
also confirms the anatomo-politics (Foucault, 1995) that structures this project 
of subjectivity – that the body is nothing more than an assemblage of vibrations, 
kalapas, experienced as subtle sensations. In order to tune in to Bangha, 
practitioners have to transform their automatisms, focusing on sensations, 
accepting whatever arises, increasing their passivity, and eventually these 
experiences can be revealed, allowing them to be affected by meditative 
agency. 
 These two experiences allowed selves to enter nonmodern realms of 
experience, usually not accessible to the nonmeditative, ordinary mind, 
suspending dualist beliefs about the self and the world. Maxwell, a Vipassana 
practitioner, reported an experience where he had the feeling of losing his 
sense of self (one could argue that it was an experience of anatta, no-self), 
during his first course: 
 “On the 7th day I…had this very intense nondual experience where for 
 some period I…only a few seconds…but I was very aware that…actually 
 the image that came up was that I was a giant vat of jello, and that I 
 was…myself had cordoned off as a small sliver and that it would’ve felt 
 completely absurd that I’d differentiated myself from the surrounding jello. 
 But more than that…I had the impression that all the nondual 
 experiences I’d had on psychoactive drugs were only the skewed 
 reflections of the true state which was what I was experiencing.” 
 (Interview, Maxwell, February 2011) 
 
 Maxwell told me that shortly before the retreat he had experienced a bad 
trip on salvia divinorum152, and going on retreat was also a chance to clear up 
his mind. The phenomenon of nonduality he went through was accompanied by 
a particular image that exemplifies the suspension of separateness between 
                                                             
152
 Salvia divinorum is a plant with psychedelic properties, see 
https://www.erowid.org/plants/salvia/salvia.shtml (Retrieved: 13/09/2013) 
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self and others. One could speculate on the role of jello as the mediator 
between the mystical realm and the perceiving mind, arguing that it represents 
fluidity and its touch can elicit threshold sensations, usually difficult to classify 
and to deal with (Douglas, 2006), therefore contributing to the general 
strangeness that characterized the experience. The fact that he was relatively 
familiar with psychedelics helped him deal with the experience of nonduality, 
and allowed him to compare it with what happens when one does certain 
drugs153. 
 Maxwell’s experience has some similarities with a particularly 
transformative episode described by Thich Nhat Hanh in his autobiography:  
 “In that moment, the sense of myself as an entity among other entities 
 disappeared. I knew that this insight did not arise from disappointment, 
 despair, fear, desire or ignorance. A veil lifted silently and effortlessly. … 
 At that moment, I had the deep feeling that I had returned. My clothes, 
 my shoes, even the essence of my being had vanished, and I was 
 carefree as a grasshopper pausing on a blade of grass.” (Hanh, 1999: 
 85) 
 
 This example is interesting for various reasons. First, we are facing the 
suspension of Elias’ homo clausus: Hanh states that the sense of separateness 
between “self” and “others” vanished as a result of the meditative insight. 
Second, instead of exclusively representing an altered state of consciousness it 
suggests that the ontology of the dual self is a construction, one of multiple 
possible enactments (Hanh wrote that he had “returned”). Finally, the image 
                                                             
153
 Other meditators told me that their psychedelic experiences helped them 
deal with altered states during meditation, and Strassman wrote that “In my 
early visits to the Zen Buddhist community at which I studied, I raised this 
question with many of the young American monks. Nearly everyone I asked at 
this training center answered that psychedelic drugs, especially LSD, first 
opened the doors to a new reality for them. It was the pursuit of stabilizing, 
strengthening, and broadening their initial psychedelic flash that led them to the 
discipline of a communal, meditation-based ascetic life.” (Strassman, 2001: 
233-234) One should also bear in mind that early meditation research was 
developed in order to provide mental maps for altered states of consciousness 
induced by psychedelics such as LSD (see Goleman, 1996), as we have seen 
in chapter II. 
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that he uses to exemplify this liminal experience is that of the grasshopper. 
Although slightly romanticized, this becoming animal is similar to the processes 
of identification advocated by deep ecologists such as Arne Naess (1984) to 
promote an ecological subjectivity – in the case of  Thich Nhat Hanh, the animal 
represents the suspension of the ordinary mind and the habitual notion of self, 
allowing an increasing sense of freedom. Therefore, the image used by Thich 
Nhat Hanh to describe his experience reinforces the suspension of the rule of 
res cogitans. Becoming animal transgresses the modern self and permits the 
emergence of a nonmodern, decentred version of selfhood.   
 While interviewing practitioners of mindfulness in the tradition of Thich 
Nhat Hanh, some of them reported mystical experiences; however, the 
definition of mystical could change: instead of referring to an altered state of 
consciousness it could be understood as a continuous process of self-
transformation or a moment when a particular difficult situation was solved. 
When I asked Michael, a dharma teacher, if he would like to share any 
transformative episode with mindfulness, his answer initially sounded simplistic, 
but it revealed a deeply noetic dimension: 
 “I remember there was a chance when I was in retreat and I had just 
 finished eating and...  I was washing up…  and while I was washing the 
 small saucer I had a…a strong insight into…what it really means to be 
 mindful … mindfulness is… really, really doing what you’re doing …  it 
 was an important experience, and a deep…a deep sense of how 
 gloriously simple mindfulness is in essence.” (Interview, Michael, May 
 2011) 
 
 Likewise, Mitch, a good friend of mine who spent a period of time 
practicing mindfulness seriously and in isolation, shared the following account: 
 “I was working all day long on these gathas, and I had very little time to 
 take a break. One day I decided that I would forget Nhat Hanh’s gathas 
 for the time being and watch some TV. It was some generic film about 
 weddings... I watched and felt a certain kind of presence that seemed to 
 feel altogether different. The feeling gradually gained presence with me, 
 so much so that I eventually turned off the TV to see what was going on. 
 I stood up and walked; I could not put my finger on just what was 
 occurring to me. I walked to the bathroom to wash up for bed. The feeling 
 of presence overtook me and suddenly I felt like I was there so entirely, 
 so completely. It was definitely not a concentration, it was immensely 
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 free... I washed my hands and it felt like the first time I ever washed 
 them. I laughed with a slight hint of madness and cackled in tears of joy. I 
 took a long time to look around the room and just looked with a sense of 
 wonder. My vision was impeccably clear and there was nowhere to go 
 and this was it...” (Interview, Mitch, June 2013) 
 
 In both cases, the interviewees became aware of the present moment. 
Michael mentioned that he became aware that mindfulness is really doing what 
one is doing, and Mitch felt like it was the first time he was washing his hands. 
In Mitch’s case, this was accompanied by tears and wonder, and he mentioned 
that his vision became clear, highlighting the power of mindfulness to transform 
one’s Umwelt, altering habitual ways of perceiving the environment. In both 
cases, these experiences emerged while the individuals were not practicing 
typical forms of meditation (such as sitting or walking meditation) – Michael was 
washing the dishes, and Mitch started feeling overwhelmed while watching TV. 
These states of passion, of total abandonment to mindfulness, were not 
mechanically induced by the practitioners – they were passive regarding these 
experiences, they emerged out of nowhere, they were accidents. As the Zen 
adage says, “Enlightenment is an accident, but meditation makes you accident 
prone” (Ophuls, 2007: 153). The installation of new automatisms through Zen 
and Vipassana practices allows selves to go through new experiences, new 
ways of dealing with their bodies, sensations, thoughts and emotions. However, 
these mystical experiences should be understood as a surplus, they escape 
individual control, and manifest as accidents, taking the practitioner by surprise, 
allowing him to enter realms of reality that are dismissed (and even 
pathologized) by ordinary states of consciousness.  
 Moreover, these nonmodern states suggest that the modern self can be 
suspended under certain conditions, and that ordinary states of consciousness 
are just one out of many possibilities available to humans. Aldous Huxley, in the 
Doors of Perception, and influenced by the theories of C. D. Broad and 
Bergson, suggested that selves are potentially Mind at Large: 
 “The function of the brain and nervous system and sense organs is in the 
 main eliminative and not productive. Each person is at each moment 
 capable of remembering all that has ever happened to him and of 
 perceiving everything that is happening everywhere in the universe. The 
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 function of the brain and the nervous system is to protect us from being 
 overwhelmed and confused by this mass of largely useless and irrelevant 
 knowledge, by shutting out most of what we should otherwise perceive or 
 remember at any moment and leaving only that very small and special 
 selection which is likely to be practically useful. According to such a 
 theory, each one of us is potentially Mind at Large. ... To make biological 
 survival possible, Mind at Large has to be funnelled through the reducing 
 valve of the brain and nervous system.” (Huxley, 1963: 21) 
 
 One could argue that modern automatisms are filtering mechanisms that 
perform a reductive version of reality. That version is useful to manipulate the 
world and to render it efficient; individuals under control of themselves in 
ordinary states of consciousness are able to extend human hubris and to 
increase productivity, to operate machines, to kill other humans and animals. 
On the other hand, mystical experiences perform states of wonder and awe, 
and subjects surrender to dissolution and to the present moment. However, the 
Mind at Large hypothesis is limited in the sense that it is dual, it presupposes 
that selves and world are two distinct entities and that there is something “out 
there” that our ordinary minds prevent us from experiencing, as if we were 
“repressed” by our brain and nervous system. I am in no position to solve the 
longstanding philosophical debate between realism and idealism; instead of 
inquiring if there is such a thing as the Mind at Large, I think it is more 
interesting to contrast different outcomes and versions of self and world that 
emerge along with particular practices. The various examples presented in this 
section support the assumption that different assemblages can enact 
nonmodern ways of experiencing reality, tuning in to different expressions of the 
multiverse (James, 1896). 
VI.V CONCLUSION 
 
 In this chapter, I have analyzed the transformations of experience 
prompted by Zen and Vipassana assemblages. In order to transform regular 
experience – ordinary states of consciousness – subjects are submitted to 
particular settings that alter their habitual webs of associations (chapter IV) and 
they install new automatisms (chapter V). 
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 These assemblages disrupt habitual ways of being, and selves generate 
resistances towards practices of meditation. They become restless, hallucinate, 
don’t understand the point of so much pain and the mind becomes lost in 
thoughts of the past and the future. Meditation is challenging. Eventually, new 
automatisms become stable, and selves are able to experience the effects of 
new programs of action. They become aware of their bodies and breath in 
different ways and are able to enjoy walking differently, becoming aware of the 
present moment and the surrounding environment. 
 In some cases, the installation of new automatisms and new forms of 
affect can lead to mystical experiences. The programs of action of meditation 
are nonmodern, in the sense that they question habitual dualisms between mind 
and body, self and others, humans and nonhumans. However, when these 
experiences take place, selves lose control, they abandon themselves to new 
realms of reality that suspend the modern self. These experiences are not 
generated in a linear fashion, they escape the control of the meditator, they are 
accidents that meditation practice can eventually generate, including 
dissolution, nondual insights and becoming totally aware of the present 
moment.  
 These technologies of the self are new forms of mediation that enact 
new, nonmodern versions of the world. The insights of Peter-Paul Verbeek, who 
actively dialogued with Michel Foucault (including his work on technologies of 
the self) are highly relevant here. He suggests that:  “What the world “is” and 
what subjects “are” arise from the interplay between humans and reality; the 
world that humans experience is “interpreted reality”, and human existence is 
“situated subjectivity”.”  (Verbeek, 2011: 15) 
 Post-phenomenology studies human-technology associations, moving 
from the phenomenological focus on “things themselves” (displaying striking 
similarities with Vipassana claims of objectivity) to the mediated character of 
perception – “There is no “original” perception that is mediated by a device; the 
mediated perception itself is the “original”” (Verbeek, 2011: 15). This obviously 
raises a set of political issues, inviting us to question “how we are to best shape 
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the interrelatedness between humans and technology” (Verbeek, 2011: 156) 
(see chapter XIX). 
 Indeed, the mediations generated by Zen and Vipassana technologies 
contrast with their modern, dual counterparts, allowing subjects to experience a 
wide range of phenomena that challenge hegemonic and ordinary states of 
consciousness. Initially, the role of meditation is to replace regular automatisms 
– the installation of these new automatisms is difficult, generating struggles of 
agency characterized by resistance and accommodation (Pickering, 1995). 
Practitioners are initially shocked by their inability to meditate: their minds are 
agitated, their bodies ache, they do not adjust to the setting– they are unable to 
capture meditative states of consciousness. Progressively, they learn ways to 
accommodate and adapt, including changing their posture, coming back to the 
breath more frequently, repeating gathas, etc.; they adjust to a new paradigm of 
subjectivity, becoming able to feel meditation, overcoming ordinary states of 
consciousness. 
 These struggles of agency, involving phenomena of resistance and 
accommodation, can allow practitioners to tune in to nonmodern experiences, 
prevented by the modern automatisms that meditation aims at suspending. 
Mystical experiences are, therefore, phenomena whose emergence can be 
captured if humans adopt a new paradigm of selfhood, characterized by 
impermanence, mindfulness or Interbeing, notions that translate the range of 
phenomena afforded by Zen and Vipassana projects of the self and that are 
actually experienced by practitioners. 
 The new webs of associations, automatisms and experiences prompted 
by Zen and Vipassana assemblages are not limited to the development of 
altered states of consciousness; their aim is to govern the self beyond these 
retreats, inspiring new ways of being in the world and in everyday life. 
Therefore, the role of the following chapter is to analyze how these technologies 
of the nonmodern self are applied in everyday life and how the continuous 
practice of meditation reconfigures selfhood, leading to new forms of 
awareness, an increased sensitivity towards other humans and nonhumans and 
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new ways of dealing with time and space, including experiences of 
synchronicity.  
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VII. MEDITATION IN EVERYDAY LIFE 
 
“The self does not undergo modifications, it is itself a modification” (Deleuze, 
1994: 79) 
 
“The ideal Western ego is an isolated, ruggedly independent, separate entity, all 
alone in a dead universe devoid of meaning or consciousness – the leather-
faced cowboy, pondering empty thoughts.” (Radin, 2013: 71) 
 
VII.I INTRODUCTION 
 
 The previous chapters have analyzed the devices of subjectification 
mobilized by Zen and Vipassana assemblages and the experiential 
transformations they generate. I suggested that these assemblages alter 
habitual webs of associations and suspend normal automatisms, installing new 
ones. The experiences that emerge within these new assemblages can be 
understood as nonmodern, contrasting with the ordinary states of 
consciousness that characterize modern selves. 
 In order to become ways of being, Zen and Vipassana techniques must 
be applied in everyday life, becoming arts of living through sustained effort and 
leading to transformations of the self beyond those extraordinary experiences 
that retreats can generate (chapter VI). According to Jack Kornfield, a well 
known Dharma teacher in the West, the transition from meditation retreats to 
daily life can be difficult and demanding because “after the ecstasy comes the 
laundry” (Kornfield, 2001: xiii). 
 In sociology of religion, the implementation of a new way of being is 
traditionally understood according to different models of religious conversion 
(Heirich, 1977), “something that happens to a person who is destabilized by 
external or internal forces and then brought to commit the self to a conversionist 
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group by social-interactive pressures applied by the “trip” ... and its agents.” 
(Strauss, 1979: 158) 
 My perspective, instead of focusing on “social-interactive pressures” or 
“groups” (denoting a humanist interpretation of social worlds), follows an 
alternative account. My material suggests that we should follow a post-humanist 
understanding of meditation in everyday life, focusing on couplings between 
humans, technologies and nonhumans. I will analyze how individuals resort to a 
variety of Vipassana and Zen practices to deal with a diversity of life 
circumstances and how the continuous, long-term practice of these 
technologies progressively suspends normal, modern versions of the self. 
 My post-humanist analysis contrasts not only with humanist approaches 
in sociology of religion but also with those perspectives based on the notion of 
“self-identity” (Giddens, 1991; DeNora, 2004). According to Giddens, in post-
traditional times self-identity is a reflexive project, consisting in “the sustaining of 
coherent, yet continuously revised, biographical narratives.” (Giddens, 1991: 5). 
This notion is questioned by post-modern and post-structuralist insights (Burkitt, 
2008), as well as by post-humanist literature that focuses on associations, 
entanglements, couplings and relationality (see chapter II). Consequently, my 
interpretation of meditation in daily life focuses on how technologies of Zen and 
Vipassana are mobilized and how they generate a number of long-term 
changes contrasting with paradigmatic accounts of the modern self. 
 Everyday life is a relevant locus of power and subjectification. The 
investigations of Goffman on interactions and social performances (Goffman, 
1969) suggested that outside traditional, disciplinary institutions, power and 
subjectification are very much alive (Burkitt, 2008). Foucauldian analyses were 
mostly focused on institutions; however, there are a number of other 
assemblages, such as cities, that sustain and enact power (thus the relevance 
of the notion of psychogeography in chapter IV).  
 Michel de Certeau, in his brilliant “The Practice of Everyday life”, 
elaborated on forms of overcoming discipline, through what he called an 
antidiscipline that is developed through “clandestine forms taken by the 
dispersed, tactical, and makeshift creativity of groups or individuals already 
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caught in the nets of discipline.” (Certeau, 1984, XIV-V). In order to deal with 
the psychogeographical powers of their homes, workplaces and cities, 
practitioners develop practices of meditation that sustain nonmodern ways of 
life, allowing them to face adversity through equanimity and mindfulness. 
 This chapter is comprised of two main sections. In the first section, 
applying meditation in daily life, I focus on the application of Zen and Vipassana 
practices throughout everyday life situations. Influenced by notions such as 
paraskeue/equipment or Latour’s plug-ins, I develop a post-humanist 
exploration of meditation in everyday life. I also reflect on how practitioners deal 
with adversities (supported by Latour’s notion of anti-programs) and how 
Vipassana meditation can get out of control, not serving the role delineated by 
its designers – the eradication of suffering. 
 In the second section, nonmodern selves, I explore three aspects that 
reinforce the contrasts between meditative and nonmeditative selves, analyzing 
how practitioners develop new forms of awareness; how meditation enacts an 
extended version of the self and how it allows practitioners to develop new 
levels of sensitivity, fostering nonstandard phenomena. 
 
VII.II APPLYING MEDITATION IN DAILY LIFE 
  
VII.II.I INTRODUCTION 
 In this section I analyze how Vipassana and Zen practices are activated 
during everyday life, implementing new automatisms. I am influenced by 
Foucault’s interpretation of the Greek notion of paraskeue. This notion, 
sometimes translated as instructions or equipment154 , concerns “the set of 
necessary and sufficient moves, of necessary and sufficient practices, which will 
enable us to be stronger than anything that may happen in our life.” (Foucault, 
2006: 321-322). Firstly, this paraskeue aims at managing behaviour, consisting 
of inductive schemes of action that progressively become one with the subject, 
                                                             
154
 See Rabinow (2003) for a reflection on modern equipment/paraskeue. 
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as if he is acting spontaneously (Foucault, 2006: 323-324). Secondly, these 
modes of regulating conduct must be “endowed with a sort of permanent virtual 
and effective presence, which enables immediate recourse to them when 
necessary” (Foucault, 2006: 324). 
 Foucault’s reflections highlight the importance of human-technology 
couplings; one could even argue that contemplative practitioners are cyborgs 
(Haraway, 1991), actively embodying technologies - practices of meditation – to 
become different selves. Latour, influenced by cyberspace, uses the term plug-
in to suggest that nowadays human competencies come in successive layers, 
and that new software allows us to see what was previously hidden: 
 “When you reach some site in cyberspace, it often happens that you see 
 nothing on the screen. But then a friendly warning suggests that you 
 ‘might not have the right plug-ins’ and that you should ‘download’ a bit of 
 software which, once installed on your system, will allow you to activate 
 what you were unable to see before... competence doesn’t come in bulk 
 any longer but literally in bits and bytes. ... you realize that to obtain 
 ‘complete’ human actors, you have to compose them out of many 
 successive layers, each of which is empirically distinct from the next.” 
 (Latour, 2005: 207) 
 
 Meditation, as a plug-in, is a new kind of equipment to make up 
nonmodern selves, allowing them to activate particular programs of action – 
equanimity and mindfulness. These new competencies emerge within novel 
human-technology couplings, inviting practitioners to come back to the breath, 
to observe their sensations or to recruit nonhumans. This new equipment 
requires participants to displace meditation from its habitual setting (the retreat), 
bringing meditation into daily life and facing any anti-programs that might arise, 
those “devices that seek to annul, destroy, subvert, circumvent a program of 
action” (Latour, 1991b: 18). The workplace, the dynamics of private life and 
modern cities can become anti-programs that jeopardize meditation, obliging 
practitioners to endure struggles of agency. The role of the following sections is 
to analyze how interviewees apply these technologies in daily life (two different 
sections will explore how Vipassana and Zen techniques are mobilized), how 
they deal with anti-programs and how meditation can get out of control, instead 
of following the program of action originally designed by meditation teachers. 
217 
 
 
VII.II.II VIPASSANA 
  
 Vipassana’s program of action concerns the maintenance of equanimity 
in all life situations, supported by the awareness of sensations developed 
through meditation. According to Goenka, when something happens, the 
meditator should wait a few moments, focusing on sensations, and only 
afterwards she should act (Goenka, 1987: 21). This art of living equips 
individuals with three technologies of the self: Vipassana, Anapana and Metta, 
involving the awareness of physical sensations, the concentration on the breath 
and the generation of “positive” emotions. 
 Sil remembers that after he started practicing Vipassana he had to “train 
his sankharas” to deal with a difficult colleague at work. She had quite an 
aggressive attitude towards others, and Sil saw that there were two options: to 
become her enemy or to be her friend. Since he believed she was being 
misunderstood, he decided that he would try to detach himself from the 
negative emotions that his mind was gearing towards her. In order to do so, he 
resorted to the breath: 
 “I had to breathe a lot, to be calm and stable, especially when we had an 
 argument, so when there was a misunderstanding and she attacked me 
 aggressively I would just breathe and wouldn’t say anything, because I 
 knew she was misunderstood.” (Interview, Sil, December 2011) 
 
 Sil told me that the sittings of strong determination prepared him to deal 
with difficult situations - they taught him to be still, observing what was 
happening with the awareness of impermanence.  Both good and bad things 
would come up, so he should just observe them, aware of impermanence, and 
this helped him change his habitual reactions. Her colleague, as well as the 
workplace environment, could be understood as an anti-program of equanimity 
– she could have made him lose his temper, reacting aggressively. However, he 
was able to resort to the breath to maintain equanimity. 
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 According to Philip, we can understand Vipassana’s program of action in 
daily life as supported by the gaze of equanimity – someone who does not react 
to sensations should not blindly react to external stimuli: 
 “If I am going to accept this sensation I am having in my body, when I’m 
 meditating, it’s obvious that I will also accept the sensation I’m having 
 caused by someone cursing me out or honking, because I’m not going to 
 generate negative energy for something like that.” (Interview, Philip, 
 September 2010) 
 
 Vipassana’s equipment turns sensations into indicators of mental states: 
when an anti-program challenges one’s equanimity, the technology is 
automatically activated, moving awareness towards sensations. The following 
passage exemplifies how regular automatisms are transformed, and how 
practitioners resort to sensations to maintain equanimity: 
 “It’s more like they [sensations] come up, actually, spontaneously, now, 
 more than trying to be aware, like I was just saying about a work 
 situation, it can be a bit stressful, then it’s like the indicator coming on, 
 just saying, oh...look at this! My attention will go to sensations that are 
 telling me something very often.” (Interview, Rebecca, April 2012) 
 
 Anti-programs are reduced to sensations that can be “observed” with the 
awareness of impermanence, allowing practitioners to become automatically 
aware of sensations. If these sensations are hard to deal with, practitioners can 
direct their attention towards subtle ones, easily found on the palms or the top 
of the head, indicating a replacement of the habitual habit of reacting to 
sensations. In some cases, equanimity is disrupted and turning the attention 
towards sensations is not sufficient. In those cases, some practitioners resort to 
Metta, deliberately attempting to generate positive feelings. As Joanna puts it: 
 “And if I’m in a difficult situation, if somebody’s coming to me and they’re 
 really hostile, Metta, I find Metta is the only thing...strong  ... sensations 
 inside come in these situations, because there’s a lot of adrenaline going 
 around, the brain releases all this adrenaline, and I just observe the 
 sensations and ... oh my goodness...may I be happy...may I be peaceful, 
 whatever’s gonna come in my way I accept it gracefully, I accept it with 
 equanimity, and it is like just putting a shield over myself.” (Interview, 
 Joanna, April 2012) 
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 Joanna’s words highlight the immunological dimension of technologies of 
the self, their potential to “protect” practitioners from the outside world. 
According to Sloterdijk, the homo immunologicus is the one “who must give his 
life, with all its dangers and surfeits, a symbolic framework, ... the human being 
that struggles with itself in concern for its form” (Sloterdijk, 2013: 10). 
Anthropotechnics involve struggles of agency to attain particular ways of being. 
In some cases, this struggle involves detachment from the outside world, setting 
up shields to protect the self from anti-programs. As Derek told me: 
 “The first time I went [on a Vipassana retreat] I was still working, I worked 
 at a bank for more than thirty years, and I had a hectic lifestyle… so it 
 helped me a lot…I started being…although I was in contact with 
 everybody, it was almost like if I was inside a bubble. Although I had 
 contact with my co-workers, whatever was surrounding me didn’t affect 
 me at all.” (Interview, Derek, December 2011) 
 
 Although Derek was working at a bank and had a fast-paced lifestyle, he 
was able to detach himself from whatever was happening. Vipassana, as a way 
of being, is supported by various techniques whose aim is to support 
equanimity. It installs new automatisms, focusing on the breath, sensations and 
the attempt to radiate positive emotions. Although, for beginners, this requires a 
tremendous effort, progressively these automatisms become embodied. The 
implementation of this way of being is eminently performative – it is through 
modifications of habitual automatisms that equanimity is activated. Vipassana’s 
equipment involves the creation of a protective bubble, reinforcing one’s 
immunological status over the world, translating events into sensations. This 
contrasts with Thich Nhat Hanh’s proposal, as we will see in the following 
section. 
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VII.II.III MINDFULNESS 
 
 As suggested in chapter IV, Zen and Vipassana have different ways of 
managing webs of associations in order to transform subjectivities. In the case 
of mindfulness, one’s immunological status is not fostered through isolations (as 
in Vipassana) but by actively extending habitual webs of associations through 
the enrolment of nonhumans. Those elements, humans and nonhumans 
(devices such as the breath, objects or trees) that sustain mindfulness, are 
called bells of mindfulness, understood in a metaphorical sense. Practitioners 
should be able to find in the environment and in their own bodies opportunities 
to support mindfulness, altering their Umwelt. Michael, a Dharma teacher, gave 
me a good example of such process: 
 “I find the metaphorical bells that we have in our daily lives very important 
 ... The other day I was rushing around at work and I didn’t have much 
 time for lunch, so I dashed off to get some sandwiches, I dashed in a 
 hurry, and I wasn’t being very mindful, and returning back from the 
 sandwich shop to my office I walked through a churchyard… a graveyard 
 and then…I saw some cherry trees which were in blossom, and that was 
 a bell of mindfulness to me, because it stopped me ...  and that made me 
 think…what I am doing rushing when I’m eating, and that made me stop 
 and sit on the wall by the churchyard and I just watched the trees for 
 about five minutes ...  those cherry trees were my Bodhisattva155 in that 
 moment…it stopped me in the middle of my rush, and unmindful state, 
 and allowed me to slow down and gain a perspective and space.” 
 (Interview, Michael, May 2011) 
 
 In the case of Michael, mindfulness was being jeopardized by the pace of 
the working life, acting as an anti-program, and he enrolled the trees, as 
metaphorical bells, to come back to himself  – he slowed down and regained 
“spaciousness”. In this case, the environment acted as a bell of mindfulness.  In 
other cases, practitioners rely on physical devices (such as actual bells) or even 
                                                             
155
 According to Annice Booth, “One of several definitions of the word 
bodhisattva that is widely accepted is that a bodhisattva is a being of bodhi, or 
wisdom, who is becoming a Buddha. Another definition, especially in the East, 
is that the bodhisattva is one who vows to help all sentient beings attain 
enlightenment.” (Booth, 1999: 55) 
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pebbles, carried around to maintain the desired state156. Ted, a practitioner I 
interviewed in Plum Village, told me that he always carries a pebble in his 
pocket to help him deal with intimacy and difficult emotions: 
 “I always carry this…it’s a rock, a pebble [he shows it to me, it’s a small 
 round grey pebble], so…it’s also…it can also be an anchor, just to hold it 
 and, I use it when somebody shares with me something personal, or 
 something difficult, ... speaking from the heart, then I hold a rock, it’s a 
 pebble...” (Interview, Ted, February 2011) 
 
 Ted’s words highlight the deeply material nature of mindfulness and 
technologies of the self, as well as the importance of relationality, couplings 
between humans and nonhumans. If these nonhumans, technologies and 
metaphorical bells are stripped away from the meditator he can say goodbye to 
mindfulness. There is no mindfulness without technology and no technology 
without matter. 
 Mindfulness is also activated through bodily functions, as we have seen 
in chapter V, and practicing in the outside world is also supported by the breath. 
Actually, most instances of re-activating mindfulness involve breathing: one can 
breathe for three times after hearing the bell (or while engaging with some other 
metaphorical device of mindfulness) or just spontaneously when “something 
happens”. As Ursula puts it: 
 “With the experience of meditation, and in various circumstances, by 
 breathing and trying to understand what is happening, but without 
 identifying with that, I saw that I have an ability to be in that situation 
 while realizing that things do not end there.” (Interview, Ursula, 
 December 2011) 
 
                                                             
156
 I remember that in one occasion I was having a discussion with my girlfriend 
and it was starting to escalate; I felt that it could easily turn into an exchange of 
harsh words if I didn’t do something about it. At that moment I was washing the 
dishes, and I immediately focused my attention on that activity and on my 
breath coming in and going out; this allowed me to detach myself from the 
strong emotions that were arising and to return to the present moment; 
afterwards, I slowed down my speech and tried to deal with the situation 
compassionately, without antagonizing her. 
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 Finally, gathas can also be widely used by practitioners. In Plum Village, 
Neil told me that he was planning to “plant” some gathas in his home after going 
back to the US. These gathas would reconfigure the spiritual texture of the 
domestic space, “reminding” him to be mindful: 
 “Putting a little gatha, a little verse on your bathroom window, while I’m 
 brushing my teeth or while I’m washing my hands, smile at the universe, 
 be thankful for the water that is coming out of this tap, so I have a plan to 
 put all those things around my apartment, to make sure that no matter 
 what I’m doing these signs will like BOOM, hit me in the face, and remind 
 me to come back to the present moment.” (Interview, Neil, February 
 2011) 
 
 Neil’s plans correspond to the attempt to transform the psychogeography 
of the house through the use of gathas as material-semiotic (Law, 2008) 
technologies, re-orienting his performance during everyday activities157. These 
gathas can be enacted as material signs or as sentences, mentally repeated 
during daily activities. Jane told me that, although she is more likely to use 
gathas during retreats, there are times when these are activated while brushing 
her teeth or cleaning the house: 
 “While I’m cleaning my teeth I’m refreshing my speech…and I’m aware of 
 mindful speech…so it’s like purifying…a gatha that is sometimes 
 helpful…cleaning the house…because sometimes I’m not kind of…I think 
 life is too short for dusting, and sometimes my house gets messy, and I 
 think…ok…let’s have a different approach… when I’m cleaning this 
 space I’m cleaning my own mental space… or making the world more 
 beautiful…you know…whatever it is…gathas are about cleaning and 
 making the space fresh and clear, then it actually gives me more clarity 
 to work.” (Interview, Jane, April 2011) 
 
 These gathas help practitioners become aware of Interbeing, linking 
performances (such as cleaning the house) with one’s inner space, challenging 
dualistic conceptions on cleanliness and dirt. They reconfigure habitual 
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 I had a chance to chat with Neil some months after interviewing him in Plum 
Village and he told me that he found it quite hard to maintain mindfulness 
outside the monastery, but I didn’t ask him if he actually managed to “plant” the 
gathas in his house. 
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associations, training practitioners to experience reality in a nonmodern fashion, 
transforming their ways of life. 
 
VII.III.IV THE CONTINUITY OF PRACTICE AND STRUGGLING WITH ANTI-
PROGRAMS 
  
 Much of the effort to implement a new way of being involves dealing with 
old, deep rooted habits and with the environment, generating struggles of 
agency to maintain mindfulness and equanimity active. One should also 
maintain a constant, daily practice, in order to allow the installation of new 
automatisms. 
 Vipassana meditators should attend at least one 10-day retreat per year, 
and there are local meditation groups that offer one-hour sittings with audio 
tapes of Goenka (including the one I attended). One can also attend one-day 
Vipassana courses. Ideally, one should practice two hours of Vipassana per 
day, one hour in the morning and one hour in the evening158. 
 Zen practitioners have an array of practices they can resort to – some of 
them have formal periods of meditation everyday (such as 40 minutes in the 
morning and in the evening), usually involving sitting and walking. The 
“evolution” of practice is far from being linear, including “periods of regression, 
restructuring and reintegration as part of the basic growth pattern” (Kornfield, 
1979: 53). Although individual practice is usually not as powerful and 
transformative as it can be in the retreat setting, meditation is a permanent 
training, and one’s equanimity and mindfulness can easily vanish without a 
continuous effort of self-cultivation.  
 An important dimension of these projects consists in maintaining 
particular restraints in daily life. In chapter IV, I presented some of the 
regulations that have to be followed in order to participate in a Vipassana 
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 Most of the interviewees are not able to meditate two hours a day, since it 
interferes with their work/study schedule, therefore joining a Sangha can be 
highly supportive to keep a semi-regular practice. 
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retreat. The five Buddhist precepts have been skilfully adapted by Thich Nhat 
Hanh to modern times (Hanh, 1993), and in chapter VIII I suggest that they 
reinforce nondual couplings between humans and the environment. Certainly, 
the story of meditation in daily life could be written as a narrative about ethics 
and the good life, since technologies of the self are inevitably intertwined with 
ethical formation (Foucault, 2006). The ethical dimension – Sila, in the case of 
Vipassana and the five mindfulness trainings and the 14 precepts of Thich Nhat 
Hanh’s Order of Interbeing (Hanh, 1997a) - is considered relevant by 
practitioners. However, I will try to tell a different story here. Instead of focusing 
on these precepts and regulations, I would like to suggest that we should 
understand these restrictions as dealing with conflicting programs of action that 
enact different states of consciousness and affect. In sum, I suggest that 
meditation supports particular ways of being that can be put at risk by particular 
environmental elements, including certain drugs and foods, meaning that 
constraints are positive (Gomart and Hennion, 1999). 
Rebecca used the metaphor of switching channels to illustrate what 
happened when, many years ago, after starting her regular Vipassana practice, 
she decided to smoke some marijuana: 
 “I actually felt paralyzed and I felt aware of what was going in my 
 mind...my mind became like a TV switching channels and it was really 
 unpleasant.” (Interview, Rebecca, April 2012) 
 
 This metaphor suggests that equanimity, understood as a particular state 
of mind, involving detached observation of whatever happens, is supported by 
an assemblage including performative and material devices that cannabis can 
eventually alter. In order to tune in on equanimity, one has to repeat a set of 
performances and conditions eventually jeopardized by marijuana. Following 
Becker’s (1953) reflections on marijuana, one could argue that the program of 
action of cannabis implies that the smoker enjoys the sensations it causes, thus 
contrasting with the sensuous detachment of the equanimous gaze. We are 
dealing, therefore, with two different “highs” or states of consciousness. 
Maxwell, who in one of the Vipassana retreats had to come to terms with a bad 
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trip on salvia divinorum, actually used the term “high” to compare Vipassana 
and cannabis programs of action:  
 “We met this pot farmer [shortly after the Vipassana retreat] …I smoked a 
 little bit and it brought me down from the meditation…which was too bad, 
 because it’s a much better high.” (Interview, Maxwell, February 2011) 
 As practitioners become more aware of their body, they are able to 
identify those elements that support their practice and those that jeopardize it. 
Apart from marijuana, food and a variety of other agents can also become anti-
programs, as put by Sean, a long-term practitioner of mindfulness: 
 “For me the process of meditation has increased my sensitivity to my 
 body … I’m more aware for instance what effect certain foods have on 
 my body…then I was before…so…five or six years ago I ate a lot of 
 sugar…like candy…or chocolate…and sugar and tea and didn’t notice 
 any negative effect and now when I eat sugar it has a very obvious 
 negative effect on my body…and on my mind…definitely my sensitivity to 
 the effects of eating certain things has become heightened …and also 
 the effect of other kinds of consumption, like watching a television 
 show… or certain conversations…I notice… if… there’s a certain level 
 of toxins… and I’m very aware of it…and my body…I can feel a kind 
 of…like a reaction…a tension…a tightness or a discomfort…that can 
 arise…” (Interview, Sean, February 2011) 
 
 Bourdieu’s argument, in Distinction, is that taste is constructed by 
economic and social factors, reinforcing class differences159. My own material 
suggests that meditation affects the taste of practitioners due to repeated 
performances in controlled settings. These practices are not developed to 
achieve cultural or class distinction but to allow the emergence of new 
paradigms of the self, transforming one’s Umwelt, including the perception of 
the effects of cannabis. Since Vipassana and Zen elicit particular states of 
consciousness, depending on particular performances and associations and 
contrasting with ordinary states of consciousness, there are some actants 
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 According to Bourdieu, “Taste classifies, and it classifies the classifier.” 
(Bourdieu, 1984: 5-6). Henion suggests that we should abandon the dualism of 
things on one side as autonomous and inert and, on the other side, as mere 
social signs, advocating a pragmatic conception of mediations and effects “in 
which the body that tastes and the taste of the object, the group that loves it and 
the range of things they love, are produced together, one by the other.” 
(Hennion, 2007: 112). 
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whose introduction can jeopardize these ways of being, preventing selves from 
tuning in to meditative states. 
 
 
VII.II.V MEDITATION AND MADNESS 
  
 Previously I have explored the maintenance of equanimity and 
mindfulness in daily life. This depends on the application of technologies to deal 
with everyday life phenomena, replacing habitual automatisms, supporting new 
ways of being. One could argue that these technologies lead to the docilization 
of selves, linking meditation with buzzwords such as well-being, happiness and 
quality of life (Praissman, 2008), the tenets of modern Buddhism (McMahan, 
2008). One should not forget that there were even claims that the happiest 
person in the world is a Buddhist monk, Matthieu Riccard160, and mindfulness 
based stress reduction (Kabat-Zinn, 1991) is flourishing, being used by the 
British National Health System (Crane and Kuyken, 2013), leading Dawson and 
Turnbull (2006) to suggest that mindfulness might have become the new opiate 
of the masses. Meditation seems to go quite well with the docilization strategies 
of contemporary advanced liberal societies and their biopolitical dispositifs, 
linked to technologies of government that require “an increasing emphasis on 
the responsibility of individuals to manage their own affairs, to secure their own 
security with a prudential eye on the future” (Rose, 2007: 4)161 . Meditative 
technologies would help neoliberal subjects getting on with their stressful lives, 
helping them adjust with a higher well-being, rendering them more “stable” and, 
obviously, docile, by setting up protective bubbles. According to Zizek, 
meditation is the perfect ideological supplement of capitalism: 
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 http://www.examiner.com/article/tibetan-monk-is-world-s-happiest-man-say-
neuroscientists (Retrieved: 13/09/2013) 
161
 As Rose states: “Today, we are required to be flexible, to be in continuous 
training, life-long learning, to undergo perpetual assessment, continual 
incitement to buy, constantly to improve oneself, to monitor our health, to 
manage our risk.”  (Rose, 2007: 154) 
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 “The “Western Buddhist” meditative stance is arguably the most efficient 
 way for us to fully participate in the capitalist economy while retaining the 
 appearance of sanity. If Max Weber were alive today, he would definitely 
 write a second, supplementary volume to his Protestant Ethic, titled The 
 Taoist Ethic and the Spirit of Global Capitalism.” (Zizek, 2005)162 
 
 In chapter VIII, I suggest that meditation is intimately coupled with social 
action, including innovative ways of tackling the environmental crisis, instead of 
leading towards a general acceptance and resignation, as Zizek claims. 
Moreover, meditators are aware of contemporary attempts to medicalize 
meditation, turning it into a mere health application. As Michael, a Dharma 
teacher in the tradition of Thich Nhat Hanh, told me: 
 “Quite recently mindfulness and meditation practices have become 
 popular in means of generating happiness in society. I don’t know what 
 that’s about, whether it’s a passing phase or whether it’s something more 
 fundamental, people are realizing that material wealth, belongings, things 
 that traditionally have been linked with comfort, happiness, aren’t 
 necessarily enough on their own. I think it’s interesting to reflect on the 
 extent to which meditation is being promoted as a tool of generating 
 comfort and a sense of being at ease with one’s life …to that extent it’s a 
 kind of therapy, if you like, for our modern world, as opposed to 
 meditation as an integral part of a spiritual path of insight development… 
 really getting to understand the nature of reality. So I think there’s a big 
 distinction to be drawn between meditation as a therapy and meditation 
 as a spiritual path, it’s important.” (Interview, Michael, May 2011) 
 
 An important dimension of the critique of contemporary meditation by 
Zizek and Michael concerns the transformation of spirituality into a kind of 
therapy, reminding us of Lasch’s critique of new age spirituality (see chapter 
VI). However, meditation and contemplative practices do not necessarily enact 
“performative islands of stability” (Pickering, 2012:6), stabilizing the outside 
world for the sake of one’s sanity and wellbeing. In the Christian tradition, the 
Dark Night of the Soul is an important and painful transformative process, 
including “a variety of physical and psychological purifications, eventually 
undergoing a profound spiritual death and rebirth” (Bache, 2000: 15). Some of 
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 Zizek, S. (2005), Revenge of Global Finance. In These times, May 21, 2005. 
http://inthesetimes.com/article/2122/revenge_of_global_finance (Retrieved: 
14/09/2013) 
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the meditators I interviewed underwent particularly difficult experiences (see 
chapter VI), and in the Mahasi Sayadaw tradition of Vipassana there are some 
stages of insight, called Dukkha Nanas, whose experience can generate fear 
and terror (Sayadaw, 1994; Koster and Oosterhoff, 2004). 
 Although there is already some research on the negative effects of 
meditation (see Walsh, 1979; Otis, 1984; Kuijpers et al., 2007)163, this is still an 
underrepresented field, considering the numerous studies that promote the 
positive outcomes of mindfulness. In this section I will analyze the experience of 
a blogger that signs as XYLOPHONEHANDS164, challenging the contemporary 
conception of meditation as a sort of magic bullet (see chapter VIII) that can 
solve numerous medical and psychological issues. The narrative that I am 
going to explore contrasts with the current appropriation of meditation by the 
industry of well-being, presenting meditation as a transgressive endeavour that 
challenges one’s sanity. 
 The aforementioned blogger, a young man still living with his parents,  
attended a Vipassana retreat, had a highly powerful experience, attempted to 
commit suicide and was eventually hospitalized165. He reports that, after some 
days of practicing Vipassana, his awareness became strong, and he noticed 
that there were two areas particularly tense, in the nerve going from the roof of 
his mouth, behind the nose, and up to an area above the eyes in his lower 
forehead and inward. He thought that this could be his “third eye”, although the 
Assistant Teacher dismissed the importance of such notion for Vipassana. This 
meditator mentions that the body scan became increasingly automatic, shifting 
                                                             
163
 Willoughby Britton, from Brown University, is currently leading the “Dark 
Night Project”, which includes the qualitative analysis of self-reports on negative 
experiences with meditation. 
164
 His complete story can be found here - http://xylophonehands.blogspot.pt/ 
(Retrieved: 14/09/2013) 
165
 I witnessed how people can lose their minds while attending Vipassana 
retreats. During my second retreat, two of my roommates had a discussion over 
the heating system -  when the Assistant Teacher called them, one became 
aggressive and was asked to leave the retreat; he didn’t accept the AT’s 
decision; he started shouting at the servers, cursing them and attempted to grab 
the other participant’s bag (the one he had an argument with) to empty it on his 
bed – he even told me that he was afraid they were going to hurt him and that I 
was going to be his “witness”. Eventually the servers were able to make him 
leave the premises.  
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“from something I have to do to something I do automatically”, indicating that 
the technique acquired autonomy – it no longer depended on the human agent 
to be “activated”, but was rather out of control, scanning the body inside out and 
increasing the awareness of sensations. This story exemplifies a replacement of 
automatisms that went terribly wrong. As he wrote:  “I let “the eye” do its own 
work”. It seems like it is tracing a path of awareness around the inside of my 
skull beneath the cheeks, nose, forehead, and the upper half of the skull in 
general.” (http://xylophonehands.blogspot.pt/) 
 The heightened awareness got out of control, generating very strong 
sensations, such as a throbbing feeling inside the head; moreover, the self 
became fragmented, with the meditator writing that his awareness became 
divided: “It seems as if I have developed two kinds of awareness now, one in 
which I can go forward and trace new connections, and one in which I can 
reverse it and go backwards in time.” (http://xylophonehands.blogspot.pt/) 
 As the scanning technology attains autonomy, moving on its own, he 
finds it impossible to sleep: as soon as he closes his eyes, the “eye” starts 
working, looking for sensations, moving to the heart or the brain and the 
prospect of imminent death becomes a possibility. When the retreat was over 
and he went back home, the awareness was still present and autonomous. He 
was still unable to sleep, with the awareness scanning all the internal organs, 
feeling the blood vessels and the tingling sensations at the surface: these 
sensations reached such an overwhelming intensity that the practitioner even 
had a seizure. At a certain point (and after contacting the AT, who told him to 
focus on the extremities and the outside of the body), he decided to kill himself: 
“I had convinced myself that I had actually lesioned my brain by developing this 
faculty of awareness and … that I would continue having more and more 
frequent seizures … until I died.”  (http://xylophonehands.blogspot.pt/) 
 After stabbing himself with a couple of kitchen knives, he threw himself 
into a passing car. He was eventually hospitalized, and spent one week in the 
psychiatric ward, heavily medicated with anti-psychotic and anti-depressant 
drugs. 
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 This episode tells us that meditation can generate unintended outcomes. 
Ideally, Vipassana should allow practitioners to become aware of sensations 
and to respond to everyday life events with equanimity. This happens through 
the installation of a new automatism, allowing individuals to develop a new 
relationship with their bodies. In this case, the new automatism got out of 
control, acquiring a life of its own, damaging the subject. The participant was 
able to increase his awareness exponentially, tuning in to new realms of 
experience; however, this awareness, instead of allowing him to become 
equanimous, became dangerous. This suggests that meditation, as a form of 
technological mediation, does not always follow  the intentions of its designers 
(Verbeek,  2011: 52) – instead of helping the practitioner deal with human 
suffering, it can multiply it; instead of liberating him from reactivity, he is 
shackled and enslaved by the obsessive “eye of awareness”. 
 Second, the introduction of a new automatism emerged as part of a 
setting that radically clashes with what western individuals are used to, and in 
chapter IV I suggested that Vipassana assemblages remind us of Klein’s 
“Shock Doctrine” (Klein, 2007). Subjects submit themselves to new webs of 
associations and automatisms that suspend regular ways of being for 10 days, 
and they learn technologies to become different types of people and to 
experience the world differently. In some cases, this can trigger spiritual 
emergencies, a term coined by Stanislav and Christina Grof (1993) to 
characterize altered states of consciousness that signal an evolutionary crisis 
(including the previously mentioned dark night of the soul). The absence of a 
strong support structure166 led the participant to continue practicing meditation 
(increasing the autonomous agency of the “eye of awareness”), eventually 
leading to the suicide attempt. During the retreat he was told to continue 
practicing; as various authors suggest (Huxley, 1963; Shusterman, 1999; 
Johnson, 2002), modern education does not focus on the non-verbal humanities 
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 According to Grof and Grof (1993), it is possible to slow down spiritual 
emergencies by engaging in a “heavier diet, drinking of beverages containing 
large amounts of sugar or honey, intense physical exercise such as jogging, 
hiking, swimming, or garden work, avoidance of stressful and over stimulating 
situations, discontinuation of any spiritual practice, and in the extreme, 
occasional use of minor tranquilizers as a temporary measure” (Grof and Grof, 
1993: 144). 
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that could eventually help the practitioner make sense of this new aesthetic 
experience. Moreover, psychiatry was unable to distinguish between mystical 
and pathological episodes (Grof, 1998) and to provide spiritual support. The 
solution was to normalize the meditator through heavy doses of psychiatric 
drugs, in an attempt to re-install the widely accepted ordinary state of 
consciousness. 
 Finally, this episode is highly interesting because it exemplifies a 
suspension of the modern self, an inversion of the traditional domain of res 
cogitans over res extensa, mind over matter. The technology of Vipassana 
acquired a life of its own, scanning the body over and over again. This caused 
strange sensations, making some parts of the body seem like they were going 
to explode – the body without organs (see Artaud, 1965: 164-8, Deleuze, 1990), 
where man is understood as pure will, was compromised by the organic 
explosion of affect, fluids, subtle sensations inside and outside. The body 
becomes alive and rebels against the individual, causing seizures and 
preventing him from acting normally. The practitioner is no longer able to control 
the struggles of agency, he is no longer in charge, and he is taken over by the 
gaze of Vipassana. The practitioner becomes trapped in a state of 
consciousness that emerges alongside the installation of Vipassana 
automatisms. Indeed, the practitioner was able to tune in to anicca, and his 
awareness was so refined that he even felt blood vessels and internal organs - 
he was able to capture the experience of impermanence; however, the 
experience would not go away, he was in a permanent state of meditative 
passion, scanning, observing, dissolving, transgressing the boundaries between 
observation and affection. His nonmeditative regular self crumbled due to the 
new technology of self-observation, and his agency was dissolved - he become 
a schizophrenic, dominated by the intensity of affect and organs, with a new 
inner eye working beyond his will, and the only way out was to commit suicide, 
a desperate attempt to re-install some form of control. This is definitely not what 
the proponents of Mindfulness Based applications want their workshop 
participants to experience, exemplifying the dangerous, cruel and transgressive 
side of Vipassana, its ability to induce transformations that are not limited to the 
management of pain or stress by a modern self still in control. 
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  These various sections explored the use of meditation in daily life, 
turning technologies into arts of living. Following a pragmatic concern, we 
should now analyze how meditation creates new kinds of people that can be 
contrasted with their modern counterparts, exploring some relevant long-term 
changes fostered by meditation. 
VII.III MEDITATION AND NONMODERN SELVES 
 
 The role of this section is to explore the nonmodern dimension of the 
paradigmatic changes fostered by meditation. In the previous chapter I 
elaborated on a wide range of experiential changes operated by meditation, 
affordances that emerge alongside Zen and Vipassana technologies. These 
experiences indicate changes of Gestalt, displaying new ways of perceiving the 
self and the world. Academic literature on meditation has generated strong 
indications that this contemplative practice has real and measurable long-term 
effects (see chapter II). The Shamatha Project, the most comprehensive study 
on meditation to date, has concluded that this practice has positive impacts on 
attention, emotions, well-being and bio-markers167. 
 I am particularly interested in the potential of meditation as an alternative 
to the modern paradigm of subjectivity, and I suggest that there are three main 
aspects highlighting the nonmodern dimension of meditation: the development 
of new forms of awareness; the enactment of an extended self and the 
experience of nonstandard phenomena. These themes allow us to conceive 
alternatives to three tenets of the paradigmatic modern self – the naturalization 
of ordinary states of consciousness; the dualism between selves, other humans 
and nonhumans and limited understandings of what a body/self can do and 
experience. 
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 See http://mindbrain.ucdavis.edu/people/jeremy/shamatha-project 
(Retrieved: 12/09/2013) 
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VII.III.I AWARENESS 
 
 As suggested in chapters V and VI, an important aspect of meditation is 
the development of new forms of awareness. A relevant aspect shared by most 
meditators, especially advanced ones, is the fact that meditation allowed them 
to become aware of themselves and their habit patterns in new ways. This is a 
positivity that emerges along with the installation of particular automatisms, 
allowing participants to relate to themselves differently. Early research on 
meditation suggested that it is a form of de-automatization (Deikman, 1966; Gill 
and Brenman, 1959), and current mindfulness research has highlighted the 
positive impact of meditation on past conditionings, including Post-Traumatic 
Stress Disorder (PTSD) (Smith et al., 2011; Vujanovic et al., 2011; Owens et al., 
2012). This could lead us to suggest that meditation is a practice of “freedom”, 
reinforcing the assumption that there is some sort of “nature or a human 
foundation which, as a result of a certain number of historical, social or 
economic processes, found itself concealed, alienated or imprisoned in and by 
some repressive mechanism.” (Foucault, 1987b: 113) 
 Pastoral authorities, such as Goenka, advocate meditation as a practice 
of liberation from the craving/aversion dialectic. After setting up a standpoint 
psychology – a map of the self – performances of meditation are prescribed as 
means to overcome the unwanted condition, reactivity, accompanied by new 
ways of experiencing the self and the world, revealing its “truth” (see chapter 
VI.) Freedoms are always contingent and emerge within practices of 
government (Foucault, 1987, 1995) - meditation, as a technology of self-
government, brings forth new freedoms, including new forms of awareness that 
correspond to Gestalt changes, following the devices of subjectification this 
dissertation has analyzed. As I suggested in chapter II, influenced by Gomart 
and Hennion’s (1999) insights, one should understand these positivies as 
affordances that emerge alongside new webs of associations (including 
constraints) and technologies.  
 In practice, meditators should be able to become aware of a variety of 
phenomena, including ordinary dimensions of human existence and a number 
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of manifestations of mental life (Depraz, Varela and Vermersch, 2003:2) 
according to meditative lenses. This allows practitioners to face their own habit 
patterns, repetitive traits of behaviour and thought, in new ways. 
  According to Neil, mindfulness allowed him to detach himself from habits 
that, has he stated, made him act like a robot (such as working without regards 
for his personal wellbeing, or smoking too much marijuana). Instead of acting 
automatically, he now feels that he has a choice: 
 “I think it [mindfulness] slowed down my reactions to things, I don’t 
 immediately do stuff out of habit or just very direct reaction, you know, 
 like this happens automatically, almost like a robot, I feel more in control 
 of myself because when things happen I see I have a desire and an 
 energy that is pushing me in a certain direction but I don’t feel…I’m not 
 always doing it, you know, it just arises, and I see that it’s there, and then 
 I can either follow it or not, you know … it’s actually much easier not to 
 do those things, you know, ‘cos you’re running around in circles and 
 wasting all your energy.” (Interview, Neil, February 2011) 
 
 Neil’s words suggest that meditation makes him more aware of his 
habits, allowing him to observe them, thus increasing his agency, his ability to 
follow a particular desire/energy or not.  Esther, a Vipassana meditator, told me 
that through the observation of subtle sensations regular habits can be broken, 
reinforcing the fact that meditation brings forth a new form of awareness 
towards one’s thought patterns:   
 “Because I think meditation makes my mind…I can really observe what’s 
 going on in my mind… sometimes I’m out of control, can see a lot of 
 thoughts coming up, and you don’t know why they’re coming up, they 
 keep…but in meditation you can start observing this concept, or this 
 thought, or where it starts, so..ok… I got into a habit, so I can observe 
 these habits of myself and I think meditation is a really powerful tool to 
 just work on myself … If I know the habit I can break it. …  It’s through 
 observing those subtle sensations and how we treat them.” (Interview, 
 Esther, October 2011) 
 
 One could interpret the narratives of self-control apparently displayed by 
Neil and Esther as reinforcing the idea that meditation increases self-mastery, 
thus linking mindfulness and Vipassana to traditional narratives of western 
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philosophy, such as Platonism (Taylor, 1989)168, not to mention contemporary 
forms of neo-liberal governmentality. What happens is that these technologies 
progressively enact new mediations, fostering new forms of self-perception, 
becoming the new mental equipment of selves. Meditators are literally 
transformed by continuous practice, and Brad resorts to the image of taking a 
picture to exemplify the process of replacing automatisms through meditation, 
allowing the emergence of a new kind of awareness:  
 “Mindfulness is like a habit…it’s like a quality…it’s like one of your … it’s 
 an instrument… but just the mind is an instrument…you can look with the 
 mind…the mind can look with the mind at the mind… you see that…the 
 mind is like the guy who takes the photo…who is the camera… and the 
 picture itself!” (Interview, Brad, February 2011) 
 
 Joanna, a long term Vipassana meditator, told me that now she feels 
mentally re-wired; previous habits are no longer around, suggesting that the 
technology of the self allowed her to experience herself and her emotions 
differently, developing a new kind of awareness that allows her to realize the 
impermanent nature of things: 
 “It’s like being re-wired! ... I think in terms of habit patterns it’s a bit like 
 not having the previous stuff around. ... in terms of my own habit 
 patterns, yeah! You know...I think in terms of ... just feeling sometimes 
 depressed, coping with that, learning to see it for what it really is, 
 because even though it comes it does go, it is impermanent, and if it’s 
 my, if it’s my time to have that experience then I embrace it now, instead 
 of trying to push away my negative emotions, and feeling depressed, I 
 welcome them now, because I think this is a really good opportunity to be 
 equanimous, with this, when it comes, so it’s almost like there’s no really 
 bad days anymore.” (Interview, Joanna, April 2012) 
 
 Joanna’s words suggest that she is able to detach herself from the 
theatre of consciousness, regardless of what happens, constantly maintaining 
equanimity. Leary et al. (1976) argued that the experience of LSD was heavily 
influenced by two major aspects: the set (involving the personality structure and 
the mood of the psychonaut) and the setting (environmental, social and cultural 
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 According to Taylor, for Plato “The mastery of self through reason brings 
with it these three fruits: unity with oneself, calm, and collected self-possession.”  
(Taylor, 1989: 116) 
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aspects). In the case of Zen and Vipassana, the practitioner should be able to 
maintain meditative modes of existence, tuning in to equanimity, without being 
affected by both set and setting, giving a new meaning to Buddha’s words - 
“Every person should be a lamp unto himself” (Hanh, 1991: 548). 
 The development of awareness is not merely negative. According to 
long-term practitioners, feelings of loving-kindness, compassion and a deep 
sense of connection progressively emerge. When Jack Kornfield asked Dipa 
Ma, a highly advanced Vipassana practitioner, what was it like in her mind, she 
answered that “In my mind there are three things: concentration, loving-
kindness and peace.” (Schmidt, 2005: 132). Meditation promotes the cultivation 
of positive or wholesome emotions, sometimes explicitly, as exemplified by the 
practice of Metta.  
 Meditation opens up new forms of awareness towards one’s self: 
interviewees usually translate this awareness into the ability to deal with their 
thought patterns, developing new ways of managing their minds. This new 
freedom is not merely negative; as I suggest in the following section, the 
transformations operated by meditation can lead to an increasing empathy 
towards others, challenging dominant, dualist versions of selfhood. 
 
VII.III.II THE EXTENDED SELF 
 
 In this section I argue that the second major characteristic of Zen and 
Vipassana ways of being is the development of an extended version of 
subjectivity, opposed to paradigmatic, dualist version of the modern self. In a 
1998 paper, Clark and Chalmers drew on the notion of “extended mind” to 
illustrate a process of active externalism where certain objects (the example 
given was that of a notebook) are actually “part” of the mind, actively supporting 
cognitive processes. My analysis suggests that Zen and Vipassana 
assemblages are supported by a set of heterogeneous devices, highlighting the 
role of relationality in the enactment of new paradigms of selfhood. The use of 
the term “extended self” in this section, instead of being “genetic” (linked to the 
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devices of subjectification mobilized by meditation), rather suggests that 
through the continuous practice of meditation one is able to identify with other 
humans and nonhumans, suspending an atomistic paradigm of subjectivity and 
performing a version of selfhood that is extended, porous and unbounded 
(Blackman, 2012) – nonmodern. 
 Peter, an advanced meditator who practiced according to the Indo-
Tibetan tradition of Buddhism for many years and recently became interested in 
Thich Nhat Hanh’s approach, shared a rich description of the experience of 
emptiness/vacuity or sunyata169, exemplifying a nondual, formless experience of 
the world: 
 “If we don’t verify what we often think to exist, the experience of the non 
 verification of a solid entity, of what we call the mind, the absence of the 
 experience of a form, a frontier, a limit, a demarcation between mind and 
 no-mind, that experience is what in the Indo-Tibetan tradition is called 
 vacuity. And at the same time, that is what we call luminosity. The 
 discovery that the mind is an open space, formless, but at the same time 
 it has a quality of self-awareness, it has the ability to experience that 
 same absence of form, and that is the discovery of the deepest nature of 
 the mind. From that moment on, the practice of meditation becomes 
 more subtle. Instead of focusing our attention or calming our mind 
 focusing it on the body, physical sensations, the experience of the 
 breath, the observation of thoughts or focusing the attention on an 
 external phenomenon, we can focus our attention on that same 
 experience of vacuity, that luminosity, on the experience of the 
 nonsubstantial nature of consciousness. And that is what I think is one of 
 the most interesting experiences that meditation can offer us. In that 
 experience, what I think is an important aspect, with plenty of 
 consequences on our lives, is that we directly verify that the mind lacks 
 duality between subject and object, that there is no separation between 
 mind and what it perceives, there is no observer and observed as 
 isolated entities, there is a nondual experience. One has the experience 
 that the world is inseparable from consciousness.”  (Interview, Peter, May 
 2013) 
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 According to Mark Epstein, “Emptiness is the understanding that the 
concrete appearances to which we are accustomed do not exist in the way we 
imagine, an experience that the late Tibetan lama Kalu Rinpoche called an 
“intangible” one, most comparable to that of “a mute person tasting sugar”. In 
particular, it means that the emotions that we take to be so real and are so 
worried about do not exist in the way we imagine them.” (Epstein, 1995: 101). 
Thich Nhat Hanh’s “Interbeing” (1997a) is another way of formulating 
emptiness/vacuity (see chapter V). 
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 Peter’s description of the experience of vacuity points towards a 
nonmodern version of the self, where consciousness is spread out through the 
entire world, instead of being limited by dermal boundaries. In practical terms 
this means that the habitual boundaries characterizing the modern self are 
suspended, and meditators develop new levels of sensitivity that allow them to 
become aware of other people’s emotions and to be affected by them without 
the need of verbalization. This, according to Lisa Blackman, constitutes forms of 
affective transfer, requiring a “decoupling of memory, perception, the senses 
and the psyche from a bounded, singular and distinctly human body” 
(Blackman, 2012: 24). This implicates a transpersonal way of understanding 
human selves, taking into account those realms of experience enacted by 
contemplative practices such as meditation (but also shamanism, psychedelics 
drugs or hearing voices) that question fixed, static and dual paradigms of 
selfhood. 
 The increasing sensitivity of Vipassana meditators towards their 
environment and other people inspired Paul Solomon to write “Speaking from 
the Body” (Solomon, 2008), where he analyzes the phenomenological 
experiences of psychotherapists who engage in different types of meditation. 
Some of these psychologists report an increasing sense of intimacy with their 
clients, including the coincidence of physical sensations and emotions between 
therapist and patient. This indicates an increase in empathy, understood as a 
heightened ability to identify with other people and their emotions, as previous 
meditation research has suggested (Lesh, 1970; Hutcherson et al., 2008). 
 One of my interviewees, Rebecca, a long-term Vipassana practitioner, 
told me that she often has this experience with her students, becoming aware of 
their sensations: 
 “With my students sometimes I will get aware of certain sensations 
 coming up, if they’re stressed or...it’s like a bit if I’m getting an early 
 warning signal of how they might be feeling, or if some anger is coming 
 up. I think it’s a bit of like attuning for vibrations, you can sort of like get 
 other people’s vibrations, and then a sensation comes and you’re like 
 hum...all different types of sensations can come. Yeah...being aware of 
 that can give you some kind of indicator of watching how you’re behaving 
 with people.”  (Interview, Rebecca, April 2012) 
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 This example suggests that meditation can enact a nonmodern paradigm 
of the self, allowing humans to become sensitive towards others’ emotions, 
feeling them without the need of dialogue. According to Rebecca, this affective 
transfer happens due to her attuning, her receptivity towards vibrations. Daniel 
Stern, a psychologist who studied infants, suggests that, when children are nine 
months old, a new form of interaction between child and mother emerges -  
mothers reinforce children’s behaviour by speaking with a particular tone, 
imitating the child’s movements by nodding the head or matching their vocal 
efforts with the infant’s attempt to reach a toy. Stern defines affect attunement 
as the “performance of behaviors that express the quality of feeling of a shared 
affect state without imitating the exact behavioral expression of the inner state” 
(Stern, 1985: 142). In the case of Rebecca, what is at stake is not the 
reinforcement of behaviour through a particular vocal or bodily performance but 
the development of the ability to feel other people’s emotions, due to the 
heightened sensitivity that Vipassana generates. Much of Vipassana’s training 
deals with the awareness of sensations, and according to Rebecca this 
heightened sensitivity also allows her to become aware of what others are 
experiencing. The following episode was shared by another interviewee, Jane, 
and took place in Plum Village during walking meditation: 
 “I remember we were walking…and we were doing outside walking 
 meditation…and there were loads of people, and I think I was kind of 
 being a bit vacant and all smiley, isn’t this great and wonderful, and it 
 ended up kind of…Thay walking towards me…I was in the back of the 
 walk and he was in the front, and then we went around and…kind 
 of…and he just looked directly at me and then there was this huge 
 amount of suffering, I got put in touch with deep suffering, you 
 know…sometimes it’s like…usually it’s like  sweet…lovely…kind of 
 a…but occasionally you get this evidence that he’s Asian, you get this 
 kind of…what’s true…what’s real…what’s authentic…so it was peculiar, 
 because I kind of got plunged into…I mean…it was something about…I 
 think maybe I  wasn’t in touch with really, with what was going on within 
 me, that underneath this kind of nice lovely…into this kind of fake smile 
 thing…and out of touch with really kind of what’s going in…so that was 
 an  interesting encounter … I think maybe, and Thay, in his life, has 
 encountered a huge amount of suffering, so…whether it was…I don’t 
 know what happened there, but I got kind of rather plunged within….I 
 think it was a wake-up call.” (Interview, Jane, April 2011) 
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 Jane’s experience affected her tremendously, and after she recalled it 
she started crying. Thich Nhat Hanh’s gaze allowed her to be in touch with 
suffering, becoming a “wake-up call” that reminded her not only of her own 
suffering but also of what Thay went through in Vietnam (see chapter VIII). This 
episode strengthens the assumption that meditation can deepen the 
connections between selves and others, contributing towards a picture of 
nondual subjectivity, exemplifying a phenomenon of affective transfer between 
two practitioners. Sometimes the abandonment of duality between self and 
others arises as part of a process of connection with ancestors. Michael told me 
that now he feels an increased connection with members of his family, namely 
with deceased ones: 
  “I have felt strong connections with members of my family, blood family, 
 from previous generations, and more recently with my father who died 
 last year, and so…you know…this…having the ancestors’ shrine, for 
 example, in the meditation hall, where we practice is a reminder, if you 
 like, to maintain that connection with our historical continuation.” 
 (Interview, Michael, May 2011) 
 
 These new connections reveal a wider, more encompassing paradigm of 
selfhood, reinforced by the collective nature of practice (see chapter V), 
indicating a picture of subjectivity that goes beyond dermal boundaries. In some 
cases, those who underwent traumatic episodes rely on the practice of 
meditation to come to terms with these situations, identifying with the 
aggressors. Judith Toy’s sister-in-law and her two teenage nephews were 
murdered by a disturbed young man, and her spiritual journey was a long term 
process of forgiveness in order to cope with the suffering caused by the 
assassinations. Eventually, and after many years of practice, one day she felt 
the urge to write a poem about the crime. During the writing, she experienced a 
process of identification with Charles, the murderer, feeling the rage, hatred and 
other strong negative emotions that he experienced while killing her three 
relatives. After the phenomenon of emotional identification with the killer she 
was finally able to forgive him: 
 “As I finished the last line, I was convinced that Charles had been 
 completely out of his body and mind when he killed my family. That was 
 the very day I stopped casting him as a beast and visualized him as a 
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 boy in whom something had gone terribly wrong. The pain of my 
 resentment vanished on the spot. Despite my mindfulness practice, for 
 years I had been trapped in fear and blame. Suddenly I understood that 
 he was not a monster, but possibly a good boy who had become – for 
 reasons I will never know for sure – a beast that night. This was not a 
 dark revelation; it was suffused with light, a kind of bodhi or awakened 
 moment. 
 So what I experienced was luminescence, in part a fruit of five years of 
 sometimes very reluctant mindfulness practice.” (Toy, 2011: 166) 
 
 Judith’s practice of meditation was also a process of healing, and she 
was able to overcome the distinction between herself and the aggressor by 
writing a poem170. The continuous practice of mindfulness allowed her to come 
to terms with the violent episode that shook her personal life, and she identified 
with the killer and the emotions that motivated his act.  
 This wider, nondual and nonmodern paradigm of the self suspends all 
established distinctions between self and others, suggesting that “relationality 
and affect are firmly located in relation to the more-than-one, plural character of 
beings, and the contingency  of all becomings” (Venn, 2010: 153). This 
decentred relationality also suspends deep rooted dualisms between humans 
and edible, raw matter. Eating meditation requires the identification between 
self and those heterogeneous networks involved in food production (see 
chapter V) and Neil’s words illustrate this process of becoming-food, supporting 
a picture of extended and decentred selfhood: 
 “If I eat a pig… I am actually one with the physical, real, scientifically 
 understood worldview that there is a supply chain of pigs coming to me, 
 and if I eat that I am completely one with all those causes and effects that 
 are involved within that process, and I am anyhow, but the question is, do 
 I want to increase or decrease that, so when I’m eating, becoming aware 
 of my eating, I’m becoming aware of all the physical processes in which 
 I’m involved and trying to take a mindful approach towards them.” 
 (Interview, Neil, February 2011) 
 
 By reinforcing the awareness towards couplings between humans and 
nonhumans, meditation contributes to enact what some authors in Deep 
                                                             
170
 A similar process was undertaken by Thich Nhat Hanh (See Hanh, Hanh, 
2005: 77-78). 
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Ecology have called the comprehensive self (Naess, 1984; 1995) or the 
ecological self (Devall, 1995), triggered by processes of identification with 
nonhumans. These phenomena bring forth a nonmodern version of human-
environment couplings, reminding us of Peter’s remarks on nonduality at the 
beginning of this section. In the following chapter, I will explore how this 
unbounded paradigm of selfhood is linked to new ways of performing human 
and nonhuman couplings, affecting environmentalism. 
 This extended version of the self, linked to forms of identification with 
other humans and nonhumans, constitutes a nonmodern paradigm of 
subjectivity, challenging dual accounts of selfhood. Neil’s words also allow us to 
distinguish between two modalities of empathy. On the one hand, the 
awareness fostered by meditation allows Rebecca and Jane to be affected by 
students or spiritual teachers – this is a referential type of awareness, focusing 
on one entity. On the other hand, Neil’s example and Peter’s words at the 
beginning of this section point towards a nonreferential type of empathy, not 
limited to a single object but spread out through the world, pervading  “the mind 
of the experiencer as a way of being.” (Halifax, 2014: 122) 
 We have seen, in chapter VI, how meditation alters the perception of 
body and mind, unleashing nondual experiences. Meditation suspends 
dominant ordinary states of consciousness, as well as the bounded, dualist 
version of the self, allowing practitioners to experience others’ emotions and to 
become aware of and affected by processes that take place beyond their 
individuality. In this section, I explored how one can be affected by others in 
new ways, prompting phenomena of identification that suspend the divide 
between self and others – Judith Toy was able to identify with a killer and Neil 
told me that when eats he becomes that heterogeneous process comprising 
humans and nonhumans. 
  The practice of meditation challenges modern, mechanical and 
restrictive accounts of reality and of what humans can do, transforming one’s 
Umwelt. The aim of the following section is to analyze some of the nonstandard 
phenomena that meditation, as nonmodern technology, unleashes. 
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VII.III.III NONSTANDARD PHENOMENA 
 
 The third aspect reinforcing the nonmodern dimension of meditation 
deals with the expansion of the range of possibilities available to humans, what 
they can do in the world. Although I elaborated on mystical experiences in 
chapter VI, in this section I argue that practices of meditation can unleash what 
Pickering (1995) calls nonstandard human performances. Spinoza (1995) asked 
what a body can do. In this case I suggest that meditation can contribute to a 
more encompassing and wider range of human possibilities, challenging 
positivist and reductionist understandings of time and space. This means that 
the installation of new automatisms transforms the meditator’s Umwelt, allowing 
him to experience the world in novel ways. 
 The accounts of extraordinary abilities developed by ascetics can lead us 
to question the boundaries between spirituality and transhumanism (see, for 
example, Murphy, 1992 and James, 2007). In the Yoga Sutras one finds a 
number of supernormal abilities, or siddhis, that can be attained in advanced 
stages of practice. According to Dean Radin, there are three categories of 
abilities that can emerge: exceptional mind-body control; clairvoyance (gaining 
knowledge without the usual constraints of time and space or the senses, 
including precognition and telepathy) and psychokinesis, influencing matter with 
the mind (Radin, 2013: 109).  
 A modern Vipassana meditator, Dipa Ma, supposedly developed an 
incredible range of abilities including “dematerialization, body-doubling, cooking 
without fire, mind-reading, visitation of the heaven and hell realms, time travel, 
knowledge of past lives, and more.” (Schmidt, 2005: 39). John E. Coleman, a 
student of U Ba Khin, once experienced his teacher’s transmission. U Ba Khin 
told him, after John left Burma to return to the U.S., that there would be regular 
transmissions of his vibrations during certain periods of time. If the anicca level 
was high, if John was experiencing impermanence through physical dissolution, 
it would be possible to tune in to those transmissions. John felt that he benefited 
from them:  
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 “I found quite genuinely that the “tuning in” procedure worked; I felt 
 waves of strength entering my mind and my being and can certainly 
 vouch for the greater depth of my meditation at the prescribed times than 
 at other times. I felt U Ba Khin had made a discovery to which modern 
 science might with advantage turn its analytical attention.” (Coleman, 
 2004: 180) 
 
 Alexandra David-Neel, in her book “Magic and Mystery in Tibet” (David-
Neel, 1997), also reports a number of “powers” attained by Tibetan practitioners 
she met, such as telepathy, telekinesis, walking for days in a trance without 
stopping or even heating the body through meditation (sometimes sitting naked 
on the snow in freezing temperatures). 
 These phenomena indicate that meditation can increase the human 
potential, allowing humans to access realms of experience and reality 
prevented by modern selfhood. Most of the meditators I interviewed were 
reluctant to address these issues due to their “exotic” dimension; however, after 
I turned off my recorder, they would often mention some “strange” episode that 
they associated with meditation. For instance, Paul told me that he started 
practicing mindfulness with his mother, shortly after she was diagnosed with 
cancer (fortunately, she has recovered and is now well). After a period of time, 
he decided to visit Plum Village, but unfortunately his mother wasn’t able to join 
him. In Plum Village, the lay practitioners were asked to collectively prepare a 
song dedicated to their mothers that was afterwards sung to the whole 
community. At night, Paul called his mother and she asked him if something 
particular had happened at a particular period of time, because she had felt a 
warm feeling throughout her body – coincidently, it was when Paul and other lay 
practitioners were singing. Another example, shared off-record, was given by 
Rebecca. During her last 20-day retreat she was meditating (as one should 
expect) and the AT’s were calling practitioners to meditate with them for a while, 
as it usually happens. Suddenly, she felt a warm energy throughout her body, 
and shortly after she was called by the AT – according to her, what she was 
feeling was the Metta energy that the ATs generated towards her, while reading 
her name, and she was able to feel it as vibrations throughout her body. 
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 I will not speculate if these episodes and abilities arise naturally in 
monastic settings or as a result of long-term practice, although I was frequently 
told that Plum Village was a “crazy place” (indicating that abnormal episodes 
could take place due its particular psychogeography). In one occasion, one of 
the interviewees shared an episode of telepathy he experienced with a monk in 
Plum Village, and I was fortunate enough to record it: 
 “It happens to me a lot, I project questions and people…they start 
 answering like…it’s weird stuff! … I had this thing with one of the elder 
 brothers, at lunch, and I just had…I was thinking about…maybe I should 
 shave my head, just to get rid of the hair, it’s refreshing you know, and he 
 said: Yeah, maybe you should shave your head…” (Interview, Brad, 
 February 2011) 
 
 After presenting the cases of Paul, Rebecca and Brad, I would like to 
explore a couple of episodes that happened to me and that can also contribute 
towards a nonmodern understanding of what humans can experience through 
meditation. 
 On the third day of my first Vipassana retreat, my mind suddenly started 
checking if everything was ok at home. Then, out of the blue, a voice (similar to 
my mother’s) told me that my grandmother had passed away. This was a 
particularly strong experience, because that voice was strange, and I had the 
clear intuition that it was coming from somewhere else, it wasn’t a product of my 
imagination. When the retreat was over and I was able to contact my family, I 
was told that my grandmother had actually died. 
 The second example concerns an experience I went through after 
attending my second retreat in Plum Village in December 2011. In early January 
2012, I was in Portugal and I was leaving the house of a family member. I 
looked at a van and I saw what looked like Michael Jackson’s (the famous 
American singer) ghost in the passenger seat. I didn’t understand why my mind 
was creating such an awkward vision. Shortly after, and back in England, I was 
talking to a friend of mine who had been in Plum Village and he told me that one 
of the brothers there had died recently. This happened to be the monk who 
moderated one of the meetings I attended (a Dharma sharing).  He told us that 
he was writing some songs inspired by Michael Jackson, and that the spirit of 
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the singer was often felt in Plum Village. After my friend told me about his death 
I connected the dots and realized that the vision I had in Portugal could be 
some sign of this brother’s death. 
 What should we make of all this? First, we are dealing with a radically 
different way of experiencing the world, confirming nonmodern ontologies such 
as Interbeing, suggesting that all entities are entangled and that the practice of 
meditation can alter one’s Umwelt, allowing individuals to become aware and 
experience this profound relationality. Since everything is entangled, it is 
possible to become aware of events that are taking place thousands of miles 
away, to communicate with those in other parts of the world without the need of 
solid-state technologies and to experience consciousness as extended beyond 
the brain and the body. This implicates a nonmodern understanding of ontology, 
of what the world is and what it can do, inviting us to revise mainstream 
versions of causality. According to Mansfield:   
 “The modern scientific view, beginning in the sixteenth century with 
 Kepler and Galileo, developed an idea of causality as the inexorable 
 unfolding of impersonal mechanical laws... As this understanding of 
 causality became more entrenched, many found themselves trapped in a 
 mechanistic universe without meaning. We developed the notion of 
 causality and then became bound by it.” (Mansfield, 1995: 46) 
 
 According to Grof, transpersonal experiences, including episodes of 
synchronicity171, such as those I apparently experienced, challenge traditional, 
modern Western understandings of physics, namely linear causality; however, 
such Newtonian picture of time and space has now been “replaced by the 
strange wonderland of quantum-relativistic physics full of baffling paradoxes.” 
(Grof, 1998: 234). Grof argues that new paradigms in physics confirm the 
possibility of transpersonal phenomena and, according to some authors, have 
close connections with Eastern philosophies (see, for example, Capra, 1975 
and Bitbol, 1999), eliciting the links between  spirituality and nonmodern 
                                                             
171
 According to Jung, synchronicity should be understood as an acausal 
connecting principle, leading to the manifestation of events that are 
meaningfully related, yet cannot be explained by conventional accounts of 
causality; this indicates a plasticity of space and time and an interpenetration 
between mind and coincidental objective situations (Jung, 1972). 
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paradigms of science (Pickering, 2010). In order to take these episodes into 
account, one necessarily has to embrace a different view of the world. The 
entangled ontology of Interbeing allows us to do. Carl Jung, the western 
psychologist who popularized the concept of synchronicity, resorted to the 
scholastic and alchemic notion of Unus Mundus, one world, a final stage that 
“produces the undifferentiated world of before the Creation; in the psychic 
sense it is the union of the liberated and assimilated unconscious with the 
collective unconscious.” (Jung, 1970: 533). Buddhist worldviews, new 
developments in physics, systems theory (Macy, 1991) and alchemy conceive 
the possibility of the existence of an interconnected world, allowing the 
emergence of nonlinear forms of causality that question mechanistic 
understandings of time and space and the dualism between mind and matter. 
The continuous practice of meditation allows practitioners to become more 
sensitive to these phenomena, instead of dismissing them as absurd or 
irrational.  As Radin argues: 
 “The mind is trained to become progressively more sensitive to the 
 holistic nature of reality that we normally can’t apprehend... telepathy 
 arises not because something is transmitted between Gail and Tom, but 
 because from a holistic perspective the objects we perceive as “Gail” and 
 “Tom” are not separate as they seem. At a deeper level of reality, there is 
 no separateness, including no isolated Gails and Toms.” (Radin, 2013: 
 197) 
 
 Meditation allows selves to become aware of the world in a nondual way, 
and these phenomena are expressions of a paradigm of reality that is not 
marked by the usual dualisms between mind and matter or self and others, 
contrasting with the technologies of the modern self that fabricate dual, efficient 
and operative humans.  
 Secondly, although new paradigms seem to justify insights arising from 
transpersonal research, most of the Western world is still dominated by a strict 
understanding of what people can do and experience. Most of us are expected 
to follow schedules, to attend classes at a given time and place, and we are not 
supposed to show up at work naked, under the influence of Dimethyltryptamine 
or in Bangha.  Although early psychological research tackled psychic 
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phenomena (see Blackman, 2012; Radin, 2009 and 2013), the attempt to 
attribute to psychology a “scientific” status resulted in the dismissal of these 
episodes that challenge the boundaries between the material and the spiritual. 
Save for few exceptions (see Schmeidler, 1970; Roney-Dougal et al., 2008; 
Roney-Dougal and Solfvin, 2011), meditation research focusing on the 
development of paranormal abilities is still underrepresented in academia. 
  Modern education does not focus on the cultivation of sensitivity towards 
these dimensions, as I have suggested in the section “Meditation and 
Madness”, which means that we are trained to ignore these events, preventing 
them from becoming part of our Umwelt. Rupert Sheldrake, who has done 
extensive empirical research on nonstandard phenomena, suggests that in the 
animal world some of these episodes are relatively common: dogs can sense 
that the telephone will ring or that the owner is arriving home, and can find their 
way back home in incredible circumstances without familiar references. 
Sheldrake’s argument is not that we do not have these abilities but that we have 
progressively lost our capacity to use them: 
 “Perhaps this decline in sensitivity is not so much a feature of our being 
 human or using language, but a more recent phenomenon, a result of 
 civilization, literacy, mechanistic attitudes, or dependence on technology. 
 There seems little doubt that people in traditional, non-industrial 
 communities were often more perceptive than educated people in 
 modern industrial societies.” (Sheldrake, 1999: 226) 
 
 The Umwelt of the dual, modern self is reductive. Modern education, as a 
technology of the modern self, enacts a mechanistic version of the world, 
bounding people to a limited version of matter, time and space. This version of 
the self is useful to operate machines and to increase productivity, but performs 
a disenchanted version of the world, reduced to mere raw dead matter that can 
be controlled by human hubris. Meditation increases sensitivity towards 
nonstandard phenomena, thus contributing to expand the human potential.  
 Finally, these examples offer an alternative to dominant versions of 
technological hubris, such as transhumanism (Bostrom, 2007). Current 
accounts of human enhancement, including the increase of life-span and the 
development of all sorts of capacities, are supported by technological advances, 
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such as nanotechnology or biotechnology. When the notion of the Cyborg 
emerged (Clynes and Kline, 1995), practices such as yoga were understood as 
part of a new approach to adapt humans to the “hostile” environment of outer 
space. In STS, the Cyborg re-emerges as a product of technoscience 
(Haraway, 1991), suggesting that there is a contrast between two models of 
expanding the human potential: on the one hand, technoscience improves 
humans through the incorporation of material devices (such as heart bypasses), 
drugs or gene manipulation; on the other hand, contemplative traditions require 
practitioners to alter their automatisms, developing exercises and becoming 
performative technologies that bring forth new possibilities. They generate a 
number of affordances that include new levels of awareness, the ability to 
become more sensitive towards others’ emotions and to experience 
phenomena that challenge mechanistic accounts of time and space. 
 
VII.IV CONCLUSION 
  
 In this chapter I have suggested that meditation in everyday life should 
not be understood according to the paradigm of religious conversion but linked 
to couplings between humans and technologies. Following Foucauldian and 
STS insights, I analyzed the application of Zen and Vipassana technologies in 
everyday life, supporting the enactment of equanimity and mindfulness as 
modes of being. I also explored three dimensions that reinforce the nonmodern 
dimension of meditation – new forms of awareness, the extended self and 
nonstandard phenomena. 
 I argued that the application of meditation in everyday life replaces 
habitual automatisms. Practitioners tend to be in the world, to deal with their 
selves and other people supported by meditation. These technologies are 
understood as mediators that perform nonmodern ways of being. Sometimes 
the installation of new automatisms fails, and instead of allowing individuals to 
perform equanimity in daily life, practices of meditation, such as Vipassana, 
become dangerous, leading to unwanted consequences that may include 
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suicide attempts. 
 The introduction of new plug-ins transforms the Umwelt of the 
practitioner, allowing her to experience the world differently, in a nonmodern 
way. One is no longer compelled to identify with regular habit patterns and can 
become aware of them. The paradigmatic dual self, whose dermal boundaries 
guarantee that it is separated from other humans and the world, can be 
suspended, and practitioners become aware of others’ emotions, identifying 
with them. The continuity of practice can also alter regular ways of experiencing 
time, space, mind and matter. The episodes reported in the section 
“Nonstandard Phenomena” suggest that meditation increases one’s sensitivity 
towards events ignored by the nonmeditative modern Umwelt. One’s perception 
of the world is altered, and mechanistic and linear versions of causality are 
questioned. 
 Technologies of Zen and Vipassana are mediators that enact nonmodern 
paradigms of people. Following Gomart and Hennion (1999), one could say that 
they allow the emergence of a set of affordances that include new ways of 
dealing with one’s emotional life, of managing particular patterns of behaviour, 
of interacting with people, of experiencing time, space and the world. The 
affordances generated by meditation, as a nonmodern equipment, reinforce the 
political dimension of technologies of the self. New technological mediations 
allow us to experience ourselves and the world differently. Dominant 
technologies of the self, such as discipline and modern education, offer a limited 
version of what we can experience and do. Meditation can suspend modern 
understandings of the self and the world, constituting alternative forms of 
subjectification. These nonmodern selves are the subjective correlate of new 
ways of performing wider social worlds, and practices of meditation are actively 
used by Vipassana and Zen assemblages to bring forth new ways of dealing 
with social issues. Therefore, the role of the following chapter is to explore the 
human-technology couplings that inform meditative ways of acting in the world, 
analyzing the social dimensions of meditation and its ramifications on issues 
such as human reformation, politics and the environmental crisis.  
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VIII. MEDITATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE 
 
 “Social reconstruction and self or personality reconstruction are the two 
sides of a single process — the process of human social evolution.” (Mead, 
1934: 309) 
 
 “It is my firm belief that the experience of higher states of consciousness 
is necessary for survival of the human species. If we can each experience at 
least the lower levels of Satori, there is hope that we won’t blow up the planet or 
otherwise eliminate life as we know it. If every person on the planet, especially 
those in power in the establishments, can eventually reach high levels or states 
regularly, the planet will be run with relatively simple efficiency and joy. 
Problems such as pollution, slaughter of other species, overproduction, misuse 
of natural resources, overpopulation, famine, disease and war will then be 
solved by the rational application of realizable means.” (Lilly, 1972: 3)  
  
VIII.I INTRODUCTION 
 
 In the previous chapters I focused on the devices of subjectification used 
by Vipassana and Zen assemblages, including the establishment of new webs 
of associations and automatisms. These devices allow the emergence of 
different ways of experiencing the self and the world, contrasting with ordinary 
states of consciousness. In order to become ways of life, Zen and Vipassana 
technologies become the new equipment of practitioners, who actively mediate 
their experience of the world through meditative technologies. The continuous 
application of Zen and Vipassana techniques in everyday life can lead to long 
term changes that challenge modern selfhood. These changes include the 
development of awareness towards habit patterns, the enactment of an 
extended version of the self and the experience of nonstandard phenomena, 
constituting archipelagos of nonmodern selfhood. 
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 Zen and Vipassana assemblages go beyond the attempt to perform self-
transformation, envisioning social change. So far, the various chapters explored 
how meditation clashes with mainstream instances of subjectification, 
introducing new devices to bring forth new kinds of people. This means that 
regular social worlds have to be suspended in order to allow selves to develop 
new ways of experiencing their bodies, mind and the world, transforming their 
Umwelt. 
 There is plenty of literature in social theory reinforcing the links between 
subjectification and broader forms of power (Foucault, 1995; Elias, 1978; Rose, 
1998), associating politics with the fabrication of selves (see, for instance, 
chapter II, where I briefly elaborate on governmentality). The Soviet civilization 
in Russia required the fabrication of a new man (Sinyavsky, 1990), and 
peripheral European countries, currently implementing austerity politics 
(including Portugal, where I’m from) use devices such as the media to 
naturalize the idea that people should willingly become poorer in order to 
expiate the sins of the past, such as overspending. 
 The connections between technologies of the self and social order are 
also well exemplified in utopian and dystopian narratives. For instance, in 
“Brave New World” (Huxley, 1932), the drug of choice, the soma, unleashes 
inner experiences that are managed by the State, thus dispensing the need for 
external (non-state run) mechanisms of religiosity; in the “Island” (Huxley, 
1962), as an example of what Huxley called the non-verbal humanities (Huxley, 
1963), Moshka-medicine (a type of psychedelic drug) is widely used to generate 
mystical experiences: boys who want to make the transition between childhood 
to adolescence take it to understand the mysteries of the world. In the dystopian 
novel “1984” (Orwell, 1949), the main character, Winston Smith, is a heavy 
drinker of Victory Gin, not available to the Proles. In western societies, save for 
few exceptions, psychedelic substances are banned, although alcohol and 
pharmaceutical drugs are usually available. As we have seen in Chapter II, for 
Foucault the government of the self and power relations are entangled 
(Foucault, 2006: 252); this means that broader social orders have mechanisms 
to ensure the “subjectification” of individuals (such as the various technologies 
of power that Foucault examined) and that particular formations (such as 
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spiritual movements or psychological techniques) display specific views of 
society, clashing with subjectification devices such as compulsory education. 
 The entanglements between the self and the social regarding meditation 
and Buddhism can assume a variety of forms, such as (and these examples are 
far from being exhaustive) the constitution of a Buddhist social theory (Loy, 
2003), forms of collective action supported by meditation (Jordt, 2007; Macy, 
1983; Watts et al., 1997; Kotler, 1996; Queen and King, 1996); or the 
transformation of already existing social structures and institutions (such as 
prisons) through the incorporation of meditation (Bedi, 1998; Philips, 2008). 
According to Singer (1966), sociological analyses of the influence of “religion” 
on social change were largely influenced by Max Weber, who argued that the 
rise of Capitalism could be partly explained by the Protestant Ethic, implying the 
expansion and secularization of ascetic ideals (Weber, 1930). Although the aim 
of this chapter is not to refute Weber’s thesis (since I agree with some of his 
remarks on disenchantment and rationalization), my data suggests a different 
approach to tackle the couplings between Zen, Vipassana and social change.  
 The various examples analyzed in this chapter highlight the importance 
of new webs of associations, automatisms and states of consciousness 
regarding a number of vignettes – Vipassana in prisons, Thich Nhat Hanh, 
social action and environmentalism. I will deploy a post-humanist interpretation 
of meditation and social change, highlighting the role played by technologies of 
the self in various social projects, offering alternative approaches to tackle 
human reformation or the environmental crisis and reinforcing the connections 
between subjectification and social worlds. 
  This post-humanist approach is influenced by three major insights. First, 
the work of Ingrid Jordt on Vipassana and social change in Burma. Jordt argued 
that transformations of consciousness operated by meditation (epistemic shifts, 
as she puts it) are the basis for a social movement that entangles personal 
practice, self-transformation and social morality: 
 “The meditation movement as institution represents the realization of the 
 systematization and acceptance of techniques of meditation meant to 
 create the necessary epistemic shift that will lead to a right-mindedness. 
 The outcome is a society-led movement that seeks to transform 
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 consciousness and individual morality and, in the process, create an 
 enlightened citizenry and a just society in keeping with Buddhist moral 
 principles.” (Jordt, 2007: 210)172 
 
 Although Jordt also mentions the role of morality, her approach 
recognizes the importance of transformations of consciousness and techniques 
of meditation in order to operate social change, instead of focusing exclusively 
on “ideas”. The second insight concerns Petteri Pietikainen’s notion of 
psychological utopianism: 
 “A form of social dreaming in which the attainment of an ideal state of 
 consciousness requires the employment of psychological insights and 
 methods that are effective in transforming the human personality and, 
 thereby, the whole of society and culture.” (Pietikainen, 2007: 16) 
 
 According to Pietikainen, psychological utopianism is supported by four 
assumptions – inner transformation, the interrelation between the structure of 
society and personality, an anthropological conception of illness and an anti-
historical mentality (Pietikainen, 2007: 20). Pietikainen’s remarks can be applied 
to the study of meditation. We are dealing with practices that aim at reshaping 
the self through the alteration of habitual webs of associations, displaying forms 
of social action that reflect the links between subjectivity and society. 
 Finally, and in order to reinforce the post-humanist “gaze” running 
through this chapter (and dissertation), my argument is also supported by 
Pickering’s (2010) reflections on cybernetics, suggesting that these nonmodern 
technologies also contributed to rethink the dynamics of the social world, 
including the transformation of psychiatric institutions (see chapter II). 
                                                             
172
 A similar argument can be found in Macy’s work on the Sardovaya Self-Help 
movement in Sri Lanka (Macy, 1983). Drawing upon the notion of dependent 
co-arising, paticca samuppada, Macy suggests that the Sardovaya movement is 
influenced by a particular ontological understanding, coupling social and self 
development: “Because reality is seen a dependently co-arising, or systemic in 
nature, each and every act is understood to have an effect on the larger web of 
life, and the process of development is perceived as being multidimensional.” 
(Macy, 1983:33) 
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 I suggest that the associations between meditation and social change 
should be understood as an extension of the devices of subjectification of 
meditation. This means that meditation assemblages translate social worlds into 
their technological correlates - according to Zen and Vipassana, the 
technologies of the modern self are inextricably entangled with the “problems” 
of the modern world, including deficient mechanisms to tackle human deviance, 
permanent war between opposing parties and the destruction of the 
environment. The “causes” of these problems lie in modern automatisms and 
webs of associations. In order to overcome them, technologies of meditation 
need to be deployed, transforming the world through the management of 
subjectivities. This model of social change relies on the intertwinement between 
selves and the world, and meditation becomes a mediator to perform a different 
version of the social that can emerge through the establishment of new webs of 
associations, automatisms and states of consciousness. The self becomes a 
microcosm of the world, whose dynamics can and should be altered through 
practices of meditation. 
 In order to explore these associations, this chapter will focus on three 
paradigmatic examples of the links between meditation and social change: the 
conduction of Vipassana courses in prisons, implying a redefinition of the 
disciplinary institution through the introduction of new actants and automatisms, 
understanding deviance according to the reactive model of nonmeditative 
subjectivity (see chapter V); Thich Nhat Hanh’s approach towards social change 
and the relationship between meditation and ecology – I analyze the links 
between Thich Nhat Hanh’s  movement and environmentalism, including the 
establishment of the Happy Farm in Plum Village. I also explore two vignettes 
that exemplify how meditation is used to tackle the environmental crisis – first, I 
focus on a practice developed by John Seed and Joanna Macy called “The 
Council of All Beings”, whose aim is to alter dominant anthropocentric couplings 
between humans and the environment; second, I analyze the establishment of 
an environmentalist political party in Portugal, examining the role played by 
meditative experiences and ways of being in reshaping political action. 
 
256 
 
 
 
VIII.II VIPASSANA IN PRISONS 
 
VIII.II.I INTRODUCTION 
 
 The first example I will explore concerns the introduction of Vipassana in 
prisons across the world, as an attempt to foster institutional transformation 
through meditation. According to Kornblum, prisons have three main functions: 
deterrence, rehabilitation and retribution (Kornblum, 2008, 204). Following 
Foucault (1995), the prison is a device for the normalization of deviant 
individuals, submitted to spatial, technological and legislature apparatuses that 
should produce more obedient and productive selves. Although ideas of 
normalization and reformation are already questionable, since they justify the 
manipulation of bodies and minds (sometimes through violent means), in 
practice prisons often become highly dystopian social systems that blatantly fail 
at “improving” people, rather becoming “schools for crime” (Califano, 1998). 
 The apparent inability of prisons, as social institutions, to work, seems to 
be illustrated by the usually dysfunctional relationships between inmates and 
prison staff. The Stanford Prison Experiment, conducted in 1971, simulated a 
prison environment with shocking results: those who were playing the role of 
guards became highly cruel, and the experiment had to be stopped, suggesting 
that the prison environment leads to sadistic behaviour towards inmates (Haney 
et al., 1973). More recently, the de-humanization processes linked to prisons 
(expanding Goffman’s remarks on processes of mortification, see Goffman 
1968) have been illustrated by the leaked photos of torture and abuse of 
prisoners in the Iraqi prison of Abu Ghraib and the images of the alleged 
“terrorists” in Guantanamo: there, the process of de-humanization reached an 
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extreme - “The detainees were wearing blacked out goggles, leg shackles, 
three-piece suits and ear muffs. Some had gloves on.”173 
 It was against this background of violence, shock and torture that often 
characterizes prisons that Vipassana was introduced in Indian prisons, in 1975, 
at the Central Jail of Jaipur. Shri Ramsingh Chauhan, Home Commissioner-
cum-Home Secretary of the Government of Rajasthan had participated in a 
Vipassana course some months earlier and decided to try it to rehabilitate 
“criminals” (Vidyalankar, 1977). 
 After this first course, Vipassana was introduced in many other prisons 
across India and in countries such as Taiwan, Thailand, Nepal, the USA, New 
Zealand and Britain (Hetherington, 2003: 110). The success of these courses 
led the Indian government to recommend them in prisons across the country – 
since 1994, approximately 26 prisons are conducting Vipassana courses 
regularly. This phenomenon has permeated popular culture due to the 
production of a number of documentaries (see chapter III). 
 The co-emergence of modern prison alongside the birth of the human 
sciences (Foucault, 1995) transformed imprisonment into an ongoing 
experiment for the rehabilitation of the soul. However, the telos of modern 
technologies to counter deviance was normalization, ideally able to produce 
efficient, productive and obedient subjects. Vipassana, when implemented in 
prison settings, becomes a tool for the integral development of the individual, 
fostering awareness towards emotions and supporting the introduction of new 
automatisms that should allow selves to overcome reactivity, becoming aware 
of themselves. 
  
 
 
 
                                                             
173
 http://edition.cnn.com/2011/10/28/world/meast/guantanamo-guard 
(Retrieved: 12/09/2013) 
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VIII.II.II VIPASSANA AS SELF-REFORMATION 
 
 The introduction of Vipassana in prisons is linked to an understanding of 
total institutions as prompting self reformation, moving away from pre-modern 
mechanisms of punishment and deliberate infliction of pain and from the 
modern appropriation of prison as a normalizing device. Vipassana envisions 
forms of reformation that aim at the totality of the individual, including his/her 
spiritual life. 
 Kiran Bedi became the new Inspector General of Tihar Jail in India in 
1993, and she soon found out that it was a hellhole. In her book “It’s Always 
Possible” (Bedi, 1998), she describes many of the problems the institution was 
facing when she first got there: the prison was overcrowded; inmates did not 
have access to free healthcare (the medical staff was insufficient) or drinking 
water and they had to pay for food; corruption was rampant because the staff 
was underpaid; gang-related violence was frequent and physical violence was 
systematically used by the guards; the place was infested with rats and insects; 
bureaucracy was highly disorganized, since most of the records were lost or 
archived in places taken over by pests. In sum, the prison was a filthy place 
where one could easily be killed by humans or diseases. After taking care of 
some of the organizational and health issues, Bedi realized that inmates’ minds 
had to be transformed in order to continue the process of institutional 
transformation, and she wished to possess “a magical therapy to help the 
inmates rid themselves of corrosive emotions.” (Bedi, 1998: 192) 
 Bedi was basically looking for a magic bullet. According to Whitaker, the 
magic bullet model in psychiatry relies on two particular premises: “First, identify 
the cause or nature of the disorder. Second, develop a treatment to counteract 
it.” (Whitaker, 2010: 29). After identifying the cause of the disorder (corrosive 
emotions) Vipassana is introduced as a set of spiritual performances that 
reshape one’s subjectivity. The transformation of the inner dynamics of the 
prison illustrates a shift to the paradigm of integral reformation, helping inmates 
to deal with emotions. However, the justifications for its introduction can vary, 
being eventually linked to dominant narratives concerning the figure of the 
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“productive citizen”, as put by Dean McGuire, the Security Operations Manager 
of the North Rehabilitation Facility in Seattle, in the documentary “Changing 
from Inside”:  
 “If you want people to change themselves, if you want inmates to stop 
 being inmates and become productive citizens, I believe that the resident 
 inmates have to…it’s on them, and what we can do is provide a way for 
 them to look at themselves, to look at their cravings and try to change 
 what’s wrong.” (Dean McGuire, Changing from Inside, 1998) 
 
 Although the risk of co-option is present (as we have seen in chapter VII, 
an important dimension of the critique of modern meditation is that it has been 
co-opted by neo-liberal regimes to foster well-being and quality of life, thus 
turning people more docile), the introduction of Vipassana meditation in prisons 
can also be interpreted as an attempt to foster more integral forms of education, 
including the awareness towards the body and emotions, involving the 
recruitment of techniques that should ideally bring about personal change. 
Before the first Vipassana course in 1975, other technologies of the self, such 
as Yoga and Pranayama (Iyengar, 1985), had already been implemented in the 
West (Vidyalankar, 1977), and Lucia Meijer, the Jail Administrator of the North 
Rehabilitation Facility in Seattle, had introduced courses on critical thinking, 
self-esteem, parenting, acupuncture, Tai Chi and stress reduction  (Bedi and 
Meijer, 2008: 311).  
 
VIII.II.III RECONFIGURING THE CARCERAL SPACE 
 
 In order to introduce Vipassana in prisons, spatial and material devices 
have to be carefully put in place to reproduce the retreat assemblage (analyzed 
in chapter IV) as accurately as possible, re-enacting the various webs of 
associations that constitute Vipassana’s psychogeography. 
 In the documentary “Changing from Inside” we learn that the course 
participants had to be separated from other inmates, requiring their own 
dormitory and exercise area and the staff had to learn a vegetarian menu to 
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prepare a special diet for them. A soundproof wall was built for the meditation 
hall, a unit usually used for office space and class rooms was transformed into a 
residence, offices were converted into dormitories, the space had to be 
separated according to the various areas of the retreat, such as sleeping areas, 
server areas, etc.. Since the participants already belonged to a total institutional 
prior to attending the course, security was integrated into the program, in order 
to maintain habitual procedures. The head count procedure had to be 
conducted with minimal distractions for the sake of concentration, therefore a 
member of staff, Ben Turner (also a Vipassana practitioner) served as the 
program manager, establishing a link between the logics of power of two 
assemblages: the prison (the host facility) and the Vipassana retreat. This 
elucidates the complexities of introducing Vipassana into a disciplinary 
institution. 
 The retreat depends on a variety of actants, such as video and 
audiotapes, cushions, vegetarian food, bells that signal transitions in the 
schedule, etc.. In the documentary “Dhamma Brothers” there is an interesting 
passage when the two Assistant Teachers are arriving and settling in. After 
unfolding their sleeping bags and preparing the room they were going to share, 
there is an image that I found particularly interesting, the box with the dozens of 
audio tapes with Vipassana instructions: 
ILLUSTRATION 3- STILL OF "DHAMMA BROTHERS", 2007, MINUTE 19. 
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 This box (illustration 3) belongs to a mobile assemblage that can 
penetrate all imaginable spaces, including prisons, supported by a variety of 
actants that perform meditative dispositions, as we have seen in chapter IV. 
The carceral space has to be filled with these material agents, including audio 
and videotapes, immutable mobiles (Latour, 1987) that materialize the practice 
of Vipassana.  
 A post-humanist understanding of social applications of meditation 
recognizes that these are entangled with the alteration of human automatisms 
and webs of associations, clashing with dominant carceral psychogeographies, 
and any incident that breaks this network can jeopardize the continuation of the 
retreat. Such incidents are not uncommon. In 1994, a course for about a 
thousand inmates was organized in the Tihar Prison, and the meditation hall 
consisted of a giant tent. In the documentary “Doing Time Doing Vipassana”, we 
learn that some hours after the beginning of the retreat a severe rainstorm took 
place and the tent collapsed, with all the rugs and cushions getting soaked. The 
course was on the verge of being cancelled, but instead the participants 
continued meditating in their barracks, and when the weather cleared up the 
organizers started rebuilding the infrastructure - by the evening, the meditation 
hall was rebuilt and the course went on. 
 The introduction of new actants, constraints and a diversity of forms of 
spatial reconfiguration support the implementation of a new psychogeography. 
This also extends to the habitual hierarchical distinction between those in power 
(guards, warden, etc.) and the inmates. According to Vipassana, these 
hierarchical distinctions are artificial. In chapter V, we have seen how 
Vipassana performances are deployed to transform regular automatisms, that 
are understood as linked to the craving/aversion mode of existence. In “Doing 
Time Doing Vipassana”, there is a sentence that illustrates this universal 
“condition”, not discriminating between prisoners and guards: “we are all 
prisoners undergoing a life sentence in prison by our own mind”174. Since the 
lack of awareness towards one’s habit patterns is universal, Vipassana disrupts 
commonly held assumptions about the radical separation between those in 
                                                             
174
 The author of this sentence is not identified, it could be Goenka; 
nevertheless, it is a faithful expression of the “spirit” of Vipassana. 
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power and those serving a sentence, and the hierarchical organization of the 
Prison is also reconfigured. 
 In practical terms, this means that Vipassana in prison can only be 
implemented if those in charge are (or become) meditators: only if they are 
willing to alter their own subjectivity they can implement Vipassana as a 
collective mechanism for self-transformation. Before deploying the 10-day 
Vipassana course at the North Rehabilitation Facility in Seattle, Lucia Meijer, 
the Jail Administrator, had to attend her first retreat at the Washington Centre, 
and in Tihar some of the staff also participated in the first course held in 
November 1993 (Hetherington, 2003: 124). Moreover, suggestions to use 
“Vipassana” as a device for reformation can come from those lower in the 
prison hierarchy – it was a guard who told Kiran Bedi that Vipassana could be 
the “magical therapy” she was looking for. This alteration of power relations 
between inmates, guards, staff members and director is linked to the 
transformation of the correctional facility into a Vipassana centre. Tihar Central 
jail even receives members of the public to meditate when other Centres are 
full, leading Bedi to suggest that instead of a prison it is now a monastery:  “Our 
prison has almost become a monastery. It’s a monastery that is full of joy and 
happiness, internal joy and internal peace.” (Bedi and Meijer, 2008: 313) 
 
VIII.II.IV IMPACTS 
  
 Several studies have been conducted on the “impacts” of these prison 
courses, including the first course conducted in Jaipur in 1975.  Independent 
“scientific studies” on the impacts of Vipassana on the 114 prisoners were 
conducted by Dr. T. K. Unnithan, Head of the Department of Sociology of 
Rajasthan University, and his colleagues and Kusum Shah, Lecturer at the 
College of Social Work in Nirmala Niketan, Mumbai. According to these studies, 
a variety of promising benefits were noticed (Vidyalankar, 1997)175.  Recent 
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 Decrease in blood pressure for those suffering of high blood pressure; relief 
of mental tensions; various prisoners gave up smoking; those suffering from 
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research suggests a decrease in substance use, alcohol-related problems and 
psychiatric symptoms and an increase in positive psychosocial outcomes 
(Simpson et al., 2007; Bowen et al., 2006). 
 Although these studies draw on a set of categories that presuppose 
moral judgments (thus being permeated by broader logics of power/knowledge, 
including statistical forms of reasoning) on aspects such as drug or alcohol 
consumption, violence and “abnormal” states of consciousness (such as 
psychotism)176, they indicate that the introduction of Vipassana in prisons can 
lead to the transformation of inmates.  
 The personal narratives provided by inmates who engage in meditation, 
in the book “Dhamma Brothers” (Philips, 2008), have strong similarities with my 
findings on the transformative power of meditation (see chapters VI and VII).  
 James George spent most of his life incarcerated, reminding us of 
Foucault’s characterization of the delinquent’s life as a “disciplinary career” 
permitted by the emergence of the carceral archipelago (Foucault, 1995). The 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
chronic headache, stomach-ache or constipation reported total or partial relief; 
negative emotions (such as hatred or vengefulness) were magically replaced by 
a general feeling of friendship and goodwill; after the course, productivity in the 
industries of the jail went up; many prisoners decided to live peaceful, pure lives 
in the future. (Vidyalankar, 1997: 53) 
 
176
 Davidson, following Foucault, suggests that the construction of sexual 
perversion by medicine is closely linked to morality: “It is not that medicine 
simply took over the study of what had once been a part of morality; moral 
deviation did not merely transform itself into disease. Instead, the moral 
phenomenon of the perversity of the will furnished a point of reference that both 
opened the way for and provided an obstacle to the medical constitution of 
perversion.” (Davidson, 1987: 48). Meditation research seems to reproduce this 
moral bias by explicitly distinguishing between destructive and healing emotions 
(see Goleman, 1997 and 2004), and the reported benefits of the introduction of 
Vipassana in prisons are also permeated by terms such as “positive 
psychosocial outcomes” or by an understanding of drug and alcohol 
consumption as inherently negative. This leads to the reproduction of moral 
prejudices and to the naturalization of legislative formations, implicitly 
supporting the persecution of particular substances and of those who use them. 
Moreover, recidivism studies, focusing on the statistical analysis of those who 
commit crimes after attending Vipassana courses in prison (see Parks et al., 
2003), link the “overall positive impact” (Parks et al., 2003: 3) of meditation 
courses to a reduction of substance abuse and psychoticism, reverberating 
dominant moral and legal discourses. 
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reasons for James’ incarceration were alcohol and drug related crimes, and in 
almost 40 years he has only been outside an institution for 25 months (Philips, 
2008: 40). In a letter, he wrote that: 
  “The changes I’ve noticed within myself made a remarkable difference in 
 the way I view things (equanimity). I’m able to deal with situations more 
 calmly than before because now I can see everything in a better 
 perspective.” (Philips, 2008: 85-86) 
 
 This process of transformation is consistent with the pattern of changes 
identified in the subjects I interviewed. The transformation of automatisms, that 
in some cases can lead to the development of emotions such as all-
encompassing love, kindness and compassion, is exemplified by the words of 
Omar Rahman, convicted for robbery and forgery:  
 “I am more caring. I am kinder. I am more gentle with myself and others. I 
 forget much easier now. I am happier … I have perceptional skills I 
 heretofore didn’t have, especially of what was happening within me. I 
 have skilful means to manage my experience more effectively.” (Philips, 
 2008: 115) 
 
 Before the popularization of Goenka-style Vipassana programs in prisons 
across the world, meditation courses (according to the Mahasi Sayadaw style of 
Vipassana) in prisons had been promoted by U Nu, the first prime-minister of 
Burma, in the 20th century. According to Jordt:  
 “The seriousness of the belief … that individuals became incorruptible 
 through achieving enlightenment was reflected by the fact U Nu 
 introduced Vipassana into the prisons. Those who “passed the course” 
 were given their permanent freedom. They were now considered 
 trustworthy people who would not transgress against other citizens.” 
 (Jordt, 2007: 30) 
 
 According to the documentaries and the literature, the inmates who 
apparently became accomplished meditators were not released following their 
spiritual transformation. In fact, the Vipassana program was even cancelled at 
the Donaldson facility in Alabama because it clashed with dominant Christian 
beliefs – those who wanted to continue meditating had to do so in semi-
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clandestine conditions (Philips, 2008). This illustrates a clash between two ways 
of understanding selves. On the one hand, the Vipassana formation reduces 
selves to assemblages whose level of reactivity can be modified according to a 
particular inner gaze – “deviance”, as a state of mind, is linked to nonmeditative 
ways of reproducing such reactivity and can be transformed through the 
installation of new automatisms. On the other hand, dominant 
conceptualizations of deviance mobilize legal systems to criminalize particular 
behaviours, bounding selves to disciplinary institutions. Subjects are only 
allowed to leave the institution after a pre-established period of time, the 
sentence, revealing a crystallized understanding of selfhood, instead of a plastic 
and flexible one, as in the case of Vipassana. Vipassana’s social applications, 
following the considerations of Jordt and Macy on the entanglements between 
ontology, social action and meditation, rely on a particular way of understanding 
humans, impermanent beings whose regular automatisms can be transformed. 
The practice of meditation becomes the antidote for deviance linked to the 
craving/aversion dialectic. 
 Although Vipassana courses were cancelled in Alabama, they are 
flourishing in other American and Western institutions, and in India they are 
actively encouraged by political power, indicating distinct civic epistemologies 
(Jasanoff, 2005) 177  that result in different ways of understanding human 
reformation and of deploying mechanisms to manage it.  
 Regardless of the success and popularity of these courses, they 
exemplify a particular form of developing social change through institutional 
reconfiguration, evidencing the corporeality of institutions (Friedland and Alford, 
1991). Vipassana assemblages are activated by actants, the management of 
space, constraints and assistant teachers that are able to bring forth the “retreat 
effect” and that alter the body of the prison in order to transform selves. Social 
transformation – including human reformation – is enacted through the 
mediation of Vipassana, requiring the re-enactment of the retreat assemblage 
and its webs of association in the carceral setting. The prison should become a 
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 Sheila Jasanoff defines civic epistemologies as “the institutionalized 
practices by which members of a given society test and deploy knowledge 
claims used as a basis for making collective choices.” (Jasanoff, 2005: 255) 
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faithful reproduction of the retreat centre, and inmates are transformed into 
Vipassana meditators, implying the emergence of new ways of understanding 
them and mobilizing what, in chapter V, I called standpoint psychologies, 
situated ways of tackling the human condition. The transformation of the prison 
setting generates new types of inmates, ideally equanimous towards 
sensations, in control of their dispositions/sankharas and generating metta 
towards other people.  
 Why are Vipassana courses in prison such a paradigmatic example of 
social change through meditation? First, it highlights the disciplinary character 
of Vipassana. The canonical 10-day retreat implements a set of constraints that 
resemble the prison setting. Likewise, nonmeditative selves are thought of as 
bound to eternal repetition, permanently reacting to pain and pleasure, deprived 
of agency, thus behaving as criminals who follow their instinctual nature and 
end up in jail. Second, Vipassana has a strong legislative dimension – as 
suggested in chapter V, the practice of Vipassana is deployed in order to see 
things as they truly are, objectively, according to the laws of nature, that are 
understood as universal. In that sense, the physical structure of prisons 
represents punishment, embodying the law of cause and effect - the disciplinary 
institution symbolizes the trap created by the human mind, bounding humans to 
the naturalization of regular, nonmeditative affect. In order to alter the human 
mind, the embodiment of prison itself has to be altered, freeing humans from 
attachment through the implementation of the equanimous gaze. Finally, 
prisons exemplify the Vipassana model of social transformation – institutional 
psychogeographies are transformed to allow self transformation. Other attempts 
to multiply this model include the organization of children courses. In such 
courses, children are submitted to a “soft” version of the retreat apparatus – 
they are able to play and talk, the courses are shorter and they only learn 
“anapana”.  
 These examples suggest that the 10-day courses are understood as a 
model for social change. This contrasts with Thich Nhat Hanh’s approach, as 
we will see in the following section. 
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VIII.III THICH NHAT HANH AND SOCIAL CHANGE 
 
VIII.III.I INTRODUCTION 
 
 If the model of social transformation advocated by Vipassana relies on 
the adaptation of institutions (such as prisons) to the retreat assemblage, Thich 
Nhat Hanh advocates the skilful mobilization of mindfulness in a diversity of 
situations. His actions contributed towards what today is called engaged 
Buddhism, generating a substantial amount of scholarly literature (Kotler, 1996; 
Queen and King, 1996; King, 2001; King, 2009), including a special issue of 
“Human Architecture”178.  
 He achieved notoriety during the Vietnam War, associating social 
activism with practices of meditation. It will not be possible to present in details 
all the relevant aspects of his actions during the Vietnam struggle (see Hanh, 
1993b and King, 1996), but a brief summary will be provided. 
 In 1965, he founded the School of Youth for Social Service, where young 
people were trained to become social workers and afterwards sent to poor 
areas, mostly to Southern regions (Khong, 2007: 70). These students went in 
groups and built homes, resettled refugees, harvested and sowed crops, taught, 
provided medical assistance and conducted many other projects (Berrigan, 
1993: 5). 
 Although Thay and his school didn’t take part in the conflict between pro-
Americans and communists, five SYSS members were abducted and shot in 
July 5 1967, and four of them died immediately.  The communists thought the 
SYSS were pro-American, and the pro-Americans thought they were 
communists (Khong, 2007: 105), therefore they were persecuted by both sides. 
 During the Vietnam War, engaged Buddhism promoted nonviolent action. 
On the one hand, there was an extensive work done by the SYSS - feeding, 
rebuilding, etc.; on the other hand, there was a spontaneous emergence of 
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 http://www.okcir.com/13HAVI3Su2008.html (Retrieved: 23/07/2013) 
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alternative tactics of nonviolence to try to stop the war. According to Thay, 
Vietnamese people were not concerned with the victory of the communists or 
anti-communists but with the cessation of the conflict179.  
 King identifies seven forms of Buddhist Engagement during the Vietnam 
War: 1) works of writers, poets, artists and composers that inspired and 
educated people, including Thich Nhat Hanh’s poetry; 2) Collective and 
individual fasting180; 3) Family altars were placed in the streets to block the path 
of tanks, a drastic action since these altars embody the familiar lineage; 4) 
Some people shaved their heads to look like a monk or nun, showing their 
support for the monastics; 5)  Civil disobedience, including strikes, the refusal to 
participate in the War or mass resignations; 6) Aiding and protecting deserters 
and draft resisters; 7) Self-immolations by monastics and laypersons to awaken 
and educate the population (King, 1996: 335-336). 
 Although Thich Nhat Hanh didn’t achieve the same prominence as 
Gandhi during the Indian struggle against British colonialism, he was particularly 
active in writing and speaking on behalf of peace, namely in the US (King, 2001: 
160).  He was particularly influential in raising the awareness on the conflict, 
and was nominated by Martin Luther King for the Nobel Peace Prize in 1967. 
However, the Vietnam conflict was just the beginning of a lifelong commitment 
to nonviolence. After the Vietnam War, he continued to be highly involved in 
social issues, including the rescue of the “boat people” (Vietnam war refugees) 
and the organization of retreats for Vietnam War veterans and for Israelis and 
Palestinians (see Hanh, 1993b and 2004). His approach is mediated by 
practices of mindfulness and by the nondual insight of Interbeing, transforming 
practices of meditation into a mediator to enact social activism. The equipment 
of mindfulness should ideally suspend the habitual divisions between members 
of opposing parties/countries/regions (communists and noncommunists, 
Americans and Vietnamese, Israelis and Palestinians), self and others.  
                                                             
179
 The fourteen precepts of Interbeing, ethical guidelines for those who join the 
Order of Interbeing, illustrate this concern with ideologies. The first precept 
reads as follows: “Do not be idolatrous about or bound to any doctrine, theory, 
or ideology, even Buddhist ones. Buddhist systems of thought are guiding 
means; they are not absolute truth.” (Hanh, 1997a: 17)  
180
 The monk Thich Tri Quang fasted for 100 days (Khong, 2007). 
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 By going through the history of his social engagement, I will explore three 
vignettes that show us the role of meditation in social change, including the 
mobilization of mindfulness for social action; the role played by emotions and 
the connections between individual practice and collective transformation. 
 
VIII.III.II MINDFULNESS AND SOCIAL ACTION 
 
 As the contemporary critique of modern meditation suggests, 
contemplative practices can be translated and applied in a variety of situations, 
eventually becoming a tool to increase productivity, well-being and efficiency, 
therefore being appropriated in ways that do not necessarily translate the 
intended programs of action of meditation teachers (see chapter VII). As Brian 
Daizen Victoria suggested (2006), Zen practices in Imperial Japan were widely 
used to support militarism and to transform soldiers into more effective killing-
machines. Currently, the US military is also using mindfulness techniques, and 
some studies suggest that it increases resilience to stress, becoming a form of 
mind fitness (Stanley and Jha, 2009; Stanley et al, 2011). The effectiveness of 
meditation, demonstrated by the plethora of scientific studies currently 
available, turns it into an application with the potential to enhance soldiers’ 
performance and resilience. It can help soldiers deal with “stressors” (the term 
used by Stanley and Jha, 2009), such as the vision of the mangled bodies of 
infants killed by bombs, and allow factory workers to become happier, more 
concentrated and efficient, conducting each task mindfully. Ron Purser and 
David Loy, in a recent article in the Huffington Post, suggest that we should 
distinguish between Right Mindfulness (samma sati) and Wrong Mindfulness 
(miccha sati), stressing that “the quality of awareness is characterized by 
wholesome intentions and positive mental qualities that lead to human 
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flourishing and optimal well-being for others as well as oneself.” (Purser and 
Loy, 2013)181 
 Although this distinction is moralist, it reinforces the importance of 
assessing the outcomes of mindfulness beyond the private sphere. Mindfulness 
is a secular translation of meditation practices, de-coupling them from traditional 
tenets such as community, ethical training and particular understandings of the 
world. As a mere “technique”, it can be used for a multiplicity of purposes, 
including those of contemporary neo-liberal societies and their focus on 
happiness (Binkley, 2011). The contemporary commodification of mindfulness 
contrasts with the use of meditation by Thich Nhat Hanh in order to achieve 
social transformation, challenging the status quo and in many occasions even 
risking the safety of the activists.  
 Firstly, mindfulness technologies were deployed to support social 
activists during the Vietnam War. As we have seen in the chapter VII, 
meditation should become an equipment that alters practitioners’ experience of 
everyday life.  Likewise, mindfulness as a way of being supported the peace 
movement in Vietnam. As the young Alcibiades was told by Socrates, if he 
wanted to become a politician first he had to practice upon himself (Foucault, 
2006) – likewise, a good social activist should be a diligent meditator. One of 
Thich Nhat Hanh’s early publications, “The Miracle of Mindfulness” (Hanh, 
2008b), had as its original subtitle “A Manual on Meditation for the use of young 
activists” – those who wanted to become socially active had to cultivate 
mindfulness. 
 There are various examples that illustrate these couplings between the 
peace movement and mindfulness. For instance, after the previously mentioned 
killing of the 5 SYSS social workers, Sister Chan Khong sought refuge in 
mindfulness:  
 “For three days and nights, I could hardly sleep. I dwelled in mindfulness, 
 reciting gathas… as I did my everyday activities: “Washing my hands, I 
 vow to have clean hands to embrace the path of love. I pray that the 
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 Purser, R. and Loy, D. (2013), Beyond McMindfulness. Huffington Post, 
07/01/2013. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ron-purser/beyond-
mcmindfulness_b_3519289.html (Retrieved: 14/09/2009) 
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 thoughts and deeds of those who killed my friends will be cleansed.”” 
 (Khong, 2007: 106) 
 
 In this case, mindfulness allowed Sister Chan Khong to maintain a 
compassionate attitude towards the perpetrators of the massacre. Mindfulness 
altered the habitual automatism of directing anger towards the aggressors and 
helped this activist, through the recitation of gathas, to endure these difficult 
times.  
 Secondly, mindfulness practices are also mobilized to gather those from 
opposite sides of the conflict, attempting to deal with it through meditation, 
translating social conflicts into paradigms of selfhood and their corresponding 
technologies, as I suggested in the introduction 182 . The attempt to use 
technologies of the self to deal with the conflict between Israelis and 
Palestinians has already been tried at the Esalen Institute 183 . Retreats for 
Israelis and Palestinians have been undertaken in Plum Village from 2001 
onwards, promoting a mindful approach to conflict resolution. During two weeks 
of intensive mindfulness practice, 15 to thirty members of these two belligerent 
sides come together (Hanh, 2004: 11).  
 These retreats expand the performative approach of Plum Village to the 
resolution of international conflicts. As Thay states, “The White House has 
organized many peace talks, but the White House has never offered the 
practices of deep relaxation, mindful walking and mindful eating so that we can 
embrace our anger and fear.” (Hanh, 2004: 15) 
 Instead of focusing on talking, participants are invited to engage in 
practices to calm their emotions, taking care of their selves, installing new 
automatisms. When their emotions are calmed down, then they can start 
looking deeply into themselves and others: 
                                                             
182
 The same process of individualization takes place in Vipassana. Goenka, in 
his speech to the "Millennium World Peace Summit" of the United Nations, 
stated that “If there is no peace in the mind of the individual, I do not understand 
how there can be real peace in the world. If I have an agitated mind, always full 
of anger, hatred, illwill and animosity, how can I give peace to the world? I 
cannot because I have no peace myself.” (Goenka, 2002a: 40) 
183
 See Friends of Esalen, Volume 19, Issue 1, Spring 2007. 
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 “Once we are successful in calming our emotions, we can begin the 
 practice of listening deeply to the other person to understand his or her 
 suffering. … This helps others understand our situation and our suffering. 
 … Once communication is possible, peace will be the outcome.  
 At the end of the retreat, Palestinians and Israelis come together to 
 report on the fruits of their practice and to discuss how to continue the 
 practice when they go back to the Middle East.” (Hanh, 2004: 16) 
 
 In a situation of war, the response of Plum Village is to get the citizens of 
the belligerent countries together, inviting them to practice mindfulness. 
Technologies of meditation are therefore mobilized to create empathy between 
members of opposite sides, mediating social conflicts. Empathy can be 
developed after practitioners are able to transform their automatisms, as we 
have seen in the previous chapters, supporting a new approach to conflict 
resolution. It has strong similarities with Vipassana in prisons – in both cases, a 
particular social phenomenon (“criminality” or “war”) is translated into meditative 
models of subjectivity. According to Vipassana, habitual, reactive automatisms, 
result in criminality; regarding Zen, unmindful ways of living lead to anger. In 
both cases, social conflicts are understood according to meditative models of 
the self, standpoint psychologies, and are solved through technologies that 
transform regular automatisms. According to Vipassana and Zen assemblages, 
subjectivity is key to understanding social phenomena, and this is linked to the 
third major appropriation of mindfulness as a technology for social change. 
 The final aspect I will address in this section concerns the use of 
technologies of the self in peace marches. In those events, hundreds or 
thousands of people meet to walk peacefully, generating a meditative and 
political choreography that intertwines inner transformation, technologies of the 
self (walking meditation) and the quest for peace. In 1982, Thich Nhat Hanh and 
his followers walked in New York for nuclear disarmament: 
 “There were a million Americans walking together that day. We were a 
 group of thirty people. A Zen teacher, Richard Baker-Roshi, asked me to 
 join the march, and I said, “Will I be allowed to walk peacefully in the 
 peace walk?” He said, “Yes, of course”.  So I joined, and our group 
 walked mindfully, and we blocked more than two hundred thousand 
 people behind us. Strangely enough, people accepted that, and they 
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 slowed down. Then the peace walk became more peaceful.” (Hanh, 
 2000: 12)  
 
 Those participating in the peace walk were altering the characteristic 
automatism of walking, demonstrating a different way of being that could inform 
nonmodern paradigms of political action. This massive choreography, coupling 
affective and aesthetic alterations prompted by mindfulness, exemplified an 
alternative way of doing politics – the self becomes a work of art (Foucault, 
1991b: 350) and the assembly of hundreds or thousands of slow, mindful 
walkers, generates a massive performance that contrasts with the habitual 
anthropotechnical scenario of modern cities. The performance of walking 
becomes the breeding ground for new ways of being, allowing us to reflect on 
the connections between subjectivity and politics. This reminds us of other 
attempts to couple performance, politics and spirituality. Antonin Artaud 
attempted to enact a radical, cruel version of Theatre, beyond discourse, turning 
it into a ritualistic and visceral process that entangles sounds, images, 
movements and gestures to radically affect the spectator – art and performance 
become a technology of the self: 
 
 “If we have come to attribute to art nothing more than the values of 
 pleasure and relaxation and constrain it to a purely formal use of forms 
 within the harmony of certain external relations, that in no way spoils its 
 profound expressive value; but the spiritual infirmity of the Occident, 
 which is the place par excellence where men have confused art and 
 aestheticism, is to think that its painting would function only as painting, 
 dance which would be merely plastic, as if in an attempt to castrate the 
 forms of art, to sever their ties with all the mystic attitudes they might 
 acquire in confrontation with the absolute... to link the theater to the 
 expressive possibilities of forms, to everything  in the domain of gestures, 
 noises, colors, movements, etc., is to restore it to its original 
 direction, to reinstate it in its religious and metaphysical aspect, is to 
 reconcile it with the universe.” (Artaud, 1958: 69-70) 
 
 As we have seen in the previous chapter, everyday life is a locus of 
power and resistance (Certeau, 1984), and these massive choreographies of 
walking meditation can be understood as acts of resistance through art. This 
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reminds us of alternative models of social transformation, including situationism 
(Trocchi, 1963) and politically engaged theatre (see Boal, 1979; Carvalho and 
Nunes, 2013). Moreover, these various examples highlight the role of emotions 
in activism, as I suggest in the following section. 
 
 
VIII.III.III THE ROLE OF EMOTIONS 
 
 According to Flam and King, emotions “connect the macro-politics to the 
micro-politics of social movements” (Flam and King, 2005: 3), mediating 
personal and collective action. Public demonstrations can assume a variety of 
formats: artistic performances; the destruction of property; the use of slogans 
and signs; shouting; sit-ins; hunger strikes; marches, etc.. According to Flam, in 
Western countries anger is the driving force directed at opponents (Flam, 2005: 
32). One expresses anger towards the government, the IMF, the European 
Central Bank, NATO or the WTO.  
 Thich Nhat Hanh suggests that there should be a continuity between the 
intended outcome of the demonstration and its format or mode of expression. 
One of Thich Nhat Hanh’s books is called “Being Peace” (Hanh, 1997c). Such 
an expression illustrates the correlations between the mindful self and broader 
social aspects. The focus on emotions and the inner realm calls for a new type 
of political subject, one who is able to maintain mindfulness and the awareness 
of Interbeing, living up to the maxim:  “There is no way to peace; peace is the 
way.” (Hanh, 1997a: 6) 
 This approach to political action, by emphasizing the continuity between 
inner and outer transformation, rejects forms of violent action; instead, these 
mechanisms of action, such as peace walks, are collective performances that 
aim at fostering emotions, such as compassion, through ahimsa, a Sanskrit 
word that is translated as “nonviolence” and that means harmlessness (Hanh, 
1993b: 65). Peace walks can be interpreted as collective displays of 
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mindfulness, and they serve as an example of an alternative way of being in the 
world: if the individual subject can transform his or her performance through 
walking meditation, the same can be done for a group – in that sense, when a 
group of people engages in a peace march, they are showing the rest of the 
world that a different political direction is possible through the transformation of 
performance/consciousness, as I have suggested in the previous section. This 
reinforces the couplings between the emotional apparatus and broader political 
aspects, including foreign policy – mindfulness becomes a form of political 
reasoning, thus justifying nonviolence and pacificism.  
 Some of my interviewees were attracted to Thich Nhat Hanh’s teachings 
because they realized that they represented a more integral approach to 
political action, without the usual dualism between subjectivity and political 
goals. As Jane puts it: 
 “That’s what drawn me to this practice, because it’s about engaged 
 Buddhism, it’s not just about contemplation…it’s actually about being 
 connected and engaged with the world, which…because when I was 
 younger, I was…I had a strong sense of justice as I was out 
 demonstrating, but it was actually an angry place to be, you know, and 
 fury…and…I would be the person who would throw the bottles of 
 cocktail…in terms of being violent in the name of peace…and obviously 
 that’s not actually very useful…and that’s one of the gifts of the teaching.” 
 (Interview, Jane, April 2011) 
 
 Neil, who was actively involved in Barack Obama’s first presidential 
campaign, told me that he was fascinated when he attended a peace walk led 
by Thich Nhat Hanh, and that it was radically different from what he was used to 
in terms of political action: 
 “The difference and contrast was just incredible – everything was 
 anti…anti Bush, anti war, anti… fuck Bush…signs in black and 
 red…angry and dark atmosphere at the protest… no matter what we did 
 nothing mattered…with the peace walk it was completely different… I 
 was not only happy throughout it but people were…what’s going on? 
 Really coming over and checking out…reflecting on that, I realized that to 
 really make something happen you have to act out of your positivity, out 
 of feeling good.” (Interview, Neil, February 2011) 
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 Neil’s words strengthen the assumption that we are facing a radically 
different form of social action – instead of being supported by anger, it is driven 
by what he calls “positivity”. One can obviously question the pragmatic effects of 
Thich Nhat Hanh’s models of social action. Thich Nhat Hanh himself recognized 
that his endeavours in Vietnam and with the boat people were not entirely 
successful (King, 2001)184. However, in order to “assess” the results of these 
models for social transformation we have to bear in mind that they rely on a 
relational ontology (see chapter V), suggesting that inner and outer realms are 
interconnected. This means that peace between nations or opposing parties 
cannot be achieved if selves are not maintaining mindfulness. Social change 
thus involves an epistemic shift (as put by Jordt, 2007), being understood 
according to a relational paradigm of the world that questions regular ways of 
understanding the effects of certain actions. The aim of the following section is 
to reflect on this important aspect. 
 
VIII.III.IV INNER/OUTER CONNECTIONS 
 
 Another major trend in Thich Nhat Hanh’s vision of social change 
concerns the entanglement between personal practice and wider social world. 
This was already exemplified by the application of mindfulness in various 
contexts, as well as by the connection between a particular way of being and 
political goals (such as peace between opposing parties). However, these 
connections are not merely symbolic, they are linked to nonmodern 
                                                             
184
 I had the chance to ask a member of one of Israel’s Sanghas if the Israeli-
Palestinian initiatives were successful, but he told me it was difficult to create a 
common ground for dialogue because Israelis were mostly concerned with 
family matters while Palestinians were worried about the occupation (see also 
Sharqaw, 2008). According to King, the apparent failure of mindfulness to 
achieve substantial social consequences is due to its focus on means and not 
ends: “Since meditation teaches a person to act without regard to 
consequences, one should not be surprised that social action inspired by 
contemplative vision is not always efficacious. The important thing is that it be 
carried out with integrity.” (King, 2001: 161) 
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understandings of causality, intertwined with meditative ontologies, as we have 
seen in chapters V and VII. 
 In practical terms this means that, according to Thich Nhat Hanh, social 
phenomena (such as wars) or political leaders are representations of individual 
consciousness. Human consciousness is understood as a microcosm of 
politics. We have already seen how Vipassana and Zen mechanisms of 
subjectification reshape usual webs of associations and automatisms to enact 
individual change. These webs of subjectification are not merely one-sided and 
material – according to Thich Nhat Hanh, individual consciousness also 
produces a feedback loop that influences group or world consciousness. Such a 
feedback loop (one is subjectified by particular social assemblages, that, in turn, 
are influenced by human consciousness) justifies the fact that political action 
has to be conducted according to mindful principles (thus rejecting 
Machiavellianism) because there is no distinction between individual conduct 
and the “outcomes” of human activity. As Hanh states: 
  “If we look deeply, we will observe that the roots of War are in the 
 unmindful ways we have been living. We have not sown enough seeds of 
 peace and understanding in ourselves and others, therefore we are co-
 responsible …” (Hanh, 1993b: 66) 
 
 In this case, Hanh suggests that technologies of the self and individual 
practice are the “basis” of broader social aspects such as war. The same takes 
place regarding elected leaders – these are a reflection of human 
consciousness: 
 “You may think that the way to change the world is to elect a new 
 President, but a government is only a reflection of society, which is a 
 reflection of our own consciousness. To create fundamental change, we, 
 the members of society, have to transform ourselves.” (Hanh, 1993b: 65) 
 
 These words remind us of Clausewitz’ aphorism that war is politics by 
other means (Clausewitz, 1989). In this case, war and politics are understood 
as consciousness by other means, emerging as the result of technologies of the 
self and ways of being. This justifies the assumption that social action has to 
follow principles of mindfulness. Peace marches, involving the coordinated 
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mobilization of hundreds or thousands of bodies, are not merely visual events 
but also energetic ones, involving skilful ways of redirecting collective energy in 
order to transform broader political spheres. 
 This means that, according to Thich Nhat Hanh’s proposal, political and 
personal transformation are intertwined – the transformation of individual habit 
patterns thus reflects on the “collective mind”. Similar claims have been made 
by the Transcendental Meditation (TM) movement, as we have seen in chapter 
IV – supposedly, the continuous practice of TM can influence its environment 
(see chapter IV), generating the so-called “maharishi effect” (Radin, 2009). 
Modern and dominant ways of understanding causality obviously dismiss these 
assumptions: dualistic understandings of the world postulate that body and 
mind are two separate entities. However, there are alternative conceptions that 
postulate real connections between individual and broader forms of 
consciousness, allowing the emergence of episodes of synchronicity such as 
those analyzed in chapter VII. These alternative conceptions may assume a 
variety of terms, such as collective unconscious (Jung, 1959), noosphere 
(Chardin, 2004); morphic fields (Sheldrake, 2011), field consciousness (Radin, 
2009), and, of course, Interbeing, contesting the “binary opposition between the 
individual and society.” (Carrette, 2007: 71) 
 In practical terms this means that individual behaviour, according to 
Thich Nhat Hanh, is an important dimension of social transformation. An 
excellent example concerns the relationship between meditation and ecology, 
illustrating how technologies of the self are used to deal with the current 
environmental crisis.   
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VIII.IV MEDITATION AND ECOLOGY 
 
VIII.IV.I INTRODUCTION 
 
 We could argue that modern versions of selfhood are ontologically 
separated from the environment, and nature is considered a standing reserve 
(Heidegger, 1977) whose only goal is to become raw matter. According to the 
disenchanted version of the world, nature is a mere set of elements arranged 
according to a mechanistic logic that can be controlled by the unveiling of 
“universal laws” as articulated in Newtonian physics. According to this version, 
the world is ontologically inferior to “humans” thus rendering all the nonhumans 
(plants, animals, minerals, etc.) to the status of mere objects that can be used 
to serve our needs. Animals are turned into food and clothes; the earth is drilled 
to fuel the engines of our cars; trees are chopped to warm us and to print 
books, supposedly exemplifying our “superior” culture, and while humans do all 
these things (including killing animals through gruesome methods) they are 
usually morally detached and unable to connect with nonhumans.  
 Ecology, understood as the set of associations between humans and 
nonhumans, is part of STS’ body of scholarly literature. It has been tackled from 
various perspectives, implicating decentred and post-humanist analyses of 
social systems (Callon, 1986; Pickering, 2001; Latour, 2005), the recognition of 
the need of new socio-technical interventions to deal with “risks” (Jasanoff, 
2005; Callon et al., 2001; Beck, 1992) the deconstruction of human “identity” 
due its new associations with nonhumans (Haraway, 1991 and 2003) or the 
identification of new scientific and technological paradigms that perform nondual 
and collaborative relationships between humans, machines and the 
environment (Pickering, 2010). 
 Latour, in “Politics of Nature” (Latour, 2004b) offers a systematic and 
complex account of the parliament of things (Latour, 1991), a political model to 
bring the “nonhumans” to the democratic process, challenging dualistic and 
modern versions of the relationship between humans and nonhumans. This 
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includes the participation of scientists, politicians, economists and moralists who 
have different functions in order to represent the collective, contributing towards 
novel ways of thinking about the politics of nature in democratic societies: 
 “Democracy can only be conceived if it can freely traverse the now-
 dismantled border between science and politics, in order to add a series 
 of new voices to the discussion, voices that have been inaudible up to 
 now, although their clamor pretended to override all debate: the voices of 
 nonhumans. To limit the discussion to humans, their interests, their 
 subjectivities, and their rights, will appear as strange a few years from 
 now as having denied the right to vote of slaves, poor people, or women.” 
 (Latour, 2004b: 68) 
 
 I suggest that meditation can offer an interesting alternative to dominant 
modes of understanding the human/nonhuman divide, contributing towards 
Guattari’s “ecology of mind”. According to Guattari, following Bateson (1972), in 
order to tackle the contemporary ecological crisis it is necessary to deploy three 
types of ecology: the environmental, the social and the mental. New ecological 
archipelagos (including mental ones) must contemplate the development of new 
aesthetic practices – they must be supported by technologies of the self –  “We  
need new social  and  aesthetic  practices,  new  practices  of  the  Self  in 
relation  to  the  other,  to  the  foreign,  the  strange  -  a whole programme  that  
seems far  removed  from  current  concerns.” (Guattari, 2000: 68) 
 This integral approach to environmentalism is supported by ideas 
emerging from the Deep Ecology Movement. We have seen, in chapters VI and 
VII, how meditation alters the experience of the environment, in some cases 
generating nonmodern experiences that include phenomena of nonduality. 
However, I believe that a more systematic account of the connections between 
meditation and ecology should be provided. In order to do so, I will analyze 
three examples: the deeply ecological nature of Thich Nhat Hanh’s project of 
the self and two vignettes that exemplify the links between meditation practice 
and ecology: Joanna Macy’s and John Seed’s “Council of All Beings”, a ritual 
that aims at allowing communication between humans and nonhumans and the 
formation of an environmentalist political party in Portugal.  
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VIII.IV.II THICH NHAT HANH AND ECOLOGY 
 
 The links between Thich Nhat Hanh’s Order of Interbeing and ecology 
are vast. I am not suggesting that Vipassana does not offer new ways of 
recreating the self to abandon anthropocentrism185; however, with Thich Nhat 
Hanh the links between meditation and environmentalism are explicit, and he 
has written extensively on the topic (see, for instance, Hanh, 1993, 2008c and 
2013). I will elaborate on four main aspects: the ontology of Interbeing; the 
ecological dimension of technologies of mindfulness; the role of ecology in Plum 
Village and the five mindfulness trainings. 
 First, the notion of Interbeing contrasts with modern dualistic accounts of 
the split between humans and the world (see chapter V). At the ontological 
level, there is an interpenetration between all existing entities, and this 
nonmodern account of the world supports ecology by questioning the “key 
assumptions of [the] Judaeo-Christian/Marxist/humanist tradition” (Seed, 1988: 
9), including anthropocentrism. According to one of my interviewees, Ursula, 
Interbeing turned her ecological consciousness more “spiritual”, because now 
she has a worldview that sustains her political involvement in environmental 
causes. 
 Second, technologies of mindfulness support a symmetrical relationship 
between humans and nonhumans. This includes hugging trees, contemplating 
the landscape, becoming aware of food chains, the weather and all the 
heterogeneous elements that are part of socio-spiritual networks. The 
awareness of Interbeing can thus be understood as an antidote to disenchanted 
modes of existence. These practices could, therefore, be understood as 
technologies of the “ecological self” (Devall, 1995), contrasting with the 
mainstream technologies of detachment deployed by education or the 
workplace that can, as I suggested in chapter VII, become anti-programs, 
jeopardizing the practice of meditation. 
                                                             
185
 In fact, and according to Rob, after his Vipassana course he decided that 
“Whenever possible I’m not going to fly anywhere because of the emissions and 
environment and everything”  (Interview, Rob, October 2011). 
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 Third, in Plum Village there is currently an attempt  to couple mindfulness 
with ecology through the development of the “Happy Farm”, partly influenced by 
permaculture, an approach that “involves the design of sustainable agricultural 
systems and human habitats that mimic the patterns and relationships found in 
natural ecologies” (McManus, 2010:162). According to Stuart Watson, a long-
term lay resident in Plum Village, the idea was to initially expand the gardens in 
the French Monastery in order to produce food for the community. The project 
started officially in February 2013. According to Stuart, 
  “For the first year we made a system of 32 raised beds each of about 42 
 metres squared growing surface. So the total growing space is 
 something like 1300 metres squared which is quite a lot of space. By 
 comparison my garden in Upper hamlet had around 100 metres of 
 growing space. 
 Already we have had big harvests of many vegetables such as cabbage, 
 courgette, kale, salad and more. It has been very successful so far. 
 We are not using permaculture principles so much although all of us are 
 inspired by permaculture. The idea was for the first couple of years to 
 learn how to grow a lot of food using conventional organic techniques 
 and from there start to move slowly in the direction of even more natural 
 and sustainable methods.” (Stuart Watson, Private Communication, June 
 2013) 
 
 An interesting aspect concerning the Happy Farm is that all the work is 
conducted in mindfulness, it is a form of working meditation (see chapter V). 
According to Stuart, that means that those who work there follow the schedule 
as much as possible, practice walking meditation, have a weekly sharing and 
“We all try and bring moment to moment awareness to the work we are doing, 
the beauty of the surroundings, and the movements of our mental formations.” 
(Stuart Watson, Private Communication, June 2013)186 
 New forms of environmental intervention are actively promoted by 
communities teaching meditation in the tradition of Thich Nhat Hanh, even 
offering courses on permaculture as part of their retreats. For instance, the 
School of Interbeing, in the south of Oregon, US, organized a course where 
                                                             
186 The Happy Farm is currently accepting donations  
https://fundrazr.com/campaigns/0RtH4?psid=bc6032c7b6f1474e91d62f35d34f0
e99 (Retrieved: 14/09/2013). 
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practices of social and personal transformation were connected, including 
alternative ways of dealing with the environment. During the first week, students 
learned yoga, meditation and self massage to develop the necessary tools for 
self care. In the second week, the Self in Relation was explored, focusing on 
conflict resolution and communication. Finally, this course also encompassed 
the relationship between humans and nature, introducing the participants to 
organic gardening and permaculture (Francis, 2003: 49). This suggests that 
mindfulness practice is coupled with alternative modes of dealing with the 
environment. 
 Finally, the last aspect concerns the five mindfulness trainings, forms of 
rephrasing the five classical Buddhist precepts: do not kill, do not steal, do not 
consume intoxicants, do not lie, do not engage in sexual misconduct. The 
reformulation of the first precept (not killing), designated as reverence for life, is 
salient: 
 “Aware of the suffering caused by the destruction of life, I am committed 
 to cultivating compassion and learning ways to protect the lives of 
 people, animals, plants, and minerals. I am determined not to kill, not to 
 let others kill, and not to support any act of killing in the world, in my 
 thinking, and in my way of life.” (Hanh, 1993: 8) 
 
 We are facing a geocentric rather than an anthropocentric worldview 
where the notion of the collective is expanded to include animals, plants and 
minerals. This “expansion” of the ethical circle (Singer, 1981) finds echoes not 
only in deep ecology but also in the decentred and post-humanist articulations 
between the natural and the social. As the phenomenological reports of peak 
experiences with meditation indicate, as well as the performative alterations 
promoted by this regime of subjectification, the expansion of the ethical circle is 
linked to particular forms of experiencing the body, the environment, other 
humans and nonhumans. In sum, the transition from a humanist to a geocentric 
ethics is allowed by new webs of associations and automatisms that unveil 
different ways of experiencing the self and the world. In practice, this means 
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that some meditators become vegetarian187 or vegan and, according to Kaza,  
“this may mean withdrawal from consumer addictions to products with large 
ecological impacts, such as coffee, cotton, computers, and cars” (Kaza, 2000: 
168), as well as engaging in a variety of forms of environmental activism, as in 
the case of some of my interviewees. The role played by meditation is to 
radically alter dominant forms of experiencing human/environment couplings. 
The following two vignettes will exemplify how meditation offers alternatives to 
rethink these couplings. Initially, I will focus on the efforts undertaken by two 
meditators, Joanna Macy and John Seed, to develop tools to allow humans to 
experience interconnectedness - “The Council of All Beings”. Afterwards, and 
informed by an interview with an experienced meditator and Dharma Teacher in 
Portugal, I will explore how the practice of meditation influenced the creation of 
an environmentalist party. 
VIII.IV.III THE COUNCIL OF ALL BEINGS 
 
 Technologies of the self can question dominant assumptions about the 
human/nonhuman divide. The 20th century Indian sage Ramana Maharshi had a 
very close connection with animals, and there are stories about monkeys and 
squirrels being attracted by the strong presence of the guru of Arunachala 
(Devotees, 2008); similarly, St Francis, the Christian saint, is often mentioned 
as an example of how spirituality can foster biocentrism  (Sessions, 1984). 
Informed by the transformations of consciousness and processes of 
identification prompted by contemplative technologies, two meditators, John 
Seed and Joanna Macy, developed a practice whose aim is to raise 
environmental awareness.  
 This practice, called “Council of All Being”, is currently enacted in 
workshops around the world to allow participants to abandon their skin-
encapsulated ego and to identify with nonhumans, following Arne Naess’ call 
(1995) for a deeper, more comprehensive subjectivity. It is a meditative version 
                                                             
187
 That is my case. After my second Zen retreat, in 2011, I have been following 
a vegetarian diet. 
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of Latour’s Parliament of things, drawing on the transformation of regular 
automatisms to enact new paradigms of selfhood. 
  John Seed became involved in environmental activism after a regular 
meditation practice, and at a certain point he had a nondual experience with the 
forest 188 , thus embodying Naess’ version of ecosophy as relying on the 
identification with nonhumans (Naess, 1995). The Council of All Beings follows 
this call and consists of a set of practices to overcome anthropocentrism, 
contributing towards a symmetrical relationship between humans and 
nonhumans. According to Macy and Fleming, 
 “The name “Council of All Beings” has come to be used in two ways. In 
 the narrower sense, it refers to a ritual form, a council circle of one-and-
 a-half or two or three hours, where people gather to speak in behalf of 
 other species. The term is also used more inclusively to refer to a longer 
 process, one that runs from one to several days and includes exercises 
 and activities leading up to and flowing from the ritual proper.” (Macy and 
 Fleming, 1988a: 97) 
 
 There are three phases in this council: mourning, remembering and 
speaking from the perspective of other life-forms (Seed, 1988: 14). Initially, one 
should be able to hear the cry of the Earth, as put by Macy and Fleming: 
“Joanna often quotes the words of the poet Thich Nhat Hanh: What we most 
need to do is to hear within ourselves the sounds of the Earth crying.” (Macy 
and Fleming, 1988a: 103). Mourning usually involves the display of sorrow and 
compassion towards the destruction of the environment. It can include telling 
eco-stories, recalling an experience where one felt the presence and pain of the 
environment or honouring endangered species. 
 The second part of the procedure involves remembering: participants 
should realize that they are deeply entangled with nonhumans, becoming aware 
of interconnectedness. This is achieved through various methods, including a 
process called “evolutionary remembering”, where participants are asked to lie 
down or sit in a comfortable position and go through a guided meditation on the 
                                                             
188
 “All of a sudden, the forest was inside me and was calling to me, and it was 
the most powerful thing I have ever felt.”  (Seed: 1992) 
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origins of the Universe and the evolution of life. (Macy and Fleming, 1988a: 
106) 
 Finally, the Council includes speaking for a nonhuman entity. Before 
doing so, one isolates him/herself in meditation to identify with a nonhuman. 
One can, for instance, allow a mountain to emerge (in vision, felt sense, etc.). 
After the being emerges, one practices meditation on the entity to become one 
with the nonhuman. After this process in solitude, all participants (ideally 
wearing masks) can be assembled and the ritual begins. When an entity wants 
to speak, the human representing it holds up his or her hand: 
 “Humans! I, Mountain, am speaking. You cannot ignore me! I have been 
 with you since your very beginnings and long before. For millennia your 
 ancestors venerated my holy places, found wisdom in my heights. I gave 
 you shelter and far vision. Now, in return, you ravage me. You dig and 
 gouge for the jewel in the stone, for the ore in my veins. Stripping my 
 forests, you take away my capacity to hold water and to release it slowly. 
 See the silted rivers? See the floods? Can’t you see? In destroying me 
 you destroy yourselves. For Gaia’s sake, wake up!” (Macy and Fleming, 
 1988b: 87) 
 
 After some rounds of interventions, the ritual leader thanks the entities for 
expressing themselves and asks them to share their powers with the 
participants. These “gifts” can include the far-seeing-eye of the condor, the 
deep peace of the mountain or the fragrance of the wildflower (Macy and 
Fleming, 1988b: 88-89). This ritual is not an end in itself. Its aim is to form new 
environmental activists and to support their actions by providing them with 
alternatives to anthropocentric ways of being. This ritual is a practical form of 
combining deep ecology with technologies of the self, supporting a 
transpersonal picture of subjectivity 189 , including the identification with 
nonhumans. 
 This council should produce real-world impacts - the aim of this 
comprehensive sense of self is to provide a “larger context for action” (Seed, 
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 This picture is brilliantly described by Fox:  “Broadening and deepening our 
identification ... with the world around us leads us from a relatively narrow, 
atomistic, isolated, or particle-like sense of self to a wide, expansive, 
participatory, or field-like one.” (Fox, 1993: 241) 
287 
 
1988: 15). This ritual is not a substitute for action, it is an integral part of 
environmental activism, as mindfulness is the support of Thich Nhat Hanh’s 
social actions. John Seed has been an active environmentalist for the past 30 
years, being involved in the successful campaign to save the sub-tropical 
rainforest of New South Wales, Australia, having subsequently founded the 
Rainforest Information Centre190. Ideally, the Council should allow participants 
to go through the same process of identification that led John to become an 
environmental activist – the role of this parliament is not to be a mere platform 
for discussion but to foster real-world action informed by the insight of 
interconnectedness. This initiative reinforces the role of meditation in the 
development of new aesthetic tools for social intervention. In the case of the 
Council, meditation is explicitly used to foster phenomena of identification with 
nonhumans and to allow participants to feel empowered and to act in the real 
world. 
 
VIII.IV.IV MEDITATION AND ENVIRONMENTALISM IN PORTUGAL 
 
 The second example I would like to explore concerns the foundation of 
an environmentalist party in Portugal, led by an advanced meditator who 
happens to be the president of the Portuguese Buddhist Union, the largest 
Buddhist organization in that country. I had the chance to interview Paulo 
Borges, professor of Philosophy at the University of Lisbon, in May 2013. The 
main aim of this interview was to clarify some practical aspects of meditation as 
well as to understand the articulations between meditative states of 
consciousness and environmentalism. 
 Paulo Borges is currently the president of PAN – Party for the Animals 
and Nature, which was founded in 2009. Initially, the party was going to follow a 
model similar to the Dutch Party for the Animals, Partij voor de Dieren, PvdD, 
becoming the Portuguese Party for the Animals. However, Paulo Borges 
realized that a party for the animals would be restrictive, and he managed to 
                                                             
190
 http://www.rainforestinfo.org.au/aboutthe.htm (Retrieved: 14/06/2013) 
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turn it into a more holistic political project, including human and nonhuman 
animals as well as the environment. Although many of its members are 
Buddhists, this party includes subjects from various religions, and individuals 
are understood as embedded in a larger system that includes other humans, 
nonhumans and the environment. 
 According to the manifesto of PAN, 
 “The Party for the Animals and Nature supports all initiatives that aim at 
 improving the living conditions of men, in harmony with nature and other 
 species. The Party for Animals and Nature will support and promote in 
 particular those actions that aim at increasing human sensitivity and 
 consciousness regarding the obvious fact that all living beings equally 
 seek happiness, well-being and the cessation of suffering. Consequently, 
 the Party for the Animals and Nature serves the development of man 
 himself, supporting the implementation of a new mental, ethical and 
 civilizational paradigm that allows humanity to develop fraternity and 
 solidarity with the universe and all living beings”191. 
 
 PAN’s political programme is comprehensive, encompassing a variety of 
fields that include culture, the economy, the refoundation of the State, ecology, 
animal well-being, social policy, nutrition, agriculture, health, education, justice 
and the military. Some of the proposed measures include the promotion of 
ecological values; the dissemination of permaculture and urban agriculture; 
banning all patents on living organisms, including seeds, and turning Portugal 
into a GMO-free zone; the inclusion of animal rights in the Portuguese 
Constitution; the promotion of a more diversified, healthy, ethical and 
sustainable diet, advocating vegetarianism and the consumption of organic 
food. 
 One could argue that the aim of these various proposals is the 
constitution of an ecotopian society, “one that operates in interactive harmony 
with ecological systems, with humans and nonhuman nature mutually 
flourishing” (Barnhill, 2011: 126). This new version of society has implications 
on a variety of levels, challenging habitual relationships between humans and 
nonhumans, fostering new tools for self formation (prescribing dietary changes 
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 PAN’s Manifesto - http://www.pan.com.pt/manifesto.html (Retrieved: 
12/08/2013) 
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and the transformation of contemporary education) and the development of new 
agricultural and economic paradigms. In sum, there is an attempt to produce a 
new man and a new social order, coupling self and world change, attributing a 
biocentric dimension to contemporary projects of governmentality. 
 I was particularly interested in understanding how meditation 
assemblages contributed towards the creation of this party, if new webs of 
associations, automatisms and experiences supported this different worldview. 
According to the interviewee, meditation and social change are entangled in 
three different ways. First, meditative states of consciousness can foster the 
experience of interconnectedness, allowing the meditator to experience 
nonduality, suspending the boundaries between self and the world: 
 “I have seen many people with ecological concerns starting a meditation 
 practice, but I also see it the other way around, people who have 
 experiences with meditation becoming interested in environmental and 
 ecological issues, in a more encompassing ethic, including not only 
 humans but also the environment, animals, the world...that is clear to me, 
 and it is one of most notable and exciting aspects of meditation, that 
 deep interpenetration between those two dimensions, meditation and the 
 nonhuman world, an interest and a respect...a consideration and a 
 deeper ethical care regarding other living beings and the natural world in 
 general, that is very clear.  I believe that the experience of meditation 
 makes us realize that we are not separated, we are not separated from 
 anything or anyone, we are not separated from any form of life, whether 
 animate or inanimate, the meditative experience allows us to feel the 
 non-separateness between what we call the self and the world.” 
 (Interview, Paulo Borges, May 2013) 
 
 Paulo Borges’ words suggest that the practice of meditation leads to the 
emergence of an extended version of the self, as I argued in chapter VII, 
allowing the enactment of different ways of experiencing and living in the world, 
suspending the usual boundaries between self and reality. Meditation can 
eventually trigger an interest in environmentalism and can also allow 
environmentalists to explore nondual forms of consciousness that justify 
different ways of dealing with the nonhuman world, generating what Paulo 
Borges calls respect and a deeper ethical care.  
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 Secondly, these changes in consciousness and affect support forms of 
political action and, according to the interviewee, they highlight the engaged 
dimension of Buddhism: 
 “I resonate with Thich Nhat Hanh’s idea that engaged Buddhism is the 
 authentic Buddhism. You cannot be a Buddhist if you are not totally 
 aware, if we do not practice mindfulness towards everything that 
 surrounds us, without responding lovingly and compassionately to what 
 the contemporary social reality requires.” (Interview, Paulo Borges, May 
 2013) 
 
 Although the interviewee used the notion of Buddhism and Buddhist to 
exemplify the connections between experience and social action, contrasting 
with some of the remarks in chapter II that call for the suspension of the notion 
of religion, he explicitly suggested that mindfulness is not limited to the self – it 
should be used to deal with the world, including contemporary social reality, 
reinforcing its relational dimension (see chapter V). This obviously contradicts 
the assumption that religious practices are nowadays individualized (Carrette 
and King, 2005; Davie, 2000), that “religion no longer has a key role to play in 
the organization of European societies” (Fadil, 2005: 143). According to my 
interviewee, new practices of the self do in fact contribute to the re-organization 
of contemporary societies, allowing the emergence of particular experiences 
that can even lead to the formation of new political parties. Far from being 
insignificant and only affecting the private life of individuals, these 
anthropotechnics can be understood as belonging to the set of those new 
aesthetic practices that Guattari (2000) wrote about while reflecting on ecology.  
 Finally, practices of meditation can also become tools192 to foster social 
transformation. Paulo Borges, inspired by Thich Nhat Hanh’s proposals, created 
the “Circle of Interbeing”, an association that promotes the teachings and ethical 
standpoints of the Vietnamese Zen Master. In May 2013, hundreds of people 
                                                             
192
 This has some similarities with Deleuze’s view of theory as a toolbox. 
According to him, “A theory is exactly like a box of tools. It has nothing to do 
with the signifier. It must be useful. It must function.” (Deleuze and 
Foucault,1977: 208). In the case of meditation, we are dealing with a mediator 
that has the potential to trigger social change but that can also escape the 
control of its designers (see chapter VI), it is not a passive tool. 
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have gathered across Portugal to participate in an event called “Sitting and 
Walking in Peace and in Silence”193, practicing sitting and walking meditation 
together as an expression of inner and outer peace. According to Paulo Borges, 
these are nonviolent tools for political change, extending the practice of 
mindfulness to the social field, contrasting with conventional ways of doing 
politics, as it has been suggested in this chapter: 
 “I believe that we need to recreate civic and political action. From my 
 perspective, we have to recreate them from the standpoint of spiritual 
 experience, the experience of meditation. We need to act and to 
 intervene civically, socially, publicly and politically in peaceful, nonviolent 
 and nondual states of consciousness. I believe that it will be the silent 
 revolution of the 21st century. Forms of civic, public and political 
 intervention influenced by meditation will be another aspect of that silent 
 revolution of the 21st century. We have to rethink and recreate political 
 action as a nonviolent action, because the history of political action, the 
 history of politics, broadly speaking has been part of the history of 
 violence. Politics has been a form of violence... If we allow those, like us, 
 who fight for social justice ... for an increasing respect of the environment 
 and the planet ... for animal rights... those who work against the 
 destruction of the planet, natural resources and biodiversity, if we are 
 able to allow those individuals to transform their experiences of 
 indignation, anger, resentment and bitterness into a more open, calm, 
 loving and compassionate mental state, not only for the victims of all this 
 but also for the aggressors, then we will have already won. The victory 
 will be achieved from the very beginning, and then it will only be a matter 
 of time.” (Interview, Paulo Borges, May 2013) 
 
 Paulo Borges’ words reinforce the importance of inner/outer 
entanglements and of emotions in changing social worlds. He suggests, 
following Thich Nhat Hanh, that it is essential to transform people’s minds, 
espousing a grassroots model of social change that finds echoes in other 
proposals (Arnstein, 1969; Freire, 2005; Knabb, 2006; Vaneigem, 2001; 
Holloway, 2002; Shukaitis and Graeber, 2007). A state of consciousness, 
emerging alongside particular webs of associations and automatisms, serves as 
the model for social transformation, affecting a diversity of fields such as 
agriculture, economics, education, environmentalism and animal rights. Far 
from being a private practice, as an expression of the subjective turn 
(McMahan, 2008), meditation practices can become tools to reconfigure social 
                                                             
193Due to the success of this initiative, it was repeated in June 2013. 
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worlds, transforming political action and affecting fields such as 
environmentalism and human reformation, as in the case of Vipassana.  
  
VIII.V CONCLUSION 
  
 This chapter explored the connections between meditation and social 
change, focusing on three particular aspects – the role of meditation in 
institutional change (Vipassana in prisons), the couplings between meditation 
and social action, exemplified by Thich Nhat Hanh’s proposals, and the links 
between meditation and ecology.  
 I suggested that we should understand these various projects of social 
change as generated by meditation assemblages, including automatisms, webs 
of associations and experiences. Broader social issues – human reformation, 
politics, the environmental crisis – are dealt with according to meditative models 
of subjectivity and reality, and the self, understood as a microcosm of the world, 
must be transformed to bring forth long lasting social change. In order to affect 
the wider world, meditation assemblages are mobilized – the carceral 
psychogeography is altered through the enrolment of new actants, associations 
and practices; political action is informed by technologies of the self, such as 
walking meditation; environmentalism is fostered by practices, insights and 
ways of being informed by meditation. 
 The post-humanist analysis employed in this chapter conceives 
technologies of meditation as mediators that transform social intervention. 
Instead of focusing exclusively on ideas, I explored the role of practices and 
experiences in enacting different versions of the social world, suggesting that 
meditation, instead of being a private practice internalized by neo-liberal 
subjects in advanced capitalist societies, actively influences a number of worldly 
interventions.  
 The interventions fostered by meditation can be understood as 
nonmodern. Vipassana in prisons contrasts with the paradigmatic model of 
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discipline for the sake of efficiency and productivity (see chapter II), allowing 
prisoners to become aware of their bodies and selves; the political vision of 
Thich Nhat Hanh is highly nonmodern, focusing on affect and the body, 
suspending habitual distinctions between inner and outer realms, self and the 
world, politics and aesthetics; the connections between meditation and 
environmentalism suggest that these technologies and the range of experiences 
they bring forth can enact a nondual Umwelt, altering human/nonhuman 
couplings, supporting social action and the creation of ecological parties. 
 The social and political mediations performed by Vipassana and Zen 
assemblages highlight the social and political relevance of technologies of the 
self. This dissertation has analyzed how these practices suspend habitual forms 
of subjectification, generating nonmodern experiences and ways of being. In 
this chapter, we have explored the wider ramifications of nonmodern paradigms 
of subjectivity, turning meditation into a set of practices, experiences, ways of 
being, associations and actants that have the potential to rethink and re-enact 
social intervention. If, as we have seen in previous chapters, subjectivities 
emerge alongside webs of associations and automatisms, institutions and 
models of social and political action are also mediated by subjective 
assemblages, affecting the management of space, the performance of sitting 
and walking, human and nonhuman couplings and political action.  
 Leibniz criticized the Cartesian version of ontological dualism, proposing 
a different view of reality where “Every monad is a living mirror which represents 
the universe in accordance with its own point of view, and is as orderly as the 
universe itself.” (Leibniz; 2004: 2). Influenced by Leibniz, one could argue that 
technologies of meditation, once activated in a diversity of settings, set up new 
automatisms that affect and mediate realms including subjective experience, 
everyday life, institutional, social and political reasoning and couplings between 
humans and the environment, influencing geographies, psychologies and the 
social. The various examples analyzed in this chapter are, therefore, 
expressions of meditation as a mediator that governs, alters, affects and 
performs nonmodern paradigms of the self and the world. 
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XIX. CONCLUSION 
 
 “The critical ontology of ourselves has to be considered not, certainly, as 
a theory, a doctrine, nor even as a permanent body of knowledge that is 
accumulating; it has to be conceived as an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical 
life in which the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the 
historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with 
the possibility of going beyond them.” (Foucault; 1984a: 50) 
 
 “Make rhizomes, not roots, never plant! Don't sow, grow offshoots! Don't 
be one or multiple, be multiplicities!” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 24) 
 
XIX.I SUMMARY 
  
 Inspired by Michel Foucault’s insights on technologies of the self and by 
STS literature, I explored two practices of meditation. This dissertation 
addressed two questions: how do Zen and Vipassana assemblages fabricate 
particular paradigms of people? What are the politics of these new versions of 
subjectivity and how do they contrast with the modern self? 
 I argued that Zen and Vipassana rely on two essential devices of 
subjectification: the transformation of habitual webs of associations and the 
installation of new automatisms.  In chapter IV, I analyzed retreats as 
transformative settings that rely on new associations between selves, other 
humans and nonhumans, as well as on the reconfiguration of space, 
constituting alternative psychogeographies. The reorganization of space, 
actants, constraints and interactions destabilize selves, supporting meditative 
dispositions and requiring the suspension of spatial, material and regulatory 
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instances of subjectification of the outside world, thus enacting new webs of 
associations. 
 In chapter V, Performances, I explored the second major device of 
subjectification, the installation of new automatisms. Subjects incorporate 
technologies of the self that transform regular automatisms, developing new 
ways of sitting and eating, focusing on the breath whenever they hear the sound 
of the bell and being aware of sensations in non-judgemental ways. 
Practitioners transform their habitual performances through Zen and Vipassana 
mediations, changing their gaze, altering their pace, modifying their posture, 
etc.. These heterogeneous devices of subjectification perform new selves 
through associations with materials, words, energies, spaces and practices. 
 The transformation of habitual webs of associations and automatisms 
allows subjects to modify their states of consciousness, tuning in to different 
frequencies. In chapter VI, I analyzed the experiences of meditators, 
characterized according to three main aspects – struggles of agency, the feeling 
of meditation and mystical experiences. The transition to a new paradigm of 
selfhood triggers pain, boredom, suspicion, discomfort, unease. Bodies and 
mind rebel and selves struggle to adapt. Eventually, selves replace habitual 
automatisms, becoming more aware of what they are doing, feeling subtle 
sensations, tasting the fruits of their effort. In some cases, mystical experiences 
occur. These reveal a radically different experience of the self and the world – 
some practitioners report becoming totally aware of what they are doing; others 
feel their bodies dissolving and the separateness between self and others 
crumbles – the modern self is suspended. 
 Zen and Vipassana assemblages mobilize a set of heterogeneous 
devices to fabricate new paradigms of people, generating nonordinary states of 
consciousness. Chapters IV, V and VI focused mostly on what happens during 
retreats or intense periods of practice, whereas chapter VII explored how 
meditation is transformed into a way of life. In order to become disseminated in 
everyday life, technologies of the self are transformed into an equipment, plug-
ins to be activated in all circumstances. This new equipment establishes new 
mediations, allowing practitioners to focus on their sensations, to find bells of 
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mindfulness in the environment and to come back to the breath over and over 
again. In some cases, the paradigm shift is not peaceful and can lead to 
unwanted consequences, as I suggested in the section “Meditation and 
Madness”. The incorporation of a new performative order leads to a number of 
long-term changes: the development of new levels of awareness (namely 
towards habit patterns); the enactment of an extended version of selfhood and 
the emergence of nonstandard phenomena. These three aspects reinforce the 
novelty of the human paradigm that meditation brings forth, contrasting with 
traditional accounts of the modern self.  
 The politics of meditation are not limited to the enactment of a new 
paradigm of subjectivity; it also influences what is commonly called the “social” 
(chapter VIII). Meditation becomes a mediator to rethink issues such as human 
reformation, political action and ecology. In Foucault’s analyses, the Panopticon 
is a mediator mobilized to reconfigure a variety of social institutions. In order to 
foster social change, Zen and Vipassana assemblages mobilize their habitual 
devices of subjectification. Prison settings are modified through the introduction 
of actants, the reorganization of space and the implementation of new 
constraints; political action, informed by principles of nonviolence, is supported 
by the constant mobilization of technologies of the self, such as breathing, 
walking meditation or the implementation of retreat settings to bring Israelis and 
Palestinians together. The extended self performed by meditation becomes the 
subjective correlate of the reconfiguration of human-environment interactions. 
These couplings were exemplified by the deeply ecological character of Thich 
Nhat Hanh’s project and by two vignettes: the Council of All Beings and the 
creation of an environmentalist party in Portugal, influenced by the nondual 
experiences of its leader. 
 I argued that the versions of the self and the world enacted by meditation 
are nonmodern. The experience of meditation contrasts with ordinary states of 
consciousness, suspending the dualism between mind and body, self and the 
world, humans and nonhumans; the long term changes enacted by meditation 
perform a different version of the self: able to develop new levels of awareness, 
to identify and to be affected by others, experiencing the world in nonlinear 
ways, overcoming mechanistic conceptions of space, time and matter. The 
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political projects promoted by meditation are nonmodern, conceiving political 
subjects as impermanent, able to suspend the self and to identify and develop 
empathy with and towards others. The ecological projects stemming from 
meditation exemplify the far reaching implications of new ways of experiencing 
the self and the world, becoming good examples of the social impacts of 
Interbeing.  
 This dissertation was influenced by three major branches of scholarly 
work.  Firstly, meditation research, in particular sociological and anthropological 
studies. By exploring the webs of associations and automatisms implemented 
by meditation, I have contributed towards a post-humanist analysis of 
meditation. This allowed me to avoid the humanist critique of modern meditation 
as an expression of particular historical trends, coining these assemblages as 
cults or new religious movements (see chapter I). Instead of drawing on these 
generalizations, I focused on the practicalities of meditation – how do they 
create new versions of people? What are the actants, constraints and spaces 
that are needed in order to transform the environment? What are human selves 
expected to do with their bodies and minds if they want to practice these 
technologies of the self? I focused on the technological dimension of meditation 
– instead of characterizing it as an expression of broader social or historical 
trends, I explored its devices of subjectification and the effects they can 
generate. 
 Secondly, I actively engaged with STS literature. Notions such as 
actants, programs of action, technologies, performativity and mediation played a 
relevant role in this dissertation. Meditation was understood as a technology, 
mediating particular versions of the self and the world. Inspired by the article of 
Gomart and Hennion (1999), I attempted to contribute to the expansion of the 
object of STS, mobilizing its insights to study subjectivity. My reflections on 
Vipassana and Zen highlighted the deeply material and technological dimension 
of subjectivities, always entangled with spaces, technologies and objects. The 
post-humanist analysis that this dissertation developed thus contributed to 
extend current reflections on subjectivity emerging from STS perspectives: 
instead of focusing on a typical object of western technoscience, I chose the 
object of meditation, a technology of the self. 
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 Finally, much of this dissertation is an expression of Michel Foucault’s 
reflections on subjectivity, in particular his later work. His remarks on 
technologies of the self (Foucault, 1988; 2006), his insights on the role of 
institutions as devices of subjectification (Foucault, 1995), the positive 
dimension of power (Foucault, 1987; 1995), and the associations between 
politics and subjectivity (Foucault, 2006; 2010) were valuable contributions, 
decisively shaping my research. Foucault’s analyses were mostly historical, 
dealing with the genealogies of sexuality (Foucault, 1987), madness (Foucault, 
1988b), clinical medicine (Foucault, 2003) and punishment (Foucault, 1995), 
contributing towards a critical ontology of ourselves. Foucault’s later work 
focused on the aesthetics of existence, “the search for a personal ethics” 
(Foucault, 1984b: 49) that transforms one’s life into a work of art: 
 “What strikes me is the fact that in our society, art has become 
something which is related only to objects and not to individuals, or to life. That 
art is something which is specialized or which is done by experts who are 
artists. But couldn't everyone's life become a work of art? Why should the lamp 
or the house be an art object, but not our life?”  (Foucault, 1984b: 350) 
 
 Foucault’s own life included many instances of personal exploration, 
such as going to a Zen monastery in Japan, taking LSD at Zabriskie point, 
smoking opium and hashish and attending S/M clubs in San Francisco (Miller, 
1993). By using different methodologies than Foucault – I resorted to participant 
observation, semi-structured interviews and my own experience – I studied how 
practices of meditation transform selves, generating new experiences, new 
ways of being in the world and new political arrangements. Influenced by 
Foucault’s concerns with the fabrication of subjectivities, I mobilized social 
sciences methodologies to analyze how paradigm shifts in subjectivity take 
place in the real, contemporary world, through the analysis of meditation. 
 After this summary, I will now focus on what I believe is the scholarly 
contribution of this dissertation, in particular regarding the existing literature 
about Foucault and post-humanism. 
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XIX.II CONTRIBUTION OF THE PHD DISSERTATION TO THE 
EXISTING LITERATURE ABOUT FOUCAULT AND POST-HUMANISM 
 
 This dissertation consisted of an empirical exploration of two sets of 
technologies of the self - mindfulness and Vipassana. The main goal was to 
extend Foucault’s reflections on practices of subjectivity as well as post-
humanist STS scholarly work on the self. I will now explain how this PhD 
dissertation contributed to these fields of research. 
 Although Foucault, in his later period, was interested in the hermeneutics 
of the subject and in practices of subjectivity, his research was mostly historical 
and focused on the western world. Foucault used translations of ancient Greek, 
Roman and Christian texts to study the evolution of forms and practices of 
selfhood. His analysis was, therefore, hermeneutical – he basically interpreted 
these ancient texts, identified the most relevant concepts and analyzed the 
different usages of these concepts in different historical settings. His primary 
concern was with the discourse of these hermeneutics of the self, the historical 
evolution of epistemes that generate subject-positions. On the other hand, my 
analysis relied on a variety of qualitative research methods – I attended 
meditation retreats, interviewed practitioners, reflected on my personal 
experiences, analyzed the socio-technical networks that enact subjective 
changes, etc.. Instead of focusing on the discursive paraphernalia of meditation 
assemblages – concepts, words, epistemes, etc. – I analyzed the deeply 
material, practical and performative dimension of these techniques. 
 A second aspect deals with the fact that Foucauldian analyses were 
focused on western technologies of the self – the Platonists, the Stoics, the 
Christians, etc.. The practices I studied, although they are currently 
disseminated in the West, are forms of Buddhist meditation. This means that, 
bearing in mind Callon’s principle of free association (Callon, 1986), I looked at 
non-western forms of meditation as mechanisms of subjectification. This 
happened because I was interested not in the genealogy of western forms of 
selfhood – Foucault’s main concern – but in the enactment of new experiences, 
ways of being and forms of social action mediated by particular sets of 
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technologies of the self. This leads us to the third point of departure from 
Foucault’s work. 
 A relevant dimension tackled by this dissertation deals with the issue of 
power. Power, according to Foucault, takes place at every connection, it is a 
strategical device, becoming a sort of a microphysics - it is basically everywhere 
(Foucault, 1987; 1995), as we have seen in chapter II. Power, according to 
Foucault, is deeply enmeshed with forms of subjectification – such as discipline 
– and it also creates a number of resistances (a good example are the forms of 
parody explored by Judith Butler, 1990). One could argue that the ubiquity of 
power prevents social change - since power is everywhere, utopian and 
alternative assemblages are also forms of power/knowledge and subjection. 
One of the ambitions of this dissertation, in line with STS concerns with the 
politics of ontology (see chapter II), was to suggest that the experiences and 
forms of political action mediated by meditation are positive alternatives to 
modern assemblages, including modern selfhood (the homo clausus) and 
conventional ways of dealing with the environment (see chapter VIII). In that 
sense, and although it was recognized that practitioners have to submit 
themselves to a number of devices of power/knowledge (see chapters IV and 
V), the affordances generated by meditation were understood as alternatives 
with the potential to reinvent modern, dualist ways of being in the world. This 
utopian dimension is missing in Foucault’s writings - they consist mostly of 
historical analyses focused on mainstream devices for the shaping and 
domestication of the population, including technologies of power – discipline, 
biopolitics – and institutional devices – the prison, the hospital, the school, etc.. I 
argued that meditation assemblages display innovative strategies for the 
reconfiguration of experience and social action, understanding social worlds not 
as assemblages purely affected by the historical transformation of aprioristic 
structures - epistemes - (Foucault, 2002) but as complex systems that comprise 
a number of different devices of subjectification and possibilities of selfhood that 
can in fact be transformed and contested.  
 The last aspect regarding my contribution towards Foucauldian scholarly 
work deals with his legacy, how his work was appropriated and how it inspired 
other authors. In the English speaking world, especially in Britain, Foucault’s 
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reception and popularity was definitely marked by an extension of his analyses 
of governmentality. The studies developed by Nikolas Rose on psychology, 
psychiatry and neurosciences (Rose, 1998; 2007; Rose and Abi-Rached, 2013), 
elaborating on the deeply biopolitical nature of contemporary societies, are 
highly illustrative, reflecting a tendency to extend Foucault’s work on 
contemporary forms of governmentality (Miller, 1987; Burchell, Gordon and 
Miller, 1991). What about Foucault’s later work on technologies of the self and 
subjectivity? Although Jeremy Carrette has done a terrific job in trying to use 
Foucault’s insights to study religion (Carrette, 2000) – including religious 
experience - Carrette’s focus is on western forms of religiosity. Moreover, when 
Carrette attempts to tackle non-western practices, or hybrid practices emerging 
from the New Age or the human potential movement, he tends to label them as 
expressions of contemporary capitalism, arguing that they are manifestations of 
the contemporary political economy of religion (Carrette, 2007; Carrete and 
King, 2005). A good example is his critique of Abraham Maslow’s work on the 
human potential, suggesting that: 
 “The (...) establishment of a hierarchy of needs, which has ‘self-
actualization’ as its highest achievement, is a clear adoption of the values of 
individualism and the American dream. The capitalistic sub-structure of 
Maslow’s psychology reflects the ideological weight of knowledge behind the 
self in Western culture (…)” (Carrette, 2007: 145). 
 Such a critical and ideological understanding of human experience 
clashes not only with the post-humanist style of reasoning that guided this 
dissertation but also with Foucault’s understanding of power, which is not a 
mere expression of economic forces. Carrette’s cynicism also extends to the 
proliferation of meditation practices in the West, which are understood as a form 
of commodification of religion (Carrette and King, 2005). My attempt to extend 
Foucault’s reflections on technologies of the self, therefore, is not undermined 
by the assumption that experience is basically an expression of the political 
economy of religion - it is entangled with human and nonhuman devices that 
generate ontologies which are irreducible to the sociological/humanist critique of 
experiential and social alternatives.  
 In order to extend Foucault’s analysis of the topic, I dialogued with 
Science and Technology studies, and the role of the following paragraphs is to 
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clarify how I contributed to post-humanist STS scholarly work. Post-humanist 
literature, in particular in Science and Technology Studies, has historically 
contributed towards decentred and non-anthropocentric ways of interpreting 
social reality, recognizing the decisive role of relationalities, performances, 
nonhumans, particular spaces, etc. (see chapter II). To say that these analyses 
of social systems are decentred – including ANT and the mangle of practice – is 
to say that humans are embedded in heterogeneous assemblages – ANT relies 
on the notion of networks to stress this relevant dimension of associations with 
nonhumans (Latour, 205) whereas the mangle of practice focuses on the 
importance of material agency and its temporal emergence, constantly affecting 
and being affected by humans (Pickering, 1993 and 1995). These analyses of 
the practices of scientists and engineers have questioned the picture of the 
human agent as being in charge of things. Moreover, developments in 
technoscience and biomedicine have progressively suspended the boundaries 
between the human and the nonhuman. This has led Donna Haraway to claim 
that cyborgs (Haraway, 1991), hybrids between humans and nonhumans, 
biology and technology, are a metaphor of post-humanist subjectivities. 
 Recognizing that post-humanist ways of interpreting socio-technical 
networks have rarely been applied to the study of human subjectivity, Gomart 
and Hennion set themselves to apply ANT to the emergence of music and drug 
amateurs as actor-networks, as we have seen in chapter II. Influenced by ANT 
and by the mangle of practice, I understood meditation assemblages as relying 
on a variety of nonhuman devices, associations, spaces, etc., to produce 
different kinds of selves (Chapters IV and V) - these devices of subjectification  
do not rely exclusively on human agents, such as the Guru (Goenka or Thich 
Nhat Hanh). Moreover, I suggested, influenced by the mangle of practice, that 
meditative experiences are not generated in a linear fashion but rather depend 
on the increased capacity of meditators to be affected by these set-ups, 
lowering their resistances and being transformed by new performative 
configurations of reality. This dissertation applied post-humanist STS insights to 
study self transformations enacted by meditation assemblages, extending 
Gomart and Hennion’s work, thus contributing towards a decentring of STS 
from its mainstream object – western technoscience. 
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 A relevant dimension of post-humanist STS deals with a concern with 
ontological politics. Since it is recognized that the world and its entities do not 
pre-exist their relatings (Haraway, 2003), it is argued that reality is an emergent 
effect of performances, associations and technologies. To say that technologies 
are not neutral is to recognize that particular configurations of these 
associations inevitably bring forth particular versions of the world, reminding us 
of William James’ reflections on sub-universes and the multiverse (James, 
2007; 1896).  Current concerns with the politics of ontology (see chapter II) 
have some links with these early pragmatist remarks and stress the political 
dimension of technologies. Relying on Pickering’s distinction between modern 
and nonmodern politics of ontology, I attempted to highlight the deeply 
nonmodern dimension of meditation. By exploring the experiences generated by 
meditation, its use in everyday life, the long-term changes it fosters, and by 
reflecting on the social impacts of mindfulness and Vipassana, I highlighted the 
essentially nonmodern dimension of these technologies, how they alter the 
politics of the self and the world. This links to the following issue, the 
contribution of this dissertation to the constitution of a post-humanist, 
nonmodern subject. 
 How does meditation contribute towards the imaginary of post-humanist 
subjectivities, not bounded by the usual dichotomies between body and mind, 
nature and culture, self and others, human and nonhuman? Although 
Haraway’s cyborg is an early illustration of a subject that erodes modern 
dualism and Hennion and Gomart’s music and drug amateurs highlight 
processes of abandonment, I believe these two pictures of subjectivity are still 
limited in constituting a post-humanist self. The cyborg relies on the military-
industrial complex and is ultimately an emergent effect of western 
technoscience, reproducing linear accounts of time, technology and knowledge, 
and doesn’t allow us to radically suspend the ontological boundaries between 
people and things – in fact, the cyborg increases hubris and mastery, 
augmenting one’s ability to survive in strange, adverse environments, such as 
outer space (Clynes and Kline, 1995). Gomart and Hennion’s experiences of 
abandonment to drugs and music are interesting to reflect on the relevance of 
passivity and affect; however, these are ultimately forms of concentration 
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(resembling states of Samadhi) and they do not tell us much about the politics 
of ontology, they just describe forms of aesthetic enjoyment. 
 On the other hand, meditation aims at enacting decentred forms of 
subjectivity beyond technoscience and aesthetic enjoyment; through the 
suspension of the self, subjects should become able to realize the 
entanglements between all existing entities, what Thich Nhat Hanh calls 
Interbeing. We came across some expressions of Interbeing throughout this 
dissertation, including experiences of nonduality (chapters VI and VII) and 
identification with nonhumans (chapter VI). These post-humanist archipelagos 
of subjectivity, instead of being limited to the hybridization of humans through 
couplings with technoscience – such as cyborgs – as an expression of hubris, 
rather promote the embracement of the ubiquitous dances of agency that 
permeate all becomings (Pickering, 1995; Venn, 2010; Carvalho, 2014). The 
post-humanist subject of meditation emerges as an attempt to break the 
identification with the ego – to suspend the homo clausus – and to generate an 
ontological choreography (Cussins, 1996) that can be manifested by embracing 
trees, experiencing nonduality while meditating or walking peacefully for nuclear 
disarmament. If the modern self relies on the distinction between body and 
mind, humans and nonhumans, nature and culture, self and the world, the 
nonmodern, post-humanist self generated by meditation is an attempt to 
suspend all these conceptual dualisms and to experience reality in a deeply 
entangled way. In that sense, the post-humanist self of meditation does not 
embody the flow of relationalities through couplings with technoscientific 
apparatuses but through a number of performances, gestures and associations 
which suspend the dual ontology of separateness, thus performing an 
entangled, fluid and relational picture of the world - a post-humanist, nonmodern 
ontology. 
 This leads us to what I believe is the main theoretical contribution of this 
dissertation, my general story about the self. Social theory has identified a 
number of devices that shape selves and minds, including social 
communication (Mead, 1934), historical transformations that lead to new forms 
of governance and technologies of power (Foucault, 1995; Giddens, 1991; 
Rose, 1998), altering the sense of self, the transformation of manners (Elias, 
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1978 and 1982), bureaucracy (Weber, 1978), education (Durkheim, 1925; 
Freire, 2005), social reproduction (Bourdieu, 1977), interactions (Goffman, 
1969), particular techniques and performances (Mauss, 1973; Foucault, 2006; 
Butler, 1990), discourse (enacted as direct interpellations (Althusser, 2008; 
Butler, 1997a) or as the surface of emergence of subjectivity (Foucault, 2002)), 
couplings between humans and technologies (Schivelbusch, 1977; Haraway, 
1991; Latour, 2005; Brenninkmeijer, 2010) and culture (Mauss, 1985; Markus 
and Kitayama, 1991). This list is far from comprehensive, but it elicits the 
number of influences, agencies and conditions that perform the self. My 
interpretation of the self in relation to practices of meditation focused on the 
notion of automatisms. These are unmediated, automatic phenomena that 
constitute the self and that include breathing, the flow of thoughts, responses to 
environmental inputs, habitual ways of sitting and walking and somatic modes 
of attention (Csordas, 1999) to pain, pleasure, anger and joy. Automatisms 
emerge in a  relational way, involving couplings with the affect of bodies and 
organs, established ways of regulating and managing subjectivities – education, 
upbringing, disciplinary and biopolitical devices – and a number of technologies 
of the self that emerge within cultural, political and historical frameworks. The 
post-humanist interpretation of the subjectification devices mobilized by 
meditation explored new webs of associations with inner gazes, nonhumans, 
spaces, energies, technologies, instructions, regulations. These assemblages 
are mobilized to alter the self through the installation of new automatisms. 
Hearing the sound of the bell allows selves to activate mindfulness, stopping 
and breathing; paying attention to sensations through the mediation of 
equanimity supports the de-identification between sensorial phenomena and 
one’s self; repeating gathas expressing Interbeing, embracing trees or being 
able to link the clouds in the sky with the steam coming out of a cup of tea 
transform habitual connections, generating a more comprehensive and 
decentred version of the self. Influenced by Uexkull’s (2010) notion of “Umwelt” 
I suggested that these technologies enact novel ways of being in the world, 
allowing practitioners to establish new networks, connections with the 
environment, altering their perception of emotions, physical sensations, 
relationships with co-workers, strangers, family members and nonhumans. The 
new webs built by meditators, in co-operation with technologies of the self, allow 
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them to become aware of their automatisms, to transform habit patterns and to 
experience their bodies, minds and space in novel ways.  The automatisms 
generated by meditation are nonmodern - instead of promoting dualism, they 
foster a nondual politics of experience that progressively leads to a decentred 
sense of self, challenging modern dichotomies. 
 One is inevitably confronted with the question of what the self is. 
Influenced by Guattari and STS, in chapter V I suggested that models of 
subjectivity are performative, and selves are enacted through various 
associations and devices of subjectification. If the worlds of meditation – 
experiences, meditation in everyday life, social applications – emerge as a 
result of these new webs, the fundamental question at stake here is not “what is 
the self?” but “what kinds of selves should be performed?” Informed by the 
pragmatic assumption that versions of reality are performative and political 
(Pickering, 1995; Mol, 1999; Barad, 2003; Law, 2004), this dissertation 
analyzed how environments are reconfigured to bring forth new versions of 
selfhood that, in turn, influence social systems (Chapters VII and VIII). The 
maintenance of social worlds is inevitably coupled with the management of 
selfhood, which reinforces the political dimension of meditation, suspending the 
dichotomy between individual and social (Carrette, 2007; Blackman, 2012). The 
two case studies, Vipassana and Zen meditation, allowed me to analyze the 
micro-politics of subjectification – spatial partitioning, new performances, 
associations with nonhumans – that are in turn mobilized to enact new versions 
of selfhood. These new versions of selfhood are mobilized to enact broader 
social changes – the macro-politics of meditation – relying on the swarming 
(Foucault 1995) of meditation assemblages and the heterogeneous networks 
that sustain them. This dissertation was, therefore, an attempt to analyze how 
these paradigmatic changes are established. 
 The associations between paradigms of selfhood and the politics of 
ontology led me to suggest that the versions of reality enacted by meditation are 
nonmodern; however, a relevant dimension of these projects of the self is to set 
up retreats, to multiply programs of action, to disseminate technologies and 
assemblages and to stabilize subjectivities in everyday life. There is a tension 
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between self-control and transgression that should be tackled, and the aim of 
the following section is to explore this tension. 
XIX.III CONTROL/TRANSGRESSION 
 
 I argued that meditation fabricates nonmodern selves, able to overcome 
dualism, to attain mystical experiences and to develop nondual forms of politics, 
suspending ordinary states of consciousness, the tenet of modern selfhood. 
However, meditation is also used to foster self-control. Some of the examples 
analyzed in chapter VII indicate that meditation is used to increase one’s 
immunological status, helping practitioners to set up protective bubbles that 
prevent them from being affected by the outside world. In chapter VIII we have 
seen how meditation is incorporated in prisons in order to fabricate equanimous 
prisoners, which means that strategies of reformation and incarceration 
recognize the potential of meditation to tame people more efficiently. 
 The Civilizing Process (Elias, 1978) is certainly a narrative of modernity 
and modernization as progressively exerting control over people, and Elias has 
given many examples that illustrate the progressive taming of humans, their 
emotions, reactions and ways of being. Humans become more docile, sensitive, 
nonviolent, harmless. Similarly, Nietzsche’s critique of morality recognizes that 
man has been tamed, and that his will to power, sometimes expressed as 
violence and cruelty, has been obstructed by what he calls the social straitjacket 
(Nietzsche, 2006). Man became a problem for himself when all the desires that 
were blocked by social formations turned inwards, creating bad conscience: 
 “All instincts which are not discharged outwardly turn inwards... against 
 man himself. Animosity, cruelty, the pleasure of pursuing, raiding, 
 changing and destroying – all this was pitted against the person who had 
such instincts: that is the origin of ‘bad conscience’. Lacking external enemies 
and obstacles, and forced into the oppressive narrowness and  conformity of 
custom, man impatiently ripped himself apart, persecuted himself, gnawed at 
himself, gave himself no peace and abused himself, this animal who battered 
himself raw on the bars of his cage and who is supposed to be ‘tamed’... this 
fool, this prisoner consumed with longing  and despair, became the 
inventor of ‘bad conscience’.” (Nietzsche, 2006:  57) 
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 Modern man is governed, submitted to rules, regulations, codes of 
conduct, socially accepted ways of being. Modern man, according to Sloterdijk, 
is the one who voluntarily lives inside parks –   
 “Humans are self-fencing, self-shepherding creatures. Wherever they 
 live, they create parks around themselves. In city parks, national parks, 
provincial or state parks, eco-parks – everywhere people must create for 
themselves rules according to which their comportment is to be  governed.” 
(Sloterdijk, 2009: 25) 
 
 This picture of tamed humans can be found in Elias’ depiction of the 
civilizing process; in Foucault’s work on discipline and biopolitics, as the two 
tenets of governmentality; in Sloterdijk’s human zoos and in Nietzsche’s bad 
conscience as an antithesis of the will to power. One could argue that the 
contemporary appropriation and popularization of meditation is an expression of 
the modern will to control, tame, domesticate humans. Practitioners have to be 
part of meditation retreat parks for a certain period of time, submitting 
themselves to rules that prevent them from having sex, eating whatever they 
want, killing other people or consuming drugs (see chapter IV). They have to 
install automatisms that clash with their “natural” workings, obliging them to sit 
in stillness for long periods of time, to experience pain, to control how they walk 
– all dimensions of human existence become prone to meditative 
domestication. Practitioners have to use these techniques in daily life to avoid 
harming themselves and others – instead of reacting “normally”, they have to 
add layers of meditative plug-ins to their everyday behaviour, using 
technologies of the self to react peacefully, lovingly, etc. (chapter VII). 
Meditation is even used to improve technologies of punishment, domesticating 
inmates who now believe they were wrong at the deepest level of reality – they 
betrayed the law of cause effect, the law of nature, by blindly reacting to 
sensations. Practices of mindfulness are used to prevent conflicts, taming 
members of opposing sides, fostering feelings of love and compassion towards 
the enemy and making humans feel guilty for the environmental crisis, adding 
new dimensions of pain and resentment to their bad conscience. This would be 
enough to make Nietzsche turn in his grave! 
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 There is obviously a different account to be told. Much of Elias’ and 
Nietzsche’s analyses depend on a version of man that exists before repression  
and internalization, an expression of the will to power that is an essentialism, 
since it assumes that, somewhere in the past, there was some sort of free man 
immune to social and moral conditionings. Moreover, and although modernity 
has disseminated those technologies of government that tame humans – they 
go to school, take vaccines, learn the common language, don’t usually kill other 
people, etc. – at the same time there is no human being free from any type of 
influence. Suggesting that modernity is the age of domestication is a 
reverberation of the old humanist critique of institutions, bureaucracies and 
technologies that generate the so-called iron cage, domination, total 
mobilization, etc.. The sun, the wind and human organs are also sources of 
domination – power is not a modern invention. The ontological conception of 
power in Foucault, as suggested in chapter II, allows us to understand it as a 
force that permeates every connection, every network and webs of 
associations.  The type of control that is required to practice meditation can be 
understood as an active effort to suspend those connections that hold the self 
together. The type of freedom granted by meditation is not an unmediated Yes 
to all impulses but the suspension of a bounded notion of selfhood, the ability to 
experience nondual phenomena and interconnectedness, and the possibility of 
de-identifying with a narrow sense of self. 
 Meditation allows practitioners to transgress the habitual, dominant 
paradigm of the modern self. This form of transgression contrasts with other 
understandings of this concept – for Georges Bataille, transgression deals with 
war, sacrifice, eroticism (Bataille, 1962); Sade’s transgression is to say yes to 
all impulses, inverting Christian norms – one kills, rapes, kidnaps, tortures, etc. 
(Sade, 1965); for Artaud, transgression involves a radical transformation of 
theatre and its opening to cruelty, affection and the mobilization of bodies 
(Artaud, 1958). The kind of transgression that meditation brings forth deals with 
the multiplication of reality, prompting non-ordinary states of consciousness that 
allow us to realize that there is no natural, unmediated state of mind or of 
enacting the Umwelt. Instead of becoming an expression of the will to power, 
saying “yes” to all the impulses and wishes emerging from an essentialized 
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version of the human self, meditation tells us that there is no such thing as a 
natural political subject, a state of consciousness unaffected by technologies, 
matter and nonhumans or a non-mediated way of behaving in daily life. As this 
dissertation suggests, it is all about mediations, human-technology couplings; 
by analyzing the processes of subjectification used by Zen and Vipassana 
assemblages, we became aware of how these associations are strategically 
mobilized in a number of situations – the retreat setting, everyday life, 
institutional and political spheres. 
 A relevant dimension of the humanist critique of western meditation is 
that it is a reflection of contemporary narcissism, individualism, the subjective 
quest for authenticity (Lasch, 1979; Taylor, 1989). In western culture, the self 
has been a problem for itself since immemorial times – the famous Delphic 
maxim of “Know thyself” (Foucault, 2006) existed in ancient Greece long before 
the recent proliferation of yoga studios and meditation centres in the West. The 
re-emergence of the care of the self, coupled with the political technology of 
governmentality (Rose, 2007) has, in some occasions, transformed meditation 
(in particular mindfulness) into the new opiate of the masses (Dawson and 
Turnbull, 2006), eager for well-being, self-control, inner peace, etc., some of the 
themes mentioned by participants in chapters VI and VII. 
 My concern here is with the potential of meditation to become a 
technology for the critical ontology of ourselves, following Foucault’s call 
(Foucault, 1984a). How can meditation allow us to transgress the historical, 
social, corporeal and mental limits imposed on us? 
 There are no easy answers, but I suggest that meditation, and 
technologies of the self in general, can support the proliferation of 
nonmodernity. The focus of modernity is on standardization, homogenization 
and normalization through the dissemination of technologies of government. 
Modernity, as an attitude (Foucault, 1984a) that aims at stabilizing humans and 
territories through technologies such as discipline and biopolitics, can be 
countered by the technologies of the nonmodern self (Pickering, 2010). These 
technologies – meditation, psychedelic drugs, radical forms of theatre, 
shamanism – have the potential to alter the sense of self, transgressing the 
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habitual boundaries of time, space and sobriety that characterize ordinary 
states of consciousness, the mental correlates of modern forms of power. 
 
XIX.IV TOWARDS PERFORMATIVE INCOMMENSURABILITY 
  
 In “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions”, Thomas Kuhn used the 
notion of incommensurability to exemplify a conflict, and lack of coincidence, 
between the viewpoints of proponents of different paradigms. He highlighted 
three main reasons: firstly, they (the scientists) have different standards or 
definitions of science; secondly, there is a misunderstanding between the two 
paradigms because “Within the new paradigm, old terms, concepts, and 
experiments fall into new relationships one with the other” (Kuhn, 1962: 149); 
finally, the proponents of different paradigms also practice in different worlds:  
 “One contains constrained bodies that fall slowly, the other pendulums 
 that repeat their motions again and again... Practicing in different worlds, 
 the two groups of scientists see different things when they look from the 
 same point in the same direction.” (Kuhn, 1962: 150) 
 
 I’m particularly interested in exploring performative incommensurability 
(Pickering, 1995) to counter the modern tendency to standardize and normalize. 
According to Pickering, radical performative incommensurability suggests that 
“within different cultures human beings and the material world might exhibit 
capacities for action quite different from those we customarily attribute to them... 
our own powers as human beings might be bound up with culture” (Pickering, 
1995: 245). 
 Recently, Pickering has explored performative incommensurability in 
relation to new forms of technology that, instead of aiming at domination and 
control, rather seek to engage in dances of agency with the world (Pickering, 
2010). The modern paradigm of reality is characterized by devices of 
translation, normalization, proliferation. Compulsory education, the 
medicalization of childbirth, the emergence of media such as television and the 
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internet, satellites and the National Forest Inventory (a survey led by the 
Brazilian government to estimate the number of trees in the Amazon rainforest) 
are expressions of the modern will to expand, control, assess, standardize, 
enacting one world. 
 Technologies of the nonmodern self should be able to counteract this 
tendency, multiplying altered states, new nonstandard phenomena and realms 
of experience that fMRI’s and the medical gaze would be unable to understand. 
This program of radical performative incommensurability would produce a 
multitude of human subjects who would not be sharing the same common 
world, capacities or frequencies. Instead of bringing the collective together, 
technologies of the nonmodern self would multiply it, producing 
incommensurable experiential effects, clashing with regular mechanisms of 
subjectification and power. 
 Much of today’s politics deals with normalization, and education is 
probably the single most powerful tool to assure the homogeneity of the human 
flock, everyone tuned in to the same frequency, performing in commensurable 
ways. According to Feyerabend, “A free society is a society in which all 
traditions are given equal rights, equal access to education and other positions 
of power” (Feyerabend, 1993: 228). This would radically alter the purposes of 
education: 
 “General education should prepare citizens to choose between the 
standards, or to find their way in a society that contains groups  committed to 
various standards, but it must under no condition bend their minds so that they 
conform to the standards of one particular group.”  (Feyerabend, 1993: 161) 
 
 Feyerabend criticizes how education, in modern democracies, has been 
co-opted by special standards, including scientific ones, suggesting that 
students should have access to many worldviews. Although his proposal still 
relies on the existence of a curriculum, compulsory education and country-wide 
efforts to introduce subjects to multiple perspectives, this would give students 
the possibility of becoming acquainted with many paradigms of knowledge and 
performance. Influenced by Feyerhabend’s insights on education and the 
hegemony of science in the contemporary world, one could argue in favour of 
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multiple possibilities for action and experience, allowing citizens to have access 
to wide range of technologies of the self that would bring forth new realities. The 
nonverbal humanities that Huxley wrote about (Huxley, 1963) would occupy a 
central role in these societies, giving subjects the chance to experience a wide 
range of frequencies beyond ordinary states of consciousness. Such a project 
seems to have started to emerge during the 1960’s. However, in contemporary 
austere societies there isn’t much room for transgression and altered agencies 
beyond those forms of enhancement that seem to create improved versions of 
humans.  
 Zen and Vipassana assemblages “multiply social worlds” (Callon, 2006: 
53), reconfiguring associations, implementing new automatisms, altering 
experience and everyday life; they inform new ways of tackling social issues. 
The research program of performative incommensurability would include 
STSers, philosophers, sociologists, meditators, shamans, psychonauts, 
anthropologists and people from the “hard” sciences interested in creating 
different worlds, combining their efforts to perform new iterations of the real, 
supported by chemical, performative and mystical archipelagos. Not only should 
citizens be given access to all these new realms but there should be a 
sustained effort to unveil, multiply, fabricate new ontologies, instead of trying to 
homogenise the human flock. Cushions, isolation tanks and entheogens might 
be the material support of this project, allowing us to explore and be affected by 
new couplings, recognizing that the experiential realms they perform are as 
legitimate as those versions of reality naturalized by ordinary states of 
consciousness.     
 
XIX.V THE LIMITATIONS OF THE THESIS AND THE 
CONVEYABILITY OF MEDITATIVE EXPERIENCE 
 
 Before I conclude this dissertation, I would like to offer a word of caution. 
As I stated in chapter III, the perspective this dissertation offers is that of a 
beginner. My own standpoint as a recent and relatively inexperienced meditator 
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affected the outcome of the thesis. Indeed, some of the most advanced 
experiences with meditation – such as enlightenment – were not explored is this 
dissertation. 
 In chapter VI I laid out an outline to interpret meditative experiences, 
influenced by the mangle of practice, according to three main moments: 
struggles of agency; the tuning in of meditative agency and mystical 
experiences. This framework allowed me to organize the experiences shared by 
informants. However, there are dimensions of meditative practice that are 
ineffable, untranslatable, difficult to grasp through language. These can include 
sensations that available languages have not yet defined; experiences that 
should not be shared due to their secret or intimate dimension or that are only 
available to those with decades of serious meditative practice.  
 As I mentioned in chapter III, I came across some problems in finding 
Vipassana practitioners who were willing to be interviewed. This led me to a 
sample of approximately 25 subjects, and a number of them were beginners 
such as myself. This decisively conditioned the research, in the sense that most 
of the experiences I recorded and analyzed were shared by those with a limited 
number of years of practice. As I argued, this was highly useful and insightful in 
order to analyze the paradigm shift brought forward by meditation, as well as to 
explore struggles of agency as a sort of ontological clash; however, there are 
realms of meditative progress that take years (one could even  say lifetimes) to 
attain. According to D. T. Suzuki, the evolution of Zen practice is usually 
compared to cow-herding, and there are ten very famous plates that depict such 
a process, including different stages such as looking for the cow, seeing the 
traces of the cow, seeing the cow, coming home on the cow’s back or entering 
the city with bliss-bestowing hands (Suzuki, 1949: 371-376). It has been argued 
that even extremely skilful western practitioners have strong difficulties to 
overcome the initial stages (Preston, 1988), therefore the experiences that were 
analyzed in this dissertation are a limited account of meditative practice. 
 Moreover, one should question the conveyability of meditation as a 
research topic, its potential to be comprehended and appropriated by scholarly 
research. As I wrote in chapter III, one of the difficulties I encountered during my 
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first retreats was precisely to abandon my academic/conceptual mindset. As 
Johnson (2002) argues, the academic mind is supported by what he calls the 
scholar-shaping techniques whose goal is the development of the capacity to 
conceptualize, discuss, compare, contrast, etc.. One of the tenets of meditation 
is precisely the suspension of the ordinary mind and of its main tenet - 
conceptualization. As Goenka puts it, Vipassana is about reality as it is, without 
conceptualization or judgement. Moreover, Thich Nhat Hanh’s practices of 
mindfulness aim at enhancing the experience of the present moment, instead of 
fuelling the conceptual, thinking mind – when the mind is agitated one is invited 
to listen to the bell or to take some deep breaths. In sum, one could argue that 
meditative ontologies radically contrast with scholarly ones – instead of 
attempting to label, categorize, separate the world according to concepts, they 
aim to foster embodiment and anatta, not-self, Interbeing. 
 The use of language in meditative settings is usually aimed at enacting 
this non-conceptual way of being – Thich Nhat Hanh’s gathas are forms of 
reinforcing Interbeing, the awareness of the entanglement between all existing 
entities, and Zen koans can be paradoxical, creating shock or confusion to bring 
about awakening through the suspension of the res cogitans (Kapleau, 1989). 
The elusive nature of meditation requires us to humbly accept our limitations as 
scholars operating in the conceptual realm, a sub-universe (James, 2007) of the 
vast multiverse (James, 1896) that constitutes reality. It has been recently 
recognized that ignorance is, in fact, a constitutive dimension of academic 
research (High, Kelly and Mair, 2012; Rappert, 2014), and meditation, since it 
deals with a number of ineffable experiences, is certainly a good example of a 
difficult subject to tackle and comprehend. 
 As I argued in chapter III, we should replace Wittgenstein’s maxim by 
“What we cannot experience we must pass over in silence”. As a recent and 
relatively inexperienced mediator, it has to be recognized that there are certain 
ontologies of meditation that I must pass over in silence, replacing the 
conceptual hubris of scholarly investigation by the humble recognition of the 
ineffability of meditative worlds. The translation, appropriation and objectification 
of such experiences would certainly be a form of trahison (Law, 1999). 
According to Derrida (1967), western metaphysics is a metaphysics of 
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presence, and philosophy is a form of logocentrism, leading to the 
apprehension and objectification of the world. Human speech is the main drive 
of this logocentric metaphysics of presence and, according to Derrida, it should 
be replaced by a metaphysics of difference, what he calls différance. This 
nonmodern, non-objectifying metaphysics, instead of relying on speech, rather 
depends on the human ability to listen; Derrida draws upon the physical 
configuration of the human tympanum to illustrate a nonmodern way of doing 
philosophy and of being in the world: 
 “We know that the membrane of the tympanum, a thin and transparent 
partition separating the middle canal from the inner ear (the cavity), is stretched 
obliquely (loxos). Obliquely from above to below, from outside to inside, and 
from the back to the front. Therefore it is not perpendicular to the axis of the 
canal. One of the effects of this obliqueness is to increase the surface of 
impression and hence the capacity of vibration... 
 Consequently, to luxate the philosophical ear, to set the loxos in the 
logos to work, is to avoid frontal and symmetrical protest, opposition in all the 
forms of anti-, or in any case to inscribe antism and overturning, domestic 
denegation, in an entirely other form of ambush, of lokhos, of textual 
manoeuvres.” (Derrida, 1982: xiv-xv). 
 The tympanization of philosophy, as suggested by Derrida, requires us to 
be humble before these asymmetrical différances, which become metaphors for 
mindfulness (Rappert, 2014), inviting us to develop new writing and research 
strategies that pay tribute to the ineffable dimensions of meditative experience. 
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